The aim of this dissertation is to reflect on economic methodology. To reflect means to think about the relationship between researcher and the object of research. The object in mainstream economics is fixed in market realm. When the object is fixed then the focus in economic study is the method. Mainstream economics used equilibrium analysis method in order to make the research outcome be certainty. In the process of pursuing certainty the ontology of the object is neglected. The de-centering strategy we applied is deconstruction concept. My main reason for taking Derrida¡¦s deconstruction as a starting point is to de-center the fixed center which operating mechanism is the invisible hand. In this dissertation the logic of deconstruction is ¡§neither..or..¡¨ form and the steps are to undo and displace. In order to emphasize the multiples means and the relation of knowledge and power we use the term discourse. In chapter four we undo ¡§the invisible hand¡¨ metaphor that is the center of market. The direct consequence of the undo process is the finding of the ontological implication. In chapter five we displace ¡§the invisible hand¡¨ metaphor. Through rereading Adam Smith¡¦s methodology we interpret invisible hand as causal relation and find the same ontological implication. Together with these two processes above we find out the inspiration for reflection of economic methodology that is to answer the most fundamental question about what is the economic object. In chapter six we call for discussion to bringing the ontology back into economics. We believe the study of economic ontology is a prerequisite for understanding economics as a scientific discipline. It is thus intended and hoped that this reflection will help to beyond the opposite between positivism and post-positivism. For the defined goal to coordinate the opposite we introduce philosopher Quine¡¦s ontological method called ontological commitment. After the reflection we claim ¡Gthe method such as formation and econometric is important, but if we can emphasize the ontology of research object then the study will be activity. The defense of this claim is the main subject of this dissertation. Finally we just point out that if the claim is accepted, then something along this line of the attention is essential to the practice researcher. That is to take more time to think the nature of the research object when he construes a model.

The discourse about commodification of time indicates that under the current socio-economic regime important values get systematically ignored. This paper reviews literature about the value of time in classical political economy, neoclassical economics, the household production approach, household economics, and activity models. Starting with neoclassical economics, all these approaches are largely in accordance with utilitarian methodology. Utilitarian methodology turns out to be incapable of explaining the value of time. The debate about "quality work" allows us to identify the following intrinsic values: power, playfulness, a sense of meaning, and a sense of belonging. These intrinsic values match with the "five sources of Motivation" in contemporary psychological research, which confirms the empirical relevance and irreducibility of these values for understanding behavior. We propose a definition of commodification of time and illustrate some of the potential effects of commodification of time.

Orientador: David Dequech Filho / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-21T00:45:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fucidji_JoseRicardo_D.pdf: 1443224 bytes, checksum: 9559a750c120f0118f98de208ea38a74 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: O objetivo desta tese é expor, avaliar e aplicar a abordagem metodológica do realismo crítico para a ciência econômica. O realismo crítico em economia propõe-se como uma alternativa os pólos do falseacionismo popperiano e ao relativismo das abordagens construtivistas. O ponto a ressaltar é que o realismo crítico dá precedência às questões ontológicas (a natureza do que existe na realidade econômica e das práticas científicas) sobre as questões epistemológicas (o status das diversas teorias como veículos do conhecimento aceito). Ao defender que o método de investigação ou inferência deve ser adequado ao objeto de análise (que neste caso é algum item da realidade sócio-econômica), o realismo crítico aponta diversas razões para o insucesso das teorias econômicas ortodoxas como instrumentos de previsão e controle dessa realidade. Ao supor uma realidade social que é complexa, diferenciada, estruturada, sistêmica, aberta, sempre em mudança e radicalmente incerta, além de internamente relacionada, essa abordagem coloca-se também como um fundamento metodológico para as correntes heterodoxas em economia. Após discutir o conteúdo dessa abordagem, bem como a concepção ontológica particular sobre a qual é sustentada, o trabalho contrapõe a ela diversas outras abordagens em metodologia econômica, destacando-lhes a ontologia (ainda que implícita). Seguem-se então duas aplicações da abordagem realista crítica em economia. Na primeira, procura-se indicar as limitações e possibilidades do darwinismo generalizado, do realismo crítico, da abordagem da auto-organização em sistemas complexos e da chamada hipótese de continuidade como metodologias alternativas (mas de certa forma compatíveis) para a economia evolucionista. Na segunda, apresentam-se algumas considerações metodológicas a respeito da recente crise financeira, com destaque para o papel dos modelos formais em teorias econômicas / Abstract: The purpose of this work is to explain, evaluate and apply the critical realist approach to economics. Critical realism in economics stands as an alternative to both Popperian falsificationism and the relativism of constructivist approaches. It is worth noting that critical realism gives primacy to ontological issues (the nature of which exists in socio-economic reality and scientific activities) over epistemological ones (the status of competing theories as vehicles of accepted knowledge). By defending that research methods and inferences must be tailored to the nature of the subject-matter - that in this case is some item of socio-economic reality - and not the other way round, critical realism points out several failures in orthodox economics project of predicting and controlling that reality. Supposing a social reality that is complex, differentiated, structured, systemic, open, ever-changing, and radically uncertain, besides internally related, this approach can provide methodological foundations for heterodox schools of thought in economics. After discussing the content of critical realism, as well as its particular ontological underpinnings, this work compares several alternative methodological approaches to it by underlining their (implicit or explicit) ontology. Two attempts of applying critical realism to methodological debates in economics follow. In the first one I point out limits to and possibilities of generalized Darwinism, auto-organized complex systems, continuity hypothesis and critical realism as alternative (but in some ways compatible) methodologies for evolutionary economics. In the second one, I put forward some methodological considerations on the recent financial crisis, focusing on the role of formal models in economic theories / Doutorado / Teoria Economica / Doutor em Ciências Econômicas

Submitted by Flávia Rubio (flaviacarrasco@gmail.com) on 2013-03-06T01:16:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Versão Final - Flavia C Rubioentrega.pdf: 974449 bytes, checksum: 73d67e621187e04b1662c91a7b78679c (MD5) / Rejected by Eliene Soares da Silva (eliene.silva@fgv.br), reason: Flavia, conforme conversamos, acrescente Palavras-chave e Key words no texto. Submeter a dissertação novamente. Obrigada. Eliene Secretaria de Registro on 2013-03-06T13:25:29Z (GMT) / Submitted by Flávia Rubio (flaviacarrasco@gmail.com) on 2013-03-06T13:45:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Versão Final - Flavia C Rubioentrega.pdf: 974171 bytes, checksum: 78759987679a971584ffc8771f9b21c0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Eliene Soares da Silva (eliene.silva@fgv.br) on 2013-03-06T13:46:32Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Versão Final - Flavia C Rubioentrega.pdf: 974171 bytes, checksum: 78759987679a971584ffc8771f9b21c0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-03-06T14:04:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Versão Final - Flavia C Rubioentrega.pdf: 974171 bytes, checksum: 78759987679a971584ffc8771f9b21c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-02-07 / The present study aims to evaluate, from a theoretical perspective, the fundamental basis argumentative which put economic science at distinct level of analysis. On one hand, the strong mathematical apparatus and microfundamentals that support the mainstream economic view. On the other hand, Keynes’s evaluation (post-keynesian perspective) about economic science. Therefore, the first chapter starts rebuilding the orthodox economics in its basis. From that perspective, the purpose of the study is focused on the new classic economic school, furthermore the contributions of Robert Lucas, the best specialist in the wealth and work processes. The second chapter presents the heterodox construction through a post-keynesian perspective, that by analyzing Keynes, and specially the work of Davidson, will propose to look back to political economics. In the third chapter, the objective is to discuss a new methodology of economics, study objects and their positioning within science. / O presente trabalho busca avaliar, de uma perspectiva teórica, as bases fundamentais argumentativas que colocam a ciência econômica em patamares tão distintos de análise: De um lado, o forte aparato matemático e de microfundamentos que sustentam a visão do mainstream economics. De outro a avaliação de Keynes (da perspectiva pós-keynesiana) acerca do objeto da ciência econômica. Para isso, inicia-se no primeiro capítulo uma reconstrução da Economia ortodoxa em sua base. De tal perspectiva, o estudo proposto se concentra na chamada escola novo clássica, sobretudo as contribuições de Robert Lucas, expoente maior, acerca do processo de geração de renda e emprego. No segundo capítulo, apresenta-se o constructo heterodoxo, através de uma perspectiva pós-keynesiana que ao resgatar Keynes, sobretudo os trabalhos de Davidson, vai propor a volta ao olhar de economia política. No terceiro capítulo visa construir o debate acerca da metodologia econômica, objetos de estudo e seu posicionamento dentro da ciência.

This diploma thesis is analyzing civic associations that conduct a social enterprise in Prague. The aim of the paper is to discover, in which measure do the specific associations fulfill economical and social conditions according to the methodology EMES, which represents characteristics for an "optimal social enterprise". Firstly, the thesis examines the idea of the social economics and social entrepreneurship in the Czech Republic as well as in Europe. It focuses on the research network EMES of professor Jacques Defourny, and on the legal and economical activity of the civic associations. The methodological part of the paper analysis examples of the specific civic associations through the methodology EMES. For each association, economic and social conditions, based on methodic EMES, are examined through the document analysis method and semi-structured interviews. The output of this thesis are recommendations, that could improve the success rate of the Czech civic associations in an important manner. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Cette thèse, dont l'objectif est de faire prévaloir l'importance de la macro-économétrie dans l'histoire de la macro-économie, s'articule autour de deux questions centrales : (1) Quelles ont été les forces et les objectif qui ont motivé le développement de la modélisation macro-économétrique et quelle est la nature des outils et des institutions que les macro-économistes ont construit pour observer, comprendre et contrôler l'économie d'après-guerre aux États-Unis , (2) Quels ont été les effets de la construction et de l'utilisation de tels outils dans la production du savoir macro-économique ? En considérant Lawrence R. Klein comme une figure centrale, je parcours la discipline économique des années 1940-1950 en me focalisant sur l'intersection entre l'histoire de la macro-économie et celle de l'économétrie, et ainsi, je propose une nouvelle vision de 'économie du vingtième siècle en tant que discipline "saisie par les outils", dans laquelle la théorie (économique et statistique), l'application, l'expertise et la politique s'incorporent dans un même outil scientifique : un model macro-économétrique. j'expose donc l'histoire de la macro-économie non pas comme le produit des questions idéologiques monolithiques ou purement théoriques, mais plutôt comme le produit des visions épistémologiques et de stratégies de modélisation divergentes qui remontent aux débats entre les approches empiriques de la macro-économie étatunienne et les méthodologies Walrasienne et Marshallienne. Ainsi, je soutiens la thèse que Klein a été le personnage principal dans la création d'une nouvelle manière de produire le savoir macro-économique qui, à travers la construction et l'utilisation d'outils complexes (modèles macro-économétriques) mis en place au sein d'une configuration institutionnelle spécifique (laboratoires économétriques), poursuivait des objectifs explicites de politique économique, et par laquelle les rôles bien définis des experts (équipes scientifiques) étaient intégrées à une nouvelle pratique scientifique : la modélisation macro-économique. / In this disseration, I place macroeconometric modeling at the center of the history of twentieth century macroeconomics, i. e. as e history of macroeconometrics, and ask two central questions : (1) What exactly were the objectives and the forces driving the development of macroeconometric modeling, and what kind of tools and institutions did macroeconomists build to observe, understand, and control the US postwar economy ? (2) What were the effects that the construction and use of these tools had on the production of macroeconomic knowledge ? Taking Lawrence R. Klein as a vehicle, I travel accross the economics discipline of the 1940s and 1950s, and study the intersection between the history of macroeconomics and the history of econometrics, providing a new understanding of twentieth century economics as a "tooled" discipline, in which theory (economy and statistical), application, expertise, and policy become embedded within one scientific tool : a macroeconometric model. Consequently, I present the history of macroeconomics not as the product of monolithic ideological and purely theoretical issues, but rather of divergent epistemological views and modeling strategies that go back to the debates between US-Walrasian and US-Marshallian approaches to empirical macroeconomics in which macroeconometric modeling from the heart of macroeconometrics. My thesis is that Klein what the most important figure in the creation of a new way to produce scientific knowledge that consisted in the construction and use of compex tools (macroeconometric models) within specific institutional configurations (econometric labotories) and for explicit policy and scientific objectives, in which well-defined roles of experts (scientific teams) were embodied within a new scientific practice (macroeconometric modeling).

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)