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“The Conservative Party and Perceptions of the British Middle Classes, 1951 – 1974,” explores conceptions of middle-class voters at various levels of the party organization after the Second World War. Since Benjamin Disraeli, Conservatives have endeavoured to represent national rather than sectional interests and appeal widely to a growing electorate. Yet, the middle classes and their interests have also enjoyed a special position in the Conservative political imagination often because the group insists they receive special consideration. It proved especially difficult to juggle these priorities after 1951 when Conservatives encountered two colliding challenges: the middle classes growing at a rapid rate, failing to form a unified outlook or identity, and the limited appeal of consumer rhetoric and interests owing to the uneven experience of affluence and prosperity. Conservative ideas and policies failed to acknowledge and resonate with the changing nature of their core supporters and antiquated local party organization reinforced feelings of alienation from and mistrust of new members of the middle classes as well as affluent workers. This research shows that there was no clear-cut path between postwar Conservatism to Margaret Thatcher’s brand of Conservatism in which the individual, self-sufficient and acquisitive middle-class consumer became the champion. Moreover, the Conservative Party revealed, in these discussions, that it was much less ideologically certain than narratives have allowed previously. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis considers the position of the British financial sector in the economic strategy of social democracy during the 1960s and 1970s. In doing so it attempts to shed light on a broader question – what caused the collapse of the postwar social democratic project in Britain during the final quarter of the twentieth century? It contends that the social democratic project faced a variety of challenges to its principles, assumptions, and practices in the two decades prior to the election of Margaret Thatcher as a result of changes to the financial system. These challenges offered opportunities for the advance of social democracy beyond the norms established following the Second World War, but the capacity to pursue these was constrained in a number of ways. The emergence of institutional investment, and the breakdown of the postwar banking settlement, undermined the social democratic methods for managing and controlling credit and investment, yet also offered the opportunity to advance the State’s capacity to intervene in the economy. However the ability of the left to renew and rebuild the social democratic economic project along more advanced, interventionist lines was limited by new material constraints which made extensive reform of the financial system and the domestic economy extremely difficult. Structural changes to the international financial system following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods settlement, combined with the severe economic crisis of the 1970s, imposed new limits on the freedom of governments to engage in domestic-focused macroeconomic management. As the methods and techniques of social democratic economic strategy became less effective, the ideal of developing an advanced industrial economy through State coordination faded. In its place a new conception of the British economy was promoted which sought to revive its historic liberal and internationalist role in which the City of London was at its heart.

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The central aim of the thesis is to investigate the myriad ideological 'thought-practices' of Cameronism by placing the composition and content of Cameronism in the context of the problem of Thatcherism's legacy. This problem is namely a problem of the gap between intentions and outcomes. The thesis identifies three discreet, but also overlapping, ideological developments that take root in the late 1980s/early 1990s: (1) the steadfast commitment to reducing the size and scope of the central state; (2) the recognition that neo-liberal economics is a necessary but insufficient precondition for the delivery of wider Conservative outcomes; and (3) the rediscovery and commitment to the renewal of civil society as an alternative to state intervention in response to the perceived failures of neo-liberalism. The thesis examines the application of these ideological developments in Cameronism, both in theory and practice. Furthermore, it examines the political-thought practices of Cameronism in the context of the Coalition Government. Finally, the thesis analyses a serious Conservative ideological threat to Cameronite Conservatism, concluding that Cameronism is a distinct, decodable and distinctive Conservatism, which has been quickly eclipsed by other Conservatisms, namely the Conservatism of the New New Right, which is much closer to the Thatcherism that Cameronism was resolutely trying to adjust. British Conservatism has thus come full circle: the market society vision of Thatcherism, which Cameronism was trying to ideologically supplement, has been restored as the best and surest way to achieve the Conservative aim of a limited conception of politics.

The diploma thesis "At the Top, or behind the Zenith of Power? To the Effect of Winston S. Churchill as the Prime Minister of Great Britain in the Years 1951-1955" examines the effect of Winston S. Churchill during his second term as Prime Minister of Great Britain. The thesis analyzes his effect on foreign policy, where the main emphasis is on the relationship with the United States, his plans for negotiations with the Soviet Union, domestic politics, and his tenure at the head of the Conservative Party. It briefly analyzes his relationship and disputes with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, and the British Prime Minister's medical condition. The main focus of the thesis is devoted to Churchill's ability to promote his ideas and plans in all areas of his operations, as a leading politician of the Great Britain.

Between 1830 and 1914 in Britain a dramatic modification of the reputation of Edmund Burke (1730-97) occurred. Burke, an Irishman and Whig politician, is now most commonly known as the 'founder of modern conservatism' – an intellectual tradition which is also deeply connected to the identity of the British Conservative party. Indeed, the idea of 'Burkean conservatism’ – a political philosophy which upholds ‘the authority of tradition', the organic, historic conception of society, and the necessity of order, religion, and property – has been incredibly influential both in international academic analysis and in the wider political world. This is an intellectual construct of high significance, but its origins have not hitherto been understood: insofar as it has been considered at all, it has been typically seen as the work of Cold War American conservatives. In contrast, this thesis demonstrates that the transformation of Burke into the 'founder of conservatism' was in fact part of wider developments in British political, intellectual, and cultural history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Drawing from a wide range of sources, including political texts, parliamentary speeches, histories, biographies, and educational curricula, this thesis provides a properly contextual history of political thought. It shows how and why Burke's reputation was transformed over a formative period of British history. In doing so, it bridges the significant gap between the history of political thought as conventionally understood and the history of the making of political traditions. The result is to show that, by 1914, Burke had been firmly established as a 'conservative' political philosopher and was admired and utilised by political Conservatives in Britain who identified themselves as his intellectual heirs. This was one essential component of a conscious re-working of 'C/conservatism', especially from the mid-1880s, which is still at work today.

Dans les années 1990, le rock britannique revient sur le devant de la scène, porté par des groupes tels Blur, Oasis, Pulp et Suede, que la presse rassemble sous l'étiquette Britpop. Non contents de s'inspirer des grands groupes locaux des années 1960, comme les Beatles, ces musiciens se distinguent par une écriture et une image profondément ancrées dans leur propre identité britannique, et évoquent volontiers dans leurs chansons le mode de vie de la jeunesse comme la culture de la classe ouvrière. Cette renaissance sur les plans musical et culturel (participant au phénomène Cool Britannia) est contemporaine de la rénovation de l'idéologie et de l'image du Parti travailliste, qui devient New Labour sous la férule de Tony Blair, intéressé par la vision positive de la britannicité dépeinte par la Britpop. Dans la course aux élections législatives de 1997, le chef de l'opposition cherche à présenter son parti comme jeune et moderne, et se rapproche des acteurs de la scène rock de l'époque dans le but de courtiser l'électorat jeune qui fait défaut à la gauche depuis les années 1980. L'utilisation du rock en tant qu'outil de soutien politique pourrait néanmoins paraître contre-Nature à cause du rôle traditionnel de ce genre musical, lié aux sous-Cultures et mouvements contestataires. L'étude des excroissances du mouvement Britpop, visibles jusqu'à l'accession de Gordon Brown au poste de Premier ministre en 2007, permettra de dégager l'existence d'une veine critique et contestataire au sein de cette même scène rock, proposant une vision plus réaliste de la société, rappelant l'idée de Broken Britain mise en avant par les Conservateurs à cette époque. / In the 1990s, a string of successful bands such as Blur, Oasis, Pulp and Suede, inspired by glorious forefathers like the Beatles, revived the British rock genre. The press was quick to dub this new scene "Britpop", to describe the way these bands drew their inspiration from their own sense of Britishness, both in their appearance and in their lyrics, which documented several aspects of youth and working-Class cultures in Britain. Meanwhile, the Labour Party was undergoing a similar kind of rebirth under the influence of Tony Blair, who rebranded his party as New Labour. Since Britpop offered a positive, near-Patriotic vision of Britishness in line with the spirit of "Cool Britannia", Blair sought to obtain a very visible support from the Britpop scene in the run-Up to the 1997 general election. This was conceived as a way to help rejuvenate the Labour Party's image and to secure the youth vote which had eluded the left since the 1980s. However, the traditional view of rock music (as a type of protest music, prone to generating subcultures) hardly seems compatible with the idea that it could be used to support a mainstream political party. As the Britpop format went on to influence homegrown rock music into the next decade, with Gordon Brown succeeding Blair as Prime Minister in 2007, it seems several bands took British rock back to its primary, subversive function by painting a realistic picture of British society, closer to the concept of "Broken Britain" than to that of "Cool Britannia".

Neste trabalho buscaremos dois objetivos. O primeiro será apresentar, de modo sistemático, os principais componentes do pensamento conservador do Império. Tomamos como referência três de seus principais expoentes: Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, Paulino José Soares de Sousa, o Visconde do Uruguai e José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, o Marquês de São Vicente. A partir daí, buscaremos relacionar as proposições destes pensadores com o que acreditamos serem as suas principais influências, no caso, o pensamento político francês do período em que foram ativos. Usamos como autores centrais na discussão, Benjamin Constant, François Guizot e Alexis de Tocqueville. A partir destas duas discussões, nosso foco será então de explorar as relações entre estes autores, suas influências e a forma e conteúdo da apropriação dos modelos estrangeiros, no intuito de entender como procuraram soluções para os problemas políticos do Brasil da época. / This work has two central objectives. The first one will to present, in a systematic way, the main components of conservative thought in the Brazilian Empire. We use as a reference three of the central thinkers of the period: Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, Paulino José Soares de Sousa, the Viscount of Uruguay, and José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, the Marquise of São Vicente. Then, we intend to compare the propositions of these thinkers with what we believe to be their main influences, the French political thought of the period. In this case, Benjamin Constant, François Guizot and Alexis de Tocqueville are central authors for the discussion. Having realized these analyses, our central objective will be to explore the relationship between the Brazilian authors and their supposed influences. We will search for the form and content of their use of foreign models, aiming to find solutions for the Brazilian political problems of the period.

Dès 2005 et son élection à la tête du Parti conservateur, David Cameron fit connaître son intention de réviser la politique étrangère britannique selon les principes du « conservatisme libéral ». Prenant ses distances avec le réalisme qui avait guidé les choix de Margaret Thatcher et de John Major aux lendemains de la guerre froide, Cameron associait la défense des intérêts nationaux et le maintien du rôle du Royaume-Uni sur la scène internationale avec le renouveau d’une tradition libérale, qu’il prenait cependant soin de distinguer des excès de l’interventionnisme dont avait fait preuve Tony Blair après 2001. Arrivés au pouvoir en mai 2010 au sein d’un gouvernement de coalition, les Conservateurs refusaient l’idée de tout repli stratégique, en dépit du décalage qui existait entre leurs ambitions et les moyens limités qu’ils étaient en mesure de consacrer à la politique de sécurité. Par le biais de l’analyse de deux études de cas : la signature d’accords de coopération bilatérale avec la France, le 2 novembre 2010, et l’intervention militaire en Libye de 2011, cette thèse examine les facteurs qui influencèrent les décisions prises par le nouveau gouvernement, ainsi que les mécanismes ayant conduit à leur adoption. Suivant une approche interprétiviste, ce travail étudie les traditions, c’est-à-dire l’héritage historique, dans lesquelles les actions du gouvernement de coalition s’inscrivirent, mais aussi la manière dont les différents acteurs de ce domaine spécifique de la politique du pays ont fait évoluer cet héritage pour répondre aux dilemmes posés par l’émergence de nouvelles menaces dans un contexte de réduction des dépenses de l’Etat et d’incertitude stratégique. / Soon after he was elected leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, David Cameron signalled his intention to implement a foreign policy based on ‘liberal Conservative’ principles. Cameron distanced himself from the realism that had guided the choices made by Margaret Thatcher and John Major in the aftermath of the Cold War. Therefore, he associated the defence of national interests, as well as the preservation of Britain’s role in the world, to the revival of the liberal tradition. However, he also insisted on the difference between his approach and the excesses of Tony Blair’s interventionism after 2001. The Conservatives, who were part of the Coalition Government that took office in May 2010, rejected the idea of strategic shrinkage, in spite of the existing gap between their ambitions and the limited resources they could allocate to security policy. Through the analysis of two case studies – the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties on 2 November 2010, and the 2011 military intervention in Libya – this thesis examines the factors that influenced the decisions made by the new government, as well as the mechanisms that led to them. By adopting an interpretivist perspective on these events, the thesis studies the traditions, that is to say the historical inheritance that formed the background of the government’s actions, but also the way the various actors involved in that specific area of policy modified that inheritance to respond to the dilemmas created by the emergence of new threats in a context of cuts in government spending and strategic uncertainty.