First, this thesis outhnes part of the thought of some pre-Socratic thinkers, particularly Heraclitus. In doing this, I explore the historical provenance of certain ideas which came to be important in Stoicism. It then moves on to look at the Stoic view of 'physics', including some comparison with Epicurus and Aristotle, and with a focus on the concept of the continuum. The third chapter attempts to synthesise a common problem arising from a belief in the continuum, namely a problem of indeterminacy. In the fourth chapter, certain characterisations of Stoic epistemology are considered, along with an overview of recent interpretations of the Stoic theory of impressions. It concludes with the thought that at certain crucial points - such as whether impressions themselves are to be thought of as true and false - the Stoic position is underdetermined with respect to the evidence. Pursuing this thought into the fifth chapter, we see the evidence as being equivalently consistent with a 'two-tier’ theory of perception, where impressions themselves are understood as neither true nor false in any sense, but iu which 'the true' arises as a result of the transformative effect of reason. This theory is shown to connect with verbalisation through the 'rational impression'. This leads to the suggestion that the Stoics had a linguistic diagnosis for some problems in philosophy, arrived at by their reflections on ambiguity and etymology. In the final chapter, an account of intersubjectivity is explored, which preserves for the Stoics the claim that their truth has an objective character and is thus appropriate for a 'dogmatic' philosophy.

Leo Strauss nous dispose de bien des manières à attendre de son œuvre une philosophie politique forte et originale. Il nous y dispose en premier lieu par sa critique vigoureuse de la sociologie et de l’historicisme, et par sa défense non moins vigoureuse de la philosophie et de la possibilité de la philosophie politique. Il nous y dispose par-dessus tout par la manière dont il rend compte, dans ses introductions notamment, de l’impulsion de sa recherche : constatant une crise sans précédent dans les sociétés libérales et dans le rationalisme moderne constitutif de ces sociétés, Strauss nous invite à retrouver chez les Anciens une compréhension adéquate des phénomènes politiques, et un rationalisme qui soit pour ainsi dire fidèle à la condition politique de l’homme. D’un autre côté pourtant, son œuvre nous semble toujours nous dérober cette élucidation des choses politiques. Strauss ne dit en particulier rien des régimes, des partis, des guerres, des nations qui animèrent si violemment la politique moderne. Il ne semble considérer cette dernière qu’aux lumières de sa pointe nihiliste ou relativiste d’un côté, et de son origine dans les projets des premiers philosophes modernes – Machiavel, Hobbes, Spinoza. Et lorsqu’il revient aux Anciens, il nous livre des commentaires si pointus et si attentifs de leurs œuvres, qu’il décourage toute tentative d’en extraire des considérations plus générales. Il est vrai qu’il nous livre également des exposés généraux sur la philosophie politique classique, qu’il caractérise notamment par ces deux traits : sa fidélité à la perspective citoyenne sur les choses politiques, et l’attention centrale qu’elle porte à la question du régime. Mais comment se fait-il que le philosophe qui ne nous dise quasiment rien des régimes dans la politique moderne nous intéresse par ailleurs par-dessus tout à la question des régimes ? N’est-ce pas que son portrait paradoxal de la modernité, loin d’être dû à un oubli du politique, est en fait la contrepartie d’une réflexion sur la politique ? N’a-t-il pas pensé que la modernité se caractérisait précisément par un éloignement toujours plus décidé de la condition politique de l’homme ? Dans ce cas, en dépit de notre perplexité, il doit bel et bien y avoir une compréhension straussienne des choses politiques, que l’on doit pouvoir extraire de son œuvre. Quelle est cette compréhension et comment devons-nous en juger ? Telles sont les questions de cette thèse, qui se déploie en deux grandes parties : I. L’analyse straussienne de la politique moderne II. Le phénomène politique dans la philosophie politique classique. Nous avons ainsi soumis l’œuvre de Leo Strauss à un questionnement sur la nature des choses politiques, en trouvant chez d’autres auteurs tels Claude Lefort, Eric Voegelin, Aurel Kolnai et Pierre Manent, de quoi nourrir ce questionnement et mettre en perspective l’approche de Strauss. / Summary not transmitted

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 4864.pdf: 721402 bytes, checksum: dd3da0b334fa484f2f42386b5e93de5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-12-19 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the philosophical discussion around Reification developed by Georg Lukács in History and Class Consciousness (1923). In this piece, the discussion of Reification presents its originality, so, for Marx the discussion of Reification was centered mainly on the material relations among men within the productive process, in History and Class Consciousness however the theory is connected to the process of material formation of the reified objectivity. This theory would be built within the development of German classical philosophy, since as Lukács first analyzes the objective forms of Reification within the socioeconomic structure the conceptualization of Reification based on Marx economic analysis and this takes to the displacement of the problem of the reified formation of consciousness in the philosophical thinking, Lukács presents his materialist interpretation of the consciousness formation: this last one possesses a material formation basis, determined by the capitalist production of commodities. This displacement represents a connection between Marxism and German classical philosophy around the issue of forming the Subject in History. In this dissertation our efforts are directed to understand the way, according to Lukács, German classical philosophy strives to produce in the History a self-knowing universal Subject and as this striving reaches the fetishist limit of its own reified formation. The main purpose is to reveal how, according to Lukács, the consciousness formation corresponds to the fetish; formation analyzed in the historical progression of bourgeois antinomic thinking. This progression corresponds to the several levels of problematisation of the Being and to the attempts of the reified subjectivity s overcoming within the development of German classical philosophy. Our perspective seeks the understanding of how the progression of antinomies allows the dialectical interpretation of the material foundations that determine the formation of consciousness in the philosophical level. / Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a discussão filosófica acerca da reificação desenvolvida por Georg Lukács em História e Consciência de Classe (1923). Nessa obra, a discussão da reificação apresenta uma originalidade, pois, se em Marx a discussão da reificação centrava-se, sobretudo, nas relações materiais entre os homens no interior processo produtivo, em História e Consciência de Classe a própria teoria está em conexão com o processo de formação material da objetividade reificada. A teoria em questão seria a teoria formada no desenvolvimento da filosofia clássica alemã, pois, ao analisar primeiramente as formas objetivas da reificação na estrutura socioeconômica a conceituação da reificação a partir das análises econômicas de Marx , para depois deslocar o problema para a formação reificada da consciência no pensamento filosófico, Lukács apresenta a sua interpretação materialista acerca da formação da consciência: esta última possui uma base de formação material nos moldes da produção capitalista de mercadorias. Esse deslocamento efetuado representa um vínculo entre o marxismo e a filosofia clássica alemã em torno da questão da formação do sujeito na história. Nesta dissertação, nossos esforços se dão no sentido de buscar compreender como, para Lukács, a filosofia clássica alemã buscou produzir um sujeito universal conhecedor de si mesmo na história e como essa busca esbarra no limite fetichista de sua própria formação reificada. O propósito fundamental seria revelar como, a partir da exposição de Lukács, a formação da consciência corresponde à formação do fetiche; formação esta examinada na progressão histórica das antinomias do pensamento burguês. Esta progressão corresponderia aos vários níveis de problematização do ser e às tentativas de superação da subjetividade reificada no desenvolvimento da filosofia clássica alemã. Nossa perspectiva visa procurar compreender como a progressão das antinomias permite interpretar dialeticamente os fundamentos materiais que determinam a formação ao nível da consciência filosófica.