Dexter Morgan is a serial killer, but he may not be blameworthy for his actions There are two possible explanations that could absolve Dexter of moral responsibility: (1) His inability to empathize with others makes it so that he cannot make appropriate moral decisions. Or (2) his serial killing tendencies are determined in nature, set off by events of which he had no control. I conclude that Dexter is, in fact, morally responsible for his actions because he is capable of second order desires

In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions. The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is that of choosing what to do and how to act. We see that we are free when we view things from a practical perspective. Determinism cannot threaten our practical freedom, since from a practical perspective we must choose what to do even if everything ultimately is determined. I argue that practical freedom is sufficient freedom-wise for moral agency and moral responsibility because morality is action-guiding. Right and wrong are concepts to be employed in deliberation and advice. This is a strong reason to regard factors irrelevant to deliberators and advisers as irrelevant when making judgements of right and wrong, and whether somebody had some other kind of freedom than practical freedom is irrelevant to deliberators and advisers. There are also prima facie reasons to regard moral responsibility as tied to rightness and wrongness, so that agents are blameworthy when they did wrong (or subjectively wrong, or what would have been wrong given their state of information and so on) and praiseworthy when they did right (subjectively right and so on). I also show that no classic arguments for incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility work when directed against practical perspective compatibilism. Finally, this thesis discusses metaethics in relation to compatibilism. Since competing theories imply the falsity of some respected metaethical positions, metaethical considerations lend further support to practical perspective compatibilism. / I den här avhandlingen argumenterar jag för en tes som jag kallar “praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism”. Enligt praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är det så att en agent med praktisk frihet är tillräckligt fri för att vara en moralisk agent och moraliskt ansvarig. Praktisk frihet är ett koncept vi ursprungligen hittar hos Kant. Det används också av en del nutida Kantianer. Kant argumenterade för att vi kan betrakta världen från antingen ett praktiskt eller ett teoretiskt perspektiv. Det teoretiska perspektivet är det vi har när vi gör förutsägelser och hittar kausala förklaringar, medan det praktiska är det vi har när vi väljer och handlar. Vi kan se att vi är fria när vi ser på tillvaron ur det praktiska perspektivet. Determinismen kan inte hota vår praktiska frihet, för vi måste välja våra handlingar oavsett om allting i slutändan är determinerat. I denna avhandling definierar jag praktisk frihet på följande sätt: En agent har minimal praktisk frihet om och endast om han måste välja sina handlingar, och han tror att hans vilja är effektiv när det gäller att realisera de handlingsalternativ han funderat över och väljer mellan. En agent har maximal praktisk frihet om och endast om han har minimal praktisk frihet, hans vilja verkligen är effektiv, han har full information om de alternativ han funderar över, och alla alternativ han inte tänkt på är sådana att hans egna värderingar inte ger honom ett övervägande skäl att välja ett av dessa alternativ snarare än det han faktiskt väljer. Jag argumenterar för att praktisk frihet så definierat är tillräckligt med frihet för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar eftersom moralen är handlingsvägledande. Det betyder att rätt och fel är koncept som ska användas i övervägning av olika handlingsalternativ och rådgivning. Tredje-persons-omdömen om ifall någon handlade rätt eller fel måste vara sådana att de hypotetiskt sett skulle kunna fungera som råd; egenskapen att vara rätt eller fel kan inte förändras beroende på om vi ger råd eller bara faller omdömen. Detta är ett starkt skäl för att betrakta faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare som irrelevanta när man faller omdömen om rätt och fel, och ifall någon hade en annan sorts frihet än den praktiska är irrelevant för övervägare och rådgivare. Vi har också prima facie skäl att betrakta moraliskt ansvar som knutet till rätt och fel, så att agenter är klandervärda när de gjorde fel (eller subjektivt fel, eller vad som skulle ha varit fel givet den information agenten hade osv) och berömvärda när de gjorde rätt (subjektivt rätt osv). Att det finns prima facie skäl för att betrakta praktisk frihet som tillräckligt för moraliskt ansvar utesluter förstås inte att det finns övervägande skäl för den motsatta ståndpunkten. Jag visar dock att inga klassiska argument för inkompatibilism om determinism och moraliskt ansvar fungerar när man riktar dem mot praktisk-perpsektiv-kompatibilism. Alla sådana argument förutsätter vad som skulle bevisas, nämligen att faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare är moraliskt relevanta, och att pålitliga moraliska intuitioner uppstår när vi betraktar agenter från ett teoretiskt snarare än praktiskt perspektiv. Slutligen diskuterar denna avhandling relationen mellan metaetik och kompatibilism. Praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är kompatibel med samtliga metaetiska teorier, medan det finns flera metaetiska teorier som implicerar att inkompatibilismen är falsk, och åtminstone en som implicerar att vissa kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Enligt en speciell Kantiansk konstruktivistisk teori så finns det rätt- och felaktiga handlingar och moraliskt ansvar på grund av att det finns praktisk frihet. Om detta är den sanna metaetiska teorin, så följer det att praktisk frihet är tillräckligt för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar, och att inte bara inkompatibilism men andra kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Beroende på vilken metaetisk teori som är den sanna, kan det alltså vara så att de föregående argumenten är överflödiga för att bevisa praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism. Det kan vara så att denna tes helt enkelt följer från den sanna metaetiska teorin.

In this thesis I attempt to introduce Galen Strawson's position, which he adopts in the free will debate followed by the debate about his Basic Argument. While giving a de-tailed account of responsibility as a reflective rational responsiveness, I show that re-sponsibility is in no respect causa sui and therefore it is not impossible for human beings to reach it, explained with the reasons given by Strawson. I refuse steps B, C, 8, 9 and 10 of the Basic Argument. I claim that undetermined self-determination consists in the ability to make a decision in the light of actually revised principles of choice. Such revision is granted by actual ability to reflect the validity and adequacy of principles of choice in relation to motivating values in question by using methodical doubt as a universal tool do to so. Such reflection, with respect to what matters for decision making in question, is potentially ultimate. I claim that Strawson underestimates the uniqueness of reflective rationality especially, when missing the crucial difference between Fido the dog and Nemo the man in the situation of choice. Moreover, I suspect Strawson of excluding the subject of action or choice and its actual principles of choice from the realm of intelligible things. This leads to disruption of request to conception of the world as internally consistent and in principle attainable by human beings. Finally, I show why I find sophisticated fatalism problematic in both of its versions, deterministic as well as indeterministic.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta é uma pesquisa sobre o uso de metáforas na construção de modelos por parte do físico escocês James Clerk Maxwell. O objetivo da pesquisa foi buscar compreender de que maneira o uso de metáforas e modelos é legítimo na ciência e em que medida contribui para seu sucesso. Além disso, busca compreender em que medida o uso de artifícios como modelos e analogias entre ramos distintos da ciência são impulsionadores de sucesso explicativo e preditivo da teoria do físico estudado. Explora as crenças teológicas e filosóficas do autor, que vê o mundo como unidade, permitindo a analogia entre ramos distintos da física. Seus desenvolvimentos em torno de teorias como calor, cores, óptica, magnetismo e eletricidade permitem evidenciar essa visão em todo o seu trabalho. Maxwell é considerado inaugurador de nova metodologia com o uso de modelos e metáforas. Explora o desenvolvimento da teoria das cores, da descrição matemática da estabilidade dos anéis de Saturno e o desenvolvimento da teoria dos gases como preâmbulo à discussão da teoria do eletromagnetismo. Descreve o desenvolvimento teórico do eletromagnetismo em seus diversos momentos. A construção da teoria do eletromagnetismo evidencia paulatino abandono do mecanicismo, uso intenso de modelos e metáforas temporários e ênfase na quantificação e no uso de experimentos. Discute o relacionamento de Maxwell com as discussões filosóficas, sociais e teológicas de sua época, seu engajamento em atividades práticas nesse sentido e suas influências científicas e filosóficas. Descreve e discute os textos filosóficos do cientista, em que se evidenciam sua ontologia, suas crenças teológicas e sua concepção de analogias. Discute a questão do uso de analogias em ciência e compara diversos autores que abordam o tema. A metodologia utilizada foi a de levantamento bibliográfico com análise crítica da literatura do autor e de seus comentadores, além de comentário crítico sobre os textos primários e secundários. Conclui que o sucesso científico de Maxwell deve-se à sua aposta numa unidade do mundo garantida por Deus, bem como na unidade entre o mundo e a mente humana, posturas que mostraram ser bem-sucedidas quando aplicadas à metodologia científica. Conclui também pela legitimidade e necessidade do uso de metáforas e modelos no empreendimento científico. / This is a research about the use of metaphors in the construction of models by the Scotish Physician James Clerk Maxwell. The aim of the research was to comprehend in which way the use of metaphors and models is legitimate in Science, and in what measure it contributes to its success. Also, tries to comprehend in which measure the use of artifices like models and analogies between different branches of Science forward the explicative and predictive success of the physicians theory that is studied here. It explores the theological and philosophycal beliefs of the author, who sees the world as a unity, allowing for the analogy between distinct branches of Physics. His developments with theories like heat, colour, optics, magnetism, and electricity enable to highlight this vision in the whole of his work. Maxwell is considered the starter of a new methodology with the use of models and metaphors. It explores the development of the theory of colours, the mathematical description of the stability of the rings of Saturn, and the development of the theory of gases as an introduction to the discussion of the theory of electromagnetism. It describes the theoretical development of electromagnetism in its several different moments. The theoretical construction of electromagnetism highlights the gradual abandonment of mecanicism, the intense use of temporary models and metaphors, and the enphasis in the quantification and use of experiments. It discusses the relationship between Maxwell and the philosophical, social and theological discussions of his time, his engagement in practical activities in this sense, and his cientific and philosophical influences. It describes and discusses the philosophical texts of the scientist, in which his ontology, his theological beliefs, and his analogy conceptions are highlighted. It discusses the issue of the use of analogies in Science, comparing several authors who deal with the subject. The methodology used was that of bibliographic survey with critical analysis of the authors literature, and of his commentators, and also a critical commentary on the primary and secondary texts. It concludes that the scientific success of Maxwell is due to his wager on the unity of the world guaranteed by God, as well as the unity between the world and the human mind, positions that showed to be well-succeeded when applied to the scientific methodology. It concludes also for the legitimacy and necessity of the use of metaphors and models in the scientific enterprise.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta é uma pesquisa sobre o uso de metáforas na construção de modelos por parte do físico escocês James Clerk Maxwell. O objetivo da pesquisa foi buscar compreender de que maneira o uso de metáforas e modelos é legítimo na ciência e em que medida contribui para seu sucesso. Além disso, busca compreender em que medida o uso de artifícios como modelos e analogias entre ramos distintos da ciência são impulsionadores de sucesso explicativo e preditivo da teoria do físico estudado. Explora as crenças teológicas e filosóficas do autor, que vê o mundo como unidade, permitindo a analogia entre ramos distintos da física. Seus desenvolvimentos em torno de teorias como calor, cores, óptica, magnetismo e eletricidade permitem evidenciar essa visão em todo o seu trabalho. Maxwell é considerado inaugurador de nova metodologia com o uso de modelos e metáforas. Explora o desenvolvimento da teoria das cores, da descrição matemática da estabilidade dos anéis de Saturno e o desenvolvimento da teoria dos gases como preâmbulo à discussão da teoria do eletromagnetismo. Descreve o desenvolvimento teórico do eletromagnetismo em seus diversos momentos. A construção da teoria do eletromagnetismo evidencia paulatino abandono do mecanicismo, uso intenso de modelos e metáforas temporários e ênfase na quantificação e no uso de experimentos. Discute o relacionamento de Maxwell com as discussões filosóficas, sociais e teológicas de sua época, seu engajamento em atividades práticas nesse sentido e suas influências científicas e filosóficas. Descreve e discute os textos filosóficos do cientista, em que se evidenciam sua ontologia, suas crenças teológicas e sua concepção de analogias. Discute a questão do uso de analogias em ciência e compara diversos autores que abordam o tema. A metodologia utilizada foi a de levantamento bibliográfico com análise crítica da literatura do autor e de seus comentadores, além de comentário crítico sobre os textos primários e secundários. Conclui que o sucesso científico de Maxwell deve-se à sua aposta numa unidade do mundo garantida por Deus, bem como na unidade entre o mundo e a mente humana, posturas que mostraram ser bem-sucedidas quando aplicadas à metodologia científica. Conclui também pela legitimidade e necessidade do uso de metáforas e modelos no empreendimento científico. / This is a research about the use of metaphors in the construction of models by the Scotish Physician James Clerk Maxwell. The aim of the research was to comprehend in which way the use of metaphors and models is legitimate in Science, and in what measure it contributes to its success. Also, tries to comprehend in which measure the use of artifices like models and analogies between different branches of Science forward the explicative and predictive success of the physicians theory that is studied here. It explores the theological and philosophycal beliefs of the author, who sees the world as a unity, allowing for the analogy between distinct branches of Physics. His developments with theories like heat, colour, optics, magnetism, and electricity enable to highlight this vision in the whole of his work. Maxwell is considered the starter of a new methodology with the use of models and metaphors. It explores the development of the theory of colours, the mathematical description of the stability of the rings of Saturn, and the development of the theory of gases as an introduction to the discussion of the theory of electromagnetism. It describes the theoretical development of electromagnetism in its several different moments. The theoretical construction of electromagnetism highlights the gradual abandonment of mecanicism, the intense use of temporary models and metaphors, and the enphasis in the quantification and use of experiments. It discusses the relationship between Maxwell and the philosophical, social and theological discussions of his time, his engagement in practical activities in this sense, and his cientific and philosophical influences. It describes and discusses the philosophical texts of the scientist, in which his ontology, his theological beliefs, and his analogy conceptions are highlighted. It discusses the issue of the use of analogies in Science, comparing several authors who deal with the subject. The methodology used was that of bibliographic survey with critical analysis of the authors literature, and of his commentators, and also a critical commentary on the primary and secondary texts. It concludes that the scientific success of Maxwell is due to his wager on the unity of the world guaranteed by God, as well as the unity between the world and the human mind, positions that showed to be well-succeeded when applied to the scientific methodology. It concludes also for the legitimacy and necessity of the use of metaphors and models in the scientific enterprise.

Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt sont inoffensifs contre l’argument de la conséquence (consequence argument), l’argument qui, à partir du principe des possibilités alternatives et du déterminisme, montre que nous ne pouvons être tenus moralement responsables de nos actions. En effet, ils sont formulés soit dans un cadre déterministe, soit dans un cadre indéterministe. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre indéterministe, ils sont inoffensifs parce qu’ils contreviennent à un principe méthodologique que nous défendons : le principe de non-négation des prémisses (PNNP). En fait, nous montrons que pour tout argument donné, il est proscrit de supposer la négation d’une prémisse afin de réfuter une autre prémisse à moins que l’attaque réussisse à réfuter les deux prémisses en question. Or, d’une part, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes supposent explicitement qu’une prémisse de l’argument de la conséquence – le déterminisme est vrai – est fausse; et d’autre part, ils ne peuvent pas nous donner de raisons de croire en l’indéterminisme, ce que nous montrons grâce à des considérations sur la transmission de la justification. Construire des contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes est donc incorrect pour des raisons méthodologiques et logiques. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre déterministe, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt font face à une autre accusation d’entorse argumentative, présentée dans la défense du dilemme (Dilemma Defence) de Kane-Ginet-Widerker : celle de la pétition de principe. Nous inspectons et nuançons cette accusation, mais concluons qu’elle tient puisque les contre-exemples de Frankfurt déterministes supposent au final une analyse des agents contrefactuels dans les mondes déterministes et de la relation « rendre inévitable » que ne peuvent endosser ni les incompatibilistes de la marge de manœuvre (leeway incompatibilists), ni les incompatibilistes de la source (source incompatibilists) ni non plus les semicompatibilistes. Conséquemment, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ne peuvent plus soutenir la forme de compatibilisme à laquelle ils ont donné naissance. L’incompatibilisme de la source ne peut plus être préféré à l’incompatibilisme de la marge de manœuvre ni non plus rejeter toute participation des possibilités alternatives dans l’explication de la responsabilité morale sur cette seule base. / Frankfurt-type examples are inoffensive against the Consequence argument, which purports to show that from both the principle of alternative possibilities and determinism, we can deduce that we are not morally responsible for our actions. Indeed, they require either a deterministic context or an indeterministic one. If they require indeterminism, they are harmless because they violate a methodological principle that we defend: the no-premise-negation principle (PNNP). In fact, we show that for each given argument, we cannot legitimately suppose the negation of a premise in order to refute another, unless the attack succeeds to refute both premises. Yet, on the one hand, indeterministic Frankfurt-type examples explicitly suppose that a premise of the Consequence argument – determinism holds – is false; and on the other hand, Frankfurt-type examples do not give us reasons to reject determinism, which we show with considerations on the transmission of justification. To build indeterministic Frankfurt scenarios is therefore incorrect for methodological and logical reasons. If they require determinism, Frankfurt-type examples are facing a different, yet very serious, argumentative accusation (presented in the Kane-Ginet-Widerker famous Dilemma defence): begging the question. We inspect and qualify this accusation. However, we ultimately claim that it still holds because a deterministic Frankfurt-type example supposes an analysis of the role of counterfactual agents and of the relation “render inevitable” in deterministic worlds that is acceptable neither for a leeway incompatibilist, a source incompatibilist or a semicompatibilist. Thus, Frankfurt-type examples no longer successfully support the form of compatibilism they contributed to give birth to. Also, source incompatibilism may not be preferred to leeway incompatibilism, nor reject all use of alternative possibilities in the explanation of moral responsibility on the sole basis of Frankfurt scenarios.

No description available.

Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.