This study considers the nature of life and society in the Indian and Oklahoma Territories and the factors contributing to the narrow defeat of the women's suffrage proposal in the Constitutional Convention.

Dr. Dinah Mayoo-Bobee, Assistant Professor, Department of History, East Tennessee State University, will address one of today’s hot topics at its inception and other issues which confronted the forefathers of our country.

Whether through legal assault, private manumissions or slave revolt, the institution of slavery weathered sustained and substantial blows throughout the era spanning the American Revolution and Constitutional Era. The tumult of the rebellion against the British, the inspiration of Enlightenment ideals and the evolution of the American economy combined to weaken slavery as the delegates converged on Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Even in the South, it was not hard to find prominent individuals working, speaking or writing against slavery. During the Convention, however, Northern delegates capitulated to staunch Southern advocates of slavery not because of philosophical misgivings but because of economic considerations. Delegates from North and South looked with anticipation toward the nation’s expansion into the Southwest, confident it would occasion a slavery-based economic boom. Consequently, the institution of slavery was given room to thrive in ways that would take decades and a devastating war to overcome.

Slavery, protected by the United States constitution, expanded as new territories opened up. Heated debate over abolition accompanied slavery’s expansion. In Kentucky’s constitutional convention of 1792, antislavery sentiments for abolition were countered by an argument for protecting slavery. This thesis analyzes the proslavery argument of lawyer George Nicholas who opposed the antislavery argument of minister David Rice. Analyzing that debate, this thesis argues that an entrenched, economic and legal, proslavery argument overcame a humane, moral, antislavery argument. Including an analysis of the consequences for African Americans, the thesis concludes how and why a growing minority of slaveholders was able to perpetuate slavery in the second constitutional convention of 1799. Consequently, Kentucky presents an important case study of how slavery took hold and expanded in a state where the majority did not own slaves.

This thesis explores the disfranchisement of free men of color in 1835 North Carolina through the lens of antebellum citizenship and within the context of the racial turmoil of the 1830s. Citizenship and the evolution of southern racial ideology converged in the 1835 North Carolina Constitutional Convention. On the one hand, free men of color voted, a right permitted in North Carolina for all taxpaying men regardless of race and one of the most crucial components of citizenship in the early republic and Jacksonian periods. But on the other hand, some North Carolina white slaveholders saw free people of color as instigators of slave uprisings and a threat to their social order and economic system. As convention delegates debated disfranchisement, they drew on their notions of citizenship and their fear of people of color, and a majority ultimately decided that free nonwhites did not deserve a voice in the political arena. My explanation of why delegates disfranchised free men of color is twofold. First, members of the convention supported disfranchisement because of the perceived connection between free people of color and slave violence. Disfranchisement also came about because the majority of delegates determined that political citizenship was reserved exclusively for white men, and the elimination of nonwhite suffrage in North Carolina was one of the most explicit representations of the ongoing transition of citizenship based on class to a citizenship based on race in the antebellum United States. / Master of Arts

In the mid-1970s, state courts began to interpret state constitutions independently of the federal constitution in a way that provided greater protection for individual rights at the state versus federal level. Scholars have generally attributed the rise of this movement, known as state constitutionalism, to the actions and scholarship of judges and point to the cause as a fear that the Burger court would rollback Warren court era protections for individual rights. In reality, the concept of state constitutionalism had been present throughout the 1950s-1970s period of state constitutional revision and was deeply influenced by concerns over the status of the federal system. Montana's 1972 Constitutional Convention illustrates the role that constitutional revision had in the subsequent adoption of state constitutionalism. In particular, the creation, adoption, and interpretation of two provisions--the privacy and dignity clauses--shows that the public was engaged in a conscious decision to go beyond the federal protections for individual rights. Montana's experience suggests that further research is needed in order for scholars to fully understand the rise and adoption of state constitutionalism.

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Le cabinet ministériel représente depuis plus d’un siècle un élément incontournable du système politique français. Équipe formée par les collaborateurs immédiats du ministre, nommée par lui, le cabinet est situé à un carrefour complexe d’interactions qui comporte les administrations, le Parlement, les groupes d’intérêt et les médias. Délaissée par les juristes, l’étude institutionnelle du cabinet ministériel est aujourd’hui l’apanage de la sociologie et des sciences politiques. À de rares exceptions près, la doctrine constitutionnelle l’a toujours considéré comme une institution juridiquement indissociable de la personne du ministre. Malgré l’ampleur du phénomène, elle observe à son égard un silence quasi unanime qui ne laisse pas de surprendre. Cette indifférence doctrinale ne peut être véritablement expliquée qu’à l’aune de l’histoire des représentations constitutionnelles. L’apparition et le développement des cabinets ministériels procèdent en effet des mutations subies par le Conseil d’État napoléonien tout au long du XIXe siècle. Par-delà les vicissitudes de l’histoire politique, les cabinets expriment la persistance coutumière d’un principe issu du constitutionnalisme révolutionnaire, selon lequel la fonction gouvernementale doit être organiquement séparée de la fonction administrative. Confondues à l’échelon du ministre, conformément à la logique propre du régime parlementaire, ces deux fonctions vont rester dissociées à l’intérieur même des ministères, grâce aux cabinets ministériels. Les réticences traditionnelles de la doctrine publiciste à l’égard de la notion de « fonction gouvernementale » expliquent en grande partie le caractère inédit d’une telle lecture de l’histoire constitutionnelle. / Since more than a century, the ministerial cabinet is an essential organ of the French political system. This team appointed by the Minister gathers his immediate staff. It is connected to administrations, to Parliament, to lobbies, to Medias, and sometimes to citizens. There are very few legal studies on this subject, which interests especially the political sciences and the sociology. With few exceptions, constitutional doctrine has always regarded the cabinet as an institution legally inseparable from the person of the Minister. Given the magnitude of this practice, the almost unanimous silence of doctrine is rather surprising. This doctrinal indifference finds an explanation in the history of constitutional representations. The emergence and development of ministerial cabinets since the monarchy’s Restoration in 1814 are related to the alterations undergone by the Napoleonic Council of State throughout the nineteenth century. Beyond the vicissitudes of political history, they express the persisting of a customary principle stemming from French revolutionary constitutionalism, according to which the governmental function must be organically separated from the administrative function. These two functions – merged at the Minister's level in accordance with the logic of the parliamentary system – will remain separated inside the ministry, by means of cabinets. The conventional reluctance of the French constitutional doctrine with regard to the notion of "governmental function" largely explains the novelty of such a reading of constitutional history.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the causes and antecedents that have contributed to the fact that, in Argentina, the office of Ombudsman remains vacant. Likewise, the normative origins of the organ are reviewed, in order to understand its value and democratic mission. In the ruling entitled Center for Studies for the Promotion of Equality and Solidarity and Others and the Ministry of Energy and Mining under Collective Protection (Centro de Estudios para la Promoción de la Igualdad y la Solidaridad y otros c/ Ministerio de Energía y Minería s/ amparo colectivo), issued on August 18, 2016, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation exhorted the Congress of the Nation to appoint an Ombudsman in accordance with the provisions conferred on it by article 86 of the National Constitution. The Court’s decision exposed a long-standing legal problem: the absence of an Ombudsman. / El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar las causas y antecedentes que han contribuido a que, en Argentina, el cargo de Defensor del Pueblo permanezca vacante. Asimismo, repasa los orígenes normativos del órgano, a fin de comprender su valor y misión democrática. En el fallo caratulado Centro de Estudios para la Promoción de la Igualdad y la Solidaridad y otros c/ Ministerio de Energía y Minería s/ amparo colectivo, emitido el 18 de agosto de 2016, la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación exhortó al Congreso de la Nación a nombrar un Defensor del Pueblo con arreglo a las disposiciones que le ha conferido el artículo 86 de la Constitución Nacional. La decisión de la Corte expuso una problemática jurídica de larga data: la ausencia de un Defensor del Pueblo.