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<p>There are various dual process models of human cognition. While many models of cognitive control propose processes that are selected exclusively or in combination, a default-interventionist model of reasoning assumes that processing occurs in serial stages. System 1 processes are believed to recruit unconscious memory retrieval processes by default and precede System 2 processes (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). System 1 processes are also considered to be overly sensitive to the automatic influences of the environment and thereby also to various cognitive biases and errors; hence System 1 is inferior. On the other hand System 2, which represent conscious logic and normative reasoning processes, is not considered susceptible to such automatic influences and thereby capable of overriding errors made through System 1 reasoning; hence System 2 is superior. This default-interventionist model has become highly influential in theories about best practices in medical education (Croskerry, 2009; 2003; Klein, 2005; Redelmeier, 2005), and has encouraged a view that increased conscious processing and reflective thought will improve performance. Such a view is in stark contrast to models of human memory in psychology that suggest contextual or automatic influences of the environment are not only critical for learning, but also critical for adaptive processing and the development of expertise (Yonelinas, 2002; Larsen & Roediger, 2012). In this thesis I investigate and critique several assumptions of the default-interventionist model by testing the relationship between processing time, reflective thought, experience and accuracy. The results of two large studies do not support basic assumptions presented in the literature and instead demonstrate that experience and knowledge are better predictors of performance.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Bereavement is painful at any time of life. For young children experiencing bereavement, grandmothers are often the first line of defense. Grandmothers are frequently called upon when their family members experience an out-of-order death, and while they are willing to provide care, grandmothers don't always know the best way forward. This qualitative study sought to learn more about the grief experiences of 22 grandmothers who had lost a family member prematurely through semi-structured interviews and Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis. Findings suggest (a) grandmothers experience layered grief in that they grieve the loss of the family member, experience the pain of the surviving family members, and their own pain; (b) grandmothers experience invisible grief as their feelings are not often revealed to or recognized by their family members; (c) grandmothers experience confusion in knowing how to help and attend to their family members who are bereaved. These difficulties seem related to the family relationships, the connection to the person who died (their own child or an in-law child or grandchild), what they are grieving, and their ability to develop new roles and relationships during the bereavement period.

Yes / Purpose Refractive blur is associated with decreased hazard perception and impairments in driving performance, but little is known about why people who have spectacles to correct their distance vision drive with uncorrected vision. Methods We conducted six focus groups. Participants were 30 drivers (mean age 45) who reported having driven uncorrected at least twice in the past six months despite having spectacles to correct their distance vision. Focus groups were audio recorded, transcribed verbatim and analysed thematically. Results We identified three themes. 1. Responsibility: participants did not feel obliged to drive with optimal vision and believed that others have a responsibility to ensure drivers maintain clear vision. 2. Safe Enough: participants felt safe to drive uncorrected, did not believe they need to wear spectacles to see sufficiently clearly and that they would know if their uncorrected eyesight fails to meet minimum standards. 3. Situations: participants discussed how they would drive uncorrected for short and familiar journeys, when they feel alert, in daylight and in good weather. Conclusions Beliefs about the importance of driving with clear vision compete with the benefits of not wearing spectacles. Eyecare professionals should provide more direct advice to patients regarding the need to wear their visual correction for driving.

BACKGROUND: Today’s societal changes, including high rate of change and increasing information flows, are increasing the demand on the individual mental capacity. It becomes increasingly difficult to analytically process all the different dilemmas and everyday decisions as individuals have a limited mental capacity available to make these decisions. Thus, it has been suggested that ego-depleted relies more heavily on intuition, which is less burdensome, when making decision. However little is known about to what extent intuitive decisions differ from analytic. Are ego-depleted individuals more or less likely to maximize outcome in moral dilemmas involving conflicting values? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less willing to cooperate? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less altruistic? Is our intuition more or less in accordance with Homo Economicus?AIM: Starting from a Dual Process perspective on decision-making the aim of this study is to examine how ego depletion affects moral judgment and pro-social decisions.METHOD: A laboratory experiment involving 115 subjects, using real monetary incentives, was conducted among students at Linköping University. Subjects were randomized into one of two treatments. Everything was identical across treatments except for the initial ego-depletion manipulation. Using a standard paradigm for ego-depletion subjects in treatment 1 were put under high cognitive load while subjects in treatment two were put under low cognitive load. Subjects faced 16 questions divided into four different decision tasks: Moral dilemmas, Public Goods game, two types of Dictator Game where the type of sacrifice subjects could make in order to contribute money to charity was varied.RESULTS: Subjects in the high cognitive load treatment made fewer consequentialists moral judgments compared to other subjects (p = 0.075). The effect is especially strong when looking only at high-conflict dilemmas such as Crying Baby. No difference between treatments was found for the public goods games. In the dictator game involving monetary sacrifice subjects donated less money to charity when put under high cognitive load. However the finding was not significant (p = 0.292). No difference was found in the dictator game involving effort as personal sacrifice since almost everyone chooses to donate to charity.CONCLUSION: According to The Dual Process perspective this essay shows that intuitive thinking does not evidently lead to that they makes decision that more or less is in accordance with Homo Economicus. The connection between ego depletion and pro-social decisions is more complex. Further research needs to investigate which different mental shortcuts that individuals uses in various types of pro-social decisions and why intuitive and analytical decision-making differ between different decisions. Further research within the area can identify potential mechanisms and policies that can support individuals’ capacity to make decisions in accordance with their own and society’s preferences.

The sunk-cost fallacy (SCF) occurs when an individual makes an investment with a low probability of a payoff because an earlier investment has already been made. It is considered an error because a rational decision should not factor in now-irretrievable investments, as they do not affect current outcome likelihoods. Previous research has measured the tendency to commit the SCF by using hypothetical scenarios in which participants must choose to make a future investment or not after making an initial investment. There are many theories as to why people commit the SCF. Loss aversion, which is the preference for uncertain over certain losses, may be related to the SCF. Dual-process theory, which views decision-making in terms of a fast, automatic process called system 1 and a slow, deliberate process called system 2, may also help to explain the SCF. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to complete a sunk-cost questionnaire in which the initial-investment types and amounts varied. They also completed an endowment-effect task as a measure of loss aversion. The SCF was committed most often when the initial investment was large compared to small and most often with money, less with time, and least with effort. There was an interaction effect in which small differences were seen in the SCF between time, effort, and money when the initial investment was small, and differences grew larger as the initial investment increased. Loss aversion displayed a non-significant negative relation with the SCF. In Experiment 2, participants completed a sunk-cost questionnaire in which they were asked to respond as they normally would and then from the perspective of a fictional person described as a logical decision maker. In cases in which they committed the SCF, they were asked to indicate why they continued to invest. They also completed a risky-lottery loss-aversion task. As seen in Experiment 1, the SCF was more likely when initial investments were greater and occurred most when the initial investment was money, less when it was time, and least when it was effort. Loss aversion had a significant but small negative relation with SCF scores. There was no effect of perspective taking. It may be that the SCF is simply due to the over-application of the personal rule “don't waste”, as not wanting to be wasteful was the most-common reason participants gave for why they committed the SCF.

A fundamental process in many important research foci in information systems is the appropriation of IT artifacts in creative ways by users. The objective of this thesis is to develop a theoretical explanation of that process. An embedded multiple-case study of incidents in which users, in a variety of field settings, developed creative ways to apply IT artifacts, was conducted. Employing theoretical lenses drawn from cognitive science (dual-process theory, distributed cognition), and Markus and Silver’s (2008) variant of adaptive structuration theory, a novel theoretical framework was developed to analyze the data. This framework – Affordance Field Theory – was used to abstract away the context-specific details of each case, so that the events in each could be compared and analyzed using a common conceptual vocabulary. Applying critical realist assumptions, the initial retroductive analysis was done with narrative networks, then the cases were re-analyzed using framework matrices. The complementary logical forms (processual and thematic, respectively) of the analytic tools helped to provide empirical corroboration of the findings. A set of cognitive mechanisms was identified that describe the information-processing operations involved in creative user appropriation. Using assumptions from distributed cognition, it was demonstrated that these mechanisms can describe those operations at the individual and collective levels. An integrative model which shows how the mechanisms explain user creativity at the individual level was then developed. It is called the Information Cycle Model of creativity. This thesis makes several contributions to knowledge. It develops a theoretical framework for analyzing interactions between users and systems that is designed to represent the cycles of ideation and enactment through which creative appropriation moves are developed. It also presents a model of the cognitive mechanisms involved in the discovery of novel appropriation moves. The thesis also contributes to current debates within IS about representational metaphors for user interaction with IT.

This thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4, I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of semantic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning, together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3.

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