Chui Wai-yin Raymonod. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-58). / ABSTRACT --- p.i / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.ii / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.iii / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background Information --- p.1 / Purpose of the Study --- p.2 / Methodology --- p.3 / Limitations --- p.4 / Chapter II. --- CORPORATE GOVERNANCE --- p.5 / Introduction --- p.5 / Why is Corporate Governance Important --- p.6 / Chapter III. --- The CURRENT STOCK MARKET IN Hong Kong --- p.9 / Characteristics --- p.9 / Governing Body --- p.11 / Rules and Regulations --- p.13 / Chapter IV. --- MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' PROTECTION --- p.16 / Insider trading --- p.16 / Introduction of Independent Directors --- p.21 / Foreign Domiciled Companies --- p.23 / Director's Remuneration --- p.25 / Interim Results Announcement --- p.26 / Responsibility of Auditors --- p.27 / Privatization --- p.28 / Profit Projections --- p.29 / Disclosure Requirement --- p.30 / Financial Statement --- p.31 / Trigger Level --- p.31 / Chapter V. --- QUESTIONNAIRES --- p.32 / Objective --- p.32 / Findings --- p.33 / Chapter VI. --- INTERVIEW --- p.36 / Purpose --- p.36 / Findings --- p.36 / Chapter VII. --- RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.37 / Insider Dealing --- p.37 / Foreign Domiciled Companies --- p.38 / Introduction of Independent Directors --- p.39 / Director's Remuneration --- p.40 / Chapter VIII. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.41 / APPENDIX --- p.42 / Chapter I. --- Market Capitalization of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange --- p.42 / Chapter II. --- Percentage of Shares Owned by Major Shareholders --- p.43 / Chapter III. --- PRC Domiciled Companies Listedin the Hong Kong Stock Exchange --- p.44 / Chapter IV. --- Statistics on Director's Remuneration --- p.45 / Chapter V. --- Questionnaires sent to Directors --- p.46 / Chapter VI. --- List of Companies to which Questionnaires were sent --- p.55 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.57

by Szeto Yee Tak. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 73-76). / ABSTRACT --- p.I / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.III / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.VII / CHAPTER / Chapter 1.0 --- Corporate Governance and Securities Market --- p.1 / Chapter 2.0 --- The Framework of Corporate Governance - Conformance --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- Corporate Governance Defined --- p.3 / Chapter 2.2 --- Corporate Governance as Related to Public-listed Companies --- p.4 / Chapter 2.3 --- Corporate Governance and Legislation --- p.6 / Chapter 3.0 --- Regulatory Framework of Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Regulatory Bodies - A Brief History --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong --- p.9 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- The Securities and Futures Commission --- p.10 / Chapter 4.0 --- Director's Duties and Liabilities --- p.11 / Chapter 4.1 --- Director's Duties at Common Law --- p.11 / Chapter 4.2 --- Director's Duties - Listed Company --- p.15 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- The Listing Rules --- p.15 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- The Listing Document --- p.16 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Notifiable Transactions --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Model Code for Dealing in Securities by Directors --- p.19 / Chapter 4.2.5 --- Further Disclosure Requirement for Director's Interests --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3 --- Director's Undertakings --- p.22 / Chapter 5.0 --- Minority Shareholders' Rights --- p.25 / Chapter 5.1 --- Majority Rule Principle --- p.25 / Chapter 5.2 --- Exceptions to Foss v Harbottle Rule --- p.25 / Chapter 5.3 --- Statutory Protection on Minority Shareholders --- p.25 / Chapter 5.4 --- Rights of Members --- p.29 / Chapter 5.5 --- Financial Statements --- p.29 / Chapter 5.6 --- Minority Shareholder's Protection in Listed Companies --- p.31 / Chapter 5.6.1 --- Revised Codes on Share Repurchases --- p.32 / Chapter 5.6.1.1 --- Restrictions on Share Repurchases- Listed Companies --- p.34 / Chapter 5.6.1.2 --- Notification Requirements --- p.37 / Chapter 5.6.1.3 --- Exemptions from the General Offer Requirements --- p.37 / Chapter 5.6.1.4 --- Offer Period and Other Conditions --- p.38 / Chapter 5.6.1.5 --- Share Repurchases which have Effects Similar to Privatisation --- p.39 / Chapter 5.6.1.6 --- Takeovers Code Implications --- p.40 / Chapter 5.6.2 --- Codes on Takeovers and Mergers --- p.40 / Chapter 5.6.2.1 --- Administration and Sanctioning Powers of the Code --- p.41 / Chapter 5.6.2.2 --- The Principles of the Takeovers Code --- p.43 / Chapter 5.6.2.3 --- The Specific Rules of the Takeovers Code --- p.44 / Chapter 6.0 --- Protection of Investors --- p.48 / Chapter 6.1 --- Protection Against Loss Due to Financial Defaults by Market Participants --- p.48 / Chapter 6.2 --- Protection Against Abuse by Financial Intermediaries --- p.49 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- "Registration Requirements of Dealers, Investment Advisers and Representatives" --- p.49 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Trading Practice of Registered Dealers --- p.51 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Protection of Improper Trading Practices --- p.51 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- Duties of Registered Person --- p.52 / Chapter 6.3 --- Protection of Investors - Offering of Securities --- p.53 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- Offers of Shares and Debentures --- p.54 / Chapter 6.3.1.1 --- The Definition of Prospectus --- p.54 / Chapter 6.3.1.2 --- The Prospectus Requirements --- p.55 / Chapter 6.3.1.3 --- Liabilities of Promoters and Directors --- p.57 / Chapter 6.3.1.4 --- Prospectus for Foreign Issues --- p.58 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Offers of Securities --- p.59 / Chapter 6.3.2.1 --- General Prohibition --- p.59 / Chapter 6.3.2.2 --- Consequence of Breach --- p.60 / Chapter 6.4 --- Protection Against Shareholder's or Director's Abuse of Powers --- p.61 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance --- p.62 / Chapter 6.4.1.1 --- The Meaning of Insider Information --- p.62 / Chapter 6.4.1.2 --- The Test of Price Sensitivity --- p.62 / Chapter 6.4.1.3 --- The Definition of an Insider --- p.64 / Chapter 6.4.1.4 --- The Meaning of Dealing in Securities --- p.65 / Chapter 6.4.1.5 --- Validity of Insider Dealing --- p.65 / Chapter 6.4.1.6 --- Liability of Officers --- p.66 / Chapter 6.4.1.7 --- Consequence of Establishment of Insider Dealing --- p.66 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance --- p.67 / Chapter 7.0 --- Conclusion - A Comment on Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.68 / Chapter 7.1 --- The Composition and Role of the Board --- p.68 / Chapter 7.2 --- Codification of Governance Policy --- p.69 / Chapter 7.3 --- The Necessary Back Up Facilities --- p.71 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.73

Chung Chi-man. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-94). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / 摘要 --- p.iii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- Agency Theory --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Separation of Large and Small Shareholders --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Role of Auditing in Corporate Governance --- p.5 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- The Framework of Corporate Governance and External Auditing in Hong Kong / Chapter 2.1 --- Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- External Auditing in Hong Kong --- p.12 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Construction of the Data / Chapter 3.1 --- Assembly of the Primary Data --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2 --- Traces of the Identities of the Ultimate Owners --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3 --- Construction of the Industry-Adjusted Audit Rate Data and Some Descriptive Statistics --- p.19 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Ownership and Control Patterns / Chapter 4.1 --- An Improved Research Methodology --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2 --- Discussions of Ownership and Control Patterns --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3 --- Ownership and Control by Owner Types --- p.30 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Examples of Typical Ownership Patterns / Chapter 5.1 --- The Li Ka-Shing Business Group --- p.35 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Swire Group --- p.40 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Kuok Khoon-Ean Business Group --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Regression Analyses / Chapter 6.1 --- The Variables --- p.43 / Chapter 6.2 --- Regression Results and Discussions --- p.46 / Chapter 6.3 --- A Restricted Model --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Some Concluding Remarks --- p.55 / Tables / Table 1 Description Statistics of the Unadjusted Auditing Rate Data --- p.57 / Table 2 Separation of Ownership and Control Rights --- p.58 / "Table 3 Control of Publicly Traded Companies, by Owner Types" --- p.59 / Table 4 Description of Regression Variables --- p.60 / Table 5 Regression Results on the Relationship between Industry- Adjusted Auditing Rates and the Largest Shareholders' Ownership and Control (Full Sample) --- p.63 / Table 6 Regression Results on the Relationship between Industry- Adjusted Auditing fee and the Largest Shareholders' Ownership and Control (Family-controlled or Corporate-Entity-controlled Firms Only) --- p.66 / Figures / Figure 1 The Structure of Hang Seng Composite Index --- p.68 / Figure 2 The Relationship between Different Types of Large Shareholders --- p.69 / "Figure 3a The Li, Ka-Shing Group" --- p.70 / Figure 3b Details of the Calculations of the Concentrated Ownership and Control Stakes --- p.71 / Figure 4 The Connections of the Chinese Government and a Diverse Corporation (Swire Group) --- p.72 / "Figure 5 The Kuok, Khoon-Ean Group (An Example of Flat Structure)" --- p.73 / Appendices / Figure A1 HSBC Holdings PLC --- p.74 / Figure A2 The Bank of East Asia --- p.75 / Figure A3 JCG Holdings Limited --- p.76 / Figure A4 Moulin International Holdings limited --- p.77 / Figure A5 Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Limited --- p.78 / Figure A6 Orient Overseas (International) Limited --- p.79 / Figure A7 Sun Man Tai Holdings Company Limited --- p.80 / "Figure A8 The Lee, Shan-Kee Group" --- p.81 / Figure A9 China National Aviation Company Limited --- p.82 / Figure A10 ICBC (Asia) Limited --- p.83 / Figure A11 MTR Corporation --- p.84 / "Figure A12 The Liu, Lit-Man Group" --- p.85 / Table A1 Summary Description of the Data --- p.86 / Bibliography --- p.91

Using a sample of firms listed in China's A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO's political connectedness will affect the listed firms' hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the channels of these effects. I find that, for state-owned enterprises, politically connected CEOs are less likely to be nominated to firms in industries with more specific knowledge, with more competition, cross-listed in Hong Kong stock exchange, and in regions with stronger institutions. However, there is no such pattern for non-SOEs. Second, as a consequence, CEOs' political connectedness of CEOs in SOEs reduces the sensitivity of their turnover to firm performance for SOEs. There is no such political connectedness effect on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in non-SOEs. Third, the reduction on turnover performance sensitivity is mitigated by stronger institutions. The additional analysis finds evidence partially explaining why the politically connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed because of their poor performance, that is, SOEs with politically connected CEOs can (1) get more subsidies from the governments when their performance is poor, and (2) tend to hire more employees when the regions in which they locate suffer from severe unemployment problem. / Yuan, Qingbo. / Adviser: T.J. Wong. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2123. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

published_or_final_version / Law / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

Zugl.: Köln, Universiẗat, Diss., 2005.

Following the growing emphasis on the monitoring role of independent directors in the board of directors in the stock exchanges of Western developed countries, companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are required to appoint independent non-executive directors (INEDs) representing at least one-third of their boards under the Listing Rules. Unlike those Western developed capital markets where listed companies are widely held, most listed companies in Hong Kong are controlled and managed by families. This means realistically, INEDs of those family-controlled listed companies can only be appointed to the boards with the support from the controlling owners. Under such circumstances, the INEDs' ability to monitor the performance of the management of those companies independently is put in doubt. This thesis intends to conduct a qualitative study using phenomenological approach to explore and understand the role and effectiveness of INEDs in family-controlled listed companies in Hong Kong based on the INEDs' lived experiences. The study is the first of its kind in the Hong Kong corporate governance research arena, as research studies on corporate boards and directors have often adopted a quantitative approach, using only publicly available archival data without in-depth discussions with the subjects on their real experience and views on their jobs. Accordingly, issues related to directors in family-controlled listed companies that require in-depth discussions with these directors are impossible to be addressed by such research approach. Through semi-structured interviews with INEDs of companies listed in Hong Kong, this thesis has contributed to the existing knowledge and literature in the research on INEDs and corporate governance in family businesses and provide useful hints and ideas to practitioners, listed companies, investors, regulators and policy-makers.

published_or_final_version / Urban Planning and Environmental Management / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Jie Jenny Tian. / Thesis submitted in 2000. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-137). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Acknowledgements --- p.i / Abstract --- p.iii / Chapter CHAPTER 1. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER 2. --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- Agency Theory Approach to Corporate Governance --- p.4 / Chapter 2.2 --- Stewardship Theory Approach to Corporate Governance --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3 --- Research on Board of Directors: Prescriptions and Empirical Evidence --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Board Composition Studies --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Board Leadership Structure Studies --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.24 / Chapter CHAPTER 3. --- REFORM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CHINESE CASE --- p.25 / Chapter 3.1 --- China's Enterprise Reform: An Overview --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2 --- State as Shareholder: The State Assets Management System --- p.30 / Chapter 3.3 --- Asset Restructuring before IPO --- p.35 / Chapter 3.4 --- Corporate Governance Research in China: Theories and Empirical Evidence --- p.43 / Chapter 3.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.46 / Chapter CHAPTER 4. --- THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES --- p.47 / Chapter 4.1 --- Theoretical Background and Research Questions --- p.47 / Chapter 4.2 --- A New Approach to Understanding Board Composition in China --- p.51 / Chapter 4.3 --- Board Composition and Firm Performance --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Agency Theory Hypotheses --- p.57 / Independent Directors and Firm Performance --- p.57 / Affiliated Directors and Firm Performance --- p.59 / Board Size and Firm Performance --- p.61 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Stewardship Theory Hypotheses --- p.62 / Independent Directors and Firm Performance --- p.62 / Affiliated Directors and Firm Performance --- p.65 / Board Size and Firm Performance --- p.71 / Chapter 4.4 --- Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance --- p.72 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Agency Theory Hypothesis --- p.72 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Stewardship Theory Hypothesis --- p.74 / Chapter 4.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.77 / Chapter CHAPTER 5. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.78 / Chapter 5.1 --- Sample Selection --- p.78 / Chapter 5.2 --- Variables and Measurement --- p.82 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Independent Variables (IVs) --- p.82 / Board Composition --- p.82 / Board Leadership Structure --- p.84 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Dependent Variables (DVs) --- p.84 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Control Variables --- p.86 / Chapter CHAPTER 6. --- RESULTS --- p.94 / Chapter 6.1 --- Results based on the Full Sample (N=203) --- p.94 / Chapter 6.2 --- Results based on the Streamlined Sample (N = 197) --- p.101 / Chapter CHAPTER 7. --- "DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION" --- p.107 / Chapter 7.1 --- Discussion --- p.107 / Chapter 7.2 --- Limitations --- p.116 / Chapter 7.3 --- Conclusion and Future Research Direction --- p.118 / References --- p.121