Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TulioSS_TESE.pdf: 2136315 bytes, checksum: def4a39ad10ea69504e5674a87349257 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-11 / This work whose title is "The transcendental arguments: Kant Andy Hume's problem" has as its main objective to interpret Kant's answer to Hume's problem in the light of the conjunction of the causality and induction themes which is equivalent to skeptical- naturalist reading of the latter. In this sense, this initiative complements the previous treatment seen in our dissertation, where the same issue had been discussed from a merely skeptical reading that Kant got from Hume thought and was only examined causality. Among the specific objectives, we list the following: a) critical philosophy fulfills three basic functions, a founding, one negative and one would argue that the practical use of reason, here named as defensive b) the Kantian solution of Hume's problem in the first critisism would fulfill its founding and negative functions of critique of reason; c) the Kantian treatment of the theme of induction in other criticisms would will fulfill the defense function of critique of reason; d) that the evidence of Kant's answer to Hume's problem are more consistent when will be satisfied these three functions or moments of criticism. The basic structure of the work consists of three parts: the first the genesis of Hume's problem - our intention is to reconstruct Hume's problem, analyzing it from the perspective of two definitions of cause, where the dilution of the first definition in the second match the reduction of psychological knowledge to the probability of following the called naturalization of causal relations; whereas in the second - Legality and Causality - it is stated that when considering Hume in the skeptic-naturalist option, Kant is not entitled to respond by transcendental argument A?B; A?B from the second Analogy, evidence that is rooted in the position of contemporary thinkers, such as Strawson and Allison; in third part - Purpose and Induction - admits that Kant responds to Hume on the level of regulative reason use, although the development of this test exceeds the limits of the founding function of criticism. And this is articulated in both the Introduction and Concluding Remarks by meeting the defensive [and negative] function of criticism. In this context, based on the use of so-called transcendental arguments that project throughout the critical trilogy, we provide solution to a recurring issue that recurs at several points in our submission and concerning to the "existence and / or the necessity of empirical causal laws. In this light, our thesis is that transcendental arguments are only an apodictic solution to the Hume s skeptical-naturalist problem when is at stake a practical project in which the interest of reason is ensured, as will, in short, proved in our final considerations / O presente trabalho - Os argumentos transcendentais: Kant e o problema de Hume -, tem como seu objetivo geral interpretar a resposta de Kant ao problema de Hume ? luz da conjun??o das tem?ticas de causalidade e indu??o o que equivale a uma leitura c?tico-naturalista deste. Neste sentido, tal iniciativa complementa o tratamento anterior visto em nossa disserta??o de mestrado, onde a mesma tem?tica fora examinada a partir de uma leitura meramente c?tica que Kant fez do pensamento humeano e onde foi analisada apenas a causalidade. Dentre os objetivos espec?ficos, listamos os seguintes: a) a filosofia cr?tica cumpre tr?s fun??es b?sicas, uma fundante, uma negativa e uma que defenderia o uso pr?tico da raz?o, aqui nomeada de defensiva; b) a solu??o kantiana do problema de Hume na primeira cr?tica cumpriria as fun??es fundante e negativa da cr?tica da raz?o; c) o tratamento kantiano da tem?tica da indu??o nas demais cr?ticas cumpriria a fun??o defensiva da cr?tica da raz?o; d) que as provas da resposta de Kant ao problema de Hume s?o mais consistentes quando se consideram cumpridas estas tr?s fun??es ou momentos da cr?tica. A estrutura b?sica do trabalho comporta tr?s partes: na primeira - A g?nese do problema de Hume -, nossa pretens?o ? reconstituir o problema de Hume, analisando-o sob a ?tica das duas defini??es de causa, onde a dilui??o da primeira defini??o na segunda corresponde ? redu??o psicol?gica do conhecimento ? probabilidade, do que se segue a chamada naturaliza??o das rela??es causais; na segunda - Legalidade e Causalidade -, menciona-se que quando se considera Hume na op??o c?tico-naturalista, Kant n?o est? habilitado a lhe responder atrav?s do argumento transcendental A?B; A?B da segunda Analogia, prova que est? embasada na posi??o de pensadores contempor?neos como Strawson e Allison; na terceira parte - Finalidade e Indu??o -, admite-se que Kant responde a Hume no n?vel do uso regulativo da raz?o, embora o desenvolvimento dessa prova exceda os limites da fun??o fundante da cr?tica. E isto fica articulado tanto na Introdu??o quanto nas Considera??es Finais, atrav?s do cumprimento da fun??o defensiva [e negativa] da cr?tica. Neste contexto, com base no recurso aos ditos argumentos transcendentais que se projetam por toda a trilogia cr?tica, procuramos estabelecer solu??o para uma quest?o recorrente que reaparece em v?rias passagens de nossa apresenta??o e que diz respeito a exist?ncia e/ou a necessidade das leis causais emp?ricas . Diante disso, nossa tese ? que os argumentos transcendentais somente constituem uma solu??o apod?tica para o problema c?tico-naturalista de Hume quando est? em pauta um projeto pr?tico em que o interesse da raz?o esteja assegurado, conforme ser?, enfim, provado em nossas Considera??es Finais

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-03T15:15:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EliangelaPB_DISSERT.pdf: 614353 bytes, checksum: 050737d0ef158e6082d81254619adac0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-09-19 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient?fico e Tecnol?gico / Considering a non-relativistic ideal gas, the standard foundations of kinetic theory are investigated in the context of non-gaussian statistical mechanics introduced by Kaniadakis. The new formalism is based on the generalization of the Boltzmann H-theorem and the deduction of Maxwells statistical distribution. The calculated power law distribution is parameterized through a parameter measuring the degree of non-gaussianity. In the limit = 0, the theory of gaussian Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution is recovered. Two physical applications of the non-gaussian effects have been considered. The first one, the -Doppler broadening of spectral lines from an excited gas is obtained from analytical expressions. The second one, a mathematical relationship between the entropic index and the stellar polytropic index is shown by using the thermodynamic formulation for self-gravitational systems / Considerando um g?s ideal n?o relativ?stico, os fundamentos da teoria cin?tica padr?o s?o investigados no contexto da mec?nica estat?stica n?o-gaussiana introduzida por Kaniadakis. O novo formalismo ? baseado na generaliza??o do teorema-H de Boltzmann e na dedu??o de Maxwell da distribui??o estat?stica. A distribui??o lei de pot?ncia calculada ? parametrizada por um par?metro medindo o grau de n?o-gaussianidade do sistema. No limite = 0, a teoria gaussiana de Maxwell-Boltzmann ? recuperada. Duas aplica??es dos efeitos n?o-gaussiano s?o estudados. Na primeira, o -alargamento Doppler das linhas espectrais de um g?s excitado ? obtido a partir das express?es anal?ticas. Na segunda, uma rela??o matem?tica entre o ?ndice entr?pico e o ?ndice politr?pico estelar ? mostrada usando uma formula??o termodin?mica para sistemas autogravitantes