由於交換合約為店頭市場交易，故其違約風險的考量為一重要因素。本文依據Wang and Liao（2003）對於權益交換的研究，以及Hübner（2001）對於信用風險的設定，將之結合，在完全市場的假設下，不考慮交易成本以及賦稅影響下，推導出考慮信用風險後的一般化權益交換評價模型，對於各類型的權益交換評價，只需將本文模型假設簡化即可運用。而依據本文推導結果在跨通貨的權益交換模型中，較無跨通貨的權益交換模型多了一個匯率風險調整項，另外在考慮信用風險之後，則會再多出一信用風險調整項。

Bakgrund och problem: Dagens företag består allt mer av immateriella tillgångar då samhället vi lever i har blivit allt mer högteknologiskt och kunskapsintensivt. När småföretag vill expandera vänder de sig vanligtvis till banker för att ansöka om krediter. Det finns dock en stor kritik mot hur banker hanterar utlåning till småföretag. Överlag är det väldigt svårt för småföretag att bli beviljade krediter hos banker, speciellt för de småföretag som har en hög andel immateriella tillgångar. Vissa forskare menar även att det finns skillnader i hur immateriella tillgångar bedöms vid kreditbeslut. Vi vill därför undersöka följande: Hur bedömer banker immateriella tillgångar vid kreditbedömningar av småföretag? Hur skiljer sig kreditgivarnas syn på de immateriella tillgångarna? Syfte: Studiens syfte är att undersöka hur banker bedömer immateriella tillgångar vid kreditbedömningar av småföretag och om det finns några skillnader i kreditgivarnas bedömning. Vidare är syftet att studien ska bidra till en ökad förståelse kring vilken betydelse immateriella tillgångar har när banker fattar ett kreditbeslut. Studiens syfte är inte att generalisera och dra slutsatser kring hur alla banker bedömer immateriella tillgångar vid en kreditbedömningsprocess. Metod: Uppsatsen är skriven utifrån en kvalitativ ansats då målet med vår studie är att bidra till en ökad förståelse kring vilken betydelse immateriella tillgångar har när banker fattar ett kreditbeslut men även för att belysa hur osäkerheten med immateriella tillgångar behandlas ur bankernas situation. Kreditgivarnas personliga åsikter har en stor betydelse i vår studie, därför har vi också valt att använda en kvalitativ metod då den bidrar till att respondenternas personliga åsikter och reflektioner kan lyftas fram vilket är nödvändigt för att få en djupare förståelse. Slutsats: Vår studie visar att bankerna vid kreditbedömning av småföretag bedömer immateriella tillgångar på ungefär liknande sätt. Det fanns inga stora skillnader i själva bedömningen av de immateriella tillgångarna. Däremot skiljer sig kreditgivarnas syn på immateriella tillgångar. Trots att samtliga respondenter bedömde tillgångarna i princip på samma sätt kan vi se att det finns skillnader. Det är överlag väldigt svårt för småföretag med en hög andel immateriella tillgångar att bli beviljade krediter men det vi har kommit fram till i den här studien är att det faktiskt finns faktorer som kan påverka ett kreditbeslut och därmed också underlätta för dessa företag att bli beviljade krediter. / Background and problem: Today's businesses consist increasingly of intangible assets because the society we live in has become increasingly high-tech and knowledge-intensive. When small businesses are looking to expand, they usually turn to banks to apply for loans. However, there is a great criticism of how banks handle loans to small businesses. Overall, it is very difficult for small businesses to get credits granted by banks, especially for those small businesses that have a high percentage of intangible assets. Some researchers also believe that there are differences in how intangible assets are assessed on credit decisions. We therefore wish to examine: How do banks assess intangible assets on credit rating of small business? How lenders view differs on intangibles? Purpose: The aim of this study is to examine how banks assess intangible assets in the credit assessment of SMEs and whether there are any differences in lenders' assessment. An additional purpose of the study is to contribute to an increased understanding of the importance of intangible assets when banks make credit decisions. The study's purpose is not to generalize and draw conclusions about how all banks assesses intangible assets on a credit assessment process. Method: The essay is written from a qualitative approach because the goal of our study is to contribute to an increased understanding of the importance of intangible assets when banks make credit decisions but also to illustrate how the uncertainty of intangibles is treated from the banks' situation. The lenders ' personal opinions are of great importance in our study, therefore, we have also chosen to use a qualitative approach as it helps to highlight the respondents' personal opinions and reflections which are necessary to get a deeper understanding. Conclusion: Our study shows that creditors assess intangible assets similarly. There were no significant differences in the actual assessment of the intangible assets. However lenders view of intangible assets differs. Although all respondents assessed the assets in basically the same way, we can see that there are differences. Overall it is very difficult for small companies with a high proportion of intangible assets to be granted credits but that we have arrived to the conclusion that there are indeed factors that can affect a credit decision and therefore make it easier for these companies to be granted credits.

The financial crisis turmoil has exposed notable weakness in the risk management processes of the financial services industry. It has also led to a critical look at the scope of the various risk types as well as the classification of loss events. More importantly, the effects that incorrect risk classification might have on capital requirements are now also examined and taken into account. Boundary events between credit risk and operational risk continue to be a significant source of concern for regulators and the industry in general. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) requires that boundary events should be treated as credit risk for the purposes of calculating minimum regulatory capital under the Basel II Framework. Such losses will, therefore, not be subject to any operational risk capital charges. However, for the purposes of internal operational risk management, banks are required to identify all material operational risk losses. Boundary events should be flagged separately within a bank’s internal operational risk database. The Basel II Framework does not provide any further guidelines as to what constitutes boundary events and, therefore, consistent guiding principles that banks can follow for accurately classifying and subsequently flagging such events do not exist. The potential exists that actual boundary events might be classified as purely credit risk, and correctly be included in the credit risk capital charge, but not be flagged separately within the bank’s internal operational risk database. Alternatively, boundary events might be classified as operational risk and, therefore, be subject to the operational risk capital charge, instead of the credit risk capital charge. The former instance might give rise to an operational risk manager not being completely informed of the operational risks that the business is facing. The emphasis should always be on the management of risks and for this reason it is important that a financial institution indicates and flags all boundary events in their operational risk systems. To remedy this lack of guidance on the boundary event issue, guidelines are provided that banks can utilise within their risk classification processes. The approach utilised is to consider mechanisms and tools for classification, guidance from the Operational Risk Data Exchange (ORX) and the BCBS, as well as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). By compiling and submitting questionnaires to five South African banks, an investigation is conducted in order to obtain a view of the current mechanisms, tools and approaches that South African Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) banks currently utilise within their classification processes. The effectiveness of boundary event classification is assessed by analysing the percentage of losses classified as boundary. In addition, the degree of uniformity or disparity in the classification of typical boundary event scenarios is considered. This analysis is performed by providing respondents with a total of 16 typical boundary event risk descriptions, and requesting the respondents to classify each of the losses in the scenarios as credit risk, operational risk or boundary event type. / Thesis (M.Com. (Risk management))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012.

The financial crisis turmoil has exposed notable weakness in the risk management processes of the financial services industry. It has also led to a critical look at the scope of the various risk types as well as the classification of loss events. More importantly, the effects that incorrect risk classification might have on capital requirements are now also examined and taken into account. Boundary events between credit risk and operational risk continue to be a significant source of concern for regulators and the industry in general. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) requires that boundary events should be treated as credit risk for the purposes of calculating minimum regulatory capital under the Basel II Framework. Such losses will, therefore, not be subject to any operational risk capital charges. However, for the purposes of internal operational risk management, banks are required to identify all material operational risk losses. Boundary events should be flagged separately within a bank’s internal operational risk database. The Basel II Framework does not provide any further guidelines as to what constitutes boundary events and, therefore, consistent guiding principles that banks can follow for accurately classifying and subsequently flagging such events do not exist. The potential exists that actual boundary events might be classified as purely credit risk, and correctly be included in the credit risk capital charge, but not be flagged separately within the bank’s internal operational risk database. Alternatively, boundary events might be classified as operational risk and, therefore, be subject to the operational risk capital charge, instead of the credit risk capital charge. The former instance might give rise to an operational risk manager not being completely informed of the operational risks that the business is facing. The emphasis should always be on the management of risks and for this reason it is important that a financial institution indicates and flags all boundary events in their operational risk systems. To remedy this lack of guidance on the boundary event issue, guidelines are provided that banks can utilise within their risk classification processes. The approach utilised is to consider mechanisms and tools for classification, guidance from the Operational Risk Data Exchange (ORX) and the BCBS, as well as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). By compiling and submitting questionnaires to five South African banks, an investigation is conducted in order to obtain a view of the current mechanisms, tools and approaches that South African Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) banks currently utilise within their classification processes. The effectiveness of boundary event classification is assessed by analysing the percentage of losses classified as boundary. In addition, the degree of uniformity or disparity in the classification of typical boundary event scenarios is considered. This analysis is performed by providing respondents with a total of 16 typical boundary event risk descriptions, and requesting the respondents to classify each of the losses in the scenarios as credit risk, operational risk or boundary event type. / Thesis (M.Com. (Risk management))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012.

台灣已於2007年初正式實施新巴塞爾資本協定(BASEL II)之相關規範，此協定透過三大支柱，強化銀行整體之風險管理，為了使我國金融體系與制度能與國際接軌，金融監理機關已發布相關管理方法與計算方式，以加強其政策面與實務面之配合，而銀行也針對其風險管理制度，進行模型建構與測試，並透過定性及定量等公開揭露，使資本適足率之計算更具風險敏感性，落實市場監督功能。 本研究利用文獻分析與整理，對新巴塞爾資本協定作一整體性之探討與介紹，並針對信用風險之規範，透過訪談，以國內某國際商業銀行為例，描述其建置信用風險管理組織架構過程及目前實施概況。惟當前多數之國內金融機構尚未具有直接實施內部評等法的條件，客戶亦多為國內中小型企業，造成信用評等取得不易，又因為成本與人力分配之考量，導致其實施內部評等法之誘因不足，因此實施近兩年來，銀行仍多採行信用風險標準法。 本論文針對此現象，將分別由銀行與監理機關兩個面向進行探討並提出相關建議，國內各銀行不論其信用風險之資本計提方式是使用標準法或準備邁向基礎與進階之內部評等法，皆應在其成本效益及經濟規模之考量下，建置能判斷授信客戶風險之內部評等模型與整體信用風險控管架構；而金融監理機關也應正視此趨勢，主動並積極建立相關之信用風險資料庫，或與聯徵中心合作，加強我國中小企業之信用評等模型，並應儘速培訓信用風險相關人才，以具備判別各銀行內部信用評等模型差異性之能力。 / Basel II has changed the game of the financial system, and the regime started on 1st January 2007 in Taiwan. The new regulatory capital framework provides incentives for a stronger risk management and makes regulatory capital much closer to economic capital. Furthermore, it relies more on high quality and accurate data, which requires convergence of risk and financial data, information and reporting. However, since the financial crisis began in mid-2007, the majority of losses and most of the build up of leverage occurred not only in the banking but the trading book. An important factor was that the current capital framework for both credit and market risks, a subject whose importance is gaining momentum among the bank these days. The Basel II Accord requires banks to keep capital for Credit risk for banking book exposures and Market risk for trading book exposures. As a result, the bank may be forced to hold more capital than current rules demand to guard against losses on some kind of complex financial products. Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission has decided to implement Basel II starting from 2007 and the implementation has resulted in a significant impact in the banking industry in Taiwan. However, two years later, most of the banks in Taiwan are still using the standard method to calculate its Credit Risk. By consulting and investigating the Basel II implementation in some representative local banks in Taiwan, this research find some issues and presents several suggestions of the BASEL II implementation in Taiwan.

Copulas are multivariate probability distributions, as well as functions which link marginal distributions to their joint distribution. These functions have been used extensively in finance and more recently in other disciplines, for example hydrology and genetics. This study has two components, (a) the development of copula-based mathematical tools for use in all industries, and (b) the application of distorted copulas in structured finance. In the first part of this study, copulabased conditional expectation formulae are described and are applied to small data sets from medicine and hydrology. In the second part of this study we develop a method of improving the estimation of default risk in the context of collateralized debt obligations. Credit risk is a particularly important application of copulas, and given the current global financial crisis, there is great motivation to improve the way these functions are applied. We compose distortion functions with copula functions in order to obtain greater flexibility and accuracy in existing pricing algorithms. We also describe an n-dimensional dynamic copula, which takes into account temporal and spatial changes. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Mathematical sciences, 2009

This work empirically examines six structural models of the term structure of credit risk spreads: Merton (1974), Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) (with and without stochastic interest rates), Leland & Toft (1996), Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001), and a constant elasticity of variance model. The conventional approach to testing structural models has involved the use of observable data to proxy the latent capital structure process, which may introduce additional specification error. This study extends Jones, Mason & Rosenfeld (1983) and Eom, Helwege & Huang (2004) by using implicit estimation of key model parameters resulting in an improved level of model fit. Unlike prior studies, the models are fitted from the observed dynamic term structure of firm-specific credit spreads, thereby providing a pure test of model specification. The models are implemented by adapting the method of Duffee (1999) to structural credit models, thereby treating the capital structure process is truly latent, and simultaneously enforcing cross-sectional and time-series model constraints. Quasi-maximum likelihood parameter estimates of the capital structure process are obtained via the extended Kalman filter applied to actual market trade prices on 32 firms and 200 bonds for the period 1994 to 2000. / We find that including an allowance for time-variation in the market liquidity premium improves model specification. A simple extension of the Merton (1974) model is found to have the greatest prediction accuracy, although all models performed with similar prediction errors. At between 28.8 to 34.4 percent, the root mean squared error of the credit spread prediction is comparable with reduced-form models. Unlike Eom, Helwege & Huang (2004) we do not find a wide dispersion in model prediction errors, as evidenced by an across model average mean absolute percentage error of 22 percent. However, in support of prior studies we find an overall tendency for slight underprediction, with the mean percentage prediction error of between -6.2 and -8.7 percent. Underprediction is greatest with short remaining bond tenor and low rating. Credit spread prediction errors across all models are non-normal, and fatter tailed than expected, with autocorrelation evident in their time series. / More complex models did not outperform the extended Merton (1974) model; in particular stochastic interest-rate and early default accompanied by an exogenous write-down rate appear to add little to model accuracy. However, the inclusion of solvency ratio mean-reversion in the Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) model results in the most realistic latent solvency dynamics as measured by its implied levels of asset volatility, default boundary level, and mean-reversion rate. The extended Merton (1974) is found to imply asset volatility levels that are too high on average when compared to observed firm equity volatility. / We find that the extended Merton (1974) and the Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) models account for approximately 43 percent of the credit spread on average. For BB rated trades, the explained proportion rises to 55 to 60 percent. For investment grade trades, our results suggest that the amount of the credit spread that is default related is approximately double the previous estimate of Huang & Huang (2003). / Finally, we find evidence that the prediction errors are related to market-wide factors exogenous to the models. The percentage prediction errors are positively related to the VIX and change in GDP, and negatively related to the Refcorp-Treasury spread.

Diss. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006.

Thesis (Ph. D. in Business Administration)--University of California, Berkeley, May 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-73).

<p>Today all private corporations are obligated by statutory audit. The government of Sweden appointed an investigation to conclude if the audit should be statutory or not. The investigator presented on the third of April 2008 a report (SOU 2008:32) that suggests abolishment of the statutory audit for approximately 97 % of all private corporations in Sweden. This will result in certain effects on the banks credit rating because of the fact that the banks trust the audited accounts to have been audited by an independent audit.</p><p>The most important in the banks credit rating are: personal judgement, business concept, business plan and repayment ability. The banks also use the private corporations audited accounts in its credit rating.</p><p>We conducted a case study by interviewing four bank officials in different banks in Skövde and Tibro. The purpose of the study was to investigate the banks credit rating and the audits importance in the credit rating.</p><p>The conclusion deducted from our case study it that the confidence between the bank and the company is very high valued and that the audit is a sign of quality.</p>