More companies have responded to the call for action, increasing their attention to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Corporate governance structures have proven to have an effect on how well companies are able to facilitate a sustainable trajectory, all influenced by values and norms. Sweden is part of what many views as the ‘next supermodel’ regarding social welfare and sustainability awareness based on a collectivist mindset. In contrast, the US fundamentally believes in the American dream of free enterprise, which has resulted in a more shareholder oriented view.   This study aims to research whether board composition mechanisms such as board gender diversity, board independence, inclusion and CEO duality impact the CSR initiatives, measured through ESG score, of Swedish and US Large Cap companies listed on OMXS and S&P 100. Moreover, it strives to investigate plausible reasons for differences between Sweden with the Nordic corporate governance model and the tier-1 model corporate governance model the US have. Even if ESG is a well-studied area, previous research does not find any consensus since earlier studies find negative, positive and non-significant results. Furthermore, many studies tend not to go beyond firm-level factors and overlook country-level factors such as national culture.   The study consists of 165 Large Cap companies, where 83 are Swedish and 82 are from the US. The chosen research method is quantitative, based on unbalanced panel data from 2020-2022. ESG score is used as the dependent variable, and the independent variables are the proportion of women board of directors, the critical mass of women directors, the proportion of independent directors, inclusion and CEO duality. The control variables consist of board size, asset size, return on assets, leverage, board-specific skills, and the number of employees. To control for country-level factors, GDP is applied. The regression also applies fixed effects for year and sector.   The data analyses are done with two robust and one standard GLS model with random effects, where the regression analyses are divided into two parts. Part I combines Swedish and US Large Cap companies, and Part II separates the two countries. The results for Part I show no significant relationship between ESG score and either board gender diversity, the critical mass, inclusion or CEO duality. The degree of board independence shows a significant positive effect on ESG scores. Part II conveys that there are fundamental differences between Sweden and the US. For example, while board independence shows a significant positive relationship in Sweden, it presents a non-significant negative relationship in the US. In addition, GDP shows significance in both models indicating that country-level factors matter, and it is evident that the explanatory power of the regressions differ. Thus, it is evermore likely that other factors, such as national culture, potentially impact companies’ corporate social responsibility.

Bakgrund: Bolagsstyrelsens roll och ansvarsområde har länge varit föremål för diskussion. I Sverige kan man från ett legalt perspektiv se att övervakning av företagsledningen får en central roll. Ägare i svenska bolag har stor möjlighet att påverka styrelsens genom den svenska valberedningsprocessen. Ägare får genom denna process möjlighet att påverka styrelsens övervakningsförmåga genom hur de sammansätter styrelsen. Påverkar därmed vilken sorts ägartyp företaget har styrelsens förmåga att övervaka effektivt. Syfte: Uppsatsens syfte är att förklara hur olika ägartyper påverkar styrelsens förmåga att övervaka. Metod: Studien har genomförts med en deduktiv forskningsansats, där teorierna agentteori, resursberoendeteori och institutionell teori har använts för att göra en teoretisk modell som förklarar ägartypernas påverkan på styrelsens övervakningsförmåga. Denna kvantitativa studie genomfördes genom användningen av data om svenska börsbolags styrelser från 2022. Slutsats: Studien visar att ägartyper har en påverkan på styrelsens förmåga att övervaka. Denna påverkan görs både direkt och indirekt genom styrelsens sammansättning. Dock tyder även resultatet på att det är ägarkoncentrationen av ägartyperna som är anledningen till detta som stämmer överens med agentteorin. / Background: The role and area of ​​responsibility of the board of directors has long been the subject of discussion. In Sweden, from a legal perspective, it can be seen that monitoring of company management has a central role. Owners in Swedish companies have a great opportunity to influence the board through the Swedish election committee process. Through this process, owners get the opportunity to influence the board's monitoring ability by how they compose the board. Can what kind of ownership type the company has then affect the board's ability to monitor effectively. Purpose: The purpose of the paper is to explain how different ownership types affect the board's ability to monitor. Method: The study has been carried out with a deductive research approach, where the theories agent theory, resource dependence theory and institutional theory have been used to make a theoretical model that explains the influence of ownership types on the board's ability to monitor. This quantitative study was conducted by using data on the boards of Swedish listed companies from 2022. Conclusion: The study shows that ownership types have an impact on the board's ability to monitor. This impact is shown both directly and indirectly through the composition of the board. However, the results also indicate that it is the ownership concentration of the ownership types that is the reason for this, which is consistent with the agency theory.

Cette thèse étudie le lien entre les caractéristiques des conseils d’administration des banques acquéreuseset la performance boursière à court terme de celles-ci, analysée grâce à la méthodologie d’étude d’événement.L’objectif étant de vérifier si la structure des conseils contribue à l’atténuation des conflits d’intérêts àl’occasion des opérations de fusions-acquisitions (F&A) et crée, par conséquent, de la valeur. Deux effets ontété mis en avant. Le premier suppose une influence directe de chacune des caractéristiques du conseil sur lesrendements anormaux de l’acquéreur ; tandis que le second, introduit l’effet médiateur de la prime de contrôlepayée, en considérant que la structure du conseil influence le pouvoir de négociation de ses membres et leurengagement dans l’intérêt des actionnaires. Pour ces deux effets, nous contrôlons certains déterminants de laperformance relatifs à la transaction et aux banques impliquées.Nos résultats indiquent que les marchés financiers ont des attentes vis-à-vis des conseils lors de cesopérations, car nous avons relevé une incidence favorable sur les rendements anormaux de la présence depersonnalités extérieures en proportion significative au conseil de l’acquéreur et de l’absence de dualité dedirection dans celui-ci. Par ailleurs, en contrôlant le choix de la méthode de paiement, nous avons égalementrelevé que l’utilisation du cash est fortement associé à des rendements positifs pour l’acquéreur. / This thesis analyzes the relationship between Board characteristics of acquiring Banks and short termStock Market reactions, measured with the Event Study Methodology. We examine if Board structure helps tolower conflict of interests during Mergers and Acquisitions, and creates Shareholder value. Two effects areanalysed. The first one supposes a direct influence of Board characteristics on the acquirer’s abnormal returns.The second one introduces a mediating effect of the premium, considering that Board structure affects itsmembers’ commitment. For both effects, we control some performance determinants relative to transactionand involved banks.Our results indicate that Financial Markets expect that Boards play an important role in acquisitions. Wefind a favourable impact of outside dominated Boards and the absence of duality on the acquirer's abnormalreturns. In addition, by controlling the method of payment, we obtain a significant and positive correlationbetween use of cash and acquirer's returns.