This thesis examines the patterns and determinants of corporate financial policy (capital structure and dividend policy) in Zimbabwe. In particular it investigates various aspects of corporate financial behaviour in an emerging market; the evolution of corporate financial structure and dividend payout ratio over the past 25 years (1975-1999), the impact of the reform programme (introduced in 1992) on firm characteristics, the corporate financing patterns during the period 1990-1999, the determinants of corporate capital structures and dividend policy and the interaction between corporate financing and dividend policy decisions. The main results that emerge from the analysis suggest that (i) the debt ratio for the Zimbabwean corporate sector significantly increased after the reform (ii) the Zimbabwean corporate sector mainly depends on external finance (75 % of total financing) especially short-term finance, which contributes 52 % of total financing. Furthermore, the results support the following hypotheses (i) the pecking order hypothesis that firms prefer internal financing to external financing, (ii) the trade-off hypothesis that non-debt tax shields reduce the expected gains from leverage, (iii) firms use liquid assets to finance investments, (iv) the agency cost hypothesis that increasing managerial ownership helps to align the interests of managers and shareholders and therefore reduces the role of debt as an agency-conflict mitigating factor, (v) large firms have lower bankruptcy costs and therefore can support more debt than smaller firms, (vi) debt service limits the amount of cash paid out as dividends, and (vii) high growth firms rely on external finance more than low growth firms (viii) high growth and firms have low payout ratios (iv) Cash flows and institutional investors increase the likelihood that firms will pay dividends (v) capital structure and dividend policy decisions are interdependent and highly leveraged firms have low payout ratios.

The issue of dividends and what role it plays, has been the subject of discussion for decades. The main reason for this is that the chosen dividend policy for a company affects several different stakeholders, with shareholders being the most affected party. Determining dividend policy is influenced by multiple factors such as capital structure, potential stakeholder signaling and corporate culture concerning payouts. This study will investigate how the relationship between firm performance and stock price is affected by the level of dividends a firm pays. To explore this relationship, the authors will conduct a correlation and regression analysis that is performed on data collected on middle and large capitalization firms listed on the Stockholm stock exchange. The chosen time frame for this study is year 2007-2017. Several variables are included in the regression model in order to explore a potential relationship.  The findings of this study indicate that the stock price of high dividend yield firms are more dependent on financial performance compared to low dividend yield firms. However, an overall positive correlation is found between financial performance and stock price for both samples.

Dividend policy, its determinants, and its impact on firm value are of significant academic interest, and many theories and explanations have been posited on the subject over the years, but there has not been a universal agreement. This thesis examines the links between dividend policy, various aspects of stock liquidity and price informativeness. We study a sample of UK firms over the period from 1996-2013. We show that, on average, stocks of dividend payers have significantly lower bid–ask spread and a lower illiquidity ratio than their counterparts of non-dividend payers. We also find that stocks of high-dividend payers are more liquid than those of firms that pay low or no dividends. These findings are consistent with the predictions of asymmetric information that posit that paying dividends reveals inside information to the market and hence decreases the level of asymmetric information, leading to higher stock liquidity. In the subsequent analysis, we suggest and examine a new channel through which dividend policy can impact firm value. Specifically, we show that dividend payers are less exposed to shocks in the aggregate market liquidity than non-dividend payers. Similarly, we find that the systematic liquidity risk is negatively associated with amount of dividends. Finally, in the context of signalling and agency costs models, we show that dividends are negatively related to stock price informativeness and that this relationship is stronger for firms with lower stock liquidity. The findings imply that dividend policy can both affect and be affected by stock markets.

Esta pesquisa busca analisar a influência da tributação e da governança corporativa sobre as políticas de dividendos das companhias de capital aberto brasileiras no período de 1986 a 2011, através de estimações Probit e Tobit com dados em painel. Particularmente no Brasil houve diversas mudanças na legislação tributária dentro do período analisado, sendo assim uma boa oportunidade para esse estudo. Os resultados empíricos sugerem que: a) quando houve aumento no Lucro Por Ação, o percentual do lucro distribuído em forma de proventos foi maior nos períodos em que não houve incidência de tributação e menor quando houve incidência de tributação; b) companhias estatais distribuíram menos dividendos do que companhias privadas; c) companhias que distribuíram dividendos também distribuíram Juros Sobre Capital Próprio; d) companhias que possuem governança corporativa tendem a distribuir mais dividendos. / This paper investigates the influence of taxes and corporate governance on dividend policy of Brazilian public companies in the years 1986 to 2011, using panel data Probit and Tobit estimation. There are several tax law changes particularly in Brazil within the period analyzed, creating a good opportunity to study dividend policy. Empirical results suggests that (a) when Earnings Per Share increased, the percentage of profits distributed in the form of dividends was higher in periods in which there was no incidence of taxation and lower when there was incidence of taxation; (b) state owned companies paid less dividends than private companies; (c) companies that paid dividends also paid Interest On Equity Capital; (d) companies under corporate governance best practices tend to pay more dividends.

A alta concentração da propriedade e de controle nas empresas brasileiras, aliada à baixa proteção legal aos acionistas, pode gerar conflitos de agência entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários. De acordo com a literatura fundamentada pela Teoria de Agência, o pagamento de dividendos poderia minimizar tais conflitos. Para a literatura de governança corporativa, por sua vez, empresas com melhores práticas de governança corporativa ofereceriam proteção mais forte aos seus acionistas, de modo que estes teriam poder para pressionar os gestores a pagar dividendos mais elevados. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho teve como objetivo investigar empiricamente se as empresas brasileiras utilizam a política de dividendos para minimizar os conflitos de agência entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários e se boas práticas de governança corporativa aumentam a proteção aos acionistas. Para atingir o objetivo proposto, foram realizados testes econométricos para um modelo não explorado em estudos anteriores. Neste, foram incluídas, além das variáveis de controle justificadas pela literatura (possíveis determinantes da política de pagamento de dividendos), duas variáveis proxies para conflitos de agência: excesso de direito de voto em relação ao direito sobre o fluxo de caixa em posse do maior acionista e fluxo de caixa livre para os acionistas e uma variável proxy para melhores práticas de governança corporativa. As estimações foram realizadas usando o método Tobit em painel com informações, referentes ao período de 2000 a 2013, de 466 empresas brasileiras não financeiras listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. Os resultados encontrados sugerem que as empresas brasileiras de capital aberto não utilizam a política de dividendos como mecanismo de redução dos conflitos de agência entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários. Esses resultados podem ser considerados robustos, uma vez que foram observados em especificações alternativas e quase todas as variáveis de controle foram estatisticamente significativas e apresentaram relações com o índice de payout conforme previsto pela literatura teórica e evidências da literatura empírica. Os resultados também mostraram indícios de que o baixo enforcement da legislação brasileira e os incentivos criados pela BM&FBOVESPA não garantem proteção aos acionistas, sinalizando a necessidade de realização de melhorias no sistema legal brasileiro / The high concentration of ownership and control in Brazilian companies, combined with low legal protection to shareholders, can generate agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. According to the literature grounded by the Agency Theory, the payment of dividends could minimize such conflicts. For the corporate governance literature, in turn, companies with best corporate governance practices would offer stronger protection to its shareholders, so that they would be able to pressure managers to pay higher dividends. In this context, this study aimed to empirically investigate whether Brazilian companies use the dividend policy to minimize the agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders and whether good corporate governance practices increase shareholder protection. To achieve this purpose, have been conducted econometric tests for a model not explored in previous studies. In this were included, besides the control variables justified by the literature (possible determinants of dividend payout policy), two proxies for agency conflicts: excess voting right in relation to cash flow rights in the possession of greater shareholder and free cash flow to shareholders and a proxy variable for best corporate governance practices.000 The estimates were made using the Tobit method panel with information relating to the period from 2000 to 2013, 466 non-financial Brazilian companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA. The results suggest that the publicly traded Brazilian companies do not use the dividend policy as a mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. These results can be considered robust, as were observed in alternative specifications and almost all control variables were statistically significant and had relations with the payout ratio as predicted by theoretical literature and evidence of the empirical literature. The results also showed evidence that the low enforcement of Brazilian legislation and the incentives created by BM & FBOVESPA does not guarantee protection to shareholders, pointing to the need of improvements in the Brazilian legal system

Esta pesquisa busca analisar a influência da tributação e da governança corporativa sobre as políticas de dividendos das companhias de capital aberto brasileiras no período de 1986 a 2011, através de estimações Probit e Tobit com dados em painel. Particularmente no Brasil houve diversas mudanças na legislação tributária dentro do período analisado, sendo assim uma boa oportunidade para esse estudo. Os resultados empíricos sugerem que: a) quando houve aumento no Lucro Por Ação, o percentual do lucro distribuído em forma de proventos foi maior nos períodos em que não houve incidência de tributação e menor quando houve incidência de tributação; b) companhias estatais distribuíram menos dividendos do que companhias privadas; c) companhias que distribuíram dividendos também distribuíram Juros Sobre Capital Próprio; d) companhias que possuem governança corporativa tendem a distribuir mais dividendos. / This paper investigates the influence of taxes and corporate governance on dividend policy of Brazilian public companies in the years 1986 to 2011, using panel data Probit and Tobit estimation. There are several tax law changes particularly in Brazil within the period analyzed, creating a good opportunity to study dividend policy. Empirical results suggests that (a) when Earnings Per Share increased, the percentage of profits distributed in the form of dividends was higher in periods in which there was no incidence of taxation and lower when there was incidence of taxation; (b) state owned companies paid less dividends than private companies; (c) companies that paid dividends also paid Interest On Equity Capital; (d) companies under corporate governance best practices tend to pay more dividends.

nÃo hà / A despeito dos diversos achados, ao longo de dÃcadas, sobre a polÃtica de dividendos, a ecisÃo de pagar dividendos ainda à um tema que segue em debate. Diversos fatores tÃm sido propostos como capazes de explicar a polÃtica de dividendos, como por exemplo, o lucro/rentabilidade, o dividendo prÃvio (manutenÃÃo na polÃtica de dividendos), tamanho da empresa, alavancagem, e oportunidades de crescimento. Mais recentemente, a literatura tem explorado a interferÃncia que a estrutura de propriedade pode ter sobre a distribuiÃÃo de dividendos. Neste contexto surgem as proposiÃÃes como a das hipÃteses relacionadas ao uso da polÃtica de dividendos como instrumento de controle da direÃÃo executiva, e à possÃvel expropriaÃÃo de acionistas minoritÃrios por parte dos controladores. O objetivo desta pesquisa à avaliar, sob o marco teÃrico da Teoria da AgÃncia, se hà uso da polÃtica de dividendos como instrumento de monitoraÃÃo executiva ou de expropriaÃÃo de acionistas minoritÃrios no mercado brasileiro. A amostra à um painel de dados composto por 1890 observaÃÃes anuais de 223 empresas no perÃodo 1996-2012 a partir de dados coletados no sistema EconomÃtica de empresas com aÃÃes negociadas na Bolsa de Valores de SÃo Paulo. A partir da estimaÃÃo de um conjunto de modelos explicativos da polÃtica de dividendos os resultados indicam que a presenÃa de um acionista majoritÃrio tem um efeito negativo sobre a polÃtica de dividendos, em linha com a hipÃtese de expropriaÃÃo. Outro resultado relevante à o efeito positivo da presenÃa de outra empresa nÃo financeira, como acionista majoritÃrio ou principal, sobre o nÃvel de distribuiÃÃo de dividendos, o que està em sintonia com a hipÃtese de monitoramento da direÃÃo executiva / Despite the many finds, for decades on the dividend policy, the ECISION to pay dividends is also a theme that follows in debate. Several factors have been proposed as able to explain the dividend policy, such as profit / profitability prior dividend (maintaining the dividend policy), firm size, leverage, and growth opportunities. More recently, the literature has explored the interference that the ownership structure may have on the distribution of dividends. In this context arise propositions as the assumptions related to the use of the dividend policy as an executive steering control instrument, and the possible expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling. The objective of this research is to evaluate, under the theoretical framework of the Agency Theory, if there is use of the dividend policy as executive monitoring instrument or expropriation of minority shareholders in the Brazilian market. The sample is a data panel of 1,890 annual observations of 223 companies in the period 1996-2012 from data collected in EconomÃtica system companies listed on the SÃo Paulo Stock Exchange. From the estimation of a set of explanatory models of dividend policy The results indicate that the presence of a majority shareholder has a negative effect on the dividend policy, in line with the hypothesis of expropriation. Another important result is the positive effect of the presence of other non-financial company, as major or principal shareholder on the dividend distribution level, which is in line with the executive direction of the monitoring event

Submitted by Haroudo Xavier Filho (haroudo.xavierfo@ufpe.br) on 2016-03-02T17:20:52Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Tese Kécia_ok.pdf: 2529280 bytes, checksum: 617f3e37322ea7246d7014e03f5c6932 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-02T17:20:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Tese Kécia_ok.pdf: 2529280 bytes, checksum: 617f3e37322ea7246d7014e03f5c6932 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-27 / Este estudo teve como objetivo investigar os fatores relacionados ao pagamento de dividendos e de payout incremental das empresas brasileiras listadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BM&FBovespa) no período de 2002 a 2013. O payout pago foi calculado com base no lucro líquido ajustado, com dados coletados nas atas das assembleias e nas Demonstrações das Mutações do Patrimônio Líquido. O Payout incremental corresponde ao valor efetivamente distribuído pelas empresas além do que é estabelecido nos estatuto social. Os dados referentes às proxies dos fatores de pagamento de dividendos foram coletados na base de dados Economatica® e na página eletrônica da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários. A amostra final foi composta por uma diversidade de 287 empresas, distribuídas nos anos estudados, variando entre 144 empresas em 2002 a 285 em 2013. Os dados foram organizados em painel desbalanceado, e foram realizadas regressões logit com efeitos aleatórios. A principal conclusão foi de que existe maior probabilidade de que as empresas com maior rentabilidade, proporção de caixa, concentração acionária e as pertencentes a algum nível diferenciado de governança, distribuam payout incremental, e as que possuem maior oportunidade de crescimento sejam menos prováveis de pagar payout incremental, o que pode ser relacionado à possibilidade de elas reterem mais recursos para novos projetos, favorecendo o enriquecimento dos acionistas. / This study investigated the factors related to the payment of dividends and incremental payout of Brazilian companies listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BM & FBovespa) from 2002 to 2013. The paid payout was calculated based on adjusted net income, with data collected in the protocol of assembly and the Statement of Changes in Shareholders' Equity. The incremental Payout corresponds to the amount actually distributed by companies beyond what is established in the bylaws. Data for proxies of dividend payment factors were collected at Economatica® database and on the website of the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários. The final sample consisted of a range of 287 companies distributed in the years studied and ranging from 144 companies in 2002 and 285 in 2013. The data were organized and carried out unbalanced panel logit regression with random effects. The main conclusion was that there is greater likelihood that companies with higher profitability, ratio of cash, ownership concentration and belonging to a differentiated level of governance, distribute incremental payout and those with greater growth opportunities are less likely to pay payout incremental, which may be related to the possibility of they retain more resources for new projects, favoring the enrichment of shareholders

När covid-19 pandemin bröt ut i Europa tidigt 2020 valde många svenska företag att dra tillbaka sina tidigare föreslagna utdelningar. Hur reagerade investerare på den svenskamarknaden på beskedet om att utdelningarna uteblev? Vi har utfört en eventstudie somundersöker den riskjusterade avkastningen för 31 svenska bolag listade på NASDAQ Stockholm som under våren 2020 återkallade sina tidigare föreslagna utdelningar. Vårtresultat konstaterar en statistisk signifikant genomsnittlig riskjusterad underavkastning isamband med beskedet. Vårt resultat indikerar även att reaktionen var mer negativ för debolag vars pressmeddelande blev offentligt innan regeringens meddelade att bolag som utförutdelningar inte är berättigade permitteringsstöd. Vidare finner vi att bolagens nivå avkassalikviditet har en statistisk signifikant negativ påverkan på den riskjusteradeavkastningen kring eventet.

Ownership structure is referenced as one of the key determinants of policy decisions and corporate governance of companies however suggested implications of different structures part in previous research. This study investigates the relationship between different ownership structures and dividend policy decisions taken by a firm and sets out to identify how family ownership in specific differs from other ownership structures. The study follows a framework based on a number of postulated hypothesis based on previous findings of similar investigations and applies it to a Swedish setting. A model is constructed consisting of variables describing ownership, financial and market conditions in Swedish firms from the period 2010-2019. Some, yet sparse, evidence is found indicating differences in dividend policy can be derived from differences in ownership, yet results clarify dividend policy decisions are based on a complex set of conditions not easily captured in a single model.