This thesis is an interdisciplinary study of the aesthetics of movement in Gilles Deleuze’s writings and in Merce Cunningham’s choreographies. But it is also a study of the movement that arises when the two meet in a series of variations, where also their respective working partners Félix Guattari and John Cage enter. It is a textual happening where the random juxtaposition between seemingly unrelated areas, philosophy and dance, gives rise to arbitrary connections. It is a textual machine, composed of seven parts. First, the methodological architecture of the juxtaposition is introduced and it is shown how this relates to the materials (the philosophy of Deleuze and the aesthetics of Cunningham), the relation between the materials, and the respective contexts of the materials. The presence of movement in Deleuze’s thinking is then presented and the figure of immobile movement is defined. This figure is a leitmotif of the analyses. It is argued that this figure of immobile movement is not only a stylistic element but has implications on a philosophical level, implications that materialise in Deleuze’s texts. Then follow four parts that build a heterogeneous whole. The analysis of movement is continued through four juxtapositions of particular texts and particular choreographies. Through these juxtapositions, different aspects of movement appear and are discussed: the relation between movement and sensation, movement in interaction with other arts, movement as a means of taking the body to its limit, movement as transformation. Through these analyses, the aesthetics of Cunningham is put into new contexts. The analyses also put into relief Deleuze’s use of figures of movement, and these suddenly acquire another kind of importance. In the seventh and concluding part, all this is brought into play.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2008. / Vita. Advisor : James Egan. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-268).

Critical theory has historically situated the beginning of the “modern” era of subjectivity near the end of the seventeenth century. Michel Foucault himself once said in an interview that modernity began with the writings of the late seventeenth-century philosopher Benedict Spinoza. But an examination of early modern English utopian literature demonstrates that a modern notion of subjectivity can be found in texts that pre-date Spinoza. In this dissertation, I examine four utopian texts—Thomas More’s Utopia, Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis, Margaret Cavendish’s Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World, and Henry Neville’s Isle of Pines—through the paradigm of Jacques Lacan’s tripartite model of subjectivity—the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real. To mediate between Lacan’s psychoanalytic model and the historical aspects of these texts, such as their relationship with print culture and their engagement with political developments in seventeenth-century England, I employ the theories of the Marxist-Lacanian philosopher, Slavoj Žižek, to show that “early modern” subjectivity is in in fact no different from critical theory’s “modern” subject, despite pre-dating the supposed inception of such subjectivity. In addition, I engage with other prominent theorists, including Fredric Jameson, Jacques Derrida, and Donna Haraway, to come to an understanding about the ways in which critical theory can be useful to understand not only early modern literature, but also the contemporary, “real” world and the subjectivity we all seek to attain.

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This dissertation examines the conceptualization of the ideal society in Western culture in relation to changes in communication modes. The utopian discourse is defined by a concern with the relationship between language and reality. I explore this concern as a reflection of the theoretical disposition invited by changes in communication modes, which are perceived as crises of representation. Plato and Thomas More’s enlightened communities in the Republic and Utopia reflect comparable idealistic perspectives on education. In my view, this optimism stems from the social reality of growing literacies with the advent of the alphabet and printing, respectively. I contend that these writers are animated by an ethical impulse to teach their readers that language is representation. From the vantage point of this knowledge, each individual may employ language symbolically in order to create and perpetuate a moral and spiritual mode of thought. I argue that the discourse of the ideal is the symbolic expression of humanity’s engagement with death, the ultimate existential concern made acute by the aspect of historical discontinuity in the crisis of representation. Plato and More exhibit comparable efforts to open to their readers the superior space of critical reflexivity which they themselves inhabit. From this conceptual, pre-representational space of conscious choice, language is subjected to achieving spiritual progress. I introduce the concept of post-utopia, which describes a pragmatic moment when the relationship between author and the ideal society is brought into the foreground and reinforced as a way of addressing concerns with textual authority. I examine these developments in Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, François Rabelais’s episode of the Abbaye de Thélème in Gargantua, and Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis. These authors draw on the ideologies of representation inherent in utopian discourse, and position the authorial figure as link between scriptural teleology and history, ensuring spiritual and societal betterment in the textual cultures of late antiquity and early modernity. The figure of the author emerges as a symbol of history and of man’s ability to assume the limits of the mind and of language.

This dissertation examines the conceptualization of the ideal society in Western culture in relation to changes in communication modes. The utopian discourse is defined by a concern with the relationship between language and reality. I explore this concern as a reflection of the theoretical disposition invited by changes in communication modes, which are perceived as crises of representation. Plato and Thomas More’s enlightened communities in the Republic and Utopia reflect comparable idealistic perspectives on education. In my view, this optimism stems from the social reality of growing literacies with the advent of the alphabet and printing, respectively. I contend that these writers are animated by an ethical impulse to teach their readers that language is representation. From the vantage point of this knowledge, each individual may employ language symbolically in order to create and perpetuate a moral and spiritual mode of thought. I argue that the discourse of the ideal is the symbolic expression of humanity’s engagement with death, the ultimate existential concern made acute by the aspect of historical discontinuity in the crisis of representation. Plato and More exhibit comparable efforts to open to their readers the superior space of critical reflexivity which they themselves inhabit. From this conceptual, pre-representational space of conscious choice, language is subjected to achieving spiritual progress. I introduce the concept of post-utopia, which describes a pragmatic moment when the relationship between author and the ideal society is brought into the foreground and reinforced as a way of addressing concerns with textual authority. I examine these developments in Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, François Rabelais’s episode of the Abbaye de Thélème in Gargantua, and Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis. These authors draw on the ideologies of representation inherent in utopian discourse, and position the authorial figure as link between scriptural teleology and history, ensuring spiritual and societal betterment in the textual cultures of late antiquity and early modernity. The figure of the author emerges as a symbol of history and of man’s ability to assume the limits of the mind and of language.

The thesis traces the evolving attitudes towards rhetoric in the highly-rhetorised English-language prose of the late sixteenth century by focusing on a term that was itself subject to significant change: 'wit'. To wit's pre-existing denotations of intellectual acumen, capacity for reason and good judgement was added a novel meaning, related to the capacity for producing lively speech. As a term encompassing widely divergent meanings, many Elizabethan and early Stuart works explored 'wit' as a central theme or treated the term as significant to explorations of the human mind, its capacity for rhetoric, and the social and moral dimensions of this relationship. The research centres on how 'wit' is seen and how it corresponds to rhetorical wittiness as produced in practice, and questions the implications of this for understanding the social and moral dimensions of the authorial wit. By focusing on the early vernacular manuals of rhetoric by author such as Thomas Wilson and Roger Ascham, on Lyly's and Greene's euphuist prose, and on Thomas Lodge's and Sir Philip Sidney's prose defences of poetry, the first half of the thesis explores the term's conceptual ambiguity. Potentially both reformative and deceptive, this ambiguity becomes a useful tool for the author looking to construct a profitable persona as a Wit, or a brilliant-yet-unruly master of rhetoric. The second half of the research notes how 'wit' tends to outlive its usefulness as a multivalent term in later writings when these seek to move away from the social commodification of an author's rhetoric. Examining Sidney's theological and political aims in The New Arcadia, Thomas Nashe's carnivalesque questioning of the idea of profit, and Francis Bacon's systematic interpretation of Nature, the research suggests that rhetoric and 'wit' maintain both their significance and their ambiguity into the seventeenth century. A meta-rhetorical signpost, 'wit' comes to reflect through its use and disuse both the issues at hand and the inherent self-reflexivity of any attempt to deal directly with rhetoric.

This thesis explores the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy (the study of nature or body) and theology (the study of the divine) in seventeenth-century England. Early modern disciplines had two essential functions. First, they set the rules and boundaries of argument – knowledge was therefore legitimised and made intelligible within disciplinary contexts. And second, disciplines structured pedagogy, parcelling knowledge so it could be studied and taught. This dual role meant disciplines were epistemic and social structures. They were composed of various elements, and consequently, they related to one another in a variety of complex ways. As such, the contestability of early modern knowledge was reflected in contestability of disciplines – their content and boundaries. Francis Bacon, Thomas White, Henry More and John Locke are the focus of the four chapters respectively, with Joseph Glanvill, Thomas Hobbes, other Cambridge divines, and a variety of medieval scholastic authors providing context, comparison and reinforcement. These case studies offer a cross-section of seventeenth-century thought and belief; they embody different professional and institutional interests, and represent an array of philosophical, theological and religious positions. Nevertheless, each of them, in different ways, and to different effect, put the relationship between natural philosophy and theology at the heart of their intellectual endeavours. Together, they demonstrate that, in seventeenth-century England, natural philosophy and theology were in flux, and that their disciplinary relationship was complex, entailing degrees of overlap and alienation. Primarily, natural philosophy and theology investigated the nature and constitution of the world, and, together, determined the relationship between its constituent parts – natural and divine. However, they also reflected the scope of man’s cognitive faculties, establishing which bits of the world were knowable, and outlining the grounds for, and appropriate degrees of, certainty and belief. Thus, both disciplines, and their relationship with one another, contributed to broad discussions about, truth, certainty and opinion. This, in turn, established normative guidelines. To some extent, the rightness or wrongness of belief and behaviour was determined by particular definitions of, and relationship between, natural philosophy and theology. Consequently, man’s place in the world – his relationship with nature, God and his fellow man – was triangulated through these disciplines.

Aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, les historiens des sciences associaient généralement Francis Bacon et Galilée pour leur rôle dans l’émergence de la science moderne, mais, à la fin du XIXe et au début du XXe siècle, la Révolution scientifique fut identifiée de manière stricte à la construction de la physique mathématique, ce qui eut souvent pour conséquence de rejeter Bacon hors de l’histoire des sciences. Nous reprenons l’étude conjointe de ces deux auteurs pour mesurer quelle est exactement la nature de leur divergence. Dans la première partie de notre travail, nous abordons les questions cosmologiques. Sur quels arguments Galilée fonde-t-il sa défense publique du copernicianisme entre 1610 et 1616, jusqu’à la première condamnation de l’opinion copernicienne par l’Eglise Catholique ? Pour quelles raisons Bacon, qui suit cette campagne copernicienne, rejette-t-il la plupart des découvertes astronomiques de Galilée ? Pourquoi Bacon, tout en réussissant à percevoir le caractère (trop peu) systématique du géocentrisme, refuse-t-il l’héliocentrisme ? Dans la deuxième partie de notre travail, nous abordons les questions relatives à la méthode, ainsi que les théories de la matière et du mouvement. Quel est le rôle de la perception sensible et la fonction des mathématiques dans les théories de Bacon ? Quelle est la signification de sa théorie du mouvement, qui multiplie les objets d’étude en proposant une typologie des différents mouvements concrets, alors que la physique mathématique tend à réduire tout déplacement au seul mouvement linéaire inertiel ? Quelle est la fonction de l’atomisme mathématique de Galilée ? Dans quelle mesure sa science du mouvement se distingue-t-elle de l’approche baconienne ? La différence fondamentale entre la science galiléenne et la démarche de Bacon consiste, selon nous, dans la nature des expériences et des observations qui sont convoquées, ainsi que dans le type d’abstraction que ces deux auteurs veulent conférer à la philosophie naturelle. / During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, historians of science usually considered that Francis Bacon and Galileo had respectively played their role in the merging of modern science, but, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, Scientific Revolution has been strictly reduced to the elaboration of mathematical physics, which had for consequence to exclude Bacon from the history of science. Our aim is to underline the exact nature of the difference between those two authors. In the first part, we deal with the cosmological problems. What arguments did Galileo produce to sustain his public commitment for the Copernican system, from 1610 to 1616, until the first condemnation of copernicanism by the Roman Church ? For what reasons did Bacon reject most of Galileo’s astronomical discoveries ? Why Bacon, who clearly perceived the fact that the geocentric theory lacked systematic character, refused heliocentrism ? In the second part, we deal with the methodological questions, we analyse matter theories and the science of motion. What is the role of sense perception and what is the fonction of mathematics in Bacon’s theories ? What is the significance of his theory of motion, which multiplies the objects of study, proposing a typology of concrete movements, while mathematical physics aims at reducing any motion to the rectilinear inertial movement ? What is the fonction of the mathematical atomism proposed by Galileo ? In what measure does his science of motion distinguish from the baconian approach ? We think that the fondamental difference between the science of Galileo and the theories of Bacon consists in the nature of the experiments and observations used, and in the type of abstraction they are looking for in natural philosophy.

Mémoire en recherche-création / Ce projet de recherche-création explore les avenues narratives d'une pensée de contrôle du corps par le sonore. Le travail de création réfléchira les mécanismes, les sentiments, les contraintes conscientes ou inconscientes de personnages face à l'environnement sonore urbain. Ces mécanismes, qu'ils soient intériorisés ou non par les personnages, permettront de penser le dispositif sonore, au sens de Foucault puis interprété par Agamben. Le dispositif crée, entre l'être sur lequel il agit et l'ensemble des dits et non-dits qu'il contient, un « processus de subjectivation », ou de « désubjectivation »: il se fait contrôle, s'organise en rapports de force. La partie création met en scène des personnages qui sont habités par des idéaux d'une libération du corps par la musique, que cette libération − ou son échec − soit spatiale, temporelle, sociale ou psychique. Ce travail se consacrera également à une analyse du recueil de Joséphine Bacon Un thé dans la toundra/ Nipishapui nete mushuat (2013) et du recueil L'Outre-vie (1979) de Marie Uguay. Ces autrices créent une dimension sonore et vocale évidente dans leurs poèmes, une sensibilité, voire une sursensibilité à l'ouïe − notamment par le teueikan (tambour) chez Bacon et par les « racines sonores » pour Uguay. Le son devient un vecteur qui permet de penser la subjectivité dans des possibles spatiaux et temporels simultanés que le corps paraît empêcher. R. Murray Schafer nomme « schizophonie » la séparation de la source d'émission du son par sa reproduction, par la multiplication des enregistrements. Ce rapport différé à la musique produite à distance du corps des musiciens − s'il s'agit de musique instrumentale − joue un rôle dans ce réseau de rapports de force, dans ce dispositif qui nous intéresse. Les sources sonores se sont aujourd'hui multipliées et apparaissent, par l'enregistrement, souvent déplacées et séparées de leur contexte de production original. Comment penser ces effets de décontextualisation? Le travail de création s'intéressera aux modalités et aux effets d'une voix énonciative travaillée par ces diverses représentations d'un corps qui entend, récepteur de réalités différées, d'une pensée du corps disséminé. Pour parler non pas seulement d'écoute, mais plutôt de ce que qui l'excède, de ce vers quoi tend l'écriture poétique: possibilité de l'écoute de l'autre, ou de l'écoute de ce qui est autre. / This research-creation M.A. thesis explores the narrative avenues of the impacts of sound and its effects to control the body. The creative writing work will show the mechanisms, feelings, and the conscious or unconscious constraints that are facing different characters with the urban soundscape. Those mechanisms, whether they are interiorized or not by the characters, will open a reflexion on the dispositif, as imagined by Foucault and later interpreted by Agamben. The dispositif (or apparatus) creates, between the subjectivity on which it acts and all of the contents it holds hidden or unhidden, a « process of subjectification » or « desubjectification »: it organizes, it creates a network of forces upon the subject. Bruit blanc, the creative writing work of this thesis, places characters that are hunted by ideals of a liberation of the body by music, whether this liberation − or its failure − is spatial, temporal, social or psychic. This work will also give space to an analysis of two poetry booklets: Un thé dans la toundra/ Nipishapui nete mushuat (2013) by Joséphine Bacon and L'Outre-vie (1979) by Marie Uguay. Those authors create upon reading a sonic and vocal dimension, a sensibility − even a hypersensibility − to hearing, especially through the teueikan in Bacon's poems and through racines sonores (« sound roots ») for Uguay. Their books present many esthetical and philosophical considerations on hearing as a physical and physiological phenomenon: sound becomes a vector throughout which we can imagine subjectivity in unsettling spatial and temporal possibilities that the body seems to forbid. R.Murray Schafer names « schizophonia » the splitting between what makes the sound and what transmits it which comes with the proliferation of recording technologies. This delayed connection to music that can be produced far from the bodies of musicians (when concerning instrumental music) plays a role in this network of forces, in this apparatus that keeps our interest. How can we think those effects of decontextualisation? Bruit blanc embodies the modalities and the effects of an enunciative voice that lives with different representations of a body hearing as a receptor of delayed realities, allowing to imagine the body in unquieting ways;to think about the possibility of listening to others, and to the listening of otherness.