Orientador: Marcos Antonio Alves / Banca: Tárik de Athayde Prata / Banca: Alfredo Pereira Júnior / Resumo: Nesta Dissertação tratamos da relação mente-corpo e, em particular do problema da consciência segundo o filósofo estadunidense John Searle, a partir de sua abordagem, conhecida como Naturalismo Biológico. De acordo com Searle (2006), o problema da relação mente-corpo possui uma simples solução. Os fenômenos mentais são causados por processos que tem lugar no cérebro, mas não podem ser reduzidos a ele. Os fenômenos mentais têm algumas características que tornaram difícil o tratamento da relação mente-corpo, dentre elas a consciência, intencionalidade, subjetividade e causação mental. Searle (2006) julga ser a consciência o elemento principal para a existência de nossa vida mental, a partir da qual surgem as demais noções mentais. Por isso, além de abordarmos o problema da relação mente-corpo, também analisamos com cuidado tal característica, averiguando a sua relevância para a resolução do problema mente-corpo. Para alcançar nosso objetivo, dividimos o trabalho em três capítulos. No primeiro deles mostramos a perspectiva do autor em questão no tocante ao problema mente-corpo. Expomos o que ele julga estar errado na filosofia da mente e qual seria a solução mais adequada a tal questão. Explicitamos em que medida a relação mente-corpo pode ser considerada um problema na concepção naturalista biológica. No segundo capítulo enfocamos, especificamente, os fenômenos mentais e suas características, dando ênfase especial à consciência. Na perspectiva searleana, entender a consciência ... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: In this dissertation we deal with the mind-body relationship, and in particular the problem of consciousness according to the American philosopher John Searle, from his approach, known as Biological Naturalism. According to Searle (2006), the problem of the mind-body relationship has a simple solution. Mental phenomena are caused by processes that take place in the brain but can not be reduced to it. Mental phenomena have some characteristics that make it difficult to treat the mindbody problem, among them consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental causation. Among these characteristics, Searle (2006) thinks that consciousness is the main element for the existence of our mental life. Therefore, in addition to addressing the problem of the mind-body relationship, we also carefully examine this characteristic. In Searle's conception, it is considered the central notion of our mental life, from which arise the other mental notions. To reach our goal, we divided the work into three chapters. In the first chapter we show the author's perspective on the mind-body problem, exposing what he thinks is wrong in the philosophy of mind and what would be the most appropriate solution to that question. We explain to what extent the mind-body relationship can be considered a problem in the naturalistic biological conception. In the second chapter we focus specifically on mental phenomena and their characteristics, with special emphasis on consciousness. From the perspective of the thinker in question, understanding consciousness and some of its characteristics is a task of paramount importance, for they are essential to the existence of the mental. Searle argues that consciousness is, in a way, reducible to brain processes and otherwise irreducible because of its subjective character. In the third and final ... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre

Orientador: Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez / Banca: Mariana Claudia Broens / Banca: Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Júnior / Resumo: A presente dissertação analisa a relação mente-corpo em suas perspectivas ontológica e epistemológica. O foco da análise se situa no tratamento de questões associadas às equivalentes noções de sensação, consciência, experiência consciente ou simplesmente experiência. Assim, partindo da concepção de que a relação mente-corpo se coloca enquanto problema filosófico, sobretudo a partir do contexto da filosofia cartesiana, investiga-se o modo como tal problema é abordado sob as perspectivas materialista e funcionalista desenvolvidas na filosofia da mente. As abordagens materialistas escolhidas seriam a teoria da identidade mente-cérebro, tal como Smart (1970) a propõe, e o eliminativismo formulado por P. M. Churchland (2004). No que diz respeito à abordagem funcionalista da mente, ênfase é conferida à possibilidade de se definir funcionalmente os aspectos qualitativos da experiência, especialmente, no que diz respeito à perspectiva funcionalista delineada por Shoemaker (1980). Após tais análises, indica-se um desestimulante ceticismo, tendo em vista a opinião de que tanto as abordagens materialistas investigadas quanto a perspectiva funcionalista escolhida falham, a rigor, em dirimir o problema mente-corpo, bem como explicar a experiência consciente. Porém, para evitar um ceticismo em relação a tais problemas, propõe-se, ao final do trabalho, o resgate dos estudos de Ryle, em que a relação mente-corpo e a questão epistemológica da experiência consciente podem ser mais bem compreendidas tendo em vista uma perspectiva que denominamos de relacional. De acordo com essa perspectiva e a mente é concebida não mais como coisa (res), localizada num recipiente de acesso privilegiado, mas como uma propriedade disposicional, de múltiplas vias, expressa no comportamento e na história vivida de cada sistema. / Abstract: This dissertation analyses the mind-body relation in its ontological and epistemological perspectives. It's main focus of analysis is the treatment of questions associated to equivalent notions of sensation, consciousness, conscientious experience, or simply experience. Thus, starting with the supposition that the mind-body relation is a philosophical problem, mainly in the context of the Cartesian philosophy, it is investigated the way such a problem is treated under the materialist and functionalist perspectives in the philosophy of mind. The materialist approach investigated is based on the mind-brain identity theory proposed by Smart's (1970), and on versions of eliminativism formulated by Churchland (2004). In relation to the functionalist approach, it is investigated the possibility of defining functionally the qualitative aspects of experience, specially from the perspective delineated by Shoemaker (1980). A certain scepticism is indicated concerning the materialist and the functionalist perspectives investigated, it is argued that strictly speaking, they fail in their attempts to solve the mind-body problem and to explain conscientious experiences. However, in order to avoid scepticism in relation to these problems, it is suggested that the mind-body problem and the epistemological nature of conscientious experience can be better understood Ryle relational perspective. According to this perspective, the mind is conceived not as a thing (res), situated in a recipient with privileged introspective access, but as a disposicional property of the multiple vias expressed in behaviour and in the lived history of each system. / Mestre

The research attempts to understand the role Black Consciousness (BC) plays in the identity of blacks in South Africa by exploring and describing the experience of self-identity in the life-history context of two members of AZAPO, a BC organisation. The literature review explores the work of Biko, Manganyi, and Fanon with a view to understanding whether and how it might be claimed that BC galvanises the black person to discard the crippling fear of colonialism which inflicts feelings of inferiority, and to rise up to claim his/her rightful place in community life. To explore the philosophical assumptions made in the literature review, a qualitative study was conducted. Interviews were conducted with two black adults who have adopted BC philosophy. Three separate in-depth phenomenological interviews were conducted which yielded a description of the experiences of each respondent. A tape recorder was used to record the interviews and they were transcribed for analysis. A thematic analysis was conducted using the reading guide method. The material was thematised using the following questions: What biographical factors are seen as being important prior to the respondent becoming black conscious? How did the participant come to realise his/her self-identity as problematic? How did the process of adopting BC change the participant’s selfidentity? The results indicate that participants became aware very early in their lives and prior to adopting BC, that their own supportive and cohesive family cultures were at odds with the surrounding social context. Early experiences of this were initially unintelligible but impressionable. BC in this sense provided a framework for understanding and engaging with these experiences. The study shows that the adoption of BC helped to make sense of experiences of community isolation, discrimination, oppression and provided them with a mode of engaging practically with these issues. It was not adopted from a perspective of poor self-esteem or other such purely personal characteristics which may have been expected on the basis of literature in the area. BC was adopted as a way of understanding the relationship between their communities or backgrounds and the broader social environment and if there was a ‘healing’ project it was at this level.However, the study did show the close relationship between individual and social well-being that emerged as intrinsic both to the philosophy of BC and the lives of these individuals. This was shown to play out in the commitment of these individuals to the development of black communities and in their tying of their own destinies to the destiny of the oppressed black people in general. These and other issues which emerged in the two case studies are discussed in relation to the literature in the area.

Orientador: Donizeti Cesar Honorato / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Ciências Médicas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T19:15:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leite_JulianaValeria_M.pdf: 641050 bytes, checksum: b62398f140661279efb6ea212dc9afcf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: A avaliação do nível de consciência faz parte da rotina da equipe multiprofissional que conduz pacientes em coma. Sinais que possam representar a melhora do nível de consciência destes pacientes são constantemente buscados. Atualmente sabe-se que alguns fatores, como por exemplo, a resposta motora na escala de coma de Glasgow (ECG) e a apresentação do reflexo fotomotor apresentam valor prognóstico, porém nenhum deles é relacionado diretamente ao despertar destes pacientes. O objetivo deste estudo foi o de relacionar a presença do reflexo de piscar à ameaça visual (RPAV), com o despertar de pacientes comatosos e evidenciar o seu valor prognóstico. Para tanto foi feito um estudo retrospectivo com os dados obtidos em prontuários do serviço de arquivos médicos do Hospital das Clínicas da Universidade Estadual de Campinas (HC-UNICAMP) de pacientes internados nas enfermarias de neurologia clinica e neurocirurgia entre os períodos de abril de 2005 a abril de 2010. Foram selecionados 975 prontuários correspondentes ao diagnóstico de traumatismo cranioencefálico e acidente vascular encefálico. Destes, foram selecionados 119 prontuários de pacientes que se enquadraram nos critérios de inclusão representados pela resposta motora menor ou igual a quatro na ECG na admissão hospitalar e a descrição do RPAV durante o período de internação sendo excluídos os pacientes com resposta motora na admissão hospitalar superior a quatro, que não apresentassem a descrição da avaliação do RPAV ou que tivessem patologias neurológicas associadas às mencionadas como fator de seleção para os prontuários. Foram analisados os dados relativos ao sexo, diagnóstico clínico, resposta motora isolada e ao Glasgow total na admissão e alta hospitalar, a apresentação do RPAV durante o período de internação e a evolução clínica do paciente que foi representada pelo despertar, traduzido pela resposta motora seis ou cinco na ECG, evolução ao estado vegetativo persistente e óbito. A análise estatística demonstrou através da análise de regressão logística univariada e multivariada com critério Stepwise de seleção de variáveis uma associação entre a apresentação positiva do RPAV durante o período de internação e o despertar dos pacientes estudados (p<0.001). Todos os 51 pacientes que apresentaram o reflexo despertaram enquanto os pacientes que não apresentaram o reflexo não despertaram, evoluindo ao estado vegetativo persistente (24 pacientes) ou ao óbito (44 pacientes). Os pacientes que apresentaram o reflexo positivo durante o período de internação apresentaram uma maior possibilidade de despertar (11.685.00 vezes maior) dos que não o apresentaram adotando-se o nível de significância para os testes estatísticos de 5%, ou seja, p<0.05. O presente estudo demonstrou que o RPAV apresenta valor prognostico, estando sua apresentação positiva diretamente associada ao despertar destes pacientes / Abstract: The level of consciousness assessment is part of the hospital routine in comatose patients. Signs that may indicate cognitive improvement in these patients are constantly searched. Nowadays it is kwon that some features represent prognostic value, however, none relates directly with awakening in coma patients. The main purpose of this study was to associate the presence of the blinking reflex as a response to a visual threat with awakening in coma patients. We reviewed medical records from University of Campinas Clinical Hospital from patients diagnosed with stroke and traumatic brain injury (TBI) who stayed in the hospital neurological ward from April 2005 to April 2010. We reviewed 975 medical records. 119 patients were included; on admission they presented a score four or less for motor response in Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) and description RPVA during hospitalization, being excluded patients with diagnoses other than those cited and motor response at admission more than four, which did not present the description of the assessment the blinking reflex or had neurological pathologies associated with those mentioned as selection factor for records. We gathered information from the charts regarding sex, disease, GCS total score, GCS motor score on admission and discharge, the presence or absence of the blinking reflex and level of consciousness on discharge, characterized as awakening, persistent vegetative state or death. Statistical analysis demonstrated through the analysis of univariate and multivariate logistic regression with stepwise selection criterion variables of a direct association between a positive blinking reflex of to visual threat during the period of hospitalization awakening in our cohort (p<0.001) . All the 51 patients with a positive reflex awoke, while patients with a negative reflex don't awakening evolved to persistent vegetative state (24) or death (44). A positive blinking reflex to visual threat during hospitalization increases the chance of awakening by 11.685.00 times when compared with patients with a negative reflex. The blinking reflex as a response to a threat has great prognostic value while its positivity is directly associated with awakening in coma patients / Mestrado / Ciencias Biomedicas / Mestra em Ciências Médicas

Doctorat en sciences psychologiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

M.A. / The present study examined the relationship between shyness and self-conscious emotions in terms of attribution style. Participants were administered questionnaires and then categorized into fearful shy, self-conscious shy, undifferentiated shy and non-shy groups. These four groups were then compared in terms of shyness, shame, guilt, embarrassment, and attribution style. Furthermore, the relationships between shame, guilt, and embarrassment and the different attribution styles were examined. The fearful shy, self-conscious shy and undifferentiated shy groups differed from the non-shy group in terms of the attribution styles of context and luck. The fearful shy group was found to score higher than the non-shy group in terms of context, in addition to the fearful shy as well as the self-conscious shy groups scoring higher than the non-shy groups in terms of luck. However no differences were found in terms of ability and effort between the four groups. With regards to experiencing self-conscious emotions, the fearful shy, self-conscious shy, and the undifferentiated shy groups differed from the non-shy group by scoring higher on shame. The fearful shy, self-conscious shy, and the undifferentiated shy groups also scored higher in terms of embarrassment from the non-shy group, with the fearful shy group scoring the highest followed by the self-conscious shy group and then the undifferentiated shy group. Furthermore, the fearful shy and undifferentiated shy differed from one another with the fearful shy group scoring higher in terms of embarrassment. The four groups, however, did not vary in terms of guilt. In terms of the relationship between attribution styles and self-conscious emotions, positive correlations were found between ability and shame and ability and embarrassment. A positive correlation was found between effort and guilt. Positive correlations between luck and shame and luck and embarrassment were also found. Self-conscious emotions were found to be highly correlated with shyness. Attribution styles may play a significant role in terms of an individual experiencing these emotions. Shy individuals may differ from non-shy individuals with regards to the attributions they engage in, causing them to experience self-conscious emotions to a higher extent. This may suggest a cognitive component that may be associated with self-conscious emotions. Therefore, shy individuals may be predisposed to experiencing self-conscious emotions more frequently than non-shy individuals. It is suggested that future research focus on this cognitive component in the experience of self-conscious emotions.

Early conceptions of schizophrenia suggest that it is a disorder of consciousness, primarily manifested as a disturbance of self-experience. However, it is only recently that researchers are focusing on the experience of self in schizophrenia. Several recent phenomenological researchers argue that the disorders of self-experience represent the experiential core of schizophrenia, suggesting that the basic defects in self-experience are already subtly present in schizotypal or schizoid like personality traits typically present in schizophrenics (Parnas&Handest, 2003; Sass&Parnas, 2003). These authors argue that schizophrenia is primarily a disorder of consciousness clinically manifested as a disturbance of the sense of self. Authors investigating schizophrenia from a phenomenological perspective seem to have developed some consensus regarding the central role of autism, intentionality, ipseity and intersubjectivity – central constructs in phenomenological conceptions of the structure of consciousness. However, the focus of phenomenology on the entire person develops insights that are circular since all points of exploration reveal a close relationship between various dimensions of self/world experience, thus leading to a circular argument. The aim of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between the aforementioned constructs in a manner that addresses the circular logic implicit in the phenomenological structure in which certain researchers have embedded schizophrenia. A further aim is to provide a phenomenologically oriented conceptual framework in which the seemingly bizarre nature of schizophrenia may be made intelligible: that the symptoms may be interpreted as attempts at re-establishing a unified sense of self and a connection with the world of others. Copyright / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Psychology / unrestricted

We live in a busy and complex world, so the ability to focus our attention on relevant information at the expense of the irrelevant is essential in allowing us to avoid distraction. However, it is also important that our attention be captured by external stimuli that, although irrelevant to the task at hand, may nevertheless provide information about important changes to our immediate environment. This capture/orienting of attention is an involuntary, fundamental, and biological mechanism necessary for survival. The present thesis employed event-related potentials (ERPs), the minute responses of the brains electrical activity, to examine how changes in the acoustic environment can lead to the capture of attention. Study 1 examined an ERP component, the P3a, which is associated with the processes that lead to the forced capture of attention by external stimuli. This intrusion into consciousness can be studied using an auditory sequence, the oddball paradigm, which consists of a frequently occurring and homogenous ‘standard’ stimulus. At times, a feature of the standard is changed to form a rarely occurring ‘deviant’. If the extent of change between standard and deviant is large enough, processes associated with attention capture may be activated. Study 1 of this thesis employed a more time-efficient multi-feature optimal paradigm, which allows for the presentation of numerous deviants in one auditory sequence. The standard stimulus was a pure tone. Four of the six deviants were created by changing a single feature of the standard (frequency, duration, increase and decrease in intensity), while the remaining two deviants varied on more than one feature from the standard (environmental sounds, white noise). Results revealed that only the environmental sounds (i.e. animal sounds, human voices, musical instruments) and white noise bursts, elicited the P3a, while the other four deviants did not. Studies 2 and 3 determined whether the attention capture processes associated with the P3a could be observed during the sleep onset and sleep periods, where awareness of the external environment is diminished. For sleep to be of benefit it needs to remain as undisturbed as possible, without constant awakenings by irrelevant external input, however, the sleeping organism must still have the ability to become conscious of possibly relevant input that requires immediate action. In Study 2, a P3a was elicited again following only the environmental sound and white noise deviants across wakefulness and the sleep onset period. Surprisingly, during definitive sleep, the environmental sounds continued to elicit a P3a suggesting that attention capture processes may still remain active during sleep. Nonetheless, only the first 30 minutes of sleep were examined. Study 3 was then conducted to examine the P3a across the entire night. Results revealed that the environmental sounds did, in fact, elicited a P3a during both NREM and REM sleep. The present thesis demonstrates that attention capture mechanisms, observed during wakefulness, are also active during sleep onset and sleep when awareness of the external environment is diminished. This is especially critical because the sleeping organism may be vulnerable to external danger, requiring the immediate ability to orient attention to incoming information, leading to awaking and conscious awareness.

Orientador: Paulo César Rodrigues / Resumo: Trata-se de compreender a relação entre a consciência e o inconsciente na segunda grande obra do filósofo Henri Bergson, a saber, Matière et mémoire, e de pensar quais as implicações desta relação. Nesta obra, Bergson apresenta e desenvolve uma concepção totalmente nova da vida psíquica que se manifesta em dois momentos diferentes. No primeiro, que é o momento da experiência da exterioridade, Bergson tematiza, por exemplo, as noções clássicas de percepção e representação e, ao reformulá-las, consciência e inconsciente ganham uma nova roupagem face às concepções tradicionais da filosofia moderna. O diálogo que Bergson estabelece com a tradição filosófica é, sobretudo com os idealistas e os realistas, fundamental para lhe ajudar a repensar a vida psíquica, bem como para remover os excessos praticados por estas posturas. No segundo momento, que é o momento da interioridade, as noções mobilizadas são, sobretudo, o espírito, a teoria da memória, a percepção concreta e principalmente a subjetividade humana. Ao propor a existência e independência das lembranças puras, Bergson nos oferece uma tematização sobre a própria subjetividade humana, cuja definição é o conjunto de memórias acumuladas ao longo de uma história particular. Estas considerações indicarão uma dinâmica curiosa da vida psíquica, que implica pensar a consciência e o inconsciente como memória. Buscar-se-á compreender, aqui, se em Matière et mémoire a própria matéria possui um inconsciente e se este pode ser considerado... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The aim of this dissertation is to understand the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious in the second most important work of the philosopher Henri Bergson, Matière et mémoire, and thinking about the implications of this relationship. In this work, Bergson presents and develops a new conception of psychic life that manifests itself at two different times. In the first, which is the moment of the experience of exteriority, Bergson thematizes, for example, the classical notions of perception and representation and, by reformulating them, consciousness and the unconscious take on a new guise compared to the traditional conceptions of modern philosophy. The dialogue that Bergson establishes with the philosophical tradition, idealists and realists, is fundamental to help him rethink the psychic life, as well as remove the excesses maded by these postures. In the second moment, which is the moment of interiority, the notions mobilized are, above all, the spirit, the theory of memory, the concrete perception and especially the human subjectivity. By proposing the existence and independence of pure memories, Bergson offers us a thematization of human subjectivity itself, whose definition is the set of memories accumulated throughout a particular history. These considerations will indicate a curious dynamic of psychic life, which implies thinking of the consciousness and the unconscious as memory. We aim to discover whether Matière et mémoire itself has an unconscious ... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre

This dissertation motivates and defends what I call non-inferential epistemic circularity. Traditionally epistemic circularity is understood to be a property of arguments, where justification to believe these arguments’ premises depends upon the truth of their conclusions. I argue that epistemically circular arguments face a dilemma. If the conditions for non-inferential justification to believe their premises are too weak, these arguments are either indiscriminate or permit one to bootstrap trivially to higher-order justification. If to avoid these problems the conditions for non-inferential justification are strengthened on the basis of evidence, then epistemically circular arguments beg the question because they collapse into logical circularity. To address these problems I argue that an account of non-inferential justification should be developed that limits the role of evidential grounds and finds room instead for non-evidential sources of justification. I conclude that epistemic circularity is constitutive of non-inferential justification because it is a property of the intentional acts in virtue of which this justification is earned.