As the international relations changed tremendously after the Cold War Era, the foreign policies of Mainland China also made a great deal change. And due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mainland China came to new perspectives on international systems; that is, the ¡§multi-polar international system¡¨ had replaced the ¡§bipolar system.¡¨ And under the hegemony of the United States, the international system should transform into ¡§one superpower with multi-polar system.¡¨ But whatever the international system could be, Mainland China has begun to consider itself as a pole in the international system after the Cold War. The concept of being a pole became more evident when Ze-Min Jiang unveiled the idea of ¡§major power foreign policy¡¨ in 1997. This is became the concept of ¡§major power¡¨ was somewhat similar with the ¡§pole¡¨ as Xiao-Ping Deng proposed before. Under the premise of being an international major power, ¡§power¡¨ had been set up as the diplomatic goal that Mainland China kept pursuing. In other words, Mainland China wanted to be an internationally powerful and influential ¡§major power.¡¨ And the importance of the Third World countries served the place where China expected them to be strategic partners. However, as the confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union gradually vanished, the political ideology that maintained the relationship between Mainland China and the Third World also weakened. Having kept the mission of making good relations with the Third World countries, the Chinese found it was necessary to have common interest for both, and therefore, even economic strategy as well as economic measures could play alternative role for Chinese foreign policy.

The September 11 terrorist attacks brought a discourse on the transatlantic rift to the agenda of international community. In fact, at the end of the CW, the emergence of the US as the leading hegemonic power gave way to transatlantic divergences concerning security perceptions and strategies of the post-CW era. Also, NATO has been challenged with these drastic changes in the international system. Yet, owing to the initiatives taken for the transformation of the Atlantic alliance during the 1990s, NATO maintained its relevance for the new world order. However, the divergences of the US and Europeans on their strategies to deal with the post-September 11 security threats led to another discussions about the future of NATO. Indeed, as the US&rsquo / post-September 11 unilateral policies deepened the transatlantic rift already underway since the end of the CW, on the way to Iraq war, NATO turned out to be the place where the divisions between the allies were reflected the most. Hence, the US&rsquo / preferences for ad hoc coalitions of the willing understanding damaged the longduring multilateral alliance by leading to a secondary role for NATO during the US&rsquo / Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. That is why, time is needed to see whether the old allies facing new threats can reconcile their differences in the name of a renewed transatlantic security cooperation through the initiatives taken within NATO?

This thesis aims at discussing the nature of relations between Russia and China and the Northeast Asian security during the post-Soviet era. The research question is whether Russia and Northeast Asian countries still pursue ideological policies after post-Cold War era. In this respect, the thesis argues that these countries act pragmatically instead of ideologically in the post-Cold War era. This has resulted in a rapprochement between communist China and post-Soviet Russia in the post-Soviet era. Moreover, ideological differences among any regional states do not constitute the basis of regional conflicts. It is rather North Korea&rsquo / s nuclear program that has become the main regional security threat. The thesis is composed of six chapters. After the introductionary chapter, the second chapter examines Russian-Chinese bilateral relations. The following three chapters discuss Russian-Chinese relations concerning the roles of Japan, South Korea and North Korea respectively in the Northeast Asian security. The last chapter is the conclusion.

The purpose of this study is to analyze and discuss Russia&rsquo / s Asia-Pacific policy after the end of the Cold War by focusing on Moscow&rsquo / s bilateral relations with the major regional countries and its overall multilateral approach and policies towards the Asia-Pacific region. Contrary to the views of scholars who claim that Russia has already emerged as a major power in the Asia-Pacific, the thesis argues that Russia&rsquo / s strategy of becoming a great power in the Asia-Pacific Region has significant limitations stemming from its competitive and assertive policies that ignore the role of multilateralism and international cooperation. Although Russia has been actively engaged in the region at the bilateral level and through its participation in the regional organizations in the post-Cold war era, this region has its own particular dynamics which necessitate a greater level of regional economic integration and a liberal approach to multilateralism rather than a realist &ldquo / power politics&rdquo / approach. Russia&rsquo / s policy of aligning itself with China militarily in the region has counterproductive consequences as it intensifies geopolitical competition in the region, and marginalizes Moscow further. The thesis is composed of six chapters. After the introduction, the second chapter examines origins of Russia&rsquo / s presence in the Asia-Pacific Region. The following chapter discusses the sources of Russia&rsquo / s increasing interest in the Region. The fourth chapter is concerned with Russia&rsquo / s relations with main actors of the Asia-Pacific Region while the fifth chapter focuses on Russia&rsquo / s involvement in theregional organizations. The last chapter is the conclusion.

²¤

Military strategy is in serve to national interests, which is the basic idea underpin this research. The subject of this thesis is ¡§Military Strategy of People's Liberation Army (PLA) toward Taiwan. The context of this thesis divided into six chapters: 1.Motivation, methodology, framework, target of this research and the definition of military strategy. 2. The change of world system and how it impacts the national interests of Mainland China.3.The national strategies of Mainland China.4. Analyzing the military strategies and actions which might be undertaken by PLA to attack Taiwan.5. The strategies of Taiwan's national military strategy against PLA is¡§effective deterrence and strong defense posture¡¨6.Perspective of the Taiwan's future national security .the damage control from Taiwan in the eventual military activities against PLA will be to strike the enemy before it reached the Taiwan's coast.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 401-417). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (D.A.)--Illinois State University, 2002. / Title from title page screen, viewed Aug. 13, 2004. Dissertation Committee: Gerlof Homan (chair), Richard Soderlund, Lawrence McBride. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 262-284) and abstract. Also available in print.

This dissertation examines the image of the child as it appeared in the propaganda and public rhetoric of the Cold War from approximately 1950 to 1968. It focuses on how American and Soviet politicians, propagandists, and critics depicted children in film, television, radio, and print. It argues that these groups constructed a new lexicon of childhood images to meet the unique challenges of the Cold War. They portrayed the young as facing new threats both inside and outside their borders, while simultaneously envisioning their children as mobilized in novel ways to defend themselves and their countries from infiltration and attack. These new images of the next generation performed a number of important functions in conceptualizing what was at stake in the Cold War and what needed to be done to win it. Politicians, propagandists, and individuals in the Soviet Union and the United States used images of endangered and mobilized children in order to construct a particular vision of the Cold War that could support their political and ideological agendas, including the enforcement of order in the private sphere, the construction of domestic and international legitimacy, and the mobilization of populations at home and abroad. At the same time, these images were open to contestation by dissenting groups on both sides of the Iron Curtain who refashioned the child's image in order to contest their governments’ policies and the Cold War consensus. What these images looked like in Soviet and American domestic and international discourse, why propagandists and dissent movements used these images to promote their policies at home and abroad, and what visions of the Cold War they created are the subjects of this dissertation. This project argues that the domestic demands of the Cold War altered American and Soviet visions of childhood. It is common wisdom that the 1950s and 60s was a period when child rearing practices and ideas about children were changing. This dissertation supports current arguments that American and Soviet parents sought more permissive approaches in raising children who they perceived as innocent and in need of protection. Yet it also finds substantial documentation showing that American and Soviet citizens embraced a new vision of idealized youth that was not innocent, but instead was mobilized for a war that had no foreseeable end. In the United States, children became participants in defending the home and the country from communist infiltration. In the Soviet Union, the state created a new vision of idealized youth that could be seen actively working towards a Soviet-led peace around the world. By using the child’s image as a category for analysis, this project also provides a window into how the Cold War was conceptualized by politicians, propagandists, and private citizens in the Soviet Union and the United States. In contrast to current scholarship, this dissertation argues that the Soviet state worked hard to create a popular vision of the Cold War that was significantly different from the “Great Fear” that dominated American culture in the 1950s and 60s. While in the United States, the conflict was portrayed as a defensive struggle against outside invasion, in official Soviet rhetoric it was presented as an active, international crusade for peace. As the 1960s progressed, and as the official rhetoric of the state came under increasing criticism, the rigid sets of categories surrounding the figuration of the Cold War child that had been established in the 1950s began to break down. While Soviet filmmakers during the Thaw created images of youth that appeared abandoned and traumatized by the world around them, anti-nuclear activists took to the streets with their children in tow in order to contest the state’s professed ability to protect their young. In the late 1960s, both the Soviet Union and the United States struggled to contain rising domestic unrest, and took the first steps in moving towards détente. As a consequence, the struggle between East and West moved to the post-colonial world, where again, the image of the child played a vital role in articulating and justifying policy. Visual and rhetorical images like that of the child served as cultural currency for creating and undermining conceptual boundaries in the Cold War. The current prevalence of childhood images in the daily construction and contestation of public opinion are the legacies of this era. / text

Richard Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972 marked a diplomatic breakthrough for Sino-American relations after two decades of mutual animosity since the Korean War. Nevertheless, the bilateral relations underwent a long stalemate in the mid-1970s, before the United States and China finally reached normalization of relations in December 1978. The scholarship on Sino-American relations in the 1970s tends to focus on Nixon’s visit or normalization of relations, without paying adequate attention to how Washington and Beijing dealt with the mid-decade deadlock. My report addresses this gap in the literature by analyzing the changing dynamism of Sino-American relations, determined first by Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong, and later by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deng Xiaoping. Kissinger sought to establish a triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and China, where the United States could manipulate the Sino-Soviet antagonism to improve its relations with both communist giants. With the failure of his initial idea of creating an anti-Soviet united front with Washington, Mao, through his Three World theory, championed the Third World struggle against both superpowers in competition for global hegemony in the disguise of détente. With Kissinger clinging to superpower détente and Mao determined to maintain a revolutionary China, their strategies were doomed to a stalemate. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski tried to create a bilateral structure, where the United States cooperated with China to confront the Soviet Union, which expanded its influence globally despite ongoing détente. Unlike Mao, Deng sought to replace revolution with development as China’s national agenda, by emphasizing modernization, instead of the Three World theory, in Chinese foreign policy. Their global strategies necessitated mutual cooperation, creating momentum for normalization negotiations, especially after Brzezinski’s trip to China in May 1978. The shifting dynamism in Sino-American relations from the Kissinger-Mao years to Brzezinski-Deng years, therefore, precipitated normalization of relations in the late 1970s. / text