Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Simons, Anna ; Second Reader: Sepp, Kalev. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 14, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Training and Advisory Assistance, Pakistan, Frontier Corps, Special Service Group (SSG), U.S. Army Special Forces, Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Waziristan Accord, Internal Defense and Development (IDAD), Security Force Assistance (SFA), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A), Unconventional Warfare (UW), counterinsurgency, Operational Planning and Assistance Training Teams (OPATT), Civilian Auxiliary Force-Geographical Unit (CAFGU), Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), Operation Cyclone, Movimento Popular di Libertacao di Angola (MPLA), Security Assistance Training Program (SATP). Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-80). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Anna Simons. Includes bibliographical references (p. 55-58). Also available online.

Longtemps en marge des pratiques militaires occidentales, la guerre irrégulière fut réintroduite au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale sous l’impulsion de la stratégie indirecte adoptée par la Grande-Bretagne. Les réseaux de coopération interalliés permettent alors à ces nouvelles conceptions de se diffuser auprès d’acteurs français et américains, formant ainsi le creuset d’une nouvelle communauté stratégique. L’émergence de la « menace subversive » au début de la guerre froide favorise le renouvellement de cette communauté et le développement des savoirs stratégiques irréguliers tels que la guérilla ou la guerre psychologique. Tantôt dans la coopération, tantôt dans la rivalité, les alliés tissent leur communauté de pratiques, d’abord en Asie du Sud-Est, face à la menace maoïste, puis dans l’ensemble du Tiers-Monde. Au cours des années 1960, ce sont les États-Unis qui prennent la tête de la croisade contre les « guerres de libération nationale » et développent en réponse une stratégie intégrée sous le nom de « contre-insurrection ». L’échec de sa mise en œuvre au Vietnam, ainsi que ses dérives politiques conduisent pourtant au rapide déclin de la stratégie irrégulière en Occident jusqu’à sa réapparition au début du XXIe siècle. En s’appuyant sur un grand nombre de sources primaires et en adoptant les nouvelles méthodes de l’histoire connectée, ce travail met en lumière les structures, les réseaux et les vecteurs qui contribuèrent à la circulation des savoirs associés à la guerre irrégulière. Il en explore également les motivations, ainsi que les limites et tente de proposer un narratif global permettant d’appréhender l’évolution des concepts de guerre irrégulière. / After being marginalized for centuries by the Western military model, irregular warfare was reintroduced during the Second World War through the indirect strategy adopted under British leadership. These new concepts then spread to the French and the American allies, thus contributing to forge the crucible of a new strategic community. The emergence of a "subversive threat" at the beginning of the Cold War allowed the renewal of such a community and the development of strategic knowledge such as irregular guerrilla or psychological warfare. Sometimes in cooperation, sometimes in rivalry, Western allies weaved their community of practice, first in Southeast Asia, facing the Maoist threat of people’s war, and then throughout the whole Third World. In the 1960s, the United States took the head of the crusade against the "wars of national liberation" and thus developed an integrated strategy, known as "counterinsurgency". The failure of its implementation in Vietnam and its political excesses yet lead to the rapid decline of irregular strategy in the West until its reappearance in the early twenty-first century, in the context of the global war on terror. Based on a large number of primary sources and adopting new methods of connected history, this work highlights the structures, networks and vectors which contributed to the circulation of strategic knowledge associated with irregular warfare. It also explores the motivations and limitations for such a circulation and attempts to offer an global narrative to apprehend the evolution of irregular warfare concepts.

Uppsatsens problemställning utgår från en eventuell brist i utbildning eller kunskap om gällande doktriner för svenska förband i utlandstjänst. Uppsatsen har ansatsen att visa på en ögonblicksbild av hur ett svenskt förband tolkar begreppet legitimitet och hur det arbetar med att stödja detta i genomförandet av verksamheten. Jämförande underlag och även analysverktyg utgår från ett brett urval inom forskning om upprorsbekämpning och även amerikanska doktriner samt reglementen. Uppsatsen utgår från att begreppet legitimitet har stor betydelse för teorier kring upprorsbekämpning och även för den använda amerikanska doktrinen. Begreppet legitimitet har definierats med hjälp av tre frågeställningar, Legitimitet för vem, Vem ska uppfatta vad som legitimt? samt Vem genererar legitimiteten åt vad? Resultatet visar på att det svenska förbandet i det undersökta exemplet har en bred syn på begreppet legitimitet och kopplar det till såväl sig själva som statsmakten i värdlandet och detta både mot befolkningen i hemlandet och också i operationsområdet. Skillnaderna mot vad som i uppsatsen redovisas som COIN teori eller amerikansk doktrin är små. En viktig del är dock att uppsatsen visar på att det svenska förbandets huvudsakliga definition av legitimitet inom ett COIN-perspektiv är stärkandet av landets säkerhetsorganisationers legitimitet kontra den egna befolkningen. Detta skulle skilja sig mot ovan redovisad teori och doktrin. / The essay presentation of a problem proceed from a possible lack of training or knowledge about valid doctrines for Swedish units conducting service abroad. The essay have the goal to give a snapshoot picture of how a Swedish unit interpret the concept of legitimacy and how the unit works with different aspects to support this. Relating material and also the tool for conducting the analysis are gathered from a wide selection of science in counterinsurgency and also American doctrines. The paper assumes that the concept of legitimacy is important in theories surrounding counterinsurgency and also for the used American doctrine. The concept of legitimacy has been defined by three issues, Legitimacy for whom, Who will perceive what is legitimate? and Who generates legitimacy for what? The result shows that the Swedish unit in the examined example has a width of vision of the concept of legitimacy and linking it to both themselves as the state of the host country and that both the population in both the home and area of operation. The differences of what is in the paper are reported as COIN theory or the American doctrine is small. An important part is that the paper shows that the Swedish's unit primary definition of legitimacy in a COIN perspective, are the strengthening of the country's security organizations legitimacy versus its own population. This would differ from the above reported theory and doctrine.

Uppsatsen är inriktad på den militära delen i upprorsbekämpning och tar sin utgångspunkt i två stycken militärteoretikers teorier inom ämnet. Teoretikerna är John Mackinlay och David Kilcullen, som under 2009 utkom med varsin ny bok inom området, The Insurgent Archipelago samt The Accidental Guerilla. Den metod som arbetet vilar på är kvalitativ textanalys. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka i vilken utsträckning som teorin och doktrinerna stämmer överrens. Därför har först teoretikernas syn på hur en utifrån kommande intervenerande styrka påverkar lokalbefolkningen analyserats. Det som framkommit av detta är dels Mackinlays uppfattning att samtliga styrkor av denna karaktär kommer att betraktas som ockupanter av lokalbefolkningen. Dels Kilcullens uppfattning att styrkan påverkar lokalbefolkningen till att gripa vapen mot dem. Detta trots att även de har en avig inställning mot upprorsrörelsen. Som lösning på problemet för Kilcullen fram bildandet av en strategisk tjänst i likhet med Office of Strategic Services. Från dessa teorier har ett antal kriterier valts ut vilka sedan använts som analysverktyg för att undersöka doktrinernas syn på områdena. De doktriner som har analyserats är Storbritanniens Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, USA:s Joint Publication 3-24, samt NATO:s i nuläget gällande styrdokument BI-SC Cointerinsurgency Joint Operational Guidelines. Av analysen har framkommit att en viss överrensstämmelse mellan teori och konceptuell verklighet förekommer. Dock att teorin snarare rör sig inom en eventuell framtid emedan doktrinerna är fast inom nulägets ramar. / The essay focuses on the military part of counter-insurgency and is based on two theories by the military theorists John Mackinlay and David Kilcullen. Who both in 2009 published a new book on the subject, The Insurgent Archipelago and The Accidental Guerrilla. The method used in the essay is qualitative text-analysis. The purpose of this essay is to examine whether resemblance between theory and doctrine exists. Therefore first of the theorists view in how an exogenous intervening force affects the local population has been analyzed. What emerged from this is partly Mackinlay's view that all forces of this nature will be seen as occupiers by the local people. Partly Kilcullen's view that the force affects the local population to resort to arms against them. This despite the fact that they’re original attitude towards the insurgent movement, which is the reason for the intervening forces presence, is of negative. As a solution to the problem Kilcullen brings forward the constitution of a strategic service, like the Office of Strategic Services. From these theories, a number of criteria have been selected which are then used as analytical tools to examine the doctrines. The doctrines which have been analyzed is the UK's Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, U.S. Joint Publication 3-24 and the currently governing NATO document BI-SC Counterinsurgency Joint Operational Guidelines. The analysis has shown that some resemblance between theory and conceptual reality exist. However that theory, rather involved in a possible future while the doctrines are restrained by the framework of the present day.

Pendant la guerre d'Algérie (1955-1962), le gouvernement général de l'Algérie met en place dans les campagnes et les banlieues des grandes villes d'Algérie une structure de pacification, les SAS (sections administratives spécialisées) et les SAU (sections administratives urbaines), dont on trouve le prolongement au sein des SAT (Service d'assistance technique) en métropole (Paris, Lyon, Marseille) et au niveau de la Force de police auxiliaire de Paris. Les officiers SAS, officiers de carrière, de réserve en situation d'active, et appelés, recrutent des supplétifs (moghaznis) et mènent une politique de pacification dans les domaines administratif, politique (promotion d'élus musulmans), économique (Plan de Constantine), social (aide aux indigents et résorption des bidonvilles), médical, scolaire, et militaire. Au cœur de la politique de la France en Algérie de 1955 à 1959, ces officiers se retrouvent, dès 1960, en porte-à-faux de la nouvelle politique du général de Gaulle. Si certains démissionnent ou partent amers de leur période de SAS, d'autres s'opposent au général de Gaulle lors du référendum sur l'autodétermination de l'Algérie de janvier 1961, du putsch d'avril 1961, voire ont la tentation de basculer dans l'organisation subversive de I'OAS. L'indépendance de l'Algérie risquant de menacer la vie des supplétifs, certains officiers SAS organisent des filières clandestines de rapatriement des supplétifs et de leurs familles, et les aident à s'insérer en France grâce à des associations, des initiatives individuelles et du soutien administratif et financier de l'État (SAT de Paris et de Marseille). / The mission of the SAS in Algeria is the current equivalent in NATO parlance civil-military cooperation. The SAS, the special administrative sections and SAU the city administrative sections were created by the governor general J. Soustelle. Its mission was to maintain contact with the population and collect the intelligence necessary for successful operation. The SAS and SAU would be irnplemented to administer the villages in Algeria to combat the economic misery and political inequality that were the root causes of the insurgency. With their civilian personnel and Muslin auxiliary troops (moghaznis), they were the administrative intermediaries responsible for development of their districts. They rebuilt schools. They cared for the sick by establishing fee medical assistance. They conducted censuses to establish welfare services and organized elections for municipal officials. They improved agriculture and husbandry, built roads and bridges. In military terms, the SAS officiers dismantled the FLN cells and collected intelligence on the ALN. They protected the village with their auxiliaries (moghaznis). ln three cities of metropolis, we find the presence of similar structures, with for Paris, an auxiliary police force. The SAS was an important policy to preserve French Algeria from 1955 to 1959, but then the new policy who wants to give at Algeria her independence (1960-1962) changed the SAS officer policy opinion. They try to oppose them during the referendum of Algerian auto determination (January 1961), at the time of the putsch (Apri11961), by tipping over to the terrorism (OAS), or by organizing Mussulmen auxiliary secret repatriation in France (April-May 1962).

This PhD thesis examines the status of ‘expert knowledge’ in the history of U.S. asymmetric, or ‘counterinsurgency’ (COIN), warfare during the last century. The historical rise of expert influence has so far been neglected in the study of wars within the field of International Relations and the thesis will give us an indication of the importance and utility of expert knowledge. With a specific focus on the campaigns in the Philippines (1899-1902), Vietnam (1954-75) and Iraq (2003-11), the central research question guiding the project is as follows: “What were the conditions for the evolution, the constitution and the use of ‘outside’ expert knowledge in U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns?” The thesis claims that military and academic ‘experts’ had a key role in framing and implementing the problem-sets and solutions to these conflicts. They have, in Iraq in particular, played an important part in developing the campaigns’ ex-post-facto justification of success. Within the framework of organisational knowledge production, this knowledge does not necessarily play an instrumental role for the military. Instead, it can also serve a merely symbolic function, demonstrating to the audience and stakeholders within the political environment that the organisation is willing to solve the problems the insurgents pose, but without any interest in long-term utilisation of the knowledge. This thesis argues that across time, from the beginning of the Philippine-American War in 1898 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, ‘counterinsurgency’ has developed from a tactical and operational tool, used instrumentally to fight insurgencies, to a strategy or even ‘ideology’ in its own right. Whilst the methods or techniques of counterinsurgency remain basically the same, expert knowledge is increasingly used in modern – that is post-World War II – campaigns to support a politico-strategic narrative.

This thesis aims to understand the political sociology of Maoist insurgency in India using a combination of disaggregated statistics and qualitative data. The vast majority of insurgent leaders are from dominant or upper caste, middle class backgrounds. Their participation in the insurgency can be understood in terms of ideology and short-term processes of mobilization. The Maoist insurgents provide a unified organizational structure for two separate sections of society. On the one hand, are untouchable or dalit landless laborers who suffer economic exploitation at the hands of higher caste landowners. On the hand are tribal or adivasi landowning cultivators whose relative autonomy has come under increasing pressure over the past two centuries as the state has established control over natural resources in their area. Their support for the insurgents does not just manifest itself from exploited untouchables’ and oppressed tribals’ positions in the social structure as structural theories would assume. Rather, the insurgents provide them with collective incentives in order to encourage their support. The actors at the macro and micro levels have very different reasons for participating in the insurgency. The insurgent leaders aim to capture state power through a Protracted People’s War, while the objectives of supporters at the micro-level tend to be more concerned with local and short-term issues. The insurgency should be conceptualised as a state building enterprise in which the interests of supporters at all levels are served by seizing local political power and the building of a base area. The thesis demonstrates that the insurgency is expanding most rapidly in the central Indian tribal belt. I use a case study to show that not all tribal communities support the insurgents. Some oppose them, either because their interests have been harmed by the presence of the insurgents, or as a result of a variety of endogenous mechanisms. This indicates that insurgency is a more dynamic and complex process than structural and rational actor theories allow for. The thesis finishes by placing the subject of indigenous communities and insurgency in the global context. It demonstrates that, while so-called indigenous communities listed by the Minorities at Risk project amount to 4.8% of the world’s population, they were involved in 43% of the intra-state conflict years listed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Armed Conflict Dataset between 1946 and 2010.

This master thesis deals with the Chinese counterinsurgency strategy in Xinjiang with particular attention paid to current situation and latest development. The studied phenomenon is explored using the "Three Pillars" framework authored by the counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen. The study concisely presents the concept of insurgency and counterinsurgency with special prominence given to counterinsurgency led by autocratic regimes. The thesis also presents the reader with a comprehensive of Xinjiang's geographic conditions as well as its historical and demographic development. By using the abovementioned framework, the thesis identifies basic characteristics of Chinese counterinsurgency strategy.

From 1991 to 2002, the Sierra Leone government and the Revolutionary United Front waged war against each other, subjecting Sierra Leone to a civil war. This war devastated the nation and resulted in many human casualties. Although many researchers have investigated the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in counterinsurgency and conflict resolution, few studies have been conducted on the specific role of strategic processing tools used by ECOWAS during the Sierra Leone war to sustain a durable peace resolution in the country. Using Galula's conceptualization of counterinsurgency and conflict resolution as a guide, the purpose of this qualitative, I used an explanatory case study to determine the elements that made strategic processing tools effective. Data were collected through open ended interviews with 10 Sierra Leoneans that experienced the conflict, publicly available documents, and mass media reports related to the Sierra Leone civil war. All data were manually coded and then subjected to constant comparative analytic procedures. The key finding of this study was that conflict resolution was successful because intervention by ECOWAS was largely viewed by Sierra Leoneans favorably and legitimate. The ECOWAS use of force was vital for the peace process. However, there were occurrences of human rights violations that were not fully resolved through the procedural mechanisms in place at the time. The positive social change implications stemming from this study includes recommendations to ECOWAS to establish a disciplinary unit to oversee violations of international humanitarian law and other serious abuses by ECOWAS troops. These actions may advance peace among religions, political parties, and ethnic groups in the region.