Vorherrschende Meinungsmacht ist das in wenigen Händen liegende Potential, auf die Meinungsbildung einzuwirken. Sie behindert die Gewährleistung eines vielfältigen Rundfunkangebotes, das im Interesse der freien Meinungsbildung steht. Sie kann entstehen, wenn von Anfang an nur wenige Anbieter auf dem Markt sind oder bei anfänglicher Vielfalt kleinere Anbieter ausscheiden, die restlichen zusammenschmelzen oder ein Veranstalter mehrere Programme ausstrahlt. Doch auch die Einflußnahme eines Unternehmens auf verschiedenen Märkten oder die Bildung eines Informationsmonopols können zu vorherrschender Meinungsmacht führen. Daher stellt der Rundfunkstaatsvertrag Antikonzentrationsregelungen auf. Deren Ziel ist es, freie Meinungsbildung durch eine Vielfalt von Programmangeboten zu gewährleisten. Vermutet wird eine Gefährdung der Vielfalt im Fernsehen, wenn ein Veranstalter mehr als 30 % der Zuschaueranteile auf sich vereinigt. Diese Regelung gestattet eine recht hohe Konzentration von Rundfunkveranstaltern, die gleichwohl nicht verfassungswidrig ist. Zu verhindern ist aber, daß starke Unternehmen die vor- und nachgelagerten Märkte und die anderer Medien derart kontrollieren, daß Neueinsteigern der Zugang dazu verwehrt oder unverhältnismäßig erschwert wird. Das auf Zuschauermarktanteilen basierende Modell muß so ergänzt werden, daß die Cross-ownership umfassend berücksichtigt wird. Dies kann nur mit einer methodenpluralistischen Vorgehensweise bei der Messung des Einflusses erreicht werden. Mit dem Zuschauermarktanteilsmodell wurde ein neues Verfahrensrecht eingeführt. Vergleichbar dem Recht der Wirtschaftsaufsicht wurde ein System aus Überwachungsmitteln, Eingriffsmitteln und Sanktionen geschaffen, das die Unternehmen stärker zur Mitwirkung verpflichtet. Die Aufklärung konzentrationsrechtlicher Sachverhalte dient dem Schutz der freien Meinungsbildung und kann daher mit einigen Ausnahmen als Umsetzung der Anforderungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts an den Grundrechtsschutz durch Verfahren aus dem Rundfunkgebührenurteil verstanden werden. / A multifarious broadcasting sypply is an essential requirement/ prerequisite for a free shaping of public opinion in a democracy. Predominance on the opinion market endangers or hinders this opinion-forming. Therefore it has to be avoided by looking first of the mechanism dominance can be developed. It occurs by acting of only a few provider on this market or the impeding of the access of new companies to the relevant market. Further on by merging of the big players or the concentration of several programs in the hands of one supplier dominance can arise. The instrument that states rules of media ownership to guarantee pluralism and diversity in the opinien market is the German Interstate Treaty of Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag). Hereafter a dominant position of a company is assumed by holding more than 30% of the recipients. Holding this high figure in one hand is not unconstitutional. Nevertheless this high market share must not erase competition on the opinion market? To identify an abuse of dominant positions you have to look at the behavior of the respective company, whether it is building up control over the adjacent markets and impeding of competing companies to enter the respective markets. This can only be done by looking at possible cross-ownership of the involved companies through a multi-tasking measuring system. A new procedure was introduced that is comparable to the general competition-rules. It consists of supervision, intervention and sanctions to bring the companies to stick to the rules. The thoroughly and strict enforcement of anticoncentration serves to shelter and enforce the free shaping of public opinion and meets -a few exceptions aside- all requirements given by the Federal Constitutional Court.

Korsägande definieras som en horisontell ägarstruktur och strukturen har fått ett ökande intresse inom den svenska fastighetssektorn. Finansinspektionen och större branschmagasin inom branschen har lyft fram den ökade risk som korsägande innebär. Därför syftar denna uppsats till att förtydliga definitionen av korsägande och de risker som ägarstrukturen medför. Utöver det kommer korsägandet mellan svenska noterade fastighetsbolag kartläggas och analyseras. Studien genomfördes med både kvantitativa och kvalitativa metoder. Kombinationen av de två tillvägagångssätten möjliggjorde en kartläggning av ägarstrukturerna som sedan kunde positioneras i direkt jämförelse med litteraturen och respondenter. Metoden innehåller en visualisering hämtad från ägardata och intervjuer med respondenter inom branschen. Av den information som samlats in i denna studie kan man sluta sig till att korsägande inte förekommer mellan de börsnoterade svenska fastighetsbolagen. Istället tillskriver branschen begreppet korsägande till en mer omfattande definition än vad den teoretiska gör. Vidare dras slutsatsen att de bakomliggande orsakerna till korsägande beror på flera faktorer. Det kan till exempel vara ett resultat av den starka marknadsutvecklingen där lönsamheten har bidragit till att en del av det tillgängliga kapitalet avleds till andra Fastighetsbolag inom branschen. Emellertid visar både teori och empiri också att det finns strategiska fördelar med korsägande, vilket också har ansetts vara en bakomliggande orsak. De primära riskerna är att det finns incitamentsproblem, systemrisker och minskad transparens. / Cross-ownership is defined as a horizontal ownership structure and has gained an increasing interest within the Swedish Real Estate sector. However, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority and major publications within the industry have highlighted the increased risk that cross-ownership entails. Therefore, this thesis aims to clarify the definition of cross-ownership and the risk it entails. Also, the cross-ownership between Swedish-listed real estate companies will be mapped and analyzed.  This study is conducted using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The combination of these two approaches provides the opportunity to chart the ownership structures and position the literature in direct comparison with the respondent’s answers. The method contains a visualization derived from ownership data and interviews with respondents within the industry. From the information collected in this study, it can be derived that cross-ownership does not occur between the listed Swedish real estate companies. Instead, the industry attributes the concept of cross-ownership to a more extensive definition than the theoretical does. Furthermore, it is concluded that the underlying causes of cross-ownership are due to several factors. For example, it can be a result of the strong market development where profitability has contributed to a portion of the available capital being diverted to other Real Estate companies within the industry. However, both theory and empiricism also show that there are strategic advantages to cross-ownership, which have also been considered an underlying cause. Lastly, there are several risks with cross-ownership, which are primarily attributable to incentive problems, systemic risks, and reduced transparency.

Title from first page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 94-105).

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In this global world, many firms present a complex shareholding structure with<p>indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers.<p>Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between<p>them. Determining who has the most influence is often a difficult task. To measure this<p>influence, game theory allows the modeling of voting games and the computing of the<p>Banzhaf index. This thesis develops models to measure the Banzhaf indices in any ownership structure (pyramidal ownership structures and cross-ownership structures). The models are then applied to real cases studies such Colruyt, Elia, Lafarge and Allianz. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The ownership structure in Sweden is characterized by a few controlling owners who often base their ownership of a lower capital investment than in many other countries. The separation of ownership and control is determined by control-boosting mechanisms and is a constantly debated topic. These mechanisms are used to control companies without having to bear the bulk of the capital, and the criticism centers around concerns that companies with control-boosting mechanisms are not managed as well as companies without them. The purpose of the study was to examine the use of control enhancing mechanisms and its effect on the market value of Swedish companies on Nasdaq Stockholm. The study adopted a quantitative form with hypotheses testing. The data collection has been made through annual reports of the sample and then statistically tested in SPSS through multiple regression. The use of vote-strong shares was shown to have a strong positive effect on the value of a company. Minor effects proven came from the difference between the largest owner's voting share and capital contribution, and of the percentage of the total votes held by the largest owner. These two, however, counteracted each other in approximately equal amounts. Not offering their vote-strong shares to on the public exchange is suggested to be strongly negative, but this could not be ascertained. Type of ownership and age were both insignificant in their ability to explain company value.