81 Summary This thesis focuses on predatory pricing in competition law of European Union and United states of America. The main goal of the thesis is to analyze the development of predatory pricing on the both sides of Atlantic and to show where the approach to predatory pricing is similar and where was used different perspective. The thesis is divided to three chapters. First part of first chapter describes predatory pricing in general. It supplies a complete view on basic elements of predatory pricing that were and some still are used to identify them. Second part of first chapter brings overview of the most important tests of costs and basic economic terminology, that is important for price tests. Last part introduces most important schools of competition law, that had the biggest impact on forming of approaches to predatory pricing. Second chapter deals with main milestones of development of predatory pricing in the United States. It brings chronological overview of laws and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and analyses their importance for next judicial practice. End of this chapter summarizes development of predatory pricing in the USA on basis of foregoing findings. Third chapter similarly describes historically younger, but equally dynamic development of predatory pricing in European Union. At...

The abuse of dominant position by establishing predatory pricing raises when the undertaking, seeking to eliminate its competitor determines to sell goods for unreasonably low price, while after elimination or weakening of competition subsequently raises those prices in order to recoup losses and earn higher profits. In theory there is consensus that determination of such pricing must be based of two-tier tests, which are comprised of price-cost comparison and analysis of subjective intent. Such test has been determined in AKZO case and until recently is applicable in the EC and Lithuanian competition law. It states that the price below VKS is presumed to be predatory; in such case if the price is between VKS and VVS, it can be acknowledged to be predatory if it is used in order to eliminate the competitor. While evaluating this test, the paper discusses practical problems arising while applying VKS criterion and raises proposal to change it by more accurate VIS criterion. Moreover, paper raises the idea that dominant element in AKZO test is not economical elements, but subjective predatory intent. Therefore economical elements must be treated only as a tool, providing the possibility to disclose the content of subjective intent. While analyzing the rules for determination of predatory pricing, the paper also discusses the third criterion which settled in EC practice and maintains the possibility to determine predatory pricing even if the prices are above VVS. After critical... [to full text]

Abuse of the Dominant Position by Prohibited Pricing Activities Abstract This thesis analyzes selected pricing practices of dominant undertakings namely predatory pricing, margin squeeze and excessive pricing. These practices may, under certain circumstances, constitute an abuse of the dominant position. The aim of the thesis is to focus on problematic aspects of each of these practices, on explanation of various legal and economic tests used to prove that certain pricing policy constitutes an abuse of dominant position and on the description of conditions that have to be met in order to consider such practice contrary to the competition law of the Czech Republic and the European Union. The thesis is composed of four chapters. In Chapter One a brief introduction to the competition law itself and to the analyzed matter is given. Chapter Two describes basic terminology used when dealing with cases of abuse of a dominant position such as basic legal concept of the abuse itself, definition of an undertaking and a competitor according to the EU law and the Czech law respectively, delimitation of a relevant market and finally definition of a dominant position. Chapter Three is oriented on the selected pricing practices of dominant undertakings. This Chapter is subdivided into three parts each of which is dealing...

Le droit de l’Union européenne appréhende les comportements d’entreprises en matière de prix par des règles antitrust et par une législation contre le dumping. Ces deux réglementations diffèrent à de nombreux égards. Elles poursuivent des objectifs différents : défense des intérêts de certains concurrents européens versus promotion de la libre concurrence au bénéfice des consommateurs. Cependant, toutes deux contribuent à protéger la loyauté de la concurrence (i.e. promotion d’une certaine homogéniété des conditions de concurrence). Elles appréhendent des pratiques tarifaires différentes : les marchés concernés sont définis différemment (produit concerné exporté depuis un pays tiers et produit similaire fabriqué par l’industrie de l’Union versus marché de produit et marché géographique en cause) et les caractéristiques des entreprises concernées sont également différentes (aucune forme d’accord entre entreprises ou de pouvoir de marché minimum requis par la législation antidumping) ; le dumping discriminatoire n’équivaut à aucun prix discriminatoire anticoncurrentiel, et le dumping à perte n’est pas l’équivalent du prix prédateur ni de tout autre prix bas anticoncurrentiel. Nonobstant leurs différences, les deux réglementations doivent coexister paisiblement. Pourtant, les opportunités de biais protectionnistes dans la détermination du dumping préjudiciable sont toujours nombreuses dans la législation antidumping et la pratique de la Commission. En outre, la mise en oeuvre de la législation antidumping peut être néfaste pour la concurrence dans le marché intérieur via l’incidence des procédures et des mesures antidumping et les effets anticoncurrentiels de certains comportements d’entreprises dans le cadre des procédures antidumping ou environnant ces dernières. De telles incidences nocives pour la concurrence sont déjà réduites par des dispositions telles que la règle du droit moindre et la clause d’intérêt public (intérêt de l’Union), mais pourraient et devraient l’être davantage. / European Union law addresses pricing practices of undertakings through antitrust provisions and an anti-dumping legislation. These two sets of regulations differ in many respects. They pursue different aims: protection of the interest of some European competitors versus promotion of free competition for the benefit o f consumers. However, they both hept to ensure fair competition (i.e. promotion of alevel playing field). They address different pricing practices: the markets concerned are differently defined (concerned product exported from one third country andsimilar product produced by the Union industry versus relevant product and geographic markets) and the characteristics of the undertakings concerned are also different (no sort of agreement between undertakings and no minimum market power required in anti-dumping law); price discrimination dumping in not equivalent to any anti-competitive price discrimination and below cost dumping is not equivalent to predatory pricing or to any other low anti-competitive price. Not with standing their differences, both sets of regulations have to coexist peacefully. Yet, opportunities of protectionist biases in the determination of injurious dumping are still numerous in the anti-dumping legislation and Commission’s practice. Moreover, the enforcementof the anti-dumping legislation may negatively affect competition in the internal market through the impact of the anti-dumping proceedings and measures and the anti-competitive effects of some undertakings’ behaviors within the ambit of, or surrounding the anti-dumping proceedings. Such harmful effects on competition of the anti-dumping action are already reduced by provisions such as the lesser duty rule and the public interest clause (Union interest), but could and should be further reduced.