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The overarching purpose of this doctoral thesis is to determine if the system of legal mechanisms in European Community law governing what procedural rules national courts shall apply to Community rights can be reformed to better balance involved interests. European Community law is often applied and enforced by ordinary national courts that, as a general rule, supplement substantive Community rules with national procedural rules. While the Community rights that individuals can rely upon before national courts are the same in all Member States, the procedural rules that national courts apply to those Community rights can and often does differ between the Member States. While this order is often acceptable, Community law contains a number of exceptions from the general rule that it is the Member States that decide what procedural rules national courts shall apply to Community rights. Such exceptions are primarily motivated by the need to ensure the effectiveness of Community. In order to determine what interests should be taken into account when deciding what procedural rules national courts shall apply to Community rights and how a more balanced system could be constructed, the European legal system is herein compared to that of the United States. American State courts apply Federal law much like national European courts apply European Community law and, also similar to Community law, a system of legal mechanism governing what procedural rules State courts shall apply to Federal rights has developed. While U.S. law and European Community law are in this respect similar, the two are not identical. A comparison between the two reveals that the European approach improperly overlooks several interests that are central in the American approach. Most importantly, the European approach emphasizes and promotes the effectiveness of union law at the expense of upholding a proper division of power between union and states. American law also provides European Community law with practical advices regarding how a better balanced approach can be constructed and points to solutions that should be avoided.

The freedom of establishment is a fundamental right on the internal market which enables companies to take up and pursue activity in other member states, “host states”, in a non discriminatory way. In situations where a company wishes to use the right to establish in a host state, complications will be discovered since the member states are applying different principles for deciding the nationality of a company. Since the Treaty of the Function of the European Union recognize both principles, and both of the legal areas company law and European international private law lack harmonization regarding companies wishing to perform such a transaction, the situation today brings the possibility that such a company could be covered by the legal system of several member states, or maybe no legal system at all. The Court of Justice of the European Union has through case law contributed to make the scope of the freedom of establishment a little bit clearer but there are still difficulties regarding situations when a company wishes to transfer its seat to another member state with a change of nationality. Today’s measures, for example the SE-company, is not enough to satisfy the companies wishing to transfer their seat to another member state. According to the writer, the Cartesio judgment brought an even greater need for a 14th Company Law Directive. The proposal for a 14th Company Law Directive enables companies to cease to be a company according to the legislation in the home state and then become a company according to the legislation in the host state without ever losing its legal personality. The conclusion is therefore that such a directive is crucial in order to make it possible for companies to fully enjoy and exploit the internal market. / Etableringsrätten är en grundläggande frihet på den inre marknaden vilken gör det möjligt för bolag att starta och driva verksamhet i andra medlemsstater utan att för den sakens skull riskera att utsättas för diskriminering. Då dessa bolag önskar utnyttja den fördragsstadgade etableringsfriheten genom att flytta sitt säte till en annan medlemsstat kommer svårigheter att uppstå då medlemsstaterna inom unionen många gånger använder olika anknytningsfaktorer för att bestämma bolags nationalitet. Då fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt godkänner båda lagvalsprinciperna samt det faktum att bolagsrättens och den europeiska internationella privaträttens område saknar tillfredställande harmonisering, kan situationen idag innebära att de bolag som önskar att vidta en sådan transaktion omfattas av fler än en medlemsstats rättsordning, eller i vissa fall ingen rättsordning alls. EU-domstolen har genom praxis bidragit till att i viss mån klargöra rättsläget på etableringsrättens område men oklarheter kvarstår för de situationer där bolag önskar att flytta sätet till en annan medlemsstat med åtföljande byte av nationalitet. Dagens gemenskapsrättsliga åtgärder, exempelvis SE-bolaget, är inte tillräckliga för att tillfredställa de bolag som önskar att genomföra en sådan transaktion. Enligt författaren har också den förhållandevis nya Cartesio-domen bidragit till ett ökat behov av ett 14:e bolagsdirektiv vilket möjliggör för bolag att flytta sätet till en annan medlemsstat. Processen skulle enligt detta direktiv innebära att bolaget skulle upphöra i ursprungsstaten samtidigt som det skulle bli en juridisk person i den nya medlemsstaten utan att under processen förlora sin status som rättssubjekt. Slutsatsen blir således att det är avgörande att åtgärder på EU-rättslig nivå vidtas, exempelvis genom det 14:e bolagsdirektivet, för att bolag till fullo ska kunna utnyttja den inre marknaden.

<p>The courts international juristiction within the European union is regulated by the Brussels I Regulation. Article 2.1 of the Brussels I Regulation contains the fundamental provision. According to this Article the plaintiff shall submit an action where the defandent is domiciled. The Regulation provides exemptions to the this provision in Article 2.1.</p><p>The court of the international case can also be determined according to Article 5 (1) of the Brussels I Regulation. This Article contains an alternative to the general provision within Article 2.1. Article 5 (1) is applicable when the dispute is based on an agreement between the parties. The Article is justified because of the close link between the contract and the court of the place where the contract was, or is to be, performed. Article 5 (1) b of the Brussels I Regulation contains a uniform definition of the place of performance, if the agreement consists of contracts for the sale of goods and the provisions of services.</p><p>The European Court of Justice in the cases Color Drack, Peter Rehder, Car Trim and Wood Floor interprets the place of performance. In paragraph 18 of the Color Drack-case the ECJ establish that the place of performance shall be “interpreted in the light of the origins, objectives and scheme of that regulation”. The ECJ follows these principles in the interpreting of the cases Peter Rehder, Car Trim and Wood Floor. This essay analyzes the above-mentioned rulings in order to investigate the impact of The ECJ rulings in Car Trim and Wood Floor for the application of Article 5 (1) b of the Brussels I Regulation.</p><p> </p>

Ända sedan införandet av de svenska ränteavdragsbegränsningarna, som kan leda till nekat avdrag för räntekostnader inom intressegemenskapen beroende på mottagarens skattesituation och syftet bakom transaktionen, har reglernas förenlighet med EU-rättens etableringsfrihet varit ett omdiskuterat ämne. Syf-tet med denna uppsats är att utröna reglernas förenlighet med EU-rätten på denna grund.EU-rätten förbjuder vanligtvis alla former av hinder mot etableringsfriheten. Avsteg får dock göras i särskilda fall om hindrande åtgärder kan motiveras mot bakgrund av art. 52(1) FEUF eller ett trängande allmänintresse. De hindrande åtgärderna måste vidare ha till syfte att uppnå de anförda rättfärdigandegrun-derna samt inte gå utöver vad som är nödvändigt för att uppnå dess mål.EU-kommissionen menar att reglerna särskilt missgynnar gränsöverskridande verksamhet. Vidare anser EU-kommissionen att reglerna går utöver vad som är nödvändigt, trots att reglerna förvisso skulle kunna motiveras. Regeringen menar att reglerna inte utgör ett hinder mot etableringsfriheten, eller att reglerna i vart fall kan motiveras och är proportionerliga.Vid en granskning av de svenska ränteavdragsbegränsningarna finner författar-na att det föreligger hinder för etableringsfrihetens utövande, men att detta hinder kan motiveras med stöd av behovet att motverka skatteflykt och beho-vet att upprätthålla en väl avvägd fördelning av beskattningsrätten mellan medlemsstaterna. Det svenska regelverket går dock utöver vad som är nödvändigt för att uppnå dessa mål, särskilt avseende rättssäkerhet och det totala nekandet av avdrag, och måste därför anses vara oförenliga med unionsrätten. / The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules have been a topic of discussion ever since they were approved. Questions have been raised as to whether the rules restrict the freedom of establishment within EU law. The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether the rules are compatible with EU law in this matter.Restrictions to the freedom of establishment are generally prohibited according to EU law. Such restrictions are warranted only if they adhere to art. 52(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or if they pursue a legitimate objective compatible with EU law and are justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest, in which case they must be suitable for securing the attainment of that objective and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to do so (rule of reason).The EU Commission claims that the Swedish rules restrict cross border activity and the freedom of establishment. The Commission initially states that the rules could potentially be justified by the rule of reason doctrine, but ultimately concludes that the rules go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective of the justification grounds. Upon an examination of the rules, the authors find that the rules restrict the freedom of establishment, but that they can be justified by the need to combat tax avoidance and evasion and need to preserve the balanced allocation be-tween Member States. The rules do, however, go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective, especially when it comes to the principle of legal certainty and the denying of the entire expense instead of adjusting it to market value, and are therefore not compatible with EU law.

The courts international juristiction within the European union is regulated by the Brussels I Regulation. Article 2.1 of the Brussels I Regulation contains the fundamental provision. According to this Article the plaintiff shall submit an action where the defandent is domiciled. The Regulation provides exemptions to the this provision in Article 2.1. The court of the international case can also be determined according to Article 5 (1) of the Brussels I Regulation. This Article contains an alternative to the general provision within Article 2.1. Article 5 (1) is applicable when the dispute is based on an agreement between the parties. The Article is justified because of the close link between the contract and the court of the place where the contract was, or is to be, performed. Article 5 (1) b of the Brussels I Regulation contains a uniform definition of the place of performance, if the agreement consists of contracts for the sale of goods and the provisions of services. The European Court of Justice in the cases Color Drack, Peter Rehder, Car Trim and Wood Floor interprets the place of performance. In paragraph 18 of the Color Drack-case the ECJ establish that the place of performance shall be “interpreted in the light of the origins, objectives and scheme of that regulation”. The ECJ follows these principles in the interpreting of the cases Peter Rehder, Car Trim and Wood Floor. This essay analyzes the above-mentioned rulings in order to investigate the impact of The ECJ rulings in Car Trim and Wood Floor for the application of Article 5 (1) b of the Brussels I Regulation.

Att upprätthålla en god affärsetik är viktigt för många företag, eftersom det skapar ett för- troende hos intressenter i olika led. För att inta en stark ställning på marknaden krävs även att företagen är konkurrenskraftiga. Ökad konkurrenskraft kan fås genom konkurrentbe- vakning, då information inhämtas från konkurrenter. Dock saknas det tydliga regler huruvida informationsutbyte omfattas av artikel 101.1 FEUF, som reglerar konkurrensbe- gränsande företeelser på marknaden. Kommissionen har meddelat att artikel 101.1 FEUF bör omfatta informationsutbyte, ef- tersom det kan påverka ett företags självständighet att ta beslut. Detta har även fastslagits av domstolen och artikeln måste därför anses omfatta informationsutbyte. För att artikeln ska bli tillämplig måste ett avtal, beslut av företagssammanslutningar eller samordnat förfa- rande föreligga, en situation mellan konkurrenter, påverka handeln mellan medlemsstater och avtalet ska ha ett konkurrensbegränsande syfte eller faktiska eller potentiella konkur- rensbegränsande effekter. I kommissionens riktlinjer ges en viss vägledning om hur en be- dömning ska göras huruvida uppgifterna får utbytas enligt artikeln. Hänsyn ska bland annat tas till hur aggregerad och gammal den är, marknaden och hur ofta informationen utbyts. I enlighet med gällande rätt får information inhämtas från konkurrenter på ett sådant sätt att det inte begränsar konkurrensen vilket innebär att företag bör undvika att ingå alla for- mer av avtal om informationsutbyte. Det är förenligt med artikeln att inhämta offentlig in- formation och delta vid mässor och branschorganisationer. Uppgifter som får inhämtas är offentliga, gamla och aggregerade uppgifter som inte går att härleda till en specifik aktör och som inte påverkar företagens självständighet att ta strategiska beslut. Dock råder en del osäkerheter vad det gäller bedömningen av de olika faktorerna och för att minska osäker- heten på området krävs tydligare regler och riktlinjer. / To maintain high standards of business ethics are important to many companies, because it creates trust among stakeholders at different levels. To hold a top position on the market also requires that company are competitive. Greater competitiveness can be obtained by competitor intelligence, when information is obtained about competitors. However, there are no clear rules whether article 101.1 TFEU, which regulates competitive restrictions, co- vers the exchange of information. The Commission has noted that article 101.1 TFEU should include exchange of infor- mation, because the exchange can affect a company's autonomy to make decisions. The Court has also established this and because of that is it to consider that the article includes exchange of information. If the article shall be applicable an agreement, decisions by asso- ciations of undertakings or concerted practices need to exist, between competitors, affect trade between Member States and the agreement must restrict the competition. Guidelines written by the Commission gives some guidance how the assessment whether the infor- mation can be exchange according to the article. How aggregated and old the information is, the market and the frequency of the exchange shall be take into consideration when a decision is made. In accordance with applicable law exchange of information from between competitors should be made in such way that it does not restrict competition. Companies should avoid entering into all forms agreement regarding information exchange. According to article 101.1 FEUF it is consistent to gather public information and participate in trade exhibi- tions and trade associations. Data that may be collected are public, old and aggregated data that can not be traced to a specific operator. However, there are some uncertainty regard- ing the assessment of the various factors and to reduce the uncertainty in this field clearer rules and guidelines are necessary.

La recherche analyse le développement du droit pénal et des politiques criminelles de l'Union européenne, en supposant que la poursuite de buts sécuritaires et de protection des droits fondamentaux soient ses principales forces motrices et justifications pour la criminalisation de certains comportements au niveau européen. Elle vise donc à clarifier ce que «sécurité» et «droits fondamentaux» signifient dans ce contexte, et de montrer comment l'intervention de l'UE dans le domaine pénal, ait affecté et remodelé les principes et catégories traditionnels du droit pénal matériel. La recherche essayer d'identifier des coordonnées pour préciser la nature et les limites de la sécurité comme intérêt juridique protégé et le but de la protection des droits fondamentaux dans leurs interrelations complexes, et leur rôle dans l'espace commun de liberté, de sécurité et de justice - ce que va etre construit par l'Union aussi par l'harmonisation du droit pénal.Après quelques considérations préliminaires sur la société occidentale postmoderne “du risque", pour mettre en évidence les difficultés rencontrées par les hypothèses traditionnelles de la théorie libérale de jus puniendi, on évaluera l'évolution des principes et catégories fondamentales du droit pénal, dont la structure est mise sous pression par l'harmonisation européenne.La recherche fait partie du domaine du droit pénal et de la théorie du droit de l'UE. Il repose largement sur l'analyse scientifique développée dans ces domaines et sur l'analyse des dispositions pertinentes des traités et des sources européennes secondaires, ainsi que sur les décisions les plus pertinentes de la CJCE, en essayant de tirer quelques considérations générales forment la politique et le document institutionnel élaboré par la Commission, le PE et le Conseil de l'UE. / The research analyses the development of criminal law and policies of the European Union, assuming that the pursuit of security and the protection of fundamental rights have been its main driving forces and principal justifications for criminalisation.It aims, therefore to clarify what “security” and “fundamental rights” mean in this context, and to show how EU intervention in criminal field, following security and fundamental rights policies, affected and reshaped the traditional principles and categories of substantive criminal law.The research try to identify some coordinates to clarify the nature and limits of security as a protected legal interest and the purpose of protection of fundamental rights in their complex interrelationship, and their role in the Common area of Freedom, Security and Justice - which is being built by the Union also through the harmonisation of criminal law.The starting point is the marked expansive trend in criminal matters due to the current conditions of the State and of representative democracy, typical of the contemporary society.After making some preliminary considerations on western postmodern “risk” society, to highlight the challenges faced by the traditional assumptions of the liberal theory of jus puniendi, I will evaluate the evolution of principle and fundamental categories of criminal law, whose structure is being put under pressure by European harmonisation.The research belongs to the field of criminal law and EU law theory. It extensively rely on influential scholarly analysis developed in those fields and on the analysis of the relevant provisions of the Treaties and secondary EU sources, as well as on the most relevant rulings from the ECJ, also trying to pull out some broad considerations form the political and institutional document produced by the Commission, the EP and the Council of the EU.

EU har gradvis utökat sin normgivningskompetens, ofta på bekostnad av medlemsstaternas lagstiftning. Detta har nyligen aktualiserats för Sverige på grund av Dataskyddsförordningen som i folkmun kallas GDPR. I och med att det traditionellt sett har funnits ett starkare dataskydd i EU-rätt jämfört med svensk rätt blir den inhemska lagstiftningen onekligen påverkad av förordningen. Den här uppsatsen avser analysera specifikt offentlighetsprincipen som är stadgad i Sveriges grundlag. Syftet är att identifiera huruvida rätten att ta del av allmänna handlingar, som är en del av offentlighetsprincipen, kan komma att inskränkas med hänsyn till principen om EU-rättens företräde. Syftet uppnås genom fyra etapper. Först sker en historisk tillbakablick av diskussionen vid det svenska unionstillträdet om offentlighetsprincipens fortlevnad. Efter detta görs en jämförelse mellan GDPR och intern rätt för att identifiera eventuella motsättningar. Vidare analyseras praxis från både Sverige och EU-domstolen för att visa på likheter och skillnader i avvägningen mellan offentlighet och sekretess. Till sist utreds hur principen om EU-rättens företräde kan tolkas tillsammans med andra unionsrättsliga bestämmelser för att antingen åsidosätta den nationella lagstiftningen eller hålla den intakt. Författaren föreslår slutledningsvis att effekten på offentlighetsprincipen är försumlig samtidigt som möjligheten att tolka mål härom delvis har skiftat från medlemsstaten till EU-domstolen. / The EU has gradually expanded its legislative competence, often at the expense of member state legislation. This has recently become highly relevant for Sweden due to the recent data protection regulation, the GDPR. Since there has traditionally been a stronger protection for personal data in the EU in comparison to Sweden, domestic Swedish law will become affected by the GDPR coming into force. Within this backdrop, the focus in this thesis will be the right to access public documents, which is established in the Swedish constitution. The aim with this work is to identify in what respect the right to access public documents will be affected considering the principle of primacy according to EU law. The aim is pursued in four steps. First, the former discussion on how the right to access public documents would be affected due to Sweden’s entrance to the EU will be presented. Secondly, the compliance of Swedish law in relation to the GDPR in order to identify potential conflict of norms will be reviewed. Thirdly, case law of the ECJ and Swedish courts in order to show the differentiation between balancing transparency and personal integrity will be reviewed. Finally, it will be analysed how the primacy of EU law can be interpreted together with other EU norms to either override the Swedish constitutional law or leave it intact. The findings suggest that while the effect of the GDPR on the Swedish “offentlighetsprincipen” is negligible, the right to interpret such cases has gradually shifted from relying partly on the member state to the EU.

This thesis deals with the fundamental right to the protection of personal data as enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ('the Charter'). An analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on Article 8 of the Charter reveals an intriguing paradox: although this provision has been repeatedly invoked in order to enhance protection of personal data and has featured prominently in several far-reaching judgments (Digital Rights Ireland, Google Spain or Schrems), there is considerable uncertainty as to the substantive scope of the right to the protection of personal data. The relationship between the right to privacy and the right to data protection has proved difficult to untangle, and the autonomous nature of Article 8 of the Charter has not always been respected. The aim of the thesis is to analyse the purpose and content of this fundamental right with reference to the CJEU's case law and recent academic debate. This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the European legal framework for data protection and demonstrates the limited value of the 'Explanations relating to the Charter' in interpreting Article 8. Chapter 2 analyses the CJEU's approach to interpreting and applying Article 8, while Chapter 3 is...