Esta tesis elabora una caracterización teórica de problemas de agencia dinámicos, basada en métodos recursivos duales. Respecto a las actuales estrategias de solución, la mayor ventaja de mi método es la posibilidad de analizar modelos complicados con muchas variables de estado, como es el caso en muchas situaciones macroeconómicas. El primer Capitulo introduce la metodología y presenta algunos ejemplos numéricos. El segundo Capitulo caracteriza contratos óptimos de participación al riesgo, en los dos casos de economía de dotación y de economía con producción, y demuestra que el método es muy simple en su aplicación a estos problemas. El tercer Capitulo analiza el seguro óptimo de desempleo bajo diferentes supuestos sobre el acceso al mercado financiero y la evolución del capital humano. / This thesis elaborates a theoretical characterization of general dynamic agency problems based on recursive duality methods. With respect to current solution strategies, the main advantage of my approach is the possibility to analyze complicated models with many state variables, as it is the case in several macroeconomic situations. The first Chapter introduces the methodology and provides some numerical example. The second Chapter provides a characterization of optimal risk sharing contracts both in endowment and production economies, and shows how the approach is easy to apply to these problems. The third Chapter analyzes optimal unemployment insurance under different assumptions on access to financial markets and human capital trends.

Submitted by Andre Espozel (andre.espozel@gmail.com) on 2017-04-19T17:47:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Andre Espozel - FGV-EPGE.pdf: 856389 bytes, checksum: 16cd3a3bbe1de2cc9ab98b718b21acb8 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2017-05-04T12:58:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Andre Espozel - FGV-EPGE.pdf: 856389 bytes, checksum: 16cd3a3bbe1de2cc9ab98b718b21acb8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-12T13:05:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Andre Espozel - FGV-EPGE.pdf: 856389 bytes, checksum: 16cd3a3bbe1de2cc9ab98b718b21acb8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-22 / This papers tests theoretical predictions concerning to agent compensation, debt structure and investment in the models of dynamic agency in DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and DeMarzo, Fishman, He and Wang (2012). The results related to agent compensation are consistent with the patterns predicted in the models, indicating that the firm-years that the models would have as more likely to pay dividends are indeed the ones more likely to pay; also, among firms that pay dividends, more profits generate higher dividend payments and higher executive compensation, as predicted in the models. The prediction that firms that go well and reach a payment threshold present marginal q equal to average q, and thus after controlling for average q cash flows would not explain investment is also supported by the tests in here. On the other hand, predictions related to the role of the credit line and to the debt structure are not compatible with the results in here. The credit line doesn’t seem to be the provider of financial slack that protects the firm from low cash flows and also doesn’t seem to have the dynamics of being paid when profits are high and being more used when profits are low.