Beginning in the 1990s, the United States and Japan began redefining their bilateral security alliance. This redefinition also prompted Japan to change its security policies. To what extent and in what ways have changes in the U.S.-Japan security alliance contributed to these changes? I argue that these changes are the result of negotiations of the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century, signed on April 17, 1996, and the occurrence of an exogenous event. I also argue that the negotiated changes only progress to a certain point, at which time an exogenous event acts as a catalyst to continue change. I examine two cases of policy change associated with exogenous events (the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis). Finally, I summarize my results that Japan was able to change its security policies through negotiations and through a series of systematic steps that follow a consistent trajectory of change; but exogenous events have continued the change that started as a result of the negotiations and the systematic steps. / Master of Arts

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 28-31, 1996 / Town and Country Hotel and Convention Center, San Diego, California / This paper reviews the performance requirements that provided the baseline for development of the onboard data system, RF transmission system, and ground segment receiving system of the Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) spacecraft. The onboard Command and Data Handling (C&DH) System was designed to support the high data outputs of the three imaging sensor systems onboard the spacecraft and the requirement for large volumes of data storage. Because of the high data rates, it was necessary to construct a dedicated X-band ground receiver system at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) and implement a tape recorder system for recording and downlinking sensor and spacecraft data. The system uses two onboard tape recorders to provide redundancy and backup capabilities. The storage capability of each tape recorder is 54 gigabits. The MSX C&DH System can record data at 25 Mbps or 5 Mbps. To meet the redundancy requirements of the high-priority experiments, the data can also be recorded in parallel on both tape recorders. To provide longer onboard recording, the data can also be recorded serially on the two recorders. The reproduce (playback) mode is at 25 Mbps. A unique requirement of the C&DH System is to multiplex and commutate the different output rates of the sensors and housekeeping signals into a common data stream for recording. The system also supports 1-Mbps real-time sensor data and 16-kbps real-time housekeeping data transmission to the dedicated ground site and through the U.S. Air Force Satellite Control Network ground stations. The primary ground receiving site for the telemetry is the MSX Tracking System (MTS) at APL. A dedicated 10-m X-band antenna is used to track the satellite during overhead passes and acquire the 25-Mbps telemetry downlinks, along with the 1-Mbps and 16-kbps real-time transmissions. This paper discusses some of the key technology trade-offs that were made in the design of the system to meet requirements for reliability, performance, and development schedule. It also presents some of the lessons learned during development and the impact these lessons will have on development of future systems.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Many potential adversaries seek, or already have theater ballistic missiles capable of threatening targets of interest to the United States. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency and armed forces are developing and fielding missile interceptors carried by many different platforms, including ships, aircraft, and ground units. Given some exigent threat, the U.S. must decide where to position defensive platforms and how they should engage potential belligerent missile attacks. To plan such defenses, the Navy uses its Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) system afloat and ashore, the Air Force has its Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) used in air operations centers, and the Missile Defense Agency uses the Commander's Analysis and Planning Simulation (CAPS). AADC uses a server farm to exhaustively enumerate potential enemy launch points, missiles, threatened targets, and interceptor platform positions. TBMCS automates a heuristic cookie-cutter overlay of potential launch fans by defensive interceptor envelopes. Given a complete missile attack plan and a responding defense, CAPS assesses the engagement geometry and resulting coverage against manually prepared attack scenarios and defense designs. We express the enemy courses of action as a mathematical optimization to maximize expected damage, and then show how to optimize our defensive interceptor pre-positioning to minimize the maximum achievable expected damage. We can evaluate exchanges where each of our defending platform locations and interceptor commitments are hidden from, or known in advance by the attacker. Using a laptop computer we can produce a provably optimal defensive plan in minutes. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

In 2008 Russia surprised the West by going to war with Georgia. While several analyses have pointed to separate actions by NATO and the West as having influenced the 2008 war, this paper endeavors to show that the combined actions of the West and NATO since the fall of the Soviet Union created a security dilemma for Russia. Because the West refused to properly acknowledge and address Russia’s dilemma, the West inadvertently created the conditions which led to the culmination of Russia’s security dilemma in the form of an invasion of Georgia. Russia’s war with Georgia was less an attempt to protect Russian citizens and prevent atrocities as it was a rebuttal of Western actions. This thesis examines the security dilemma and cooperation theories as presented by Dr. Robert Jervis, and looks specifically at Western-Russian relations relating to three spheres: NATO expansion and Western marginalization of Russia, Western unilateral and extra-U.N. military aggression, and Western anti-ballistic missile defense initiatives and programs. Western actions relating to these three spheres created the conditions for the war, and specifics within the Caucasus region and relating to separatist conflicts drove Russia to deem a war with Georgia a politically safe rebuttal to the West. This paper also examines continued Western refusal to acknowledge Russia’s dilemma and developing conditions, as they relate to the three spheres of NATO expansion, unilateral military action and missile defenses, which could potentially lead to further conflict between Russia and the West. / text

Includes supplemental material. / Based on public law and Presidential mandate, ballistic missile defense development is a front-burner issue for homeland defense and the defense of U.S. and coalition forces abroad. Spearheaded by the Missile Defense Agency, an integrated ballistic missile defense system was initiated to create a layered defense composed of land-, air-, sea-, and space-based assets. The Ship Anti-Ballistic Response (SABR) Project is a systems engineering approach that suggests a conceptualized system solution to meet the needs of the sea portion of ballistic missile defense in the 2025-2030 timeframe. The system is a unique solution to the sea-based ballistic missile defense issue, combining the use of a railgun interceptor and a conformable aperture skin-of-the-ship radar system.

Med den nya omvärldsutvecklingen där NATO moderniserar sitt missilförsvar i Europa samt att Ryssland har placerat taktiska ballistiska robotar i Kaliningrad påverkade Sveriges behov till att anskaffa förmågan att bekämpa ballistiska robotar. Sverige har därför anskaffat Patriotsystemet, dock utan att tillföra ett radarsystem för att invisa ballistiska robotar till luftvärnsförbandet. Missilförsvar är ett väl utforskat område, allt från bekämpningsförlopp till hur en sensorkedja ska se ut. Forskningen tar däremot inte upp vilka förutsättningar ett nyanskaffat radarsystem behöver innefatta för att bidra till att invisa ballistiska robotar för luftvärnsförbanden. I uppsatsen genomfördes en modellering, teknisk analys, där teorin missilförsvar en kedja av event nyttjades för att härleda krav på radarprestanda. En analys om hur organisationerna idag nyttjar radarsystem och hur de tekniska och taktiska kraven påverkar organisationen genomfördes med konceptet militär nytta. Resultatet visar att organisationen där radarsystemet tillförs behövde kompletteras med ett sensorkompani och säkerhetsförband för att uppfylla kravet till invisning. Mot bakgrunden av det scenario som togs fram för undersökning visar den tekniska analysen att radarn vara fordonsburen samt ha en räckvidd på 500 km och en höjdtäckning på 50 km. Den måste även vara kompatibel med Patriotsystemet samt en sensorkedja för strategiskt partnerskap. / With the new developments in international affairs, where NATO modernizes its missile defense system in Europe and Russia has placed tactical ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad, Sweden needs to acquire the ability to combat ballistic missiles. Sweden has therefore acquired the Patriot system, however without adding an early warning radar for the Air defense against ballistic missile. Missile defense is a well-explored area, ranging from missile defense events to how a sensor chain should function. The research does not, however, discuss the abilities an acquired radar system needs to help guide ballistic missiles for Air defense units. In this essay, a modeling and a technical analysis based on the theory Missile defense a chain of events are used to conclude requirements for radar performance. An analysis of how the organizations use radar systems today and how the technical requirements affect the organizations was implemented with the concept Military utility. The result indicates the organization there the radar system will be implemented needs to be reinforced with a sensor company and a security unit to meet the requirement for guidance. The background of the scenario that has been developed for the analysis shows that the radar should be integrated to a vehicle, have a range of 500 kilometers and a height coverage of 50 kilometers. Battle management systems must also be compatible with the Patriot system and the sensor chain for strategic partnership.

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to explain why states obtain nuclear weapons and the role various</p><p>actors and interests play in the making of states´ nuclear policies. The main questions are as</p><p>follows: (1) What big theories exist concerning states obtaining nuclear weapon and nuclear</p><p>armament in International Relations and what relevance do they have of the post cold-war period?,</p><p>(2) What is the meaning of the perspective of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC)?, and (3)Are</p><p>there empirical studies which supports the existence of a MIC in the United States?</p><p>The focus lies on actors and driving forces that are internal to states and it is also important to</p><p>investigate if the theories have relevance for the post 9/11-era. The study uses the method of</p><p>qualitative literature-study with some quantitative segments. It is claimed that states might be</p><p>interested in justifying their behaviour in a morally appealing way and that real reasons may be</p><p>hidden. There are many reasons for states to obtain and keep nuclear weapons and related</p><p>technology (which includes many of the most lucrative elements of the arms industry´s sales).</p><p>Among this reasons are that arms and related technology may be used to influence other states and</p><p>nuclear weapons-construction and modernisation might be used to protect the state from external</p><p>threats, stop unwanted interference from other actors, secure job and gain recognition and prestige</p><p>in world politics. For security reasons states might hold onto their own nuclear weapons and try to</p><p>hinder other actors from getting access to them. The internal actors and driving forces we look at</p><p>are bureaucratic, economical and political, and the MIC-perspective. The military can be said to</p><p>have interests in as much resources and capabilities as possible, which includes advanced</p><p>weaponary such as nuclear weapons and related technologies, at its disposal because of the goal to</p><p>defend the state from all possible threats and for officers career reasons. Much of its influence is</p><p>said to come from its expert knowledge and position and it is said to be especially influential in</p><p>matters of foreign policy, military spending and foreign policy. The major economical actors</p><p>mentioned are big corporations involved in military spending and these have interests in</p><p>maximizing profits. Nuclear weapons making and maintenance and the related areas of missile</p><p>defense and delivering methods for nuclear weapons seem to be areas with high changes of being</p><p>profitable for the involved major companies. The actors wield influence for example through</p><p>lobbying and campaign contributions. An economic driving force claim is that state spending is</p><p>necessary for stimulating the economy and defense spending is easily justified in other ways.</p><p>Political actors and driving forces concerns politicians interest in promoting the interests of</p><p>supporting groups, there are indications that the weapon industry is such a group. Research have</p><p>shown various results about the extent politicians tend to further the interests of supporting groups.</p><p>The MIC-perspective talks about groups with interest in high levels of military spending. Most</p><p>researchers seem to agree that the complex exists but there are different opinions about what actors</p><p>belongs to it and its power on various issues. There is some mention of the core of the complex</p><p>consisting of such internal actors as mentioned above. MIC-related empirical research has been</p><p>conducted and this author finds that the MIC is a relevant analytical tool for the post cold war – and</p><p>9/11 era.</p>

The high costs and political tensions associated with Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (BMDS) has driven much of the testing and evaluation of BMDS to be performed through high fidelity Modeling and Simulation (M&S). In response, the M&S environments have become highly complex, extremely computationally intensive, and far too slow to be of use to systems engineers and high level decision makers. Regression models can be used to map the system characteristics to the metrics of interest, bringing about large quantities of data and allowing for real-time interaction with high-fidelity M&S environments, however the abundance of discontinuities and non-unique solutions makes the application of regression techniques hazardous. Due to these ambiguities, the transfer function from the characteristics to the metrics appears to have multiple solutions for a given set of inputs, which combined with the multiple inputs yielding the same set of outputs, causes troubles in creating a mapping. Due to the abundance of discontinuities, the existence of a neural network mapping from the system attributes to the performance metrics is not guaranteed, and if the mapping does exist, it requires a large amount of data to be for creating a regression model, making regression techniques less suitable to BMDS analysis. By employing Nested Neural Networks (NNNs), intermediate data can be associated with an ambiguous output which can allow for a regression model to be made. The addition of intermediate data incorporates more knowledge of the design space into the analysis. Nested neural networks divide the design space to form a piece-wise continuous function, which allows for the user to incorporate system knowledge into the surrogate modeling process while reducing the size of a data set required to form the regression model. This thesis defines nested neural networks along with methods and techniques for using NNNs to relieve the effects of discontinuities and non-unique solutions. To show the benefit of the approach, these techniques are applies them to a BMDS simulation. Case studies are performed to optimize the system configurations and assess robustness which could not be done without the regression models.

Abstract The focus of this paper is to discuss ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and their impact on international relations. I have a profound interest in the correlation between technological innovation/improvement and changes in international politics. I have therefore chosen the impact of BMD on global politics as the subject of discussion in my paper. I begin the discussion by describing the technological segment of Ballistic Missile Defense systems, after which I indulge in the political aspect of it. There are three primary actors in the field: the United States of America, China, Russia. These three are the main focus of the debate, though not the only ones. During the Cold War it was the USA and Russia which pursued BMDS with most vigor, with China keeping a close eye on their progress as well as initiating its own BMD program. The emergence of the “New World Order” in the aftermath of the Cold War resulted in restructuring and re-organizing of the countries` strategic thinking, interests as well as defenses. The strongly criticized 2002 US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 became the latest milestone in the sphere of strategic defenses. US withdrawal from the Treaty paves way for a new kind of arms race between the three major powers of today: USA, China, Russia. My conclusion is that US policy regarding strategic defenses is completely unacceptable. The US quest for “invulnerability”, by many experts seen as futile, is extremely dangerous and just another proof that USA continues to relentlessly pursue complete global military, political and economic domination. The international community, with China and Russia leading, must not ignore US strategic defense ambitions and it must act today. Tomorrow might be too late.

This thesis examines how corporations use North Korea’s media portrayal to profit. By gaining government contracts to develop weapons and missile defense systems, companies such as Lockheed Martin make billions of dollars. The thesis will examine how this is accomplished in three stages: first, by examining how soft power is generated and used to build a consensus. Then, government usage of soft power to rationalize North Korea as a threat is discussed. Finally, how corporations profit from government-authorized weapons programs will be detailed. The thesis will incorporate theory based off of the ideas of Joseph Nye, as well as geopolitical concepts promulgated by Michael Hardt. / Graduate