EB Sutarties 82 straipsnis nustato draudimą vienam ar keletui ūkio subjektų piktnaudžiauti dominuojančia padėtimi bendrojoje rinkoje ar didelėje jos dalyje, jei toks elgesys galėtų paveikti prekybą tarp valstybių narių. Intelektinės nuosavybės esmę lemia negatyvios teisės, sąlygojančios jų turėtojo galimybę kontroliuoti kitų asmenų elgesį ir intelektinės nuosavybės teisių objekto atžvilgiu sukuriančios išimtinę teisinę padėtį, vadinamą teisine monopolija. Priklausomai nuo atitinkamos rinkos apibrėžimo, minėta kitų asmenų elgesio kontrolės galimybė gali kurti ūkio subjektų veiklos plėtros ar įėjimo į rinką kliūtis ir intelektinės nuosavybės turėtojo teisinę monopoliją priartinti prie monopolijos ekonomine prasme. Tačiau šia prasme teisinė monopolija gali būti pagrįsta tik tol, kol jos socialinė nauda atsveria socialines sąnaudas. Intelektinės nuosavybės teisės siekiama socialinės naudos ir išimtinumo socialinių sąnaudų tarpusavio pusiausvyra individualios išimtinės teisės atveju nėra tiksli. Todėl konkurencijos teisė gali būti taikoma ribojant individualių intelektinės nuosavybės teisių įgyvendinimą. EB Sutarties 82 straipsnis gali būti taikomas rinkoje dominuojančio subjekto intelektinės nuosavybės teisių įgijimo ir įgyvendinimo antikonkurencinio ar išnaudotojiško piktnaudžiavimo prasme. ETT patvirtinęs bendrą taisyklę, kad intelektinės nuosavybės teisių turėtojas neprivalo tretiesiems asmenims suteikti licencijos naudotis jam priklausančiomis išimtinėmis teisėmis Vis dėlto... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Article 82 of the Treaty establishes the prohibition of any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in substantial part of it in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. The essence of intellectual property is defined by its negative rights giving rise to their holders capability to control the behavior of others and amounting to the legal exclusivity over the object of right in question, called legal monopoly. Subject to the definition of the relevant market, the said ability of controlling other‘s behavior may erect barriers to entry or extension and bring the legal monopoly of the owner of intellectual property close to the economic one. In this sense, the legal monopoly is justified in as mush as it is capable of outweighing social costs by the respective benefit. The balance between the social benefit and costs of the exclusivity, sought by the intellectual property law, in every particular case is not precise. Therefore competition law may be applied to limit the exercise of intellectual property. Article 82 of the Treaty may be applied for restricting acquisition or exercise within the meaning of either anticompetitive or exploitative abuse of intellectual property right by an undertaking holding a dominant position on the market. The European Court of Justice has held that the owner of intellectual property is not obliged to license its rights for using of them by others. However, the refusal to grant the... [to full text]

This work deals with legal aspects of collective dominant position under Article 82 of the Treaty establishing European Community (hereinafter- EC). The purpose is to reveal a legal definition and main features of collective dominant position. The author examines features and criteria which are established in the jurisprudence of EC institutions. The author examines features and criteria which are established in the jurisprudence of EC institutions. The author also indicates that the criteria for establishing collective dominance are not fully scrutinized under EC competition law. Moreover, the practice of EC institutions is analyzed not only under Article 82, which prohibits abuse of a dominant position, but also under Merger regulation to that extent which is necessary to reveal the main topic. Further the work presents problems which are found under these two institutions of EC competition law.

The abuse of dominant position by establishing predatory pricing raises when the undertaking, seeking to eliminate its competitor determines to sell goods for unreasonably low price, while after elimination or weakening of competition subsequently raises those prices in order to recoup losses and earn higher profits. In theory there is consensus that determination of such pricing must be based of two-tier tests, which are comprised of price-cost comparison and analysis of subjective intent. Such test has been determined in AKZO case and until recently is applicable in the EC and Lithuanian competition law. It states that the price below VKS is presumed to be predatory; in such case if the price is between VKS and VVS, it can be acknowledged to be predatory if it is used in order to eliminate the competitor. While evaluating this test, the paper discusses practical problems arising while applying VKS criterion and raises proposal to change it by more accurate VIS criterion. Moreover, paper raises the idea that dominant element in AKZO test is not economical elements, but subjective predatory intent. Therefore economical elements must be treated only as a tool, providing the possibility to disclose the content of subjective intent. While analyzing the rules for determination of predatory pricing, the paper also discusses the third criterion which settled in EC practice and maintains the possibility to determine predatory pricing even if the prices are above VVS. After critical... [to full text]

This work includes analysis of application of rules of the Competition law in European Community and in the Republic of Lithuania, those concerned to the abuse of the dominant position connected to unfair pricing. There is laid the detailed explanation of concept of the unfair pricing, distinguishing the four groups of such pricing – excessive pricing, „predatory” pricing, discriminatory pricing and unfair discounts and rebates.