Konstanz, Univ., Diplomarb., 2004.

Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2005.

Aucun texte de loi n'affirme que la société anonyme est régie selon les principes de hiérarchie et de séparation des pouvoirs. C'est la jurisprudence de l'arrêt Motte qui fonde ces principes à l'image d'une démocratie politique. L'enjeu consiste donc à vérifier l'application de ces principes dans les sociétés anonymes de type classique. La présence du principe de séparation des pouvoirs semble associée à la présence du principe de hiérarchie. Pourtant, les rapports entre les deux principes sont traditionnellement tumultueux. Pour autant, il ne s'agit guère d'un simple constat. L'affirmation selon laquelle l'assemblée d'actionnaires occupe une position souveraine dans la hiérarchie ne résiste pas longtemps à l'analyse. L'apparente cohabitation 'paisible entre principe de hiérarchie et principe de séparation des pouvoirs s'érode devant les exigences du marché. Ce marché est un acteur externe à la société anonyme mais démontre intensément que les règles régissant l'organisation des pouvoirs dans la société anonyme reflètent imparfaitement les rapports entre ces principes. Les différentes figures de ces principes ont permis de constater la présence de forts déséquilibres très contraignants et paradoxaux, voire une distorsion entre la pratique de ces principes et ce qu'exige l'essence de leurs déterminants. Ces constats ne s'opposent pas à la possibilité de retrouver une cohérence et une harmonie générale au fonctionnement de la société anonyme. Toutefois, le développement des solutions alternatives ne devrait guère contester l'influence légitime du marché; bien au contraire, il convient d'affirmer le rôle économique de la société anonyme. Ainsi, l'un des objectifs premiers de cette thèse est de montrer que si les principes de hiérarchie et de séparation des pouvoirs sont des principes fondateurs du fonctionnement des sociétés anonymes; ils nécessitent néanmoins une refondation. Celle-ci consiste à déterminer les finalités des principes, la redéfinition des pouvoirs de l'organe souverain, ainsi qu'une rationalisation des pouvoirs de l'organe de gestion. Enfin, pour renouer le dialogue entre ces deux organes, il convient de relativiser leurs rapports, en intégrant les valeurs de collaboration et de conciliation dans la culture de la société anonyme. / There is no legislation asserting that the limited company is governed according to the principles of hierarchy and separation of powers. It is the jurisprudence of the Motte ruling that establishes these principles modeled on a political democracy. The challenge is therefore to verity the application of these principles in classic limited companies. The presence of the principle of separation of powers seems to be associated with the presence of the principle of hierarchy. However, the relationship between the two principles is traditionally tumultuous. Nevertheless, it is hardly about a simple report. Indeed, the assertion according to which shareholders assembly occupies a sovereign position in the hierarchy does not resist for a long time to the analysis. The apparent peaceful coexistence between the principle of hierarchy and the principle of separation of powers is eroded when facing the market requirements. This market is an external actor to the limited company. However it intensely demonstrates that the rules governing the organization of power in the company imperfectly reflect the relationship between these principles. The different cases of these principles revealed the presence of strongly binding and paradoxical imbalances, even distortions, between the practice of these principles and what is required by the essence of their determinants. These findings are not opposed to the possibility of reaching consistency and harmony in the general operation of the limited company. However, the development of alternatives should not challenge the legitimate influence of the market. On the contrary, it is to enforce the economic role of the company. Thus, a primary objective of this thesis is to show that even though the principles of hierarchy and separation of powers are the founders of the companies operating principles, they nevertheless require a re-founding. The re-founding aims to determine the purpose of the principles, redefining the powers of the sovereign body, as well as streamlining the powers of the managing body. Finally, to resume the dialogue between the two bodies, their relationship should be relativized, incorporating the values of cooperation and conciliation in the culture of the company.

Bakgrund: Styrelsen anses vara en viktig mekanism inom bolagetsstyrningen. Ett syfte med styrelsen är att övervaka den operativa ledningen. Revisorns syfte är att reducera de agentkostnader som uppstår vid separationen mellan ledning och ägande, vilket sker i stor omfattning inom noterade bolag. Det är därför relevant att studera hur styrelsens sammansättning påverkar revisionskvaliteten. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att förklara hur styrelsens sammansättning påverkar revisionskvaliteten. Metod: Studien har ett deduktivt angreppssätt. Teorin som används utgår från agentteorin, Corporate Governance Strategy och stewardship-teorin. En kvantitativ undersökning av bolagens årsredovisningar och databaser har utförts. Datamaterialet är hänförbart till räkenskapsåret som avslutats under 2016 samt 2017. Slutsats: Utifrån studien kan det konstateras att det finns samband mellan styrelsens sammansättning och revisionskvaliteten hos bolag noterade på Stockholmsbörsen. / Background: The board of directors is considered being an important part of corporate governance. One purpose of the board is to monitor the managers. When there is a separation between managing and ownership of a company, agency costs occure. This happens when companies are listed. The auditors purpose is to reduce the agency costs. Because of this, it is relevant to study how board characteristics affect audit quality. Purpose: This paper aims to explain how board characteristics affect audit quality. Method: This study is based on a deductive approach. Theories used in this study are agency theory, Corporate Governance Strategy and stewardship theory. A quantitative study of annual reports and databases have been done. The empirical datasets are collected from the years 2016 and 2017. Conclusion: The results from this study show that board characteristics affect audit quality at companies listed at Nasdaq Stockholm.

Cette thèse avait pour ambition de mettre en évidence l'effet des conflits sur la dynamique du conseil d'administration. Ceci a été possible en observant de plus près ce terrain habituellement caractérisé par son opacité et son hermétisme. Ainsi, une approche par étude de cas a été préconisée. Il a été possible de mettre en évidence que le conseil d'administration est un organe de gouvernance dynamique et évolutif même lorsque les objectifs de la ou des personnes qui le dominent se focalisent sur un seul rôle ou, au mieux, sur deux. Ainsi, il a été possible de démontrer que les conflits sont susceptibles de modifier la configuration des rôles du conseil d'administration. Cependant et contrairement à ce qui a été avancé, aucun cas de changement du rôle dominant n'a été vérifié parmi les six cas étudiés. Ceci nous a permis de conclure que le conflit, même s’il agit sur les dynamiques du conseil, n’entraîne pas forcément une reconfiguration des rôles ou un changement du rôle dominant. Par ailleurs, nous avons considéré le rôle de médiation comme étant un rôle indépendant assumé par le conseil d’administration (van Ees et al., 2009). / This thesis is an attempt to highlight the impact of conflict on the dynamics of the board. This was possible by observing more closely this research area usually characterized by its opacity and hermeticism. Thus, a case study approach was advocated.It was possible to show that the board of directors is a dynamic and evolving governance instrument even when the goals of the individual or individuals who dominate the board focus on one role or, at best, two. Thus, it was possible to demonstrate that conflicts are likely to modify the configuration of the roles of the board. However, contrary to what has been suggested, no change of the dominant role was verified among the six cases studied. We can then conclude that the conflict, even if affecting the dynamics of the board, do not necessarily lead to a reconfiguration of roles or a change in the dominant role. In addition, we considered the role of mediation as an independent role played by the board of directors (van Ees et al., 2009).

Este trabalho tem como objetivo testar quais são as características dos Conselhos de Administração de 20 bancos, com capital aberto, no Brasil, no período compreendido entre os anos de 2007 a 2013, bem como detectar a influência das mesmas sobre a Rentabilidade do Ativo (ROA), Rentabilidade do Patrimônio Líquido (ROE) e a Razão Valor de Mercado (RVM). Para alcançar esses objetivos foram levantadas características relevantes que envolvem os Conselhos de Administração (CA) dos bancos, apoiando-se nas recomendações do Comitê de Basileia sobre o que se exige da estrutura desses Conselhos como instrumento de governança. Além das instruções do Comitê, outros artigos científicos, envolvendo dados dos CA e sua provável influência sobre a rentabilidade, foram referenciados. Após o levantamento das variáveis do CA utilizou-se uma análise de regressão múltipla para avaliar se as mesmas influenciam ou não e, em que dimensão elas interferem na rentabilidade dos bancos. Os resultados foram divididos em duas partes: a primeira levou em conta a alavancagem de controle do maior acionista de cada banco no período estudado e, a segunda considerou como uma das variáveis independentes a alavancagem de controle dos três maiores acionistas, entre os anos de 2007 a 2013. Através do resultado estatístico de uma análise quantitativa constatou-se que as características do CA influenciam, em intensidades diferentes, o ROA, ROE e o RVM. Quanto ao ROE e ao ROA, os menores níveis de Governança Corporativa (GC) demonstraram influências negativas para os dois tipos de controle, enquanto que o maior nível, o 3, mostrou influenciar positivamente o resultado. O número de componentes do CA refletiu, positivamente, sobre a rentabilidade. Porém, um aumento ocasionaria um decréscimo na mesma. As variáveis de controle influenciaram em pelo menos uma das variáveis dependentes. O estudo estatístico apresentou um importante resultado sobre a GC em bancos brasileiros. Esse aspecto pode servir de suporte ao investidor em sua tomada de decisão, pois evidencia que as variáveis abordadas devem ser consideradas quando forem verificados os retornos. / This study aims to test some characteristics of the Board of Directors of 20 publicly traded banks in Brazil in the period of 2007 to 2013, to determine whether these influence the Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and market value ratio (MVR).To achieve these goals, some relevant features that involve the Board of Directors (BoD) of banks were prospected, based on recommendations of the Basel Committee about the demands on the structure of these councils as instruments of governance. Scientific articles involving characteristics of the BoD and the possible influence on profitability were also considered. Once the BoD variables are set up, a multiple regression analysis was applied to assess whether, and how, the characteristics of the BoD influence the profitability of banks. The tests were divided into two parts: the first considering the leverage control of the largest shareholder of each bank, in every year; and the second had as one of the independent variables to leverage control of the three largest shareholders in the same period. Through the statistical results of a quantitative analysis, it was observed that the characteristics of the BoD influence, at different intensities, ROA, ROE and MV. In consideration of ROE and ROA, lower levels of Corporate Governance (CG) showed negative influences for both types of control, while the higher level, 3, resulted positive influence in the result. The number of members of the CA correlated positively with profitability. The control variables influenced on at least one of the dependent variables. Through this study, a significant statistical result is presented about GC in Brazilian banks. This may support the investor in his decision-making, highlighting that these variables must be considered when returns are checked.

Este trabalho tem como proposta analisar a regra prevista no art. 147, § 3º, da Lei das S.A., e compreender a efetiva extensão do interlocking board e seus impactos para a vida das companhias brasileiras. Com base na análise dos motivos que levaram à inclusão desse dispositivo, propõe-se uma nova abordagem interpretativa. Afasta-se uma concepção abrangente da hipótese de conflito de interesses contemplada no inciso II ou a interpretação autônoma da atuação em sociedade considerada concorrente, independentemente da existência de conflito de interesses. A proposta interpretativa, nesse sentido, aponta para a complementaridade dos dispositivos, de forma que ocorra o impedimento quando o conselheiro atuar em sociedade concorrente e, em decorrência disso, tiver interesse conflitante com o da companhia. Propõe, da mesma forma, um novo enfoque para o estudo das situações de conflito de interesses entre os administradores e a companhia, sugerindo uma desvinculação das conclusões obtidas com a análise do conflito de interesses do acionista (art. 115, § 1º) para aceitar a possibilidade de uma análise a priori do conflito de interesses entre o administrador e a companhia, ainda que identificável por critérios substanciais. / This work intends to study the Article 147, Paragraph 3, of the Brazilian Corporate Law (Law 6.404/76), and understand the actual extension of interlocking board and their impacts on the Brazilian companies. Based on the study of the reasons that led to the inclusion of this Article during Brazilian Corporate Law changes during the year of 2001, we propose a new interpretative approach. Disregarding a wide view of the conception of conflict of interest, under Article 147, Paragraph 3, Item II, and the autonomously conception of interlocking board, under Item I, regardless the existence of any related conflict of interests, we propose a complementary view of items I and II, so that the disqualification of the board of directors applicant occurs when he/she holds of a position in a competing company and, as a result, have conflicting interests with the company. We also propose a new approach to the study of conflict of interests between managers and the company, suggesting a disconnection of the conclusions from the analysis of conflict of interests between shareholders and the company (Article 115, Paragraph 1) to accept the possibility of a prior analysis of the conflict of interests between managers and the company, even with the use of a substantial criteria.

Diversos trabalhos estão sendo desenvolvidos sobre o Comitê de Auditoria nos Estados Unidos e outros países, porém esse assunto é ainda recente no Brasil. Esta pesquisa difere dos estudos anteriores, pois o foco está na análise da exceção dada pela Securities and Exchange Comission - SEC à Regra 10A-3 para as empresas estrangeiras com American Depositary Receipts - ADRs. A SEC permitiu que, no caso do Brasil, o Conselho Fiscal pudesse adaptar suas funções às do Comitê de Auditoria. Todavia, há controvérsias em relação à utilização do Conselho Fiscal adaptado. Este estudo fornece evidências empíricas sobre o Comitê de Auditoria e o Conselho Fiscal adaptado nas empresas que operam no Brasil. Além de analisar as características das empresas que optaram por formar o Comitê de Auditoria ou o Conselho Fiscal adaptado sob o ponto de vista da teoria da agência e o impacto da formação desses órgãos no retorno das ações das companhias, são apresentados também os resultados obtidos com aplicação de questionários a executivos das empresas e entrevistas com analistas de mercado. Os resultados significantes dos testes estatísticos indicam que empresas com vendas inferiores a R$ 15.000 milhões têm menor probabilidade de constituir Comitê de Auditoria e empresas com proporção de ativo imobilizado sobre vendas inferior a 60% têm maior probabilidade de constituir Comitê de Auditoria, conforme esperado. Além disso, empresas em que os gestores possuem algum percentual de participação têm maior chance de constituir o Comitê de Auditoria. Há indícios de uma relação positiva entre a formação do Comitê de Auditoria e o ativo total da empresa, a classificação da empresa no novo mercado ou nível 2 de governança corporativa, número de diretores e o retorno das ações, conforme esperado, ressalvando-se que o modelo é não significante. Não houve consenso dos analistas de mercado quanto à influência do nível de governança corporativa na formação do Comitê de Auditoria. Ao contrário do esperado, não há indícios da existência de uma relação positiva significante entre a empresa ter maior alavancagem e a presença do Comitê de Auditoria. Além disso, diferentemente do esperado, tanto a maioria das empresas que formaram o Comitê de Auditoria quanto as que optaram pelo Conselho Fiscal adaptado foram auditadas por uma das Big4 e foram classificadas como large accelerated filer. Já os analistas de mercado não souberam informar se a presença de uma Big4 poderia influenciar na escolha de um dos órgãos. De acordo com os executivos das empresas que formaram o Comitê de Auditoria, a maioria apontou que o nível de governança corporativa foi um dos fatores que influenciou na decisão do Comitê ou Conselho Fiscal adaptado, enquanto a maioria dos executivos das empresas que formou o Conselho Fiscal adaptado indicou o nível de governança corporativa, o fato de ser auditada por uma das Big4 e a classificação da empresa conforme o valor agregado de mercado como fatores que influenciaram nas suas decisões. Tanto a maioria dos executivos das empresas quanto a maioria dos analistas de mercado concordaram plenamente que o Comitê de Auditoria pode ser visto como um mecanismo de monitoramento da gestão da companhia, e discordaram que no Brasil faltem executivos com perfil que se enquadre no Comitê de Auditoria conforme definido pela SEC. Não houve consenso de opinião entre os executivos das empresas e os analistas de mercado quanto ao Conselho Fiscal ser mais adaptável que o Comitê de Auditoria ao ambiente de negócios brasileiros, quanto às funções dos dois órgãos serem distintas e quanto aos custos associados à formação do Comitê de Auditoria. Assim, percebe-se que, em alguns casos, o ponto de vista dos analistas é diferente da opinião obtida com os executivos das empresas e com os resultados baseados nas informações financeiras das companhias. Pode-se concluir que esse assunto precisará ser acompanhado de perto, afinal seu entendimento é ainda divergente. / Various works are being developed regarding Audit Committees in the United States and other countries, though the issue has only recently been introduced in Brazil. This research differs from previous studies given that its focus is on analysis of the exception made by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on Regulation 10A-3 regarding foreign companies possessing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). In the case of Brazil, the SEC allowed the Fiscal Council to adapt its roles to those of the Audit Committee. However, there are controversies relative to the use of an adapted Fiscal Council. This study provides empirical evidence on Audit Committees and the adapted Fiscal Councils within companies operating in Brazil. Besides analyzing the characteristics of companies that opt to form an Audit Committee or an adapted Fiscal Council from the agency theory point of view, it also discusses the impact of building these agencies on the company\'s return on investment, along with the results obtained from questionnaires given to company executives and interviews with market analysts. The results of the statistical tests were significant, indicating that companies with sales under R$ 15,000 million have a lower probability of building an Audit Committee, while companies with a proportion of fixed assets over sales that is less than 60% are more likely to build an Audit Committee, as was expected. Also, companies where managers possess some stake in the company have a greater chance of building an Audit Committee. There are indications that a positive relationship exists between building an Audit Committee and a company\'s total assets, a company\'s classification within the new market or level 2 corporate governance, the number of directors and the return on investment, as expected and remembering that the model is not significant. No consensus was reached by market analysts regarding the influence of the level of corporate governance on building an Audit Committee. Contrary to expectations, there are no indications that a meaningful positive relationship exists between the company having greater leverage and the presence of an Audit Committee. Also contrary to expectations, was the fact that both the majority of companies that formed an Audit Committee or an adapted Fiscal Council were audited by one of the Big 4 and classified as large accelerated filers. On the other hand, market analysts could not explain if the presence of one of the Big 4 could influence the choice of one entity over the other. According to executives from companies that formed Audit Committees, the majority pointed out that the level of corporate governance was one of the factors that influenced the decision between a Committee or an Adapted Fiscal Council, while the majority of executives from companies that chose the adapted Fiscal Council indicated the level of corporate governance, the audit by one of the Big 4 and the company\'s classification according to the Aggregate Worldwide Market Value as the factors that influenced their decisions. Both the majority of company executives and the majority of market analysts agree that an Audit Committee can be viewed as a monitoring mechanism for the company, while disagreeing that Brazil lacks executives who match the Audit Committee profile defined by the SEC. There was no consensus of opinions among company executives and market analysts regarding a Fiscal Council being more adaptable to the Brazilian business environment than an Audit Committee, both in terms of the role of each entity being distinct and in terms of the costs associated with building an Audit Committee. Thus, in some cases, one notices that the point of view of analysts is different than that of company executives, with results based on the company\'s financial information. One can conclude that this issue needs to be closely monitored, given that no consensus has been reached in its regard.

Este estudo tem por objetivo captar as percepções dos conselheiros de administração no Brasil a respeito das atividades que norteiam o escopo de atuação dos mesmos, em especial da RSC, Responsabilidade Social Corporativa. O intuito é de responder aos seguintes questionamentos: os conselheiros de administração no Brasil possuem uma visão ampliada do seu escopo de atuação, se envolvendo nas questões estratégicas das organizações? Nesse contexto, qual a percepção destes em relação à questão da RSC? O estudo observa a interrelação existente entre RSC, GC, Governança Corporativa, e o papel dos conselheiros. A premissa é de que a agenda da RSC é progressivamente uma extensão da agenda de GC e seria da responsabilidade dos conselhos de administração (ELKINGTON, 2006; INGLEY, 2008; JAMALI et al, 2008). Na pesquisa de campo, foram coletados dados junto a 128 conselheiros certificados pelo BCC, Banco de Conselheiros Certificados do IBGC, Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa. Os resultados apontam na direção de que os conselheiros não consideram relevantes, dentro do seu escopo de atuação, somente as atividades de cunho monitoramento e controle, mas também as atividades estratégicas e aquelas relacionadas à RSC. A RSC é justificada, conforme os conselheiros, porque uma empresa possui a responsabilidade de ir além de criar empregos, pagar impostos e gerar lucros. Tal posicionamento reflete na maneira exposta pelos conselheiros de como tomam decisões. Segundo os mesmos, mais do que os valores e as crenças dos acionistas, eles consideram aquilo que gera valor no longo prazo para as organizações. Os conselheiros não buscariam simplesmente remunerar o capital dos acionistas, mas criar e manter valor para que as organizações possam operar de forma sustentável. Com esses resultados, entende-se que essa pesquisa contribui para o desenvolvimento dos campos de estudo da RSC e da GC. / This study aims to grasp the perceptions of corporate board members in Brazil about the activities that guide the scope of work of the same, in particular the CSR, Corporate Social Responsibility. The intent is to answer the following questions: do corporate board members in Brasil have a broad view of the scope of their activities, engaging in strategic issues of the organizations? In this context what their perception regarding the issue of CSR? The study remarks the interrelationships among CSR, CG, Corporate Governance, and the role of directors. The main premise is that the CSR agenda is increasingly an extension of the CG agenda, so that it would be under the responsibility of Corporate Boards (ELKINGTON, 2006; INGLEY, 2008; JAMALI et al, 2008). During the field-level research, data have been collected from 128 counselors certified by BCC, Bank of Certified Counselors from IBGC, Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance. Results indicate that directors do not consider relevant, in the scope of their activities, such as monitoring and control, but also the strategic activities and activities related to CSR. According to directors, CSR is justified because companies have the responsibility to go beyond creating jobs, paying taxes and profiting. This positioning reflects on the manner directors revealed to make their decisions. According to them, beyond considering the values and beliefs of the shareholders, they consider all that creates long-term value for the organizations. Directors would not only seek to remunerate the shareholder capital, but also to create and maintain value for the organizations so that they can operate sustainably. With these results, it is understood that this research contributes to the development of CSR and CG fields of study.

Submitted by Eliene Soares da Silva (eliene.silva@fgv.br) on 2012-07-31T15:55:35Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Final_Thesis_Beatriz_Schalka.pdf: 1044126 bytes, checksum: b67899dc3d2c8303cc985a6fc89e8a41 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Eliene Soares da Silva (eliene.silva@fgv.br) on 2012-07-31T15:57:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Final_Thesis_Beatriz_Schalka.pdf: 1044126 bytes, checksum: b67899dc3d2c8303cc985a6fc89e8a41 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-07-31T15:59:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Final_Thesis_Beatriz_Schalka.pdf: 1044126 bytes, checksum: b67899dc3d2c8303cc985a6fc89e8a41 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-02 / Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title 'Novo Mercado' refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.