¡@Ever since the foundation in 2000, the branches of Administrative Enforcement Agency have been handling the cases of monetary payment duty in public law with the total amount reaching 3,0178,624, by only about the workforce of 400 people in average while bringing in 1,133,000,000 financial income for the nation in six years. Among these cases, 24,386,174 are closed, which are more effective than in the past and helpful in keeping the publics from evading their duties by luck and therefore realizing the social fairness and justice, thus manifesting the public authority. However, there are still many problems hiding behind the new organizations and their systems, as the number indicates: unresolved cases reach 5,809,904 while 3,732 1,1609,753 dollars are unexecuted. In order to reduce the number of unclosed cases and enhance the administrative efficiency from two indexes: rate of the case-closing and levied tax, the thesis had combined the transaction cost theory from the Coase Theorem with the concept of opportunity cost in law economics, and had discussed the forming causes and strategies from three aspects under the principle of maximum efficiency, while not omitting the point of view of the public choices by the people of the duty. Three main conclusions are therefore made as follow: Firstly, speaking of system in terms of case management and evaluation, the amount of case closed must outnumbers the case received, while different types of cases (according to the amount of money) must be reduced in proportion; moreover, specific execution procedure should be arranged according to its types, and to indicate a clear termination of the time rather than being delayed for too long. Secondly, as far as the case efficiency is concerned, the more payment channel ,the better. In addition, by using information technology, it is effective in exchanging the information among different individuals, and speeding up the case to be closed. Thirdly, in the part of case receiving, be sure to monitor the loading of cases according to the workforce and to adjust the human resource or control the speed of case receiving. Setting up the voucher re-transfer evaluation mechanism to avoid the running-empty of administrative procedure and the waste of resource; to build up the pre-case database and to provide decision support system of the case execution so as to reduce the cost of research and decision making.

No description available.

Behavioral economics is widely recognized as a rising field in economics, one whose discoveries and implications are not yet completed or understood. At the same time, economic theory plays an enormous role in our governmental and legal system. In particular, the Coase Theorem and its implications have affected nearly every area in the field of law and economics. This paper proposes a experimental test of Coasean bargaining in situations using two competitive players whose payoffs depend on minimizing their costs of mitigating the externality. A rational player’s action can be predicted ahead of time, and the rationality of the game’s outcome can be objectively measured. If behavioral effects found in consumer goods situations by other experimenters carry over to competitive business situations, then a substantial review of law regarding such situations is in order.

Stuttgart, Univ., Diss., 2007.

Die bisherigen Heranziehungsmodelle der Rechtsökonomik bei der Rechtsanwendung geht vor allem davon aus, dass die Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip in bestimmten Rechtsordnungen inbegriffen ist. Dies schränkt aber die Rolle der Rechtsökonomik für die Rechtsanwendung ein. Da der Rechtsanwender in Deutschland sowohl am geltenden Recht als auch an wissenschaftlichen Gesetzen binden soll, kann die Rechtsökonomik als die im Sinne vom kritischen Rationalismus genannte Wissenschaft zur Erklärung menschlichen Verhaltens unter Berücksichtigung der gegebenen Rechtszuordnungen bezeichnet werden. Daraus ergibt sich, dass die aus der wissenschaftlichen Rechtsökonomik abgeleitete Gesetzmäßigkeit dem Rechtsanwender nachkommen soll, sodass die Rechtsökonomik als Rechtsanwendungsmethode unbeschränkt bei der Rechtsanwendung verwertet werden kann. Bei der Auswahl rechtsdogmatischer Lehrsätze bei der Rechtsanwendung ist das Werturteil unvermeidlich, mithilfe des vom kritischen Rationalismus vertretenen Brückenprinzips und Komparativismus kann die Werturteilproblematik bei der Rechtsanwendung durch die positive Wissenschaft und Rechtsökonomik gelöst werden. Die konkrete Methode zur Auswahl rechtsdogmatischer Lehrsätze ist es, dass durch die positive Rechtsökonomik diese rechtsdogmatische Lehre auszuwählen ist, die im Vergleich mit anderen konkurrierenden Lehren das restriktive Minimum der Transaktionskosten darstellt und somit die faktische Geltung der entsprechenden rechtlichen Regelung unter dem gegebenen Umstand am höchsten verwirklicht. / The previous application models of economics of law in the judicial application assume that efficiency as a legal principle is included in the jurisdiction. However, this limits the role of economics of law in the judicial application. As the legal practitioner in Germany shall obey applicable laws and scientific laws, economics of law can be recognized as a real science in the sense of critical rationalism, explaining the human behavior under the condition of the given legal order. It follows that the regularity derived from the scientific economics of law shall be complied with by the legal practitioner, so that the economics of law can be indefinitely used in the judicial application. By selecting the concrete legal dogmatic doctrines in the judicial application, the value judgement is inevitable. With the help of bridge principle and comparativism of the critical rationalism, the value judgement problem can be resolved through the positive science and the positive economics of law. The concrete method of selecting legal dogmatic doctrines is that the legal dogmatic doctrine, which represents the restrictive minimum of the transaction costs and thus realizes the de facto validity of the relevant legal provisions under the given circumstance in highest grade, shall be selected through the positive economics of law.

Student Number : 7909638 - MCom dissertation - School of Economics and Business Sciences - Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management / Healthcare, it can be argued, is a commodity that has a social constitution. The reason may be because healthcare is seen to have its foundation in socio-economic principles but has evolved through scientific study and business application into a profitable business. The delivery of healthcare in South Africa and in many parts of the world has come under immense scrutiny from policy-makers, high-volume purchasers, patient-consumers and the healthcare community. Arguments criticizing the high cost of healthcare delivery range from levelling the blame on one component (pharmaceuticals, medical fees, inadequate medical scheme cover to name a few examples) to a condemnation of the entire healthcare delivery system. The healthcare cost deliberation has also shifted to the centre stage in many public-policy debates and certainly caught the imagination of the public and journalists alike. It is an emotional debate. A review of related literature of the past fifty years (such as the Sainsbury Report (1967), the Kefauver Hearings (1963) and the Snyman Report (1962)), reveals that healthcare and the cost of healthcare delivery are some of the most frequently debated areas amongst the citizens and policy makers of both the developed and developing world. Pharmaceutical prices, more often than not, have been cast as the primary reason that the delivery cost of healthcare is so high. The methods used by pharmaceutical companies to promote their products – elaborate conventions, colourful brochures and generous amounts of free samples (certainly in previous years) to physicians may have contributed to this perception. Furthermore, the fact that the absolute cost of manufacturing a single capsule or tablet (including drugs that are no longer under patent) is a small fraction of the actual selling price also tends to raise the public ire. A greater understanding of pricing structures is necessary to appreciate this sector. The writer’s own experience in the area of healthcare that involves insurance for medical risks (medical schemes - the private healthcare funding system) suggests that it is crucial that pharmaceutical pricing structures be understood against this backdrop. Therefore the main reasons for undertaking this study are: i. to appreciate the pricing structures of pharmaceuticals to inform policy debates; ii. the current empirical evidence1 in the South African market has indicated that pharmaceuticals are unfairly priced and has prompted the Department of Health to introduce price regulations2. One goal of the research is to ascertain whether this is accurate; and iii. to obtain a broader knowledge base of the issue of pharmaceutical pricing practices in the South African healthcare market. It was with this approach that the area of pharmaceutical pricing and the topic was decided upon.

Mass., Harvard Univ., Dep. of Economics, Diss.--Cambridge, 2003. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich. - Enth. 3 Beitr.

<p>The right to personal data is compared with the right to land. The concept of rights may be regarded as bundles of rights of which the right to use of scarce resources, the right to exclude and the right transfer rights are the most important ones. The development of Information Technology has reduced considerably the cost of using personal data leadingto an increased use of the data in the context of direct marketing by different firms. However, the use and processing of personal data may cause externalities, both positive and negative ones, on the individual to whom the data relates. This situation can be analysed with the Coase Theorem, where the transaction costs have important function. In a state of zero transaction costs the parties, firms and individuals, can make agreements of an optimal use of the personal data, independently of the assignments of rights to the personal data. Such agreements internalise further the externalities. However, in the real life the transaction costs are high meaning that the assignments of rights are most significant leading to that the externalities remain. To pass by the problem of transaction costs and externalities, zoning procedure with transference of rights can be used. The background of bundles of right to personal data together with the Coase Theorem and zoning procedure are applied to the Directive 95 /46/EC adopted by the European Union regarding the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy. This Directive may however be interpreted in different ways leading to that the assignment of rights and level of direct marketing is different between Member States.</p>

This dissertation is devoted to the analysis of various aspects of inefficiency in the political economy. It consists of four self-containing theoretical essays. The first two chapters deal with the interplay between inefficiency and commitment. Chapter 1 studies the problem of commitment in autocratic regimes and its implications for growth. Chapter 2 argues that the absence of commitment undermines the validity of the Coase theorem. The next two chapters address alternative sources of inefficiency, abstracting from commitment-related problems. Chapter 3 discusses inefficiencies arising in organizations whose members possess veto power and suggests a way of mitigating the problem. Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of demand linkages on the efficiency of lobbying for trade policy. Chapter 1. “Autocracy, Devolution and Growth” Some autocracies have sustained high economic growth for many decades; others have stagnated at low levels of production. Paradoxically, the stagnating autocracies appear to possess more natural resources and be more resistant to political change than the growing autocracies. The paper argues that the scope for capital accumulation and growth in an autocracy is largely determined by the autocrat's incentive to cling to power. The main result of the paper is that there will be private capital accumulation only if the autocrat’s benefits from political control are not too high. The reason is that, as capital accumulates and growth slows down, the autocrat faces an increasing temptation to expropriate the capitalists. Since expropriation eliminates growth, the autocrat may voluntarily refrain from expropriating if future growth is sufficiently large; otherwise, the temptation to expropriate can only be resisted through a credible commitment, that is, by devolving some political power. For autocrats with large benefits of control, for example valuable natural resource rents, devolution of power may always be unattractive. As a result, capitalists realize that they will eventually be expropriated, and capital accumulation therefore never starts. On the other hand, autocrats with small resource rents will eventually devolve power, since this commitment is necessary to sustain growth. Therefore, capitalists are willing to start accumulating despite the autocratic regime. In other words, autocracies are vulnerable to the resource curse.   Chapter 2. “The Coase Theorem Is False” (with Tore Ellingsen) The paper provides simple and robust counterexamples to the Coase Theorem. More precisely, we show that equilibrium investments in club goods can be suboptimally small despite the presence of well-defined and perfectly protected property rights and the absence of transaction costs and informational asymmetries. The reason is that, in equilibrium, a club of owners will typically not exercise their right to exclude outsiders, preferring instead to exercise their right to sell access. As long as the club of owners does not have all the bargaining power in such ex post access negotiations, strategic non-membership provides a valuable free-riding opportunity. Chapter 3. “Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity” (with Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart and Guido Friebel) In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogeneous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on the entire organization. In the presence of externalities and an incomplete charter, the threat of forming an “inner organization” can undermine the veto power of the less efficient members and coerce them to exert more effort. We identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is never executed, and under which inner organizations are equilibrium outcomes, and provide a rationale for the diversity of decision rules. Chapter 4. “Protection for Sale to Oligopolists” This paper modifies Grossman and Helpman’s "Protection for Sale" model by allowing demand linkages and oligopolistic competition. It shows that increased substitutability between products weakens interest groups’ incentives to lobby. For the case of two industries it obtains a particularly simple result: the protection of the organized industry’s product falls, whereas the protection of the unorganized industry’s product increases with product substitutability. The model suggests that empirical studies of the "Protection for Sale" may overstate the lobby groups’ desire for protection. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

The right to personal data is compared with the right to land. The concept of rights may be regarded as bundles of rights of which the right to use of scarce resources, the right to exclude and the right transfer rights are the most important ones. The development of Information Technology has reduced considerably the cost of using personal data leadingto an increased use of the data in the context of direct marketing by different firms. However, the use and processing of personal data may cause externalities, both positive and negative ones, on the individual to whom the data relates. This situation can be analysed with the Coase Theorem, where the transaction costs have important function. In a state of zero transaction costs the parties, firms and individuals, can make agreements of an optimal use of the personal data, independently of the assignments of rights to the personal data. Such agreements internalise further the externalities. However, in the real life the transaction costs are high meaning that the assignments of rights are most significant leading to that the externalities remain. To pass by the problem of transaction costs and externalities, zoning procedure with transference of rights can be used. The background of bundles of right to personal data together with the Coase Theorem and zoning procedure are applied to the Directive 95 /46/EC adopted by the European Union regarding the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy. This Directive may however be interpreted in different ways leading to that the assignment of rights and level of direct marketing is different between Member States.