International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 30-November 02, 1995 / Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada / The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is developing new Theater Missile Defense (TMD) weapon systems to defend against the rapidly expanding ballistic missile threat. The tactical ballistic missile threats include systems with range capabilities greater than 1000 kilometers. The development and testing of systems such as the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3), the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Navy Area Defense, and the System Integration Tests (SIT) to address the interoperability of this family of systems, will require the development of the Transportable Range Augmentation and Control System for Multiple Shot Engagements (TRACS - MSE). Congress has mandated that these systems be tested in multiple simultaneous engagements. These systems will be tested at several ranges to meet all the developmental and operational testers' needs. Potential range locations include White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR), the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) and the Gulf Range at Eglin Air Force Base. Due to the long distances separating the target launch site and the interceptor site, the TRACS - MSE will be required at multiple sites for each range used. To be cost effective, transportable systems should be developed to augment existing capabilities. Advances in Global Positioning System (GPS) technology and high data rate receivers make telemetry based solutions attractive. This article will address the requirements for range safety, for Time, Space, Position Information (TSPI) collection and processing requirements to support a TRACS - MSE capability.

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 28-31, 1996 / Town and Country Hotel and Convention Center, San Diego, California / The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is developing new Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) weapon systems to defend against the expanding ballistic missile threat. In the arms control arena, theater ballistic missile threats have been defined to include systems with reentry velocities up to five kilometers per second and strategic ballistic missile threats have reentry velocities that exceed five kilometers per second. The development and testing of TMD systems such as the Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) Lower Tier, and NMD systems such as the Army Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle and the Army Ground-Based Radar, pose exceptional challenges that stem from extreme acquisition range and high telemetry data transfer rates. Potential Central Pacific range locations include U.S. Army Kwajalien Atoll/Kwajalein Missile Range (USAKA/KMR) and the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) with target launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Wake Island, Aur Atoll, Johnston Island, and, possibly, an airborne platform. Safety considerations for remote target launches dictate utilization of high-data-rate, on-board instrumentation; technical performance measurement dictates transmission of focal plane array data; and operational requirements dictate intercepts at exoatmospheric altitudes and long slant ranges. The high gain, high data rate, telemetry acquisition requirements, coupled with loss of the upper S-band spectrum, may require innovative approaches to minimize electronic noise, maximize telemetry system gain, and fully utilize the limited S-band telemetry spectrum. The paper will address the emerging requirements and will explore the telemetry design trade space.

South Korea should join the US BMD in Northeast Asia. Application of Offensive Realism clearly shows that China is a potential threat to South Korea, and Seoul requires an alliance partner in order to counter the threat from the west. The immense latent power and offensive military capabilities of China, coupled with its nuclear strategic weapons render China as a potential threat to South Korean national security. No independent action from South Korea would be sufficient to balance against China, hence the need for an ally. The United States is already engaged in relative power maximization against China. In addition, its role as an offshore balancer and status as a regional hegemon in the western hemisphere makes the US the most ideal alliance partner for South Korea. The alliance with the US to balance against China cannot be built upon the existing ROK-US alliance, because the current status of the alliance has deteriorated. One of the key causes of alliance deterioration could be attributed to the unilateral American security assistance to South Korea. Seoul’s participation in the US BMD would solve the non-reciprocating role of South Korea found in the existing ROK-US alliance. Because the benefits from South Korea’s participation in the US BMD are great for Washington, Seoul would be able to secure the US as an alliance partner to balance against China. Keywords: US, South Korea, China, Ballistic Missile Defense, ROK-US Alliance, Offensive Realism.

<p>Abstract</p><p>The focus of this paper is to discuss ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and their impact on international relations. I have a profound interest in the correlation between technological innovation/improvement and changes in international politics. I have therefore chosen the impact of BMD on global politics as the subject of discussion in my paper.</p><p>I begin the discussion by describing the technological segment of Ballistic Missile Defense systems, after which I indulge in the political aspect of it. There are three primary actors in the field: the United States of America, China, Russia. These three are the main focus of the debate, though not the only ones. During the Cold War it was the USA and Russia which pursued BMDS with most vigor, with China keeping a close eye on their progress as well as initiating its own BMD program. The emergence of the “New World Order” in the aftermath of the Cold War resulted in restructuring and re-organizing of the countries` strategic thinking, interests as well as defenses. The strongly criticized 2002 US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 became the latest milestone in the sphere of strategic defenses. US withdrawal from the Treaty paves way for a new kind of arms race between the three major powers of today: USA, China, Russia.</p><p>My conclusion is that US policy regarding strategic defenses is completely unacceptable. The US quest for “invulnerability”, by many experts seen as futile, is extremely dangerous and just another proof that USA continues to relentlessly pursue complete global military, political and economic domination. The international community, with China and Russia leading, must not ignore US strategic defense ambitions and it must act today. Tomorrow might be too late.</p>

Beginning in the 1990s, the United States and Japan began redefining their bilateral security alliance. This redefinition also prompted Japan to change its security policies. To what extent and in what ways have changes in the U.S.-Japan security alliance contributed to these changes? I argue that these changes are the result of negotiations of the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century, signed on April 17, 1996, and the occurrence of an exogenous event. I also argue that the negotiated changes only progress to a certain point, at which time an exogenous event acts as a catalyst to continue change. I examine two cases of policy change associated with exogenous events (the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis). Finally, I summarize my results that Japan was able to change its security policies through negotiations and through a series of systematic steps that follow a consistent trajectory of change; but exogenous events have continued the change that started as a result of the negotiations and the systematic steps. / Master of Arts

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 28-31, 1996 / Town and Country Hotel and Convention Center, San Diego, California / This paper reviews the performance requirements that provided the baseline for development of the onboard data system, RF transmission system, and ground segment receiving system of the Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) spacecraft. The onboard Command and Data Handling (C&DH) System was designed to support the high data outputs of the three imaging sensor systems onboard the spacecraft and the requirement for large volumes of data storage. Because of the high data rates, it was necessary to construct a dedicated X-band ground receiver system at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) and implement a tape recorder system for recording and downlinking sensor and spacecraft data. The system uses two onboard tape recorders to provide redundancy and backup capabilities. The storage capability of each tape recorder is 54 gigabits. The MSX C&DH System can record data at 25 Mbps or 5 Mbps. To meet the redundancy requirements of the high-priority experiments, the data can also be recorded in parallel on both tape recorders. To provide longer onboard recording, the data can also be recorded serially on the two recorders. The reproduce (playback) mode is at 25 Mbps. A unique requirement of the C&DH System is to multiplex and commutate the different output rates of the sensors and housekeeping signals into a common data stream for recording. The system also supports 1-Mbps real-time sensor data and 16-kbps real-time housekeeping data transmission to the dedicated ground site and through the U.S. Air Force Satellite Control Network ground stations. The primary ground receiving site for the telemetry is the MSX Tracking System (MTS) at APL. A dedicated 10-m X-band antenna is used to track the satellite during overhead passes and acquire the 25-Mbps telemetry downlinks, along with the 1-Mbps and 16-kbps real-time transmissions. This paper discusses some of the key technology trade-offs that were made in the design of the system to meet requirements for reliability, performance, and development schedule. It also presents some of the lessons learned during development and the impact these lessons will have on development of future systems.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Many potential adversaries seek, or already have theater ballistic missiles capable of threatening targets of interest to the United States. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency and armed forces are developing and fielding missile interceptors carried by many different platforms, including ships, aircraft, and ground units. Given some exigent threat, the U.S. must decide where to position defensive platforms and how they should engage potential belligerent missile attacks. To plan such defenses, the Navy uses its Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) system afloat and ashore, the Air Force has its Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) used in air operations centers, and the Missile Defense Agency uses the Commander's Analysis and Planning Simulation (CAPS). AADC uses a server farm to exhaustively enumerate potential enemy launch points, missiles, threatened targets, and interceptor platform positions. TBMCS automates a heuristic cookie-cutter overlay of potential launch fans by defensive interceptor envelopes. Given a complete missile attack plan and a responding defense, CAPS assesses the engagement geometry and resulting coverage against manually prepared attack scenarios and defense designs. We express the enemy courses of action as a mathematical optimization to maximize expected damage, and then show how to optimize our defensive interceptor pre-positioning to minimize the maximum achievable expected damage. We can evaluate exchanges where each of our defending platform locations and interceptor commitments are hidden from, or known in advance by the attacker. Using a laptop computer we can produce a provably optimal defensive plan in minutes. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

Includes supplemental material. / Based on public law and Presidential mandate, ballistic missile defense development is a front-burner issue for homeland defense and the defense of U.S. and coalition forces abroad. Spearheaded by the Missile Defense Agency, an integrated ballistic missile defense system was initiated to create a layered defense composed of land-, air-, sea-, and space-based assets. The Ship Anti-Ballistic Response (SABR) Project is a systems engineering approach that suggests a conceptualized system solution to meet the needs of the sea portion of ballistic missile defense in the 2025-2030 timeframe. The system is a unique solution to the sea-based ballistic missile defense issue, combining the use of a railgun interceptor and a conformable aperture skin-of-the-ship radar system.

The high costs and political tensions associated with Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (BMDS) has driven much of the testing and evaluation of BMDS to be performed through high fidelity Modeling and Simulation (M&S). In response, the M&S environments have become highly complex, extremely computationally intensive, and far too slow to be of use to systems engineers and high level decision makers. Regression models can be used to map the system characteristics to the metrics of interest, bringing about large quantities of data and allowing for real-time interaction with high-fidelity M&S environments, however the abundance of discontinuities and non-unique solutions makes the application of regression techniques hazardous. Due to these ambiguities, the transfer function from the characteristics to the metrics appears to have multiple solutions for a given set of inputs, which combined with the multiple inputs yielding the same set of outputs, causes troubles in creating a mapping. Due to the abundance of discontinuities, the existence of a neural network mapping from the system attributes to the performance metrics is not guaranteed, and if the mapping does exist, it requires a large amount of data to be for creating a regression model, making regression techniques less suitable to BMDS analysis. By employing Nested Neural Networks (NNNs), intermediate data can be associated with an ambiguous output which can allow for a regression model to be made. The addition of intermediate data incorporates more knowledge of the design space into the analysis. Nested neural networks divide the design space to form a piece-wise continuous function, which allows for the user to incorporate system knowledge into the surrogate modeling process while reducing the size of a data set required to form the regression model. This thesis defines nested neural networks along with methods and techniques for using NNNs to relieve the effects of discontinuities and non-unique solutions. To show the benefit of the approach, these techniques are applies them to a BMDS simulation. Case studies are performed to optimize the system configurations and assess robustness which could not be done without the regression models.

Abstract The focus of this paper is to discuss ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and their impact on international relations. I have a profound interest in the correlation between technological innovation/improvement and changes in international politics. I have therefore chosen the impact of BMD on global politics as the subject of discussion in my paper. I begin the discussion by describing the technological segment of Ballistic Missile Defense systems, after which I indulge in the political aspect of it. There are three primary actors in the field: the United States of America, China, Russia. These three are the main focus of the debate, though not the only ones. During the Cold War it was the USA and Russia which pursued BMDS with most vigor, with China keeping a close eye on their progress as well as initiating its own BMD program. The emergence of the “New World Order” in the aftermath of the Cold War resulted in restructuring and re-organizing of the countries` strategic thinking, interests as well as defenses. The strongly criticized 2002 US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 became the latest milestone in the sphere of strategic defenses. US withdrawal from the Treaty paves way for a new kind of arms race between the three major powers of today: USA, China, Russia. My conclusion is that US policy regarding strategic defenses is completely unacceptable. The US quest for “invulnerability”, by many experts seen as futile, is extremely dangerous and just another proof that USA continues to relentlessly pursue complete global military, political and economic domination. The international community, with China and Russia leading, must not ignore US strategic defense ambitions and it must act today. Tomorrow might be too late.