Thesis--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1962. / Vita. Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 261-265).

A questão Essequibo tem sido assunto de pauta na política externa da Venezuela, desde o séc. XIX, quando foi assinado o Laudo de Paris, em 1899, por aquele país e pela então Guiana Britânica, como forma de dar solução à disputa fronteiriça entre as duas nações. No transcorrer da primeira metade do séc. XX, o problema persistiu como uma agenda aberta, dada a dificuldade de se estabelecer negociações eficazes com os britânicos, em função da instabilidade política e alternância de poder entre caudilhos e ditadores militares. Com a divulgação do Memorandum Mallet-Prevost, no final da primeira metade do séc. passado, a Venezuela passou a insistir pela anulação do Laudo, em decorrência de denúncias apontadas no Memorandum . Só após a democratização do país, no início dos anos 60, o assunto passou a ser pauta de negociações entre chanceleres das duas nações. Assunto que se tornou mais persistente com a proximidade da independência da Guiana, quando a Venezuela sela o Acuerdo de Ginebra, com o propósito de resolver a pendência fronteiriça no âmbito das comissões mistas, criadas sob os auspícos da ONU. Foi uma época de intensificação de propaganda pró-Essequibo na Venezuela, levando a região reclamada a constar, inclusive, no mapa venezuelano como zona en reclamación. No entanto, dada a conjuntura política na Guiana, decorrente da polarização ideológica entre o People’s Progressive Party – PPP – e o People´s National Congress – PNC –, a questão pouco progrediu, mesmo com a assinatura do Protocolo de Puerto España, em 1970, como previa o Acuerdo. O instituto do buen oficiante, como mediador proposto pela ONU, não impediu, tampouco, ações armadas contra o território guianense. Quadro este que permaneceu assim até o início da Era Chávez, quando o bolivarianismo e sua ideologia transnacionalista levou a Venezuela a aproximar-se de país latinos e caribenhos, incluindo a Guiana. Porém, concomitante ao andamento da agenda bolivariana, grupos pró-Essequibo, de ideologia nacionalista, constituídos por muitos membros da oposição à política chavista, passaram a propalar a conquista da região reclamada, numa clara evidência de que a questão Essequibo é parte de uma agenda persistentemente aberta, podendo ser utilizada por diferentes forças políticas da República Bolivariana de Venezuela contra a Guiana. / Essequibo has been a subject of discussion in Venezuela’s policy, since the 19th century, when the Award of Paris was signed in 1899 by that country and also by British Guiana, to solve the border dispute between the two nations. In the first half of the 20th century, the problem persisted as an open question, because of the difficulties to establish effective negotiations with the British, due to political instablility and alternation of power between the military dictators and the warlords. With the release of the Memorandum Mallet- Prevost, at the end of the past first half century, Venezuela insisted on cancelling the award because of complaints which there were in the Memorandum . Only after the democratization of the country in the early 60’s, the situation started with the negotiation between the foreign ministers of both nations, and it became more persistent with the proximity of Guyana’s independence. At that time Venezuela had sealed the “Acuerdo de Ginebra”, in order to solve the border problems with the mixed commissions created under the auspices of the UN. In Venezuela they started an intensified propaganda pro Essequibo, requiring the claimed area to be included in the Venezuelan map as “Zona en Reclamacíon”. However, because of the political situation in Guyana, due to the polarization between the People’s Progressive Party – PPP – and the National People’s Congress – PNC – the situation did not improve, even with the signing of the Port of Spain Protocol, in 1970. The Institute Buen Oficiante, proposed by the UN as a mediator, could not stop armed actions against the Guyanese territory. Remaining like that until the beginning of Chávez era when the bolivarism and his transnationalist ideology led Venezuela to approach the Latin and Caribbean countries, including Guyana. The groups pro Essequibo with a nationalist ideology, formed by the members of political opposition to Chávez, began to spread ideas of conquest of that claimed area, showing that Essequibo is a question of discussion and which can be used by different political forces of the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela against Guyana.

A questão Essequibo tem sido assunto de pauta na política externa da Venezuela, desde o séc. XIX, quando foi assinado o Laudo de Paris, em 1899, por aquele país e pela então Guiana Britânica, como forma de dar solução à disputa fronteiriça entre as duas nações. No transcorrer da primeira metade do séc. XX, o problema persistiu como uma agenda aberta, dada a dificuldade de se estabelecer negociações eficazes com os britânicos, em função da instabilidade política e alternância de poder entre caudilhos e ditadores militares. Com a divulgação do Memorandum Mallet-Prevost, no final da primeira metade do séc. passado, a Venezuela passou a insistir pela anulação do Laudo, em decorrência de denúncias apontadas no Memorandum . Só após a democratização do país, no início dos anos 60, o assunto passou a ser pauta de negociações entre chanceleres das duas nações. Assunto que se tornou mais persistente com a proximidade da independência da Guiana, quando a Venezuela sela o Acuerdo de Ginebra, com o propósito de resolver a pendência fronteiriça no âmbito das comissões mistas, criadas sob os auspícos da ONU. Foi uma época de intensificação de propaganda pró-Essequibo na Venezuela, levando a região reclamada a constar, inclusive, no mapa venezuelano como zona en reclamación. No entanto, dada a conjuntura política na Guiana, decorrente da polarização ideológica entre o People’s Progressive Party – PPP – e o People´s National Congress – PNC –, a questão pouco progrediu, mesmo com a assinatura do Protocolo de Puerto España, em 1970, como previa o Acuerdo. O instituto do buen oficiante, como mediador proposto pela ONU, não impediu, tampouco, ações armadas contra o território guianense. Quadro este que permaneceu assim até o início da Era Chávez, quando o bolivarianismo e sua ideologia transnacionalista levou a Venezuela a aproximar-se de país latinos e caribenhos, incluindo a Guiana. Porém, concomitante ao andamento da agenda bolivariana, grupos pró-Essequibo, de ideologia nacionalista, constituídos por muitos membros da oposição à política chavista, passaram a propalar a conquista da região reclamada, numa clara evidência de que a questão Essequibo é parte de uma agenda persistentemente aberta, podendo ser utilizada por diferentes forças políticas da República Bolivariana de Venezuela contra a Guiana. / Essequibo has been a subject of discussion in Venezuela’s policy, since the 19th century, when the Award of Paris was signed in 1899 by that country and also by British Guiana, to solve the border dispute between the two nations. In the first half of the 20th century, the problem persisted as an open question, because of the difficulties to establish effective negotiations with the British, due to political instablility and alternation of power between the military dictators and the warlords. With the release of the Memorandum Mallet- Prevost, at the end of the past first half century, Venezuela insisted on cancelling the award because of complaints which there were in the Memorandum . Only after the democratization of the country in the early 60’s, the situation started with the negotiation between the foreign ministers of both nations, and it became more persistent with the proximity of Guyana’s independence. At that time Venezuela had sealed the “Acuerdo de Ginebra”, in order to solve the border problems with the mixed commissions created under the auspices of the UN. In Venezuela they started an intensified propaganda pro Essequibo, requiring the claimed area to be included in the Venezuelan map as “Zona en Reclamacíon”. However, because of the political situation in Guyana, due to the polarization between the People’s Progressive Party – PPP – and the National People’s Congress – PNC – the situation did not improve, even with the signing of the Port of Spain Protocol, in 1970. The Institute Buen Oficiante, proposed by the UN as a mediator, could not stop armed actions against the Guyanese territory. Remaining like that until the beginning of Chávez era when the bolivarism and his transnationalist ideology led Venezuela to approach the Latin and Caribbean countries, including Guyana. The groups pro Essequibo with a nationalist ideology, formed by the members of political opposition to Chávez, began to spread ideas of conquest of that claimed area, showing that Essequibo is a question of discussion and which can be used by different political forces of the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela against Guyana.

A questão Essequibo tem sido assunto de pauta na política externa da Venezuela, desde o séc. XIX, quando foi assinado o Laudo de Paris, em 1899, por aquele país e pela então Guiana Britânica, como forma de dar solução à disputa fronteiriça entre as duas nações. No transcorrer da primeira metade do séc. XX, o problema persistiu como uma agenda aberta, dada a dificuldade de se estabelecer negociações eficazes com os britânicos, em função da instabilidade política e alternância de poder entre caudilhos e ditadores militares. Com a divulgação do Memorandum Mallet-Prevost, no final da primeira metade do séc. passado, a Venezuela passou a insistir pela anulação do Laudo, em decorrência de denúncias apontadas no Memorandum . Só após a democratização do país, no início dos anos 60, o assunto passou a ser pauta de negociações entre chanceleres das duas nações. Assunto que se tornou mais persistente com a proximidade da independência da Guiana, quando a Venezuela sela o Acuerdo de Ginebra, com o propósito de resolver a pendência fronteiriça no âmbito das comissões mistas, criadas sob os auspícos da ONU. Foi uma época de intensificação de propaganda pró-Essequibo na Venezuela, levando a região reclamada a constar, inclusive, no mapa venezuelano como zona en reclamación. No entanto, dada a conjuntura política na Guiana, decorrente da polarização ideológica entre o People’s Progressive Party – PPP – e o People´s National Congress – PNC –, a questão pouco progrediu, mesmo com a assinatura do Protocolo de Puerto España, em 1970, como previa o Acuerdo. O instituto do buen oficiante, como mediador proposto pela ONU, não impediu, tampouco, ações armadas contra o território guianense. Quadro este que permaneceu assim até o início da Era Chávez, quando o bolivarianismo e sua ideologia transnacionalista levou a Venezuela a aproximar-se de país latinos e caribenhos, incluindo a Guiana. Porém, concomitante ao andamento da agenda bolivariana, grupos pró-Essequibo, de ideologia nacionalista, constituídos por muitos membros da oposição à política chavista, passaram a propalar a conquista da região reclamada, numa clara evidência de que a questão Essequibo é parte de uma agenda persistentemente aberta, podendo ser utilizada por diferentes forças políticas da República Bolivariana de Venezuela contra a Guiana. / Essequibo has been a subject of discussion in Venezuela’s policy, since the 19th century, when the Award of Paris was signed in 1899 by that country and also by British Guiana, to solve the border dispute between the two nations. In the first half of the 20th century, the problem persisted as an open question, because of the difficulties to establish effective negotiations with the British, due to political instablility and alternation of power between the military dictators and the warlords. With the release of the Memorandum Mallet- Prevost, at the end of the past first half century, Venezuela insisted on cancelling the award because of complaints which there were in the Memorandum . Only after the democratization of the country in the early 60’s, the situation started with the negotiation between the foreign ministers of both nations, and it became more persistent with the proximity of Guyana’s independence. At that time Venezuela had sealed the “Acuerdo de Ginebra”, in order to solve the border problems with the mixed commissions created under the auspices of the UN. In Venezuela they started an intensified propaganda pro Essequibo, requiring the claimed area to be included in the Venezuelan map as “Zona en Reclamacíon”. However, because of the political situation in Guyana, due to the polarization between the People’s Progressive Party – PPP – and the National People’s Congress – PNC – the situation did not improve, even with the signing of the Port of Spain Protocol, in 1970. The Institute Buen Oficiante, proposed by the UN as a mediator, could not stop armed actions against the Guyanese territory. Remaining like that until the beginning of Chávez era when the bolivarism and his transnationalist ideology led Venezuela to approach the Latin and Caribbean countries, including Guyana. The groups pro Essequibo with a nationalist ideology, formed by the members of political opposition to Chávez, began to spread ideas of conquest of that claimed area, showing that Essequibo is a question of discussion and which can be used by different political forces of the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela against Guyana.

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L’éclatement de l’Autriche-Hongrie en un ensemble des nouvelles nations en 1918 constitue un événement clé dans l’historiographie de l’Europe centrale. Cette thèse porte sur les relations bilatérales entre deux Etats « nouveau nés » – la Hongrie et la Tchécoslovaquie. Elle se concentre plus particulièrement sur la politique extérieure hongroise et sur les perceptions, motivations et décisions du gouvernement hongrois et de ses différents organes politiques vis-à-vis de la République tchécoslovaque. Cette thèse questionne l'historiographie dominante qui décrit les relations entre Budapest et Prague dans l’entre-deux-guerres à travers le prisme de leur conflit territorial sur la Slovaquie et la Ruthénie – deux provinces hongroises annexées par la Tchécoslovaquie en 1918–1919. Cette recherche confirme que les élites hongroises et les cercles gouvernementaux espéraient récupérer ces territoires, mais elle démontre aussi que Budapest s’est efforcé d'éviter un conflit ouvert avec Prague, considérant que la Tchécoslovaquie était plus peuplée, industrialisée, militarisée et avait plus d'alliances internationales que la Hongrie. A partir des sources primaires principalement en hongrois et en tchèque, mais aussi en slovaque, en français et en anglais, trouvées dans les archives de Budapest et de Prague et dans des ouvrages publiés, cette thèse soutient que le gouvernement hongrois envisageait sérieusement de développer la coopération politique, économique et internationale avec Prague dans les années médianes de l'entre-deux-guerres. Cette thèse est organisée en cinq parties. Quatre périodes se distinguent: l’après-guerre (1918-21, part. 2), les années 20 (1922-1930, part. 3), le début des années 30 (1931-36, part. 5). La première partie traite des sources et de l'historiographie, tandis que la partie 4 s’intéresse plus en détails aux liens de l'opposition démocratique hongroise avec Prague en 1919–1932. / The replacement of Austria-Hungary by series of new nations in 1918 is a key event in the historical reflections in Central Europe. This thesis deals with the bilateral relations between two "new born" states - Hungary and Czechoslovakia.This thesis pays special attention the topic of the foreign policy of Hungary, by exploring the perceptions, motives, and the decisions that the government of Budapest and its different political bodies expressed in regard to the Czechoslovak Republic. This thesis aims to challenge the mainstream historiography which portrays the Budapest-Prague relations between the two World Wars through the prism of the territorial dispute over Slovakia and Ruthenia, two Hungarian provinces that were annexed by Czechoslovakia in 1918–1919. This research confirms that the Hungarian elites and the governmental circles were indeed unsatisfied with the loss of these two regions. However, the historiography has over-estimated the impact of territorial dispute on the practical and every day political attitudes and the decision making process in Budapest. This thesis claims that the Hungarian government tended to avoid open conflicts with Prague, considering that Czechoslovakia was more populous, industrialized, militarized and had more international alliances than Hungary. Analyzing primary sources mainly in Hungarian, and Czech, but also in Slovak, French and English, found both in the archives in Budapest and Prague and in published versions, this thesis argues that the government of Hungary seriously considered developing political, economic and international cooperation with Prague in the middle years of the Interwar. This thesis is organized into five parts. The opening part deals with the sources and the historiography. Part 2 examines the Hungarian policy on Czechoslovakia in 1918–1921. Part 3 tackles the Budapest-Prague relations between 1922 and 1930. Part 4 portrays the connections of the Hungarian democratic opposition with Prague in 1919–1932. Part 5 uncovers the changes of the foreign policy of Hungary towards Czechoslovakia in 1931–1936.

This paper is an attempt to explore some of the linkages between national and international political systems through an application of a modified version of Rosenau's pre-theory to the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese border disputes. The Indian and Burmese cases presented contrasts on some of the variables considered in Rosenau's theory along with marked differences in the consequences of policy outputs. The case studies revealed important differences in the foreign policy making processes that could be linked to Rosenau's variables and to outcomes and consequences. Concepts developed within the field of foreign policy analysis, the study of international political systems, and the theory of bargaining can readily be encompassed within the model. The model, however, presents some problems of definition and problems in causal analysis. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The master thesis aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the Slovenia-Croatian territorial dispute in the period 1991-2010. Although this dispute has its origin in the SFRY, it fully sprung up at the time of independence of Slovenia and Croatia, when the question of the definition of a common border appeared. The thesis is primarily focused on three key issues: the definition of the coastal border at the mouth of the River Dragonja, the delimitation of the territorial sea in the Piran Bay and in particular on the main Slovenian request for a direct access to international waters. In the first part selected terms from the international law of the sea are explained. The second chapter covers the historical development and changes of borders in Istria with an emphasis on the development of the municipality of Piran. The above key issues are analysed in the third chapter, which is attempting to verify the relevance of the arguments of both parties from the perspective of international law. The fourth chapter deals with the bilateral dispute resolution attempts and also briefly outlines the political developments in both countries. The final chapter then examines the role what the European Union, or the European Commission, played.

從1968年的《中俄尼布楚條約》到2004年的《中俄國界東段補充協定》，中俄邊界爭議談判歷時三百多年，在這漫長的期間內彼此的國界線也曾數度遷移。本文探討兩國國界複雜多變的形成過程，來歸納出造成雙方邊界變動的結構性因素為何。 一般習慣將中俄國界區分為東、中、西三段，這其實是經過長期的歷史演變而來的概念，早期的邊界條約並非一定是依此方式分段簽訂。若依此地理分法，雖可詳細了解各段邊界的演變經過，但部分涵蓋範圍較廣的條約將被迫拆散或是重複討論，失去了完整性。因此本論文以歷史事件的順序為章節安排，如此一方面可顧及條約的完整性，二方面也較易釐清各階段的歷史脈絡。 此外，本論文的研究重點強調在各重要邊界條約的談判經過，藉著中俄雙方互相角力的過程，來剖析出兩國國界線擴張與限縮的關鍵因素，最後並以條件的滿足來解釋中俄國界得以確定。 / From “The Treaty of Nerchinsk”(1689) to “The Supplementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of the China-Russia Boundary Line”(2004), negotiations on the Chinese-Russian border disputes lasted more than 300 years. In this prolonged period the demarcation line of boundaries changed several times. This thesis explores the structural factors of the complex forming process of Sino-Russian borderlines. Actually, the conventional concept of the three border sections of east, central, and west between China and Russia comes from the long-term historical evolution. The early boundary treaties were not necessarily signed by both sides section by section. If we use the geographical taxonomy as the thesis’s analytical structure, we may understand each border section’s formation in details, but we will not capture the whole picture of Sino-Russian border negotiations because some broad-scoped treaties which comprised not just one specific border section have to be divided into sections or resulted into overlapped discussion accordingly. Alternatively, the organization of this study takes historical events chronologically to maintain the border treaties’ wholeness in their precise historical contexts. Moreover, this thesis emphasizes the negotiation processes of important boundary treaties between China and Russia in terms of comparative power strength, which decided the expansion or shrinkage of each other’s boundary and the final settlement of Sino-Russian border dispute.

Sovereignty over the South China Sea waters and the territorial features therein has been a contentious issue since at least the 1970’s, with conflicting claims going back even further. Key concepts of Liberal and Neo-Realist International Relations Theory are used to assess respective theory’s explanatory capability for why the South China Sea Dispute is difficult to settle. The scope of the study is limited to three pairings of international relations: China-Philippines, China-Vietnam and China-USA. The analysis concerns the development of these sets of international relations from 2016 up until now. The findings point to unilateral action by one claimant in the face of contesting claims by another as being one of the main factors perpetuating the conflict. Treaties and international law are designed with Liberal development of international relations in mind, but in practice Neo-Realist hard power politics interrupts this development. Examples of disruptive action include attempts to unilaterally exploit natural resources in the region, settling features in the sea, doing construction work on features in the sea, as well as regular FONOPS conducted by navy ships in the region. Finally, there are difficulties settling on a mechanism for sovereignty settlement, as China makes its claims based on historic- or historical claims, rather than international law as it is written out in UNCLOS.