School of Economics and Political Science, Diss.--London.

Cette thèse traite de l'utilisation et de la dispense de conseils dans un contexte de conflit d'intérêts avéré ou suspecté entre le juge et le conseiller. Une première partie s'intéresse aux conseils vagues et explore les différentes interprétations que le juge peut en faire. Le résultat principal est la mise en évidence du rôle prépondérant joué par la bienveillance perçue chez le conseiller dans l'interprétation de ce type de conseils. Une deuxième partie étudie les effets de la bienveillance et de la compétence du conseiller sur la confiance qui lui est accordée mais également sur la fiabilité de ses conseils en comparant une situation où les intérêts du juge et du conseiller sont en conflit à une situation où ils ne le sont pas. Nos résultats montrent que les participants ne sont pas sensibles au conflit lorsqu'ils utilisent des conseils: ils se basent uniquement sur les paramètres individuels du conseiller. Par contre, ils se montrent attentifs au conflit lorsqu'ils dispensent des conseils: dans ce cas, leur bienveillance détermine la hauteur de l'aide qu'ils apportent au juge; leur compétence détermine la qualité et l'honnêteté de leurs conseils. La dernière partie traite exclusivement de la dispense de conseils en situation de conflit d'intérêts et approfondit l'étude du lien entre compétence du conseiller et honnêteté des conseils. Nos résultats montrent que l'incertitude ressentie par les conseillers les moins compétents vis à vis de leurs conseils peut les pousser à donner des conseils malhonnêtes car elle réduit la probabilité que ces conseils aient des conséquences néfastes. Ce même phénomène se manifeste lorsque l'incertitude est générée par la situation. / This phD thesis studies advice-giving and advice-taking in a situation of conflicting interests between judges and advisors. The first part looks more specifically at vague advice and examines all possible interpretations advisors can make of this vagueness. Our main result shows that perceived benevolence positively influences advice-taking. The second part investigates the effects of advisors' benevolence and competence on judges' trust when they use advice and on advisors' actual trustworthiness when they give advice. We compare situations with and without conflict of interests. Our results show that people are not sensitive to conflict of interests for advice-taking: they only use dispositional cues concerning the advisor. By contrast, they take into account the conflict when they give advice: the amount of help given to the judge depends on benevolence; the quality and sincerity of advice depend on advisors' competence. In the last part, we only study advice-giving in a situation of conflicting interests and we investigate more deeply the relation between advisors' competence and their sincerity. Our results show that uncertainty experienced by the least competent advisors about their advice can lead them to give unsincere advice because it less likely has a negative impact on judge. This phenomenon also occurs when uncertainty comes from the situation.

Este trabalho tem como proposta analisar a regra prevista no art. 147, § 3º, da Lei das S.A., e compreender a efetiva extensão do interlocking board e seus impactos para a vida das companhias brasileiras. Com base na análise dos motivos que levaram à inclusão desse dispositivo, propõe-se uma nova abordagem interpretativa. Afasta-se uma concepção abrangente da hipótese de conflito de interesses contemplada no inciso II ou a interpretação autônoma da atuação em sociedade considerada concorrente, independentemente da existência de conflito de interesses. A proposta interpretativa, nesse sentido, aponta para a complementaridade dos dispositivos, de forma que ocorra o impedimento quando o conselheiro atuar em sociedade concorrente e, em decorrência disso, tiver interesse conflitante com o da companhia. Propõe, da mesma forma, um novo enfoque para o estudo das situações de conflito de interesses entre os administradores e a companhia, sugerindo uma desvinculação das conclusões obtidas com a análise do conflito de interesses do acionista (art. 115, § 1º) para aceitar a possibilidade de uma análise a priori do conflito de interesses entre o administrador e a companhia, ainda que identificável por critérios substanciais. / This work intends to study the Article 147, Paragraph 3, of the Brazilian Corporate Law (Law 6.404/76), and understand the actual extension of interlocking board and their impacts on the Brazilian companies. Based on the study of the reasons that led to the inclusion of this Article during Brazilian Corporate Law changes during the year of 2001, we propose a new interpretative approach. Disregarding a wide view of the conception of conflict of interest, under Article 147, Paragraph 3, Item II, and the autonomously conception of interlocking board, under Item I, regardless the existence of any related conflict of interests, we propose a complementary view of items I and II, so that the disqualification of the board of directors applicant occurs when he/she holds of a position in a competing company and, as a result, have conflicting interests with the company. We also propose a new approach to the study of conflict of interests between managers and the company, suggesting a disconnection of the conclusions from the analysis of conflict of interests between shareholders and the company (Article 115, Paragraph 1) to accept the possibility of a prior analysis of the conflict of interests between managers and the company, even with the use of a substantial criteria.

<div>Entrepreneurial ventures face a trade-off when receiving corporate venture capital (CVC) financing. They need to give sufficient control rights to motivate and enable corporate investors to provide exclusive resources. However, giving control rights to CVCs whose strategic goals could cause a conflict of interest and lead to opportunism also puts the ventures at risk. This dissertation shows that third-party involvement with the design of passive control rights can be a solution to the trade-off.</div><div><br></div><div><div>By examining venture capital financing contracts in high-tech industries, Essay 1 found that veto power, a prevailing passive control right, of the third party can protect the vulnerable side in the cooperation without hurting the other side’s incentive to contribute. Moreover, two types of veto rights are identified and found to have diverse responses to conflict-of-interest factors in CVC-entrepreneur relationships. The effects of knowledge overlap, CVC parents’ research and development capability, and ventures’ technological quality on the liable third party’s veto power are studied. With a focus on the function of passive control rights, Essay 2 and Essay 3 maintain that allocating control rights can significantly affect the innovation of both CVC corporate parents and CVC-backed ventures under difference contingencies. In particular, as the aforementioned dilemma increases when CVCs’ corporate parents and portfolio firms are competing in product markets, Essay 2 shows that ventures’ innovation performance can benefit from granting CVCs strong active control rights in the condition of low product market overlap and from granting CVCs strong passive control rights within a high product market overlap.</div></div><div><br></div><div><div>On the other hand, Essay 3 shows that CVCs’ control rights will moderate the inverted Ushaped relationship between knowledge overlap and the innovation performance of the corporate parents such that the positive effect of knowledge overlap on CVC parents’ innovation at lower levels of knowledge similarity will be less positive, and the negative effect of knowledge overlap on CVC parents’ innovation at higher levels of knowledge similarity will be less negative, for CVCs with greater control power over their portfolio ventures. Moreover, the moderating effect of active control right is stronger than the moderating effect of passive control right under high degree of technological knowledge overlap between a CVC parent and the CVC’s portfolio ventures. Meanwhile, the moderating effect of passive control rights is stronger than the moderating effect of active control right under high degree of technological knowledge overlap between a CVC parent and the CVC’s portfolio ventures.</div></div>

Introdução. O modelo tecnocrático de assistência ao parto e nascimento propõe uma lógica organizacional com práticas não baseadas em evidências científicas cujos desfechos se contrapõem ao bem-estar materno e infantil. No setor público ocorrem partos com excesso de intervenções e altas taxas de cesarianas. No setor privado, a maioria das mulheres é submetida a cesáreas. Em ambas as situações, pergunta-se a quem e por que é vantajoso o que se prescreve. Objetivos. Revisar sistematicamente a produção científica nacional e internacional que trata das circunstâncias em que o tema dos conflitos de interesses nas indicações de cesárea é abordado. Material e método. Revisão sistemática abrangente da literatura disponível, segundo a metodologia do Instituto Joanna Briggs. Resultados. Foram identificados 4.135 textos em 4 bases de dados - The Cochrane Library, EconPapers, CINAHL e Medline - dos quais 41 foram analisados após a aplicação de critérios.de inclusão. Os idiomas encontrados foram: inglês, francês, português e espanhol, com predominância do primeiro. A maioria trouxe a palavra cesárea entre seus descritores. Foram recorrentes termos ligados à prática de profissionais e às diferentes formas de pagamento ou financiamento da assistência. As influências sobre a decisão por cesárea são abordadas em diferentes análises da assistência. Os principais atores envolvidos são médicos e mulheres. Foi possível identificar conflitos de duas naturezas: financeiros diretos e indiretos e não financeiros. Discussão. A literatura silencia sobre os conflitos de interesses entre provedores de cuidados e mulheres nas decisões por cesárea. Os interesses secundários problematizados nos textos foram nomeados fatores associados a conflito de interesses. A narrativa hegemônica (percepção do médico) se sobrepõe às outras e as obscurece. Conflitos de interesse são omitidos e surgem termos como incentivos financeiros e indução da demanda, frequentemente analisados sem considerar o desnível de poderes entre os atores envolvidos. Conclusões. O fenômeno é apenas implícito na literatura que problematiza os incentivos e a indução da demanda à prática de cesarianas. As circunstâncias são processos de análise da assistência obstétrica que investigam explicações e interferências nas variações das taxas de cesáreas. O ator com maior poder de influenciar o desfecho é o médico. A invisibilidade do conceito na literatura científica aponta para uma lacuna de conhecimento a ser preenchida. / Background. The technocratic model of childbirth care proposes a logical organizational with non-evidence based practices whose outcomes oppose the welfare of both mother and child. In the public sector births occur with excessive interventions and high rates of caesarean section. In the private sector, the majority of women are subjected to caesarean sections. In both situations, the question is to whom and why it is advantageous to perform those practices. Objectives. To review systematically national and international scientific literature which addresses the circumstances in which the issue of conflicts of interest in indications for cesarean section is approached Material and method. Comprehensive systematic review of the available literature, according to the methodology of the Joanna Briggs Institute. Results. 4,135 texts were identified in four data bases The Cochrane Library, EconPapers, CINAHL, Medline - of which 41 were analyzed after applying inclusion criteria. Languages found were English, French, Portuguese and Spanish, English being the most common. Most brought the word \"cesarean\" among their key terms. Recurrent terms were related to professional practice and the different forms of payment or financing healthcare. The influences on the decision for cesarean section are addressed in different healthcare analysis. The main actors involved are doctors and women. It was possible to identify conflicts of two natures: financial - direct and indirect - and non-financial. Discussion. Literature is silent about the conflicts of interest between care providers and women on decisions for cesarean sections. The secondary interests approached in the texts were named \"factors associated with conflict of interests.\" The hegemonic narrative (physicians perception) overlaps and obscures all others. Conflicts of interest are omitted and other terms such as financial incentives and supplier induced demand are often analyzed without considering the difference of power between the actors involved. Conclusions. The phenomenon is only implicit in the literature that discusses incentives and provider induced demand over the practice of cesarean sections. The circumstances are processes of analysis of obstetric care which investigate explanations and interferences on variations of cesarean section rates. The actor with the greatest power to influence the outcome is the doctor. The invisibility of the concept in the literature points out to a knowledge gap to be filled

Introdução. O modelo tecnocrático de assistência ao parto e nascimento propõe uma lógica organizacional com práticas não baseadas em evidências científicas cujos desfechos se contrapõem ao bem-estar materno e infantil. No setor público ocorrem partos com excesso de intervenções e altas taxas de cesarianas. No setor privado, a maioria das mulheres é submetida a cesáreas. Em ambas as situações, pergunta-se a quem e por que é vantajoso o que se prescreve. Objetivos. Revisar sistematicamente a produção científica nacional e internacional que trata das circunstâncias em que o tema dos conflitos de interesses nas indicações de cesárea é abordado. Material e método. Revisão sistemática abrangente da literatura disponível, segundo a metodologia do Instituto Joanna Briggs. Resultados. Foram identificados 4.135 textos em 4 bases de dados - The Cochrane Library, EconPapers, CINAHL e Medline - dos quais 41 foram analisados após a aplicação de critérios.de inclusão. Os idiomas encontrados foram: inglês, francês, português e espanhol, com predominância do primeiro. A maioria trouxe a palavra cesárea entre seus descritores. Foram recorrentes termos ligados à prática de profissionais e às diferentes formas de pagamento ou financiamento da assistência. As influências sobre a decisão por cesárea são abordadas em diferentes análises da assistência. Os principais atores envolvidos são médicos e mulheres. Foi possível identificar conflitos de duas naturezas: financeiros diretos e indiretos e não financeiros. Discussão. A literatura silencia sobre os conflitos de interesses entre provedores de cuidados e mulheres nas decisões por cesárea. Os interesses secundários problematizados nos textos foram nomeados fatores associados a conflito de interesses. A narrativa hegemônica (percepção do médico) se sobrepõe às outras e as obscurece. Conflitos de interesse são omitidos e surgem termos como incentivos financeiros e indução da demanda, frequentemente analisados sem considerar o desnível de poderes entre os atores envolvidos. Conclusões. O fenômeno é apenas implícito na literatura que problematiza os incentivos e a indução da demanda à prática de cesarianas. As circunstâncias são processos de análise da assistência obstétrica que investigam explicações e interferências nas variações das taxas de cesáreas. O ator com maior poder de influenciar o desfecho é o médico. A invisibilidade do conceito na literatura científica aponta para uma lacuna de conhecimento a ser preenchida. / Background. The technocratic model of childbirth care proposes a logical organizational with non-evidence based practices whose outcomes oppose the welfare of both mother and child. In the public sector births occur with excessive interventions and high rates of caesarean section. In the private sector, the majority of women are subjected to caesarean sections. In both situations, the question is to whom and why it is advantageous to perform those practices. Objectives. To review systematically national and international scientific literature which addresses the circumstances in which the issue of conflicts of interest in indications for cesarean section is approached Material and method. Comprehensive systematic review of the available literature, according to the methodology of the Joanna Briggs Institute. Results. 4,135 texts were identified in four data bases The Cochrane Library, EconPapers, CINAHL, Medline - of which 41 were analyzed after applying inclusion criteria. Languages found were English, French, Portuguese and Spanish, English being the most common. Most brought the word \"cesarean\" among their key terms. Recurrent terms were related to professional practice and the different forms of payment or financing healthcare. The influences on the decision for cesarean section are addressed in different healthcare analysis. The main actors involved are doctors and women. It was possible to identify conflicts of two natures: financial - direct and indirect - and non-financial. Discussion. Literature is silent about the conflicts of interest between care providers and women on decisions for cesarean sections. The secondary interests approached in the texts were named \"factors associated with conflict of interests.\" The hegemonic narrative (physicians perception) overlaps and obscures all others. Conflicts of interest are omitted and other terms such as financial incentives and supplier induced demand are often analyzed without considering the difference of power between the actors involved. Conclusions. The phenomenon is only implicit in the literature that discusses incentives and provider induced demand over the practice of cesarean sections. The circumstances are processes of analysis of obstetric care which investigate explanations and interferences on variations of cesarean section rates. The actor with the greatest power to influence the outcome is the doctor. The invisibility of the concept in the literature points out to a knowledge gap to be filled

This dissertation comprises three chapters that explore and expand on the use of experimentation and randomization in the study of courts, judges, and the law: Chapter 1: This Chapter reviews the two most prominent procedural approaches to addressing judicial conflicts of interest in U.S. courts—judicial self-recusal and in-court disclosure. These procedural approaches fail to account for the legal and institutional dynamics that surround the relationship between judges, attorneys, and the adjudicative process. I argue that judges do not recuse themselves, that attorneys will not ask them to, and that if we understand both the legal and extra-legal incentives at play in these decisions, this should not surprise us. The shortcomings of recusal and disclosure are particularly salient in the context of judicial campaign finance, where judges often face the acute dilemma of being assigned to preside over cases in which one of the parties or attorneys has contributed to their election campaign. To support these claims, Chapter 1 presents the results of a randomized field experiment which I identify active Wisconsin and Texas civil cases that feature donor-attorneys. The experiment randomly assigns a portion of the judges presiding over these cases to receive a letter from an NGO identifying the potential conflict and requesting recusal. The empirical results support the growing skepticism surrounding judicial self-recusal and raise doubts that judicial disclosure is an efficacious remedy. Building on these results, the Chapter explores two potential alternatives—one procedural and one institutional—that better account for the realities of judicial conflicts of interest and the incentives of court actors. Chapter 2: This Chapter contributes to the growing literature challenging the general assumption of and reliance on random judicial assignment by identifying common court procedures and practices that threaten unbiased causal inference. These “de-randomizing” events, including differing probabilities of assignment, post-assignment judicial changes, non-random missingness, and non-random assignment itself, should be accounted for when making causal claims but are commonly either ignored or not even recognized by researchers utilizing random judicial assignment. The Chapter explores how these de-randomizing events violate the key empirical assumptions underlying randomized studies and offers methodological solutions and presents original data from a survey of the 30 largest U.S. state-level criminal courts, outlining their assignment protocols and identifying the extent to which they feature the de-randomizing events described. Chapter 3: In Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar (2015), the Supreme Court ruled that a Florida law banning direct campaign solicitation by judicial candidates was not a violation of the First Amendment. In doing so, the majority relied on several untested empirical claims, including the assertion that direct solicitation has a distinctly stronger impact on the public’s confidence in the judiciary than indirect solicitation. This chapter provides a short but focused evaluation of these empirical claims. A nationally-representative survey experiment presents subjects with a hypothetical vignette in which a state trial-level judge runs for election and utilizes one of various campaign fundraising tactics. The survey then presents subjects with questions relating to the trust and legitimacy that they associate with both the judicial system presented in the vignette and their actual state- and federal-level government institutions. The results suggest that the public does not discern any significant difference between direct and indirect judicial solicitation but does see other judicial campaign features (promises of recusal and the amount of the donations) as salient in regard to trust and legitimacy. These findings are at odds with the empirical assumptions that the majority relied upon in the Williams-Yulee decision and highlight the value that survey experiments can play in evaluating empirical claims made by the Supreme Court.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Dept. of Community Medicine, University of Adelaide, 1992. / Typescript (Photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 307-320).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 268-280).

The proposition of the thesis is, in its role as the lead offshore petroleum regulator in Ghana, the Petroleum Commission is not competent enough to oversee robust offshore health and safety regulation. Two accounts are developed to support this claim. First, the conferment of dual licensing and health and safety regulatory functions on the Petroleum Commission gives rise to a potential conflict. Secondly, even recognising a distinction between formal and de facto independence, neither is present in the Petroleum Commission. A number of factors justify these assertions: not least the fact that the law establishing the Petroleum Commission confers discretionary powers on the executive and does not provide regulatory independence as a formal requirement. In addition, the Commission's financial and administrative procedures are determinable by influences external to it. Formal independence is not, however, in itself a sufficient condition for the proper exercise of regulatory discretion. It is necessary for the regulatory body in question to be able in fact to behave independently, that is, to develop and take ownership of regulatory values, which in turn depend on the possession of relevant competence and expertise. Based on comparative analysis of global offshore regulatory regimes, and backed by empirical evidence, the thesis recommends legislative reforms in Ghana aimed at a functional separation of petroleum licensing from health and safety regulation.