What meaning does a name have in a sentence? How do we escape the inevitable difficulties that arise in delineating an individual's meaning through one's speech? The need arises for a distinction between proper names on the basis of the kinds of objects to which they refer. This distinction can provide the theoretical tools needed to solve the problems of empty names, negative existential statements, cognitive significance and substitution failure. Through a study of these issues, the fallacies inherent in current theories of meaning for proper names becomes apparent, as they fail to provide adequate or complete solutions. By elucidating a distinction between two kinds of proper names, labels and tags, we are able to provide solutions to the problems of naming where other theories fail.

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Together with an basic assumption of the main thesis of the theory of singular direct reference, this paper formulates two original theses grounded in the Kripkean notion of proper names. Regarding the assumption of the main thesis, efforts have been made to explicitly explain its essence as a reactionary theory against the description theory of proper names, a theory mainly due to Bertrand Russells (1905) influential article "On Denoting". Grounded in Russell, outlining the fundamental idea of proper names as abbreviated or disguised definite descriptions, this paper moves forward through the critiques of Strawsons (1950) "On Referring", Donnellans (1966) "Reference and Definite Descriptions" and Kripkes (1977) "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference". With the historical background in place, in accordance with Salmons (1982) "Reference & Essence" the arguments against the theory of descriptions for proper names are put forward, which leads to the assumption of the mentioned main thesis. Regarding the papers more original theses, the first of these distinguishes between different kinds of proper names depending on whether or not they refer to an object capable of cognitive functioning. The main thrust of this paper is however made through the formulation of the second thesis, as it is being aimed at challenging Kripke's Millian notion of all proper names as being non-connoting. However, in contrast to this view in accordance with the view being put forward in this paper, cognition-referring proper names are connoting. Additionally, a finishing discussion is supplemented concluding descriptions of such connotations as being questions for pragmatism.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

The purpose of my thesis is to explore and assess recent efforts by Direct Reference Theorists to explain the phenomenon of empty names. Direct Reference theory is, roughly, the theory that the meaning of a singular term (proper name, demonstrative, etc.) is simply its referent. Certain sentences, such as negative existentials ("Santa does not exist"), and sentences in contexts of fiction ("Holmes lived on Baker Street"), present the following challenge to DR Theory: Given that the semantic value of a name is simply its referent, how are we to explain the significance and truth-evaluability of such sentences? There have been various approaches DR Theorists have taken to address this problem, including the Pragmatic Strategy, Pretense Theory, Abstract Object Theory, and the Metalinguistic Strategy. All of these views are analyzed and assessed according to their various strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, overall, a Metalinguistic Strategy, supplemented by the notion of pretense, best deals with negative existentials and normal-subject predicate occurrences of empty names, Abstract Object Theory best deals with empty names in meta-fictional contexts, and Pretense Theory best deals with empty names in object-fictional contexts.