As man moved out on the internet, so did the companies. One of the most successful business models in the digital era is the digital platform. A digital platform acts as an intermediary on multi-sided markets and enjoys, amongst others, lucrative network effects. One of the main factors behind the great success of digital platforms is the usage of big data combined with algorithms that are enhanced by machine learning. However, as big data is becoming more and more indispensable for any modern company, questions have been raised about whether digital platforms should be able to withhold the massive amount of big data exclusively, or whether they could be forced to share it. This paper investigates these questions through the lens of EU-competition law, especially under Article 102 TFEU and the doctrine of essential facilities.  To address the problem of digital platforms and big data, the business models of digital platforms, the economic forces behind them, and their usage of data are assessed to conclude whether an intervention by the Union could be motivated. It is concluded that the markets where digital platforms act are prone to tip and that the characteristics of big data in combination with sophisticated algorithms create a positive feedback loop, creating barriers to entry. Thus, there are severe risks of external market failures, making an intervention feasible. The paper secondly assesses the essential facility doctrine and evaluates the four elements that needs to be fulfilled for big data to be covered by the doctrine. Even though the business model of digital platforms challenges the traditional instruments of EU-competition law, the author argues that three out of four elements of the essential facilities doctrine are fulfilled. However, as data to its character is non-rivalrous and non-exclusive the data held by the incumbent cannot be considered indispensable, making the essential facilities doctrine inapplicable. Finally, alternative instruments under EU-competition law are assessed to find a solution to the problems attributable to a refusal to supply big data. The paper concludes that there are no optimal solutions, but the best of the potential instruments is to find a new form of abuse under article 102 TFEU or to add a modified version of the essential facilities doctrine to the newly proposed legislation DMA.

During the last two decades many pharmaceutical originator companies have struggled with refilling its pipelines with novel pharmaceutical products. At the same time many of these companies have lost patent protection for its most profitable drugs and more are expected to do so in the very near future. When pharmaceutical patents expire it is generally expected that generic manufacturers enter the market with significantly cheaper versions of the pre-patented drugs. Accordingly, generic entry poses strong competitive price pressure on originator companies and the latter may therefore be inclined to hinder these competitors from entering the market. The preparations for generic launch often starts a few years before patent expiry and it is therefore common that patent disputes arise. Patent disputes are not only highly complex, time consuming and costly, the disputes are often also characterized by a high degree of uncertainty to whether or not the patents are infringed and/or valid. Thus, incentives for settling the disputes out of court are often high for both originator and generic undertakings. Legitimate patent settlement agreements are generally not considered to pose any competitive concern. However, the Commission has observed that these settlement agreements has been used to conceal anti-competitive terms by which the originator companies sets out to buy off its generic competitors for delaying its plans to enter the market. These anti-competitive arrangements are more generally known as pay-for-delay settlements. The Commission has issued two decisions against pay-for-delay settlements of which the GC has confirmed the Commission’s assessments. After fulfilling a three-step criteria developed by the Commission, these agreements were considered to have as its object the restriction of competition within the meaning of article 101 (1) TFEU. When an agreement is categorized as a restriction by object it is considered to be by its very nature restrictive of competition, and is therefore presumptively illegal. This approach has been vastly criticized in the legal doctrine for not being sufficiently clear and legally certain. Therefore, the purpose of this essay has been to critically analyze the Commission’s approach in assessing patent settlement agreements. The overall findings of the analysis do however indicate that the Commission’s categorization of pay-for-delay settlements as restrictions of competition by object follows the established rules of EU competition law and should therefore be justified.

This diploma thesis deals with state aid and financing of transport infrastructure under the EU law. The main aim of the thesis is to answer the question, whether the financing of transport infrastructure is a state aid and if it so, would it be compatible with the internal market. Member States have to ask these questions while they are deciding whether they should use public funds for specific infrastructural project in transportation industry. The thesis is divided into two main parts. In the first part author is focused on airport transportation industry, which has been liberalized since early 90's of 20th century. Thanks to the market opening the completion came in and Commission started to control financing of airport infrastructures. Airports were no longer recognized as an infrastructural facilities and their operators were found as an undertaking in the sense of competition judicature. That is why the first chapter is dealing with the historical excursus of state aid law in the field of aviation infrastructure. The author describes the fundamental decisions of Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union; a great focus is placed on analysis of the decision on the Leipzig- Halle case. In the third chapter of the first part, there is a deep analysis of the relevant documents...

Regulation 1/2003 empowers the European Commission to issue a decision, by which it makes commitments offered by the parties to the proceedings legally binding. Although being an alternative to the prohibition decision, it has become a predominant type of decision the Commission uses to tackle various antitrust issues, save from the area of secret cartels. This thesis primarily focuses on the effectiveness of commitment decisions, exploring various features contributing thereof. The first chapter outlines the main changes to the enforcement of EU competition law brought by Regulation 1/2003. The second chapter provides a necessary background for the subsequent analysis by introducing the legal framework for the adoption of commitment decision, followed by an explanation of the importance of effectiveness in public enforcement of EU competition law. The fourth chapter analyses effectiveness of the commitment procedure, which is narrowed down to the quickness of the procedure leading to the adoption of the final decision. The author observes that the procedure provides for more rapid resolution of cases, but it contains various drawback negatively affecting the quickness of the procedure. The fifth chapter is devoted to the enhanced effectiveness of commitments, mainly in comparison to remedies which...

Digitalisation has fundamentally changed the way we communicate, conduct trade and consume goods and services. It has also enabled new business models to evolve. Some firms in the digital sector have developed and are now operating large conglomerate-like networks commonly referred to as ‘digital ecosystems’. Most digital ecosystems involve several autonomous, yet interdependent, firms. They offer diverse sets of different goods and services that often are technologically or economically interlinked and thus provide more value when bought or used together. Ecosystem business structures exist in many industries but a distinct feature of those in the digital sector is that the interdependencies within them are driven by digital technology and data connectivity. This affects how digital ecosystems function and how they need to be assessed under competition law. One of the ways in which digital ecosystems can expand and broaden their product portfolios is through mergers and acquisitions. The world’s five largest digital ecosystem operators – Alphabet (formerly Google), Apple, Meta (formerly Facebook), Amazon, and Microsoft – have together acquired over 800 firms during their relatively short lifetime. The intense merger and acquisition activity observed in the digital sector in the past years has raised concerns about the ability of European Union merger control to ensure that competition in this sector is not distorted by digital ecosystems’ expansion strategies. These concerns relate both to the adequacy of the current procedural system and to the precision of the analytical framework for assessing digital ecosystem mergers. This paper focuses mainly on the latter issue, and more specifically, on the theories of harm that have been applied in assessments of acquisitions by the five digital ecosystem operators mentioned above as well as on the need for alternative approaches or theories of harm for these mergers. It is shown that the assessments largely follow the traditional analytical framework of European Union merger control but that many of the special characteristics of digital markets and digital ecosystems are also taken into consideration. Yet, it is argued in this paper that there is a need for alternative approaches and theories of harm to better account for the competitive implications of digital ecosystem mergers.

L'adoption du règlement n° 1/2003 a décentralisé la mise en oeuvre des articles 101 et 102 TFUE et a entraîné la création du Réseau européen de la concurrence. Désormais, les autorités nationales et la Commission partagent la responsabilité de l'application des règles de concurrence de l'Union européenne au sein du Réseau. Le fonctionnement de celui-ci obéit à la logique de la méthode du conflit d'autorités. Ainsi, la question de la compétence des autorités pour traiter une affaire a une importance primordiale dans le contexte du Réseau. Elle détermine la loi applicable à l'inégralité de l'affaire et exerce une influence sur les effets extraterritoriaux des décisions. Les autorités de concurrence emploient une grande variété de méthodes de coopération et de coordination afin d'éviter des conflits de compétence et les solutions contradictoires au sein du Réseau. Malgré la coopération étroite des autorités, les divergences des règles de procédure sont susceptibles de miner l'efficacité de la mise en oeuvre des articles 101 et 102 TFUE ainsi qu'éroder la protection des droits fondamentaux. / The entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 resulted in the decentralisation of the application of articles 101 et 102 TFEU. The national authorities and the Commission share the responsibility for the enforcement of the EU competition rules and form together the European Competition Network. According to the theory of conflict of authorities, the designation of the competent authority to deal with a case is crucial for the functioning of the Network, since it determines the applicable law to the case and the extraterritorial effect of the decision. Despite the cooperation and coordination mechanisms at the authorities's disposal, the divergences in national procedural rules can undermine not only the goal of efficient enforcement of competition rules in the EU, but also the protection of fundemantal rights.