In 1991, following its defeat in the Second Gulf War and as a response to the international humanitarian protectionist umbrella provided to the three Kurdish-population governorates in Northern Iraq, the Government of Iraq (GOI) under Saddam Hussein centrally seceded from the area. The vacuum that ensued was soon filled by the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (KNA) and soon a de facto state resurrected from the ashes of destruction besieging Iraqi Kurdistan for many decades. Hence, the precarious existence of what came to be known as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in a highly challenging geopolitical environment and the strategic imperative of preserving the de facto independence of the entity forced the Kurdish leadership to give high priority to building foreign relations and pursuit of foreign policy. Foreign policy as a political activity is of paramount importance to all actors including sovereign states to preserve and promote their national interests. The practice of foreign policy, however, is particularly acute for de facto states. As internationally non-recognized entities, the international system of sovereign states is often skeptical if not hostile to engage in foreign relations with de facto states. Yet, projection of foreign policy and building foreign relations is extremely vital for the continued survival and consolidation of de facto states. By exploring the case of the KRI as a case of de facto statehood, this research argues that, mutatis mutandis, de facto states can pursue independent foreign policies. By identifying major transitions in the KRI, this thesis seeks to better explain foreign policy determinants, objectives and instruments of implementation of foreign policies of the KRI. In doing so, this thesis further seeks to contribute to the analysis of de facto statehood in general, and to contribute to the study of the KRI as the case of de facto statehood in the Middle East region.

This thesis has for major aim to present the de facto state through another approach, by placing their intrinsic frozen conflict situation as a rational choice rather than a symptom of the lack of recognition. To do so, the case studies of Transnistria and Somaliland have been chosen since, the de facto state's academic field had, so far, focus more on the Caucasus' cases - therefore lack of similar comparisons. It appears indeed that, both these cases possess numerous similarities - such as not basing their identity on ethnicity or religion. Thus, through an empirical research, it has been possible to approach the establishment of these two de facto states and the reason behind the lack of international recognition; but also the role and influence of the frozen conflict within their internal evolution as well as their role in its perpetuation; and finally, the place of their parent state and the international community in the continuation of the status quo. It seems thus that, if it remains unlikely to find out if Somaliland and Transnistria do use the frozen conflict as a political tool to reach their political goals - namely international recognition but also identity building -, it appears that all actors involved in these conflicts do benefit from the perpetuation of such status quo.

Abstract – From de facto to de jure: A comparative study between three post-Soviet territories path towards diplomatic recognition The purpose of this essay has been to study how well three post-Soviet de facto states live up to the definition of the concepts of state and sovereignty. Basically, the focus has been to, with the help of an analysis scheme constructed specifically for this study, analyse the situation the three de facto states are currently in and then compare their situations to one another. With the study I want to show that the history of the de facto states, as well as their current legal status, carry with them differences and similarities that play a major role in their future. By analysing a number of scientific articles and other research material within the social science sphere, I have been able to compile a table that shows how well the case studies live up to the seven criteria of the state outlined by Martin Glassner in Political Geography (2004). The main result of the study has been that various historical and demographic circumstances in the three de facto states have distinguished them from one another during the more than three decades that have passed since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, this is in stark contrast to the strong ties they all have to a patron state, which in all cases is crucial to the legal state of limbo they are all currently residing in.

En 1991, suite à la fin de la deuxième guerre du Golfe, un État de facto a été établi au Kurdistan irakien. Cette mutation d’un acteur contestataire kurde en un État de facto s’est avérée un gain sans précédent pour le « mouvement nationaliste kurde ». Néanmoins, malgré son importance historique, ce gain d’autonomie ne permit pas pour autant de dépasser les divisions présentes au sein du mouvement nationaliste kurde. Ce mémoire tente ainsi de comprendre les raisons du maintien de ces divisions. L’hypothèse proposée est que la raison pour laquelle la création d’un État de facto kurde en Irak n’a pas permis de dépasser les divisions du mouvement nationaliste est que ce dernier a poursuivi un projet de construction étatique similaire aux États de facto. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, la recherche fait le lien entre la littérature sur les États de facto, le comportement du Kurdistan irakien et les divisions du mouvement nationaliste kurde. La recherche démontre dans un premier temps que la poursuite d’un projet de construction étatique a amené le Kurdistan irakien à prioriser sa légitimation interne plutôt que l’unité du mouvement nationaliste kurde. Elle démontre dans un deuxième temps qu’afin de réaliser ce projet, le Kurdistan irakien a employé des stratégies externes qui ont nui au reste du mouvement nationaliste kurde. / In 1991, following the end of the Second Gulf War, a de facto state has been established in Iraqi Kurdistan. This transformation of a protest actor into a de facto state has been an unprecedented gain for the « Kurdish nationalist movement ». However, despite his historic importance, this gain has failed to overtake divisions within the « Kurdish nationalist movement ». This thesis attempts to identity the reasons why the divisions have not faded away. The assumption is that the reason why these divisions have not been overtaken is because Iraqi Kurdistan has pursued a state-building project similar to those of de facto states. To test this hypothesis, this research links de facto state’s literature, Iraqi Kurdistan behaviour and the divisions of the « Kurdish nationalist movement ». This thesis first demonstrate that this project has led Iraqi Kurdistan to establish other priorities that the « Kurdish nationalist movement » unity. It then shows that to realize this state-building project, Iraqi Kurdistan has used external strategies that have affected the rest of the movement.