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Before 1950, the United States intervened in large scale counterinsurgencies twice as often and intervened almost exactly as long as interventions after 1950. Yet, U.S. supported states developed before 1950 tended to survive an average thirty years after U.S. withdrawal. In contrast, U.S. supported states after 1950 have tended to survive only three years. The central question of this examination is why did U.S. military counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions before 1950 produce host-nation governments and host nation security forces that tended to endure ten times longer than interventions after 1950? My central argument is that when the U.S. military deeply embeds within and inhabits host-nation institutions (institution inhabiting strategies) then, state longevity improves in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. Inversely, when the U.S. military employs strategies of lower embeddedness (institution influencing strategies) then, state longevity decreases in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. I compare cases of intervention in tabula rasa or erased governance in the Philippines 1898-1913 and Iraq 2003-2010. The former employed high degrees of embeddedness in both governance and security development and the latter low degrees in both. I also compare cases of intervention in existing governance in Nicaragua 1912-1933 and Vietnam 1964-1972. The former employed a high degree of embeddedness in host-nation security force development and a low degree in host-nation government development while and the latter employed low degrees in both. My research finds a correlation between degree of embeddedness in developing security and governance and state longevity after withdrawal of U.S. forces. The implications for this study are salient today. Where state fragility has progressed to the point where intervention by conventional military force is required to arrest it, institution influencing strategies like Advise and Assist are insufficient. And while trusteeship forms of relation have been largely dismissed since decolonization, the apparent efficaciousness of neo-trusteeships and shared sovereignty relationships in places like Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone hold out the promise of more effectual strategies for state building in counterinsurgency interventions. / PHD

This project analyzes the relationship between military occupations and power vacuums. Specifically, it seeks to understand why some military occupations result in power vacuums while others do not. Pundits and policymakers have written extensively about the possibilities that the end of US occupations might yield dangerous power vacuums. These vacuums would create regional turmoil by inviting hostile actors and causing state failure. Based on these assumptions, many commentators caution against the withdrawal of forces. But what exactly is fearful about a power vacuum remains unclear. The concept of a power vacuum lacks defined parameters and scope, and why military occupations might lead to power vacuums is unknown. Much of the current analysis derives from familiar and recent cases of occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. David Edelstein has the most comprehensive work on military occupations, but his work does not directly address the outcome of power vacuums. This project uses a mix multimethod research design to examine which factors cause power vacuums to emerge following occupations. It uses a comprehensive dataset of occupations since 1943. It will begin with a medium-n QCA and then proceed with case studies. The ultimate goal is to identify the conditions likely to lead to power vacuums and develop policy recommendations about how to avoid them. This project theorizes that a high level of economic destruction inflicted by the occupying military is a necessary condition for the absence of a power vacuum in the occupied territory. Shortened, this project calls this theory total destruction equals total buy-in. High levels of economic destruction inflicted by the occupier pacify the occupied population, while simultaneously delegitimizing the occupied state's previous regime. High economic destruction, which is defined as the decline of a state's per-capita GDP and overall population, is not the sole factor in preventing a power vacuum. Combinations of other conditions help influence the advent or absence of a power vacuum, but economic destruction inflicted by the occupier is the only condition that must be present in order to prevent a power vacuum. / Doctor of Philosophy / This project examines how, when, and why power vacuums emerge at the end of military occupations. Power vacuums evoke fear from pundits and policymakers, as hostile actors can exploit power vacuums to sow instability. Yet there remains no clear definition of what constitutes a power vacuums or substantive research on their etiology and impact. Policy discussions typically look to recent US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan to evaluate how the end of military engagement and occupation can create power vacuums. Thus risk of a power vacuum is often cited as justification to prolong military operations. To rectify this, this project will complete a replication and extension using David Edelstein's seminal dataset on military occupations. The dataset includes well-known cases such as the Allied occupations of Western Germany and Japan and lesser-known occupations like the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Using a combination of within-case process tracing and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the project seeks to elucidate what combination of conditions generate power vacuums following military occupations. The theory this project argues is that a high level of economic destruction inflicted by the occupying military is a necessary condition for the absence of a power vacuum in the occupied territory. The crux of this theory is that occupiers that engage in protracted conflict, inflicting widespread damage on a state before occupying it, are more likely to prevent a power vacuum from occurring. This widespread damage creates "breathing space" for the occupier to establish indigenous security forces (ISF) and a friendly government without having to worry about nationalist resistance from the occupied population.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

This study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.

The intent of the author is to establish a methodology for future forcible interventions in the affairs of failed, failing or rogue and terrorist sponsoring states in order to stabilize and democratize these nations in accordance with stated United States' goals. The argument follows closely current and developing United States military doctrine on stabilization, reconstruction and counterinsurgency operations. Further the author reviews several past interventions from 1844 to the present. Conducting a survey of colonial, imperialist as well as pre and post World War II, Cold War, post Cold War and post September 11th interventions to determine the techniques and procedures that proved most successful, the author proposes a program of intervention and reconstruction called Progressive Reconstruction that incorporates many of the successful activities of these past and present doctrines. The cornerstone of the methodology is the combination of rapid decisive combat and stabilization operations leading into a series of governmental transitions from foreign direct and indirect to indigenous independent rule.

'On All Fronts' is a thesis focused on the EOKA insurgency in Cyprus (1955-1959), which aimed at overturning British rule and unifying the island with Greece. EOKA’s campaign was one of several insurgencies carried out against Britain in the two decades following the Second World War. This allowed British policymakers and soldiers to apply lessons learned in other colonies on the island. These lessons included pursuing a political solution in tandem with military operations, unifying command and control, improving intelligence capabilities, and increasing the number of police and soldiers on the ground. Cyprus also presented distinctive challenges. The insurgency was not inspired by communism, like many other anti-colonial struggles, but by right-wing nationalism. The campaign was also intimately linked to the strategic reorganisation undertaken by Britain after 1945. Retreat from India and Palestine increased the importance of the Middle East and Africa, making a presence in Cyprus central to Britain’s post-war plans. Finally, Cypriot demographics meant that the island’s Turkish minority (some eighteen percent) – supported by Ankara – opposed union with Greece. An ethnic-based civil war on the island was possible, as was a regional war between Greece and Turkey. British policy sought to avoid both of these potential conflicts while maintaining the strength of NATO and positive relations with both Athens and Ankara. Utilizing newly declassified papers from the British government, in conjunction with evidence from Greek-Cypriot sources, this study offers insights into the campaign from the perspective of both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces. Parallel to the military analysis, the thesis addresses the political aspect of the insurgency, demonstrating the deep connection in insurgency war between military operations and diplomatic negotiation. While counter-insurgency operations failed to destroy EOKA, the success of government forces created pressure for a diplomatic solution and highlighted the reality that there were insurmountable military and strategic obstacles to union with Greece.

L’invasion et l’occupation de l’Irak ont montré les capacités des Etats-Unis de renverser un ordre politique, et les difficultés d’en construire un à leur profit. Le postulat de départ de la présente recherche consiste à s’interroger sur les effets produits par la présence américaine en Irak. Ceux-ci ne peuvent être analysés indépendamment des logiques qui en sont à l’origine ni de l’interaction avec de multiples acteurs. C’est donc à une analyse stratégique que cette interrogation invite : analyse du raisonnement, de l’articulation entre fins, voies et moyens, mais aussi de l’interdépendance entre les actions américaines et celles des acteurs irakiens. A cette aune, l’histoire militaire devient l’occasion d’une étude sociologique de l’utilisation de la force ainsi que des rapports entre sphères politiques et militaires. D’autre part, l’inscription des actions militaires dans un contexte sociopolitique dynamique porte à se poser la question du rôle joué par la coercition dans l’établissement d’un ordre politique au niveau local. Plus largement enfin, cette thèse interroge les prétentions des Etats occidentaux et de la communauté internationale à promouvoir un ordre libéral dans un contexte de consolidation de l’Etat. / The US invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq seem to highlight the capability of the United States to overthrow a given political order as well as the difficulties in building another order more favorable to their interests. That research is premised on the analytical necessity to interrogate the effects produced by the American presence in Iraq. Indeed, the effects of military actions cannot be studied independently from their underlying logic. In addition, one has to take into account the dialectical interaction between US military actions and those of the various actors at play in Iraq. Hence a strategic analysis, drawing on the Clausewitzian strategic theory and encompassing the reasoning, the articulation between ends, ways and means, and the interplay between the US and Iraqi actors. In the light of this analysis, military history gives way to a more sociological study of the use of force and of the civil-military relations. Furthermore, as military actions are inscribed in a broader and dynamic sociopolitical context, it is necessary to question the role of coercion in building a political order at the local level. At a higher level, this study questions Western States’ and international community’s claims to promote a liberal order in a context of state consolidation.

Régulièrement décrite comme le fruit d'un conflit identitaire déclenché par des interventions extérieures, la guerre civile irakienne est d'abord le résultat d'une intense compétition partisane. À travers une enquête de terrain menée de 2010 à 2017 au sein du gouvernorat de Kirkouk, cette thèse montre la manière dont les partis irakiens pénètrent l'État et produisent la société. En particulier, notre travail interroge la manière dont les partis captent les ressources étatiques qui leur permettent la mise en place de politiques d'ingénieries démographiques, la violence étant par ailleurs une modalité d'action centrale du jeu politique. En conséquence, une nouvelle hiérarchie communautaire s'installe qui modifie les structures socio-économiques et la vie quotidienne de la population. À partir de 2011, les inégalités qui résultent de ces transformations encouragent des protestations unanimistes (et non communautaires), mais la violence interdit le développement de ce mouvement et la marginalisation des Arabes sunnites facilitera finalement l'émergence de l'État islamique. Entre 2014 et 2017, la guerre contre l'EI radicalise encore les projets politiques de l'ensemble des partis, mais aboutit paradoxalement à un renforcement de l'État qui revient par le biais d'une politique de décharge milicienne et parvient à reprendre Kirkouk aux partis kurdes irakiens en octobre 2017. / Regularly described as the result of an identity conflict triggered by external interventions, the Iraqi civil war is first and foremost the result of intense partisan competition. Through an investigation conducted from 2010 to 2017 in the Kirkuk governorate, this thesis demonstrates how Iraqi parties penetrate the state and produce society. In particular, my work questions how parties capture the state resources that enable them to implement demographic engineering policies, violence being also a central modality of action in the political game. As a result, a new identity hierarchy is emerging that is changing the socio-economic structures and daily lives of the population. From 2011, the inequalities resulting from these transformations will encourage unanimous (and not sectarian) protests, but violence ultimately prohibits the development of this movement and the marginalization of Sunni Arabs will ultimately facilitate the emergence of the Islamic State. Between 2014 and 2017, the war against lS further radicalizes the political projects of all political parties, but paradoxically leads to a strengthening of the State, which returns through a devolution of power in favor of militias and, in October 2017, manages to take Kirkuk back from the Iraqi Kurdish parties.

This dissertation is focused on one of many aspects of religion and politics in Guatemala in recent history (1976-1990). This period is characterized by unequal wealth distribution, ethnic divisions, civil war, and U.S. influence. It is a contemporary mission history examining missionary efforts directed from the United States, Guatemalan responses, and indigenous initiatives. The problem concerns a movement within Protestant evangelicalism, which in this study is called Political Evangelicalism, and its relationship to the counterinsurgency war which the Guatemalan military waged against guerrillas, political opposition, and the Mayan majority. The problem centers on the following interrelated questions: How did Political Evangelicalism appear in Guatemala and how did it develop? How did agents of Political Evangelicalism act? What kind of discourse was employed to legitimize armed and structural violence? What was the relationship between Political Evangelicalism and counterinsurgency strategy? Political Evangelicalism must be reflected through different actors and aspects of Guatemalan conflicts to be understood. Therefore, Political Evangelicalism is placed in the broader context of the Guatemalan situation and its relation to the United States. This is a chronological study describing the role and development of Political Evangelicalism on three levels: the relationship between the United States and Guatemala; Guatemala on the national level; and an in-depth study of the Ixil people. The focal point is on the Guatemalan national level. A wide array of empirical material is employed, including interviews, unpublished documents, official documents, booklets, articles, and so on.