O presente estudo teve como objetivo analisar porque as indústrias processadoras de suco concentrado e congelado de laranja não estão negociando na New York Board of Trade, considerando que o risco de preços é alto neste setor, e preferindo utilizar o preço de Rotterdam como base para as suas negociações. Os mercados derivativos de commodities agrícolas são utilizados na administração do risco de preços e a maioria dos contratos negociados em Bolsas de Commodities no mundo inteiro tem tido sucesso, mas no caso do suco de laranja concentrado e congelado, negociado na NYBOT, o volume de negociação de contratos é baixo em comparação com outras commodities. Mas, os custos de transação relacionados ao mercado futuro de SLCC aliados com a concentração das empresas brasileiras processadoras de suco concentrado de laranja, acabaram induzindo um modo alternativo de governança neste setor: o mercado a termo. As empresas processadoras estão administrando o risco de preços e a governança do mercado vem sendo feita por meio dos contratos a termo onde ocorre a entrega física do produto, sendo que nas negociações entre as empresas brasileiras e os seus clientes não é utilizado o preço futuro e sim o seu próprio preço, negociado em contratos individuais, desse modo o preço é pré-estabelecido, assim como a qualidade e a quantidade do suco e o local de entrega. O mercado a termo pode ser considerado uma forma híbrida de contrato onde ocorre a dependência bilateral dos agentes econômicos, e está sendo utilizada para reduzir os riscos envolvidos nesta transação entre empresas processadoras de suco concentrado e seus clientes na Europa. / The objective of the present study was to analyze why the frozen concentrated orange juice industries are not trading in the New York Board of Trade, considering that the price risk is high in this sector, and prefer to use the price of Rotterdam as a basis for negotiation. The derivative markets for agricultural commodities are used in the administration of the price risk and the majority of the contracts negotiated in Stock Markets of Commodities in the entire world has had success, but in the case of Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice, negotiated in the NYBOT, the volume of contract negotiation is low comparing to others. But the costs of transaction related to the futures market of FCOJ along with the concentration of the Brazilian industry that produces FCOJ, had induced an alternative way of governance in this sector: the forward market. The FCOJ industries are managing the price risk, and market governance is made through forward contracts, where the physical delivery of the product happens. In the negotiations between the Brazilian companies and customers the future price is not used but the price negotiated in individual contracts. In this way the price is pre-established, as well as the quality and the quantity of juice and the place of delivery. The forward market can be considered a hybrid contract form where the bilateral dependence of the economic agents occurs, and is being used in order to reduce the risks that are involved in this transaction between FCOJ producers and their customers in Europe.

O presente estudo teve como objetivo analisar porque as indústrias processadoras de suco concentrado e congelado de laranja não estão negociando na New York Board of Trade, considerando que o risco de preços é alto neste setor, e preferindo utilizar o preço de Rotterdam como base para as suas negociações. Os mercados derivativos de commodities agrícolas são utilizados na administração do risco de preços e a maioria dos contratos negociados em Bolsas de Commodities no mundo inteiro tem tido sucesso, mas no caso do suco de laranja concentrado e congelado, negociado na NYBOT, o volume de negociação de contratos é baixo em comparação com outras commodities. Mas, os custos de transação relacionados ao mercado futuro de SLCC aliados com a concentração das empresas brasileiras processadoras de suco concentrado de laranja, acabaram induzindo um modo alternativo de governança neste setor: o mercado a termo. As empresas processadoras estão administrando o risco de preços e a governança do mercado vem sendo feita por meio dos contratos a termo onde ocorre a entrega física do produto, sendo que nas negociações entre as empresas brasileiras e os seus clientes não é utilizado o preço futuro e sim o seu próprio preço, negociado em contratos individuais, desse modo o preço é pré-estabelecido, assim como a qualidade e a quantidade do suco e o local de entrega. O mercado a termo pode ser considerado uma forma híbrida de contrato onde ocorre a dependência bilateral dos agentes econômicos, e está sendo utilizada para reduzir os riscos envolvidos nesta transação entre empresas processadoras de suco concentrado e seus clientes na Europa. / The objective of the present study was to analyze why the frozen concentrated orange juice industries are not trading in the New York Board of Trade, considering that the price risk is high in this sector, and prefer to use the price of Rotterdam as a basis for negotiation. The derivative markets for agricultural commodities are used in the administration of the price risk and the majority of the contracts negotiated in Stock Markets of Commodities in the entire world has had success, but in the case of Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice, negotiated in the NYBOT, the volume of contract negotiation is low comparing to others. But the costs of transaction related to the futures market of FCOJ along with the concentration of the Brazilian industry that produces FCOJ, had induced an alternative way of governance in this sector: the forward market. The FCOJ industries are managing the price risk, and market governance is made through forward contracts, where the physical delivery of the product happens. In the negotiations between the Brazilian companies and customers the future price is not used but the price negotiated in individual contracts. In this way the price is pre-established, as well as the quality and the quantity of juice and the place of delivery. The forward market can be considered a hybrid contract form where the bilateral dependence of the economic agents occurs, and is being used in order to reduce the risks that are involved in this transaction between FCOJ producers and their customers in Europe.

O presente estudo teve como objetivo analisar porque as indústrias processadoras de suco concentrado e congelado de laranja não estão negociando na New York Board of Trade, considerando que o risco de preços é alto neste setor, e preferindo utilizar o preço de Rotterdam como base para as suas negociações. Os mercados derivativos de commodities agrícolas são utilizados na administração do risco de preços e a maioria dos contratos negociados em Bolsas de Commodities no mundo inteiro tem tido sucesso, mas no caso do suco de laranja concentrado e congelado, negociado na NYBOT, o volume de negociação de contratos é baixo em comparação com outras commodities. Mas, os custos de transação relacionados ao mercado futuro de SLCC aliados com a concentração das empresas brasileiras processadoras de suco concentrado de laranja, acabaram induzindo um modo alternativo de governança neste setor: o mercado a termo. As empresas processadoras estão administrando o risco de preços e a governança do mercado vem sendo feita por meio dos contratos a termo onde ocorre a entrega física do produto, sendo que nas negociações entre as empresas brasileiras e os seus clientes não é utilizado o preço futuro e sim o seu próprio preço, negociado em contratos individuais, desse modo o preço é pré-estabelecido, assim como a qualidade e a quantidade do suco e o local de entrega. O mercado a termo pode ser considerado uma forma híbrida de contrato onde ocorre a dependência bilateral dos agentes econômicos, e está sendo utilizada para reduzir os riscos envolvidos nesta transação entre empresas processadoras de suco concentrado e seus clientes na Europa. / The objective of the present study was to analyze why the frozen concentrated orange juice industries are not trading in the New York Board of Trade, considering that the price risk is high in this sector, and prefer to use the price of Rotterdam as a basis for negotiation. The derivative markets for agricultural commodities are used in the administration of the price risk and the majority of the contracts negotiated in Stock Markets of Commodities in the entire world has had success, but in the case of Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice, negotiated in the NYBOT, the volume of contract negotiation is low comparing to others. But the costs of transaction related to the futures market of FCOJ along with the concentration of the Brazilian industry that produces FCOJ, had induced an alternative way of governance in this sector: the forward market. The FCOJ industries are managing the price risk, and market governance is made through forward contracts, where the physical delivery of the product happens. In the negotiations between the Brazilian companies and customers the future price is not used but the price negotiated in individual contracts. In this way the price is pre-established, as well as the quality and the quantity of juice and the place of delivery. The forward market can be considered a hybrid contract form where the bilateral dependence of the economic agents occurs, and is being used in order to reduce the risks that are involved in this transaction between FCOJ producers and their customers in Europe.

Les marchés futures de matières premières existent depuis des siècles. Néanmoins, depuis le début du 21e siècle, le développement en parallèle de la financiarisation et de marchés futures sur une matière première non-stockable (l’électricité) a bouleversé leur fonctionnement.Les trois essais de cette thèse étudient théoriquement et empiriquement les marchés futures de matières premières dans différentes conditions de fonctionnement.Le premier essai est une étude empirique qui montre l’existence de l’effet Samuelson sur les marchés futures d’électricité. Ce faisant, il montre que le stockage n’est pas une condition nécessaire à l’existence d’un tel effet.Le second essai est un modèle qui montre comment le comportement dynamique des prix d’une matière première stockable sur un marché futures segmenté du reste de l’économie est impacté par ses caractéristiques physiques, et notamment par le coût de stockage.Enfin, le troisième essai est un modèle qui montre que la financiarisation modifie la fonction de partage des risques des marchés futures de matières premières, et ce, quelle que soit la maturité concernée. / Commodity futures markets have a long history. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, both the financialization process and the development of futures markets on a non-storable commodity (the electricity) have shake up their functioning.The three essays of this thesis study theoretically and empirically commodity futures markets in different situations of functioning.The first essay is an empirical study that shows that the Samuelson effect exists on electricity derivative markets. As a consequence, it shows that storage is not a necessary condition for such an effect.The second essay is a model that shows how the dynamic behavior of storable commodity prices on a segmented futures market is affected by its physical characteristics, and more precisely by the cost of storage.Further, the third essay is a model that shows that financialization changes the risk sharing function of commodity futures markets, whatever the concerned maturity.

Real estate represents a part of the portfolio of many investors and can be accessed from both the real and the financial market. The low efficiency of real market prevents from taking advantage of the value created through diversification. This value can be partially recovered substituting real assets by securitized assets such as REITs. The empirical study of both markets in Spain shows an insufficient supply of securitized assets and the inexistence of an organized market of real estate derivatives, leading to a lower efficiency compared to other countries where they do exist. The relationship between real and financial markets opens a way to study real estate bubbles. It also enables to identify the sources of real estate risks and the strategies for hedging it. A wide development of assets-securitization and derivatives is essential to manage real estate risk and to improve the efficiency of the real estate market. / La inversió immobiliària, que forma part de la cartera de molts inversors presenta una doble via d’accés: el mercat real i el mercat financer. La baixa eficiència del mercat real impedeix aprofitar el valor creat mitjançant la diversificació. Aquest valor es pot recuperar parcialment substituint actius reals per actius titulitzats, com per exemple els REITs. L’estudi empíric dels dos mercats a Espanya revela una oferta insuficient d’actius immobiliaris titulitzats i la inexistència d’un mercat organitzat d’actius derivats immobiliaris, provocant un nivell d’eficiència més baix, comparat amb d’altres països on sí que existeixen. La interrelació entre mercat real i financer obre una via per a l’estudi de la formació de bombolles. També ens permet identificar les fonts de risc immobiliari i proposar estratègies de cobertura. Un desenvolupament ampli dels actius titulitzats i dels instruments derivats és essencial per a la gestió del risc i per millorar l’eficiència del mercat immobiliari.