Over the last decades technological companies have grown significantly and impacted our societies both politically and economically.The significant amount of user data these companies collect and manage have economic as well as political impacts on our societies.  The busines model of social media companies has raised alerts and provoked calls for regulatory measures. The thesis investigated whether social media platforms ‘data’ can constitute a protected investment under a Bilateral Investment Treaty, and what is the position of the international investment law if any about the digital economy. The author made an analysis of data localization regulation to determine if tech companies can claim protection under a BIT to avoid potential issues of a domestic regulation. After the analysis of international legal instruments, BITs and scholar literature the results of the study concluded that data could constitute a protected investment under the wording of certain BITs.

We analyze the effect of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on bilateral foreign portfolio investment in equity and debt securities. We find that expropriation risk and the level of a BIT’s investor protection are complementary. Applying a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood model to a panel of 60 home and 39 host countries from 2002 to 2017, we find that host countries receive 40% more bilateral equity investment when they protect foreign investors with a BIT. This effect almost doubles when investment protection of BITs is strong, and the political risk of the host country is high.

This thesis contributes to a better understanding of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). The second Chapter investigates the potential downside of BITs on sovereign default risk. The legal risk of arbitral proceedings imposed by BITs might increase sovereign default risk. This risk channel is especially relevant in countries with low executive constraints. Even if a sovereign does not expropriate, there may be negative effects on sovereign bond prices. Thus, sovereign debt may become more expensive after a BIT signature. The third Chapter investigates how BITs affect foreign portfolio equity investment. BITs with strong investor protection increase bilateral portfolio equity investments in countries with high political risk. In low-risk countries, no effect is detected. Policymakers should consider their political risk when deciding on investment treaties. When the political risk is low, one cannot expect an investment-enhancing effect from BITs. The fourth Chapter encourages policymakers to comply with concluded investment treaties. The first arbitral proceeding permanently lowers the bilateral portfolio investments, even from countries not involved in the investment dispute. A conviction of the host state seriously deters foreign portfolio investors. However, initiating proceedings and decisions favoring the respondent state can also deter some portfolio investors. Concerning portfolio investments, policymakers should avoid arbitral proceedings as far as possible.

<p>Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash / Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries.</p>

The purpose of my thesis is to analyse Bilateral Investment Treaties between the EU and China. The question that passes through the entire work is whether there is indeed a homogeneous relationship in FDI between the EU and China as a whole, or whether the practice is rather different relationship with the EU members with some common and different elements. I have chosen the theme of this thesis because I am interested in investment relations, and China is a very attractive destination for the investment, that has from a European point of view its specific features. The thesis is composed of six chapters. In the chapter one I decided to take historical approach by researching the needs and motivations that inspired and influenced the emergence of the BIT program between the EU and China. From a historical approach to the development of FDI in China is obvious that the policy of FDI in China follows the national interests of China. From the beginning FDI was an unwanted tool for China that did not correspond with national policy, however it provided the necessary capital. Over time, China has changed its approach from receiving investment indiscriminately into the consistent direction of flow of FDI into desired sectors. The second chapter provides an analytical view of the current legal framework...

直覺上，跨國資本的自由流動對投資國與被投資國的經濟均有益處，亦可促使資源在國際間以更有效率的方式分配，增進雙方的福利。然而實際上被投資國卻對外來投資加以限制，並且須透過雙邊協商的方式移除此限制。因此，前述自由投資增進兩國福利的直覺似乎與既存的眾多雙邊投資協定相互矛盾。本文建立一基本的理論模型，考慮直接投資以及兩國的策略性投資政策，藉以說明 Nash Equilibrium 為兩國相互課稅，且無單邊降稅的動機。因此，只有透過雙邊簽署投資協定的方式共同降稅，方能消除課稅所產生的無謂損失。 / Intuitively, the free mobility of transnational capital not only benefits home countries and host countries, but also allocates resources globally in a more efficient way, which makes their welfare increase. However, host countries actually implement many restrictions on cross-border capital and try to remove these through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the intuition that free investment between two countries will increase their economic welfare seems to be contradictory to many existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This article provides a theoretical model with foreign driect investment (FDI) and strategic investment policies, first, as to explain the Nash Equilibrium is that two countries will tax investors' FDI behavior. Second, it explains both countries do not have any motivation to reduce taxes unilaterally. Therefore, only when these two countries decide to remove all restrictions on foreign capital mutually by signing bilateral investment treaties do they eliminate the deadweight loss which restraints bring about.

Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash;Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries. / Magister Legum - LLM

<p>Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash / Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries.</p>

A regulação direta ou indireta da transferência de tecnologia pelo Brasil desde o final da década de 50 do século XX nem sempre foi devidamente compreendida. O uso da tributação, com efeitos fiscais e extrafiscais, teve reflexos sobre a atuação do INPI e do Banco Centra do Brasil (BACEN) que permanecem até os dias de hoje, mas tinham como fundamento uma política industrial específica e a limitação dos seus efeitos no balanço de pagamentos do país. O Brasil nunca se fechou totalmente aos investidores estrangeiros, mas sempre utilizou limitações setoriais, posteriormente o registro do ingresso do capital estrangeiro e, por muito tempo, o desincentivo à sua saída por medidas limitadoras ou proibitivas de remessas de dividendos e royalties, até mesmo com o uso da extrafiscalidade. Como o país apenas recentemente realmente prioriza de forma geral a pesquisa e desenvolvimento (P&D) tecnológico, o que resulta em pouca tecnologia gerada internamente, os royalties devidos pelo uso da tecnologia das empresas transnacionais sempre foram objeto de crítica e, consequentemente, medidas limitadoras. Essa atuação regulatória representa um risco político aos investidores, com os acordos bilaterais de investimentos (BITs) sendo os tratados internacionais mais utilizados para afastá-lo. O Brasil, porém, apesar de ter assinado diversos deles, não possui nenhum em vigor. O confronto entre as cláusulas de proteção dos BITs e a política regulatória sobre a transferência de tecnologia e investimento estrangeiro que durante muito tempo vigorou no país representa um caso concreto extremamente interessante para avaliar a aplicação desses tratados e eventuais medidas que os violam, auxiliando, ainda, a compreensão de algumas das medidas regulatórias que permanecem em vigor. / The direct or indirect regulation of technology transfer in Brazil since the late 50s of the twentieth century was not always properly understood. The use of taxation, with fiscal and regulatory purposes, had an impact on the performance of the Brazilian PTO and the Central Bank of Brazil, which remains to this day, but was based on a specific industrial policy and the limitation of its effects on the balance of payments of the country. Brazil never completely closed its market to foreign investors, always using sectoral limitations, then the registration of foreign capital and for a long time the disincentive of its return by limiting or prohibiting profit and royalty remittances, even with the use of regulatory taxes. As the country only recently generally prioritizes technological research and development (R&D), resulting in low technology internally generated, the royalties due for the use of transnational corporations technology has always been an object of criticism and regulatory norms. This regulatory policy is a political risk to investors, with the bilateral investment agreements (BITs) being the international treaties most often used to circumvent it. Brazil, however, despite having signed several of them, has no one in force. The confrontation between the protection clauses of BITs and the regulatory policy on technology transfer and foreign investment that has long prevailed in the country represents an extremely interesting case to evaluate the implementation of these treaties and any measures that violate them, also helping to understand some of the regulatory measures that remain in force

Magister Legum - LLM (Mercantile and Labour Law) / Most developed countries that enjoy the lion's share of foreign investment do not have domestic legal frameworks on foreign direct investment. This is because investors are attracted by a holistic picture of these countries. Such countries have strong institutions of governance, enjoy political and economic stability, embrace democracy, have respect for rights, and have high levels of development - factors which attract investors. In terms of regulation, many of these countries are heavily reliant on bilateral investment treaties. However, this is not the case in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. The existence of an effective and efficient legal framework on the governance of foreign direct investment is an important consideration for investors. This emanates from the fact that developing countries often have weak legal systems, shaky economies and uncertain political environments.