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Background: Family-business is considered to be the most frequent and complex form of business organization around the world. However, recently there has been a large number of corporate scandals in such firms especially at the board level (e.g. Parmalat). Within the framework of two corporate governance models characterized by the Continental European and the Anglo-Saxon model, boards of directors hold a central position. This position becomes of great importance when talking about public companies and more specifically in public family-controlled companies. The concentration of ownership is the main characteristic of the Continental European, which is the most workable form of corporate governance for family-controlled business. Nevertheless, family-controlled companies acting under the Anglo-Saxon model have also been able to operate successfully. Therefore, we will investigate if there is a convergence of corporate governance in family-controlled companies across frontiers focusing mainly on boards’ structures and composition as well as ownership, and the sub-committees. Purpose: The overall purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of Corporate Governance in public Family-controlled firms which are in the Swedish and United Kingdom stock market. More specifically, investigate whether the boards’ structures and composition, as well as ownership and the existence of sub-committees show similarities or not in Family-controlled firms acting within the framework of an Anglo-Saxon and Continental model of Corporate Governance Method: A quantitative approach was used to fulfill the purpose of this thesis. Furthermore, the top 10 family-controlled companies with highest market-capitalization have been selected from both countries to constitute our sample. The empirical material was gathered mainly from the annual reports of the companies but also by contacting the companies by email or from articles in online newspapers. Conclusion: This study found that in some aspects of corporate governance convergence exists while in others it does not. Regarding board structures and composition, there is a convergence to “one tier board” and the presence of family members and employee representation in boards. On the other hand, when it comes to the sizes of the boards and number of independent directors in the boards we argue that convergence is not present.

Today, gender quotation in the Board of Directors has become an important political question that is being discussed not only in Sweden but in several other countries as well. However, research on gender diversity and, for that matter, other forms of diversity in the corporate world is not something new. Diversity in Board of Directors and Top Management Teams and how it affects firm performance have been the topic of many researches the last two decades. Nevertheless, there are still many unanswered questions in this field that need to be answered. The purpose of this dissertation is to study how diversity in BoDs and TMTs affect firm performance. We used five different diversity variables, tenure, age, education, nationality and gender in our research and we tested them separately to see how they each affect firm performance. Because there is limited previous research conducted on diversity in Sweden and on Swedish firms, this dissertation attempts to fill that gap. This study is conducted on Swedish firms that are listed on large cap on Stockholm stock exchange. We used several ways to measure the five different diversity variables in both BoDs and TMTs. Firm performance was measured by using two well established measurements, Return on Equity and Return on Assets. We developed ten hypotheses to test how diversity affects firm performance; some diversity variables had positive effect on firm performance, while others had negative effect. The hypotheses are based on earlier research. There are mixed results from our study; seven out of ten hypotheses had to be rejected due to insignificant relationship between diversity and firm performance. Three hypotheses were rejected, even though they showed a significant relationship between diversity and firm performance, because the relationship was the opposite of our hypotheses. One reason for these results can be that there is low diversity in both BoDs and TMTs, and this makes it difficult to measure and establish a relationship between diversity and firm performance.

This thesis aims to consider the debates in the field of corporate governance in the fact that there have been and will be dramatic changes in the structure of corporate activities, such as the nature of work and the organization of corporations, as well as the influences of reforms in the financial reforms. Moreover, the emergence of institutional investment in the financial markets, the process of globalization and the development of electronic commerce have the influences on the corporate governance both in Canada and in China. There is an immense magnitude of discussion on various aspects of corporate governance in the academic field. This thesis will focus on comparing two rather distinctive systems of corporate governance, with respect to three specific aspects of the corporate governance. Those are: the board of directors, the role of shareholders, the roles of banks and investors in the two countries, also the reforms in China. Moreover, the convergence of the two corporate governance systems is introduced. / Le présent mémoire vise à faire enquête sur de tels débats dans le domaine de gouvernance des sociétés pour le fait qu'il y a ou aura de changements dramatiques dans la structure des activités des sociétés, par exemple, la nature de travail et l'organisation des corporations, ainsi que les influences des réformes financières. De plus, l'émergence de l'investissement institutionnel dans Ie marché financier, la progression de globalisation et le developpement du commerce électronique ont d'influence sur gouvernance des sociétés tant au Canada qu'en Chine. II y a une magnitude immense de discussion sur les aspects variés de gouvernance des sociétés dans le domaine académique. Ce mémoire présente une étude de comparaison détaillée sur les deux systèmes différents de gouvernance des sociétés concernant trois aspects spéciaux de gouvernance des sociétés, y compris le conseil d'administration, les rôles des banques et les investisseurs dans les deux États, ainsi que les réformes en Chine, de plus, la convergence des deux systèmes de gouvernance des sociétés est introduite. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (LL.M.)"

Background: Female representation on boards is an ongoing debate. The European Parliament voted in November 2013 in favour of a proposal that it should be at least 40 percent women on company boards by 2020. Jens Spendrup, president of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, was interviewed on Swedish Radio in February 2014 and stated that there are not enough qualified women to recruit to the company boards. The listed companies in Sweden only have 22 percent of women in their company boards and given Jens Spendrup’s statement should they have difficulty reaching up to 40 percent by 2020. Nevertheless, the state-owned companies has shown that it is possible with a female representation of 50 percent. The question then is what the private companies are doing wrong? Aim: The study aims to investigate the recruitment process within listed companies and state-owned companies in Sweden to see if it affects the representation of women on corporate boards. This study intends to explain why female representation is so low in the private sector relative to the state sector. Methodology: The study is qualitative in nature where empirical data is primarily collected through interviews with representatives that have insight in the recruitment process in each sector. Theory and empirical data were alternately collected which implies an iterative approach. Conclusion: We have distinguished organizational differences in the recruitment process, which is crucial for female representation. Time and resources have been identified as key parameters and age as well as experience affects the selection of candidates. We also discovered that normative regulations do not work in the private sector and therefor there is a need for a mandatory regulation. / Bakgrund: Den kvinnliga representationen i bolagsstyrelser är en aktuell debatt. Europaparlamentet röstade i november 2013 ja till ett förslag att det ska vara minst 40 procent kvinnor i bolagsstyrelser senast år 2020. Jens Spendrup, ordförande i Svenskt Näringsliv, uttalade sig i Sveriges Radio i februari 2014 om att det inte finns tillräckligt med kompetenta kvinnor att rekrytera till bolagsstyrelser, vilket blev väldigt uppmärksammat i media. Som synes pågår debatten både nationellt och internationellt. Börsbolagen i Sverige har 22 procent kvinnor i sina bolagsstyrelser och med tanke på Jens Spendrups uttalande borde de ha svårt att nå 40 procent till år 2020. Dock har de statligt helägda bolagen visat att det är möjligt och har en kvinnlig representation på 50 procent. Frågan är då vad de privata bolagen gör för fel? Syfte: Studiens syfte är att undersöka rekryteringsprocessen inom börsbolag och statligt helägda bolag i Sverige för att se om den påverkar den kvinnliga representationen i bolagsstyrelserna. Denna studie ämnar att förklara varför kvinnlig representation är så låg inom den privata sektorn i förhållande till den statliga sektorn. Metod: Studien är av kvalitativ karaktär där empirin främst är insamlad genom intervjuer med representanter som har insyn i rekryteringsprocessen inom respektive sektor. Teori och empiri insamlades växelvis vilket innebär en iterativ ansats. Slutsats: Vi har i studien urskilt organisatoriska skillnader i rekryteringsprocessen vilket är avgörande för den kvinnliga representationen. Tid och resurser har identifierats som viktiga parametrar samt att ålder och erfarenhet spelar en viktig roll vid urvalet av kandidater. Vi konstaterar även att normativa regelverk inte fungerar på privat sektor och därmed finns behov av tvingande regelverk.

While the European Union is striving towards harmonization among the member countries, interlocks (connections) are a social phenomenon that has an implication on the Corporate Code but it is more implicitly pointed out with words like “other relevant information” or ”other significant board positions” that might affect the individual board member’s independence and ability to fully commit to the company. Although the board often is referred to as one single entity, it consists of many board members that individually can have an agenda that might deviate from all stakeholders’ goal. Every single director has a business network of social contacts, especially if they are elected to more than one company’s board. These individual directors create interlocks (links) between the firms they work for, and form a social network on company level, while the Code only recommends the companies to provide independence information and other significant assignments one by one as if they operate in solitude.   This exploratory study captures the corporate governance perspective about independence and the social networks of directors on supervisory corporate boards in Denmark, Finland and Sweden by investigating the interconnectedness of the directors and companies, and combines this data with the independence disclosure by companies.   We employed deductive approach and a quantitative archival research strategy based on secondary data from annual reports and corporate governance documents in a total of 150 companies to gather a sufficient database about the independence disclosure and the corporate networks.   We identified the most central companies and individuals in corporate framework, and found concentration of power to be evident. Identifying the director networks enabled us to focus on the structural aspects of the networks and what implications this has on the independence of the boards. Furthermore, this research analysed the disclosure independence by the companies and assessed, whether the current requirements on disclosure are adequate for their purpose.   We also found, contrary to our expectations, that the independence disclosure is not harmonized between the studied countries and therefore we assessed the disclosure by using insider-outsider theory. This showed that the current corporate codes do not capture the independence very accurately, and that harmonization of the codes in addition to insider-outsider theory would help the relevant stakeholders to get a “truer and fairer view” of the directors’ independence.   This study has been written especially the legislators in mind and suggests the use of insider-outsider -theory approach to the legislators for providing a more comprehensive and accurate view of the independence.

Bakgrund Små familjeägda aktiebolags styrelsesammansättning brukar kännetecknas av en överlappning mellan familjen och företaget. Små företag har ofta inte råd med det antal kompetenta styrelseledamöter som de har behov av och kan därmed gå miste om viktig information, kompetens och erfarenheter som en extern styrelseledamot kan bidra med. Vidare har tidigare forskning visat att externa styrelseledamöter kan tillföra ett främmande inslag i familjeföretaget vilket kan ge en känsla som innebär förlust av kontroll. Slutligen kan det anses finnas brister i tidigare forskning då små företag har undersökts i mindre utsträckning. Forskningsfrågor Vad är det som avgör varför små familjeföretag väljer att tillsätta externa styrelseledamöter eller inte? Syfte Syftet är att genom kvalitativa intervjuer förklara små familjeföretags tillsättande av externa styrelseledamöter. Metod Studien har byggts på en kvalitativ metod med semistrukturerade intervjuer som genomförts med tio VD:ar i tio små svenska familjeägda aktiebolag. Teoretisk referensrams Den teoretiska referensramen bygger på en trecirkelmodell som beskriver familjeföretags överlappande system. Avslutningsvis ges en överblick av styrelser samt beskrivs agentteorin och stewardshipsteorins förhållande till externa styrelseledamöter. Empiri De tio genomförda intervjuernas resultat presenteras under fyra teman och tabeller. Analys Analyskapitlet har genomförts med stöd av den teoretiska referensramens olika delar. Slutsats 0Vår slutsats är att den viktigaste egenskapen hos en extern styrelseledamot är dess kompetens och erfarenhet. En annan viktig faktor som avgör valet är för att få en s.k. input, en extern syn på verksamheten och någon att bolla idéer med. I och med tillsättandet har många av företagens styrelsearbeten övergått från passivt till aktivt styrelsearbete och de intervjuade företagarna ser endast positivt på tillsättandet. / Background Small family-owned limited liability company board composition is usually characterized by an overlap between the family and the company. Small businesses often can’t afford the number of qualified board members that they have in need and can thus miss important information, expertise and experience as an external board member can contribute. Furthermore, previous research has shown that outside directors can bring a foreign element in the family business which can give a sense involving loss of control. Finally, it is considered to be flaws in previous research when small companies have been investigated to a lesser extent. Research questions What is it that determines why small family businesses choose to appoint outside directors, or not? Purpose The purpose is that through qualitative interviews explain small family companies appointment of external board members. Method The study has been built on a qualitative approach with semistructured interviews conducted with ten CEOs of ten small, familyowned companies. Theory The theoretical framework is based on a threecircelmodel that describs the overlapping systems in family business. Finally it is an overwiev of boards and a explanation about the agency theory's and stewardship theory’s relation to the external board members. Empiricism The ten completed interview results are presented under four themes and tables. Analysis The analysis chapter has been implemented with the support of the theoretical framework different parts Conclusion Our conclusion is that the main feature of an external director is its expertise and experience. Another important factor that determines the choice is to get a so-called input, an external view of the business and someone to bounce ideas with. After the appointment many boards have worked in shift from passive to active and the interviwed businessowners only look positive on the appointment.

European and US companies, who desire to expand from a domestic-oriented focus to a more international mind-set, must undergo significant organizational transformation. Whether the transformation results in the company becoming internationally oriented, a complete transnational organization or anywhere in-between, one of the key components in the transformation process is developing a strategy that is outwardly focused from its natural domestic markets. To develop and execute said strategy, the utilization of human capital resources might be required that the company itself may not possess. Literature review has supported the concept that when European or US companies incorporate foreign nationals on the Board of Directors (BOD), the development and execution of international expansion strategies will increase the probability of reaching their respective strategic objectives. However, literature research is silent as to whether the inclusion of foreign nationals on the BOD of South American companies would result in the comparable results as experienced by European and US companies. This research study will begin to explore if a broader set of theoretical concepts could be applied to publicly traded Chilean companies and through future studies to publicly traded South American domiciled companies. Through an engaged scholarship approach, Resource Dependency Theory will be utilized as the lens through which to present the theoretical and practical applications for the BOD of publicly traded Chilean-domiciled companies to consider when developing international expansion strategies outside of Chile.

Agency theory proposes that the role of the board of directors is to control management (Fama & Jensen 1983). A structurally independent board, one with a high percentage of non-executive directors and a chairperson who is not the CEO, has been used as a proxy for the control role. Therefore, agency theory predicts a positive relationship between independent board structure and firm performance. These predictions have not been confirmed by meta-analytic reviews (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson 1998; Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy 2000). This thesis applies structural contingency theory to provide an alternative explanation for the relationship between board structure and firm performance. Structural contingency theory (Donaldson 2001) proposes that the relationship between an organization???s structure and its performance is moderated by contingencies. In this study the contingency is the salience of the board???s control role. I argue that structural independence of the board has a beneficial effect on performance only if it is in fit with control salience. For example, a firm with an independently structured board that gives high prominence to the control role will perform well. On the other hand, another firm with a less independently structured board that does not see its main role as controlling management will also prosper. Survey data were analyzed to measure the control salience for 98 Australian listed companies. Archival data provided measures of board structure and firm performance. Consistent with the meta-analytic reviews, there was no association between independent board structure and firm performance. There was some evidence that high control salience resulted in high performance, but this effect was evident chiefly when performance was measured by total shareholder returns. This may indicate that the share market was responding to the symbolism of high control salience. In contrast to the symbolic main effect of control salience, the fit between the control salience and the independent structure of the board caused increased return on equity. This reflects the board???s objective effect on profit when its structure is in fit with control salience.

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