The special role courts play in a democracy requires designers of constitutions to consider the delicate trade-offs between democratic accountability and judicial independence. This dissertation analyzes the decisional consequences of state supreme court institutional structures. States utilize several types of election and elite reconfirmation, and each method carries a systematically different risk of incumbent defeat. My theory predicts that as reappointment uncertainty increases, judicial independence decreases. I define judicial independence as decisions made by judges using only considerations that are internal to the rule of law. I measure judicial independence by quantifying the external influence of partisan, elite, popular, and economic pressures applied to judges. I conclude by considering the normative implications of the empirical findings. Because judicial independence is a problem of optimization, not maximization, constitutional designers hope to strike a balance between some form of judicial accountability, popular constitutionalism, and judicial independence. / text

The addition of random selection to our arsenal of methods for selecting political officials would enhance performance against norms of representative democracy. I employ historical and analytic methods to explore the nature of sortition and its relation to political equality, rational decision-making, and legitimate representation. Sortition both expresses a democratic commitment to political equality and facilitates improved performance under this democratic norm. It can be rational to eschew reasons in the process of selecting political officials, and decision-making bodies chosen randomly can be expected to make good decisions. I also address concerns stemming from representative norms, surrounding random selection of officials, arguing that random selection can enhance the resemblance and responsiveness of representatives. Finally, I detail some possibilities for institutional arrangements that would deliver the benefits of sortition while addressing the challenges it presents. / text

Each of the fifty U.S. state constitutions establishes a fundamental framework for governmental operations within the state. Described by previous scholarship as the state's political technology, state constitutions delineate formal gubernatorial and legislative authority. Extant literature has focused on gubernatorial and legislative relations from the standpoint of the contemporary contextual political factors associated with individuals serving in the respective offices. Although useful, this focus limits a deeper understanding about how state constitutions, as a point of departure, might affect the way in which governors and legislators interact in the policy process. Specifically examined by this research is how variation in design might impact the ability of governors and state legislatures to achieve preferred policy alternatives. This is addressed through the divergence between the governor's proposed budget and the state legislature's enacted budget. To analyze potential influences of this divergence, state budgets from 27 U.S. states over a recent period of eleven years were collected and coded according to policy areas. Data were used to test hypothesized effects of state constitutional design of formal authority. Based on Tobit model estimation and predicted values of divergence derived from alternative constitutional design scenarios, some state constitutional factors affect the ability of governors and state legislatures to achieve preferred policy alternatives. Salient constitutional variables include gubernatorial and legislative budget authority, institutional control, and duration in service factors. The empirical focus of this research contributes to a more enriched understanding of state constitutions as political technologies. In essence, the design of state constitutional authority has the potential to affect how governors and state legislatures interact in the policy process. In addition to contributing to state constitutional theory, these findings enrich the understanding of the design of authority by reformers and citizens. / Ph. D.

This study starts with two theoretical puzzles within the rational choice oriented literature on government formation in parliamentary democracies: the relative importance of constitutional rules and the existence of multiple party goals. From these puzzles stem the research questions that guide the study: First, what is the theoretical and empirical link between constitutional arrangements (including rules) and party goals? Second, what are the goals of political parties and how can these be studied? Third, relative to the goals of political parties and other constitutional arrangements, what is the importance of government formation rules for the empirical record of minority and majority governments?Coalition theory provides the theoretical starting point from which the research questions stem. The historical-institutional strand of new institutionalism is used to guide the general understanding of the importance of institutional context. The rational choice oriented strand is used for a detailed study of the design of the Swedish government formation rules and an analysis of how the formation rules affect the goal seeking (micro-logic) of actors.Based on both cross-national data and an in-depth study of Swedish coalition and government formation, the analysis shows that the answer to research question number one is that the link between constitutional arrangements and party goals is one of co-determination. The answer to research question number two is that party leaders pursue four main goals and that this should be an explicit model assumption. The answer to research question number three is that the government formation rules help determine the parties' bargaining positions and for that reason they are of significant importance for the formation of minority and majority governments. / digitalisering@umu

The present paper seeks to establish some relationships between political regimes and constitutional design, putting into debate the notion of the Arab Spring and its extent to explain the regimes changes and authoritarian breakdown. This is why topics as the scope of political participation in constitutional processes and the context of constitutional drafting are reviewed on the lights of the dataset of the Comparative Constitutional Project. The article is divided in five main parts. Firstly, it is contextualized the Arab Spring centered in the process of decision making and the actors related to the process of constitutional design. In the second place, the notions of majority constitutions and constitution compromises are turning in a debate. In the third place, a review of comparative studies about constitutions is presented by emphasize the work of Ackerman and Arato. In the fourth part, the data collected from de Comparative Constitution Project and the Economist Intelligence Unit is presented.Finally, some conclusions are elaborated. / El presente artículo busca establecer algunas relaciones entre los regímenes políticos y los diseños institucionales, poniendo en debate la noción de la Primavera Árabe y sus alcances para explicar los cambios en regímenes y la caída de los autoritarismos. Es por ello que temas como el alcance de la participación política en los procesos constitucionales y el contexto de la redacción constitucional son revisados a la luz de las bases de datos del Comparative Constitutional Project. El artículo está dividido en cinco partes principales. En primer lugar, la Primavera Árabe es contextualizada centrándose en los procesos de toma de decisión y en los actores relacionados al proceso de diseño constitucional. En segundo lugar, las nociones de constituciones mayoritarias y compromiso constitucional son puestas en debate. En tercer lugar, es presentada una revisión de estudios comparativos con énfasis en los trabajos de Ackerman y Arato. En cuarto lugar, se introduce la data a usar basada en los proyectos del Comparative Constitutional Project y el Economist Intelligence Unit. Finalmente, se presentan las conclusiones.