雙重股權結構現今於美國公司治理上的應用越來越普遍，在此股權結構下的公司透過具不同投票權的股票達到控制權與盈餘分配權分離，使內部經理人可以掌握公司的控制權，但相應而生的可能是經理人與股東間的代理問題，且並非所有等級的股票皆公開在市場上交易，這也使得公司資訊透明度降低，進而影響股票的流動性和公司價值，然而，對於雙重股權結構亦有研究持正面看法，如公司可藉控制權集中提升經營效率等。本研究由此為出發點，欲以聯貸市場的角度來檢驗雙重股權結構公司在進行聯貸時，是否會對聯貸條件產生影響，而貸款銀行面對公司的雙重股權結構又將採取何種風險評估角度。 本研究利用1991至2012年間美國公司的資料，研究結果顯示公司在雙重股權結構下，所獲得之聯貸條件並未呈現負面影響，其中原因可能存在於雙重股權結構的公司特性與其可能為公司創造的價值。

The classical corporation, as described by Berle and Means (1932), was characterized by ownership that is dispersed between many small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers. This ownership structure created the conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholders. More recent empirical work (see, e.g., La Porta et al. (1999) and Barca and Becht (2001)) has shown that ownership in many countries around the world is typically concentrated in the hands of a small number of large shareholders. As a result, an equally important agency conflict arises between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. On the one hand, large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders by monitoring managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). On the other hand, large shareholders can be harmful if they pursue private goals that differ from profit maximization or if they reduce valuable managerial incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Burkart et al., 1997). In the presence of several large shareholders, a conflict of interest may arise between these controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Zwiebel (1995), Pagano and Röell (1998), and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). They can compete for control, monitor each other, or form controlling coalitions to share private benefits. The question arises as to what determines the role of controlling shareholders in various firm policies and performance. Previous literature has noted that the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders are often exacerbated by the fact that the capital invested by the controlling shareholders is relatively lower than the voting control they achieve through the use of dual class shares (i.e., shares with differential voting rights) or stock pyramids (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002). Moreover, the identity of the shareholder (e.g., family vs. financial institution) is important for understanding the role of controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Volpin (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Burkart et al. (2003)). Using Swedish data, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) show that the agency costs of family owners are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners. The role of controlling shareholders in transition countries is exacerbated by the fact that the legal and general institutional environment remains underdeveloped. In such an environment, strong owners may be the second best option to weak legal protection of investors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). The transition countries of central and eastern Europe are experiencing increasingly concentrated control structures, typically with the controlling owner actively involved in the management of the firm (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003). Moreover, experience from transition countries suggests that foreign direct investment, where investors take controlling positions, have been critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms. This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters that empirically examine various corporate governance issues. The common theme throughout the thesis is the focus on large shareholders, their identity, as well as to whether they deviate from the principle of one share-one vote. In particular, I examine the effect of large shareholders on firm value (in the first and third chapters), dividend policies (in the second chapter), and stock returns (in the final chapter). The first two chapters employ the data from Finland, the third looks at companies in seven European countries where deviations from one share-one vote are common, and the final one explores the evidence from transition countries. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004

Diss. (sammanfattning) Göteborg : Univ., 2004. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

Essay one investigates registered insider sales as stated in the final prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to test managerial market timing ability during the Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) process. Using a comprehensive sample of 1,051 SEOs between 1997 and 2005, the findings suggest that the initial market reaction and the long-run post-issue performance of issuers are negatively related to C-level executive insider sales, but unrelated to sales by non-executive insiders. Overall, the findings are consistent with the notion that executive insiders are aware of the mispricing in their firm’s securities and successfully time their sales by participating in the secondary components of SEOs. The implication is that SEOs with C-level executive sales are overvalued relative to both SEOs without insider sales and SEOs with only non-executive insider sales. In the second essay, we compare shareholder wealth effects of dual-class and single-class Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) between 1997 and 2005. While there is no difference in pre-issue stock performance or the initial market reaction to the SEO announcements, dual-class issuers significantly underperform single-class issuers in the post-issue years. The mean three-year underperformance of dual-class firms relative to single-class is a significant 28.93% (30.45%) in buy-and-hold raw (abnormal) stock returns, and robust to alternative model specifications. We document that this relative long-run stock underperformance is related to differences in the impacts of post-issue capital expenditures and acquisitions for dual and single-class issuers. Similarly, post-issue corporate cash holdings also contribute less to the shareholder wealth for dual-class firms.

The ownership structure in Sweden is characterized by a few controlling owners who often base their ownership of a lower capital investment than in many other countries. The separation of ownership and control is determined by control-boosting mechanisms and is a constantly debated topic. These mechanisms are used to control companies without having to bear the bulk of the capital, and the criticism centers around concerns that companies with control-boosting mechanisms are not managed as well as companies without them. The purpose of the study was to examine the use of control enhancing mechanisms and its effect on the market value of Swedish companies on Nasdaq Stockholm. The study adopted a quantitative form with hypotheses testing. The data collection has been made through annual reports of the sample and then statistically tested in SPSS through multiple regression. The use of vote-strong shares was shown to have a strong positive effect on the value of a company. Minor effects proven came from the difference between the largest owner's voting share and capital contribution, and of the percentage of the total votes held by the largest owner. These two, however, counteracted each other in approximately equal amounts. Not offering their vote-strong shares to on the public exchange is suggested to be strongly negative, but this could not be ascertained. Type of ownership and age were both insignificant in their ability to explain company value.

Submitted by Diogo Anunciação Reis (diogoanunreis@gmail.com) on 2015-02-24T02:27:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 007293707_MPE_Dissertacao_V10.pdf: 747515 bytes, checksum: 91e13be0bac80e71972e87a4567cbc0b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2015-02-24T16:06:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 007293707_MPE_Dissertacao_V10.pdf: 747515 bytes, checksum: 91e13be0bac80e71972e87a4567cbc0b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-24T16:11:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 007293707_MPE_Dissertacao_V10.pdf: 747515 bytes, checksum: 91e13be0bac80e71972e87a4567cbc0b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-01-26 / Este trabalho tem por objetivo contribuir para a discussão acerca do diferencial relativo de preços entre duas classes de ações - ordinárias nominativas (ON) e preferenciais nominativas (PN) - no Brasil e os seus determinantes no período compreendido entre 2002 e 2014. Considerando-se a disseminada utilização de duas classes de ações (com e sem direito de voto) por empresas listadas na BMFBovespa – permitindo a separação entre controle e propriedade - e a elevada concentração do controle, este trabalho contribui para o entendimento dos potenciais conflitos de interesse entre acionistas majoritários e minoritários. Utilizou-se o método de mínimos quadrados ordinários (MQO) e os procedimentos de efeitos fixos (EF) e aleatórios (EA) para um painel formado por 46 companhias listadas resultando em 1.653 observações. Foram encontradas evidências de que as ações ON (com direito a voto) são negociadas com prêmio em relação às PN (sem direito a voto) e de que o prêmio (pelo voto) apresenta leve tendência de alta durante o período. Por fim, em relação aos determinantes, foram encontradas evidências de que o maior grau de proteção aos acionistas minoritários, o tamanho da empresa e a maior proporção de ativos tangíveis (imobilizados) estão negativamente associados ao prêmio pelo voto. / This paper aims to contribute to the discussion about dual-class premium (voting and non-voting shares) and its determinants in Brazil from 2002 to 2014. Considering the disseminated issuance of voting and non-voting shares by Brazilian listed firms – allowing the separation of ownership and control – and concentrated ownership, this paper contributes to the understanding of potencial conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders. This paper applies the ordinary least square (OLS) method and the procedures of fixed (FE) and random effects (RE) for a panel of 46 listed companies resulting in 1.653 observations. We found evidence that supports a premium of voting shares over non-voting shares (voting Premium). Furthermore, this premium presented a slight upward trend during the period. Finally, regarding the determinants, we found evidence that higher protection levels of minority shareholders rights, firm’s size and higher proportion of tangible assets are negatively associated to voting premium.

Inledning: Huruvida insynsägande påverkar finansiell prestation är ett beforskat område där tidigare studier kommit fram till olika slutsatser. Utifrån agentteorin torde insynsägande ha en positiv påverkan på finansiell prestation, utifrån entrenchment-teorin torde insynsägande påverka finansiell prestation negativt i och med ökad makt. Samtidigt utifrån stewardship-teorin torde det inte finnas en relation mellan insynsägande och finansiell prestation. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att analysera sambandet mellan insynsägande och finansiell prestation i svenska bolag vilka präglas av en hög förekomst av aktier med skilda röstvärden och en hög ägarkoncentration. Vidare är syftet att teoretiskt förklara de resultat som framkommer i denna uppsats för att redogöra för vilka befintliga teorier inom området som kan appliceras i en svensk kontext. Metod: För analysera sambandet mellan insynsägande och finansiell prestation i svenska bolag har uppsatsen tagit en kvantitativ ansats med ett deduktivt synsätt där teori har testats genom en panelregression innehållande 300 observationer. Slutsats: Uppsatsens resultat påvisar att sambandet mellan insynsägande och finansiell prestation, operationaliserat som Tobin's Q, tar sitt uttryck som ett inverterat U. I spannet 0 till 37,75 procent insynsägande finner vi stöd för en alignment-effekt samtidigt som vi finner stöd för entrenchment-effekten vid nivåer av insynsägande över brytpunkten på 37,75 procent. Vidare finner vi inget stöd för stewardship-teorin. Den brytpunkt som noterats i svenska bolag är lägre än den brytpunkt som påvisats i länder så som USA och Storbritannien. Förklaringen till detta kan vara den höga prevalensen av aktier med skilda röstvärden och den höga ägarkoncentration som präglar svenska företag. / Introduction: Whether Managerial Ownership affects financial performance is an area of research where previous studies have come to different conclusions. Based on Agency Theory, Managerial Ownership should have a positive impact on financial performance, and based on Entrenchment Theory, Managerial Ownership should have a negative impact on financial performance due to increased power. At the same time, based on Stewardship Theory, there should not be a relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance. Purpose: The purpose of the essay is to analyze the relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance in Swedish companies, which are characterized by a high prevalence dual-class shares and a high ownership concentration. Furthermore, the purpose is to theoretically explain the results that appear in the essay to explain what existing theories in the field that can be applied in a Swedish context. Method: To analyze the relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance in Swedish companies, the essay has taken a quantitative and deductive approach where theory has been tested through a panel regression containing 300 observations. Conclusion: The essays results show that the relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance, operationalized as Tobin's Q, takes its expression as an inverted U. In the range 0 to 37.75 percent Managerial Ownership we find support for an alignment effect while also finding support for an entrenchment effect at levels of Managerial Ownership above the inflection point of 37.75 percent. Furthermore, we find no support for Stewardship Theory. The inflection point noted in Swedish companies is lower than the inflection points detected in countries such as the US and the UK. The explanation for this may be the high prevalence of dual-class shares and the high ownership concentration that characterizes Swedish companies.