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El texto completo de este trabajo no está disponible en el Repositorio Académico UPC por restricciones de la casa editorial donde ha sido publicado. / Microfinance allows the integration of all sectors for the country's economic growth. Data duplicity, invalid data and the inability to have reliable data for decision-making are generated without a formal Governance. For this reason, Data Governance is the key to enable an autonomous, productive and reliable work environment for the use of these. Although Data Governance models already exist, in most cases they don't meet the requirements of the sector, which has its own characteristics, such as the volume exponential growth, data criticality, and regulatory frameworks to which it is exposed. The purpose of this research is to design a reference model for the microfinance organizations, supported by an evaluation tool that provides a diagnosis with the objective of implementing and improving the organization processes regarding Data Governance. This model was implemented based on the information of Peru's microfinance organizations, from which a 1.72 score was diagnosed, which is encouraging for the organization, since it shows that it has defined all its plans concerning Data Governance. Finally, after the validation, it was concluded that the model serves as a medium to identify the current status of these organizations to ensure the success of the Data Governance initiatives.

“What determines bond ratings?” has been asked since 1860 when Henry V. Poor, of now Standard & Poors, released his first financial and operational analysis of the railroad industry and is still asked today. The determinants of bond rating studies date back to Fisher (1959) and single out various industries (railroad, manufacturing, industrial, and utility) but do not focus on REITs. REITs are different from other industries in various ways. Literature suggest differences between REITs and non-REIT industries including: the regulatory IRS restrictions regarding REITs, the uncertainty regarding the value of REITs, the number of uninformed investors is greater in the REIT market due to valuation uncertainty, REITs securities behave more like mutual fund securities than like industrial firm securities (Wang et al. (1992), (1995)), and the uncertainty about the value of real estate stocks is greater than that for stocks of industrial firms with operating assets, causing REIT advisors to complain that the stock market underestimates their real value more often than the real value of industrial firms (Hite, Owens, and Rodgers (1987)). This study analyzes the determinants of REIT debt ratings. The determinants are analyzed using ordered probit and multinomial logit regression models. The results of the ordered probit regression model reveal that REIT debt ratings are determined by similar financial characteristics used to analyze determinants for non-REIT industries. Similar to the findings in Horrigan (1966), the data also reveals that liquidity is not as significant to REIT debt ratings as S&P analyst claim. The multinomial logit resuts show that leverage, cash, size, interest coverage, and shareholders right plan are significant to downgrades. Overall, the findings presented here are consistent with non-REIT ratings literature.

This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore the changes in corporate governance around the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 2002. In the first essay, I examine the relation between board structure and compensation as a bargaining game between the board and the CEO. Bargaining game theories describe an endogenous process of determining the structure of director and CEO compensation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered the equilibrium of power between the board and CEO by changing the monitoring role of the board. SOX essentially provides a natural experiment to test how a shock to the bargaining game alters the balance of power between directors and the CEO. Using the ratio of director compensation to CEO compensation to proxy for bargaining power, I find a significant increase following the passage of SOX, consistent with directors gaining bargaining advantage. Moreover, firms with strong shareholder rights exhibit even greater evidence of power shifting to the directors. Overall, the results suggest that directors gain more power relative to the CEO in determining compensation plans and strong shareholder rights help firms to align directors' incentives with those of shareholders. In the second essay, I examine the relation between CEO compensation structure and acquirer returns. In the literature, researchers find that executive compensation structures influence corporate acquisition decisions. Equity-based executive compensation should reduce the non-value-maximizing behavior of acquiring managers. A series of corporate reforms such as SOX and the FASB expensing rule affected the structure of CEO equity-based compensation. I find a significant increase in CEO restricted stock compensation and a significant decrease in CEO option-based compensation following these reforms. I also find that CEOs with strong managerial power are more likely to receive more restricted stock in their compensation package after the 2002 reforms. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between the restricted stock compensation of acquiring firm CEOs and abnormal stock returns after 2002. This provides empirical support on the effectiveness of the shift away from options towards restricted stock in executive compensation packages. Restricted stock is associated with better merger decisions.

This PhD studies the imperative of racially transforming South Africa's economy in a way that spurs the growth of capital investment that is socially and locally inclusive. Part I explores the role of bargains among elites (“deals”) in facilitating investment. It studies deals as the basis of credible commitment and as the “arena of action” in the context of a relatively robust rule of law. What kind of deals produce capital investment and transformation, and what kind of deals produce predation and isomorphism? Using process tracing methodology, the research traces deal in platinum mining between 1994 and 2018. Part II examines the extent to which this investment is socially inclusive in alleviating local poverty, creating local employment, and reducing local inequality. This part relies on individual level census data of 20 million observations and geocoded mining data of over 400 mines to evaluate the local impact of mining investments on income poverty, employment, and inequality between 1996 and 2011. The study finds compelling evidence that “deals are the basis of credible commitment” to securing investment. The rule of law alone is important but insufficient as it leaves “residual uncertainty” for investors. The evaluation of the impact of mining investments on local communities suggests a qualification, at the local level, of the “resource curse” hypothesis. Mining brings benefits in terms of income poverty alleviation and employment. However, the high-low cycles of commodity price booms create employment volatility and exacerbate inequality. Mining investments inherently involve trade-offs that can be moved in net positive directions with good deals between business and the state, and local communities. The research thus contributes to the literature on property rights and investment, state-business relations and development, and natural resource governance for development.

The Jamaican don is a non-state actor who wields considerable power and control inside that nation's garrison communities. A don is a male figure, usually from the community in which he plays a leadership role. Garrisons in Jamaica have often emerged as neighborhoods that are don-ruled shadow versions of the official State. These are poor inner city communities characterized by homogeneous and, in some cases, over-voting patterns for one of Jamaica's two major political parties: the Peoples National Party (PNP) or the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP). This dissertation explores the major roles dons played in Jamaican garrisons. It focused on one community in the downtown metro area of one of the nation's cities. Additionally, it investigated the factors that account for the evolution of such roles performed by dons from the 1960s to the present. I used governance theories and the concept of embeddedness as an analytic framework to interpret the power and authority dons have in garrisons. Dons, as it turned out, perform four central roles in garrisons: security/protection, social welfare, partisan mobilization and law, order and conflict resolution via "jungle justice" measures. Different types of dons perform alternate mixes of these roles. The case study described here led me to develop a taxonomy of these informal community leaders by separating them into Mega, Area and Street Dons. I argue overall that dons are embedded governing authorities in Jamaican garrisons based on the socio-economic and political roles they carry out. By examining the responsibilities of dons in Jamaica, this analysis contributes to the literature on the activities of non-state criminal actors and their forms of influence on governance processes. The study suggests that it may now be appropriate to re-think the nature of governance and the actors we broadly assume are legitimate holders of power and authority in developing nation contexts. / Ph. D.

Yes / Informal prisoner governance in Latin American penal institutions raises a number of dilemmas for policy. The responses must encompass decarceration and diversion policies, and an approach to prison security that emphasises co-production and co-governance rather than coercive control.

Innovation is fundamental to long-term business success in technology medium-sized enterprises (MSEs). The owner-CEO interrelationship is likely to set the culture and be an important influence on the enterprise innovation capability. Previous studies of the owner-CEO interrelationship have produced varying results but few have examined the influence on innovation capability. Agency theory assumes that owners and CEOs have contrasting objectives but it is silent when owners and CEOs are in accord. Companies may have varying dominant ideologies, such as entrepreneurialism, managerialism, and paternalism, which likely influence their innovation capability. Using primary data from three different German MSEs, selected for their contrasting ideologies, this study examines how interrelationship influences of the owner-CEO interrelationship have the potential to influence the innovation capability of MSEs. The results show that the influence of the owner-CEO interrelationship on the innovation capability is associated with social and situational influences. This thesis provides an original contribution by developing an “interrelationship influence model” that captures the interrelationship factors that influence innovation capability, namely: action, support, communication, responsibility, power and autonomy. This study has important implications for researchers in corporate governance as well as in innovation. Enterprises aiming to improve their innovation capability should pay attention to interrelationships and the influence of owners as well as to the CEO and the management team.

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