International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 30-November 02, 1995 / Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada / The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is developing new Theater Missile Defense (TMD) weapon systems to defend against the rapidly expanding ballistic missile threat. The tactical ballistic missile threats include systems with range capabilities greater than 1000 kilometers. The development and testing of systems such as the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3), the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Navy Area Defense, and the System Integration Tests (SIT) to address the interoperability of this family of systems, will require the development of the Transportable Range Augmentation and Control System for Multiple Shot Engagements (TRACS - MSE). Congress has mandated that these systems be tested in multiple simultaneous engagements. These systems will be tested at several ranges to meet all the developmental and operational testers' needs. Potential range locations include White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR), the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) and the Gulf Range at Eglin Air Force Base. Due to the long distances separating the target launch site and the interceptor site, the TRACS - MSE will be required at multiple sites for each range used. To be cost effective, transportable systems should be developed to augment existing capabilities. Advances in Global Positioning System (GPS) technology and high data rate receivers make telemetry based solutions attractive. This article will address the requirements for range safety, for Time, Space, Position Information (TSPI) collection and processing requirements to support a TRACS - MSE capability.

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 28-31, 1996 / Town and Country Hotel and Convention Center, San Diego, California / The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is developing new Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) weapon systems to defend against the expanding ballistic missile threat. In the arms control arena, theater ballistic missile threats have been defined to include systems with reentry velocities up to five kilometers per second and strategic ballistic missile threats have reentry velocities that exceed five kilometers per second. The development and testing of TMD systems such as the Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) Lower Tier, and NMD systems such as the Army Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle and the Army Ground-Based Radar, pose exceptional challenges that stem from extreme acquisition range and high telemetry data transfer rates. Potential Central Pacific range locations include U.S. Army Kwajalien Atoll/Kwajalein Missile Range (USAKA/KMR) and the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) with target launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Wake Island, Aur Atoll, Johnston Island, and, possibly, an airborne platform. Safety considerations for remote target launches dictate utilization of high-data-rate, on-board instrumentation; technical performance measurement dictates transmission of focal plane array data; and operational requirements dictate intercepts at exoatmospheric altitudes and long slant ranges. The high gain, high data rate, telemetry acquisition requirements, coupled with loss of the upper S-band spectrum, may require innovative approaches to minimize electronic noise, maximize telemetry system gain, and fully utilize the limited S-band telemetry spectrum. The paper will address the emerging requirements and will explore the telemetry design trade space.

This thesis analyses the policy debate surrounding National Missile Defense in the US during the 1990s from the framework of strategic intelligence failure. It focuses on the Congressional reaction to the release of the national intelligence estimate "NIE 95-19: Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years" and the establishment of a new interpretation of foreign ballistic missile threats to the continental US. The role that partisan politics plays in the oversight of the US intelligence community is a vital and inescapable one. Yet little academic investigation has been devoted to understanding the political nature of intelligence oversight and its potentially catastrophic impact on intelligence product. Instead most of the scholarly literature treats intelligence and its oversight as apolitical, objective processes and intelligence failures as 'sins' produced by human error or organisational dysfunction with little analysis of the essentially subjective nature of political debate. The debate between the Clinton Administration and the Republican Congress can be understood as a conflict between two competing policy frames, each giving their holders a subjective assessment of what threats the US faced from ballistic missiles. Both parties sought to use their competing power over the intelligence community to produce community support for their paradigm and undermine support for that of their rival. The production and release of NIE 95-19 highlighted these competing claims. The unambiguous nature of the NIE's threat projections caused Congress to wield its oversight powers in an ultimately successful attempt to overturn the findings of the NIE. This represented an unprecedented level of Congressional involvement in strategic intelligence interpretation. Most importantly however it highlights the inherent dichotomy produced by current conceptions of strategic intelligence failure. In building a system of oversight that protected US strategic intelligence from certain apparent sources of failure the ability for Congress to actively meddle in the production of strategic intelligence and arguably undermine the value of long-term projections such as the NIE were massively increased.

This thesis analyzes the Western missile defense initiatives and their role in Russia&#039 / s relations with NATO and the U.S. The main question of this thesis is whether the Western missile defense initiatives have paved the way for a new era of cooperation between Russia and the West or not. The main argument of this thesis is that Russia has failed to collaborate with NATO in a meaningful manner on missile defense issue as Russia has not adjusted its security policies and nuclear strategy, which are still based on the Cold War thinking, to the changing conditions of global security in the post Cold War era. The missile defense initiatives have a negative impact on the relations between Russia and the West due to the intransigent stance of Russia on this issue. A robust cooperation can only be achieved between Russia and NATO if Moscow changes its Cold War mentality about global security issues.

South Korea should join the US BMD in Northeast Asia. Application of Offensive Realism clearly shows that China is a potential threat to South Korea, and Seoul requires an alliance partner in order to counter the threat from the west. The immense latent power and offensive military capabilities of China, coupled with its nuclear strategic weapons render China as a potential threat to South Korean national security. No independent action from South Korea would be sufficient to balance against China, hence the need for an ally. The United States is already engaged in relative power maximization against China. In addition, its role as an offshore balancer and status as a regional hegemon in the western hemisphere makes the US the most ideal alliance partner for South Korea. The alliance with the US to balance against China cannot be built upon the existing ROK-US alliance, because the current status of the alliance has deteriorated. One of the key causes of alliance deterioration could be attributed to the unilateral American security assistance to South Korea. Seoul’s participation in the US BMD would solve the non-reciprocating role of South Korea found in the existing ROK-US alliance. Because the benefits from South Korea’s participation in the US BMD are great for Washington, Seoul would be able to secure the US as an alliance partner to balance against China. Keywords: US, South Korea, China, Ballistic Missile Defense, ROK-US Alliance, Offensive Realism.

The research explain because of the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, the United States suffers the threat of mass destruction weapons. For maintaining the hegemony position of the United States in global region, the United States announces the missile defense project to protect American mainland and the overseas garrison forces security. In the Asia-Pacific region, North Korea lunches the Taep¡¦o-dong 1 ballistic missile in 1998. The United States and Japan cooperate to develop Theater Missile Defense to respond the threat that may suffer from North Korea. China feels anxiety about United States and Japan strength their military relationship. China explains Theater Missile Defense is unstable for Asia-Pacific region. Theater Missile Defense will decrease China strategic nuclear weapon ability. Facing the Taiwan may join the Theater Missile Defense, China is strong objection. Taiwan is one part of China. China puts forward reactions. Militarily, China also understands to develop anti-system weapon is rather important. As increase the ballistic missile, enhance the nuclear weapon and develop the missile defense ability. In addition to enhancing self military force, through the performance of diplomacy and participate in multilateral organizations to reach consociations front of the objection the United States. Keywords: Weapons of Mass Destruction Taep¡¦o-dong 1 ballistic missile Minimum Deterence Theater Missile Defense

<p>Abstract</p><p>The focus of this paper is to discuss ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and their impact on international relations. I have a profound interest in the correlation between technological innovation/improvement and changes in international politics. I have therefore chosen the impact of BMD on global politics as the subject of discussion in my paper.</p><p>I begin the discussion by describing the technological segment of Ballistic Missile Defense systems, after which I indulge in the political aspect of it. There are three primary actors in the field: the United States of America, China, Russia. These three are the main focus of the debate, though not the only ones. During the Cold War it was the USA and Russia which pursued BMDS with most vigor, with China keeping a close eye on their progress as well as initiating its own BMD program. The emergence of the “New World Order” in the aftermath of the Cold War resulted in restructuring and re-organizing of the countries` strategic thinking, interests as well as defenses. The strongly criticized 2002 US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 became the latest milestone in the sphere of strategic defenses. US withdrawal from the Treaty paves way for a new kind of arms race between the three major powers of today: USA, China, Russia.</p><p>My conclusion is that US policy regarding strategic defenses is completely unacceptable. The US quest for “invulnerability”, by many experts seen as futile, is extremely dangerous and just another proof that USA continues to relentlessly pursue complete global military, political and economic domination. The international community, with China and Russia leading, must not ignore US strategic defense ambitions and it must act today. Tomorrow might be too late.</p>

Zugl.: Bielefeld, Univ., Diss., 2007

Zugl.: Bielefeld, Univ., Diss., 2007

Beginning in the 1990s, the United States and Japan began redefining their bilateral security alliance. This redefinition also prompted Japan to change its security policies. To what extent and in what ways have changes in the U.S.-Japan security alliance contributed to these changes? I argue that these changes are the result of negotiations of the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century, signed on April 17, 1996, and the occurrence of an exogenous event. I also argue that the negotiated changes only progress to a certain point, at which time an exogenous event acts as a catalyst to continue change. I examine two cases of policy change associated with exogenous events (the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis). Finally, I summarize my results that Japan was able to change its security policies through negotiations and through a series of systematic steps that follow a consistent trajectory of change; but exogenous events have continued the change that started as a result of the negotiations and the systematic steps. / Master of Arts