by Man Ka Kit. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-76). / ABSTRACT --- p.3 / INTRODUCTION --- p.4 / Chapter PART I --- WHAT IS PREDICTION? --- p.7 / Chapter 1.1 --- Structure of Scientific Explanation： Covering-Law Model --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2 --- Prediction and Theory choice --- p.10 / Chapter 1.3 --- Prediction and Economic Methodology --- p.11 / Chapter 1.4 --- Conventional Wisdom --- p.12 / Chapter 1.41 --- Friedman's Methodology --- p.12 / Chapter 1.42 --- The Impact of Popper --- p.14 / Chapter 1.5 --- Unconventional Wisdom --- p.16 / Chapter 1.51 --- KUHN AND LAKATOS --- p.16 / Chapter 1.52 --- FEYERABEND THE ANARCHIST --- p.17 / Chapter 1.6 --- Conclusion for Part I --- p.18 / Chapter PART II --- MACROECONOMIC CONTROVERSY --- p.20 / Chapter 2.1 --- "lucas' Critique, the New Classical and the New Keynesian" --- p.20 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Role of Stabilization Policy --- p.22 / Chapter 2.3 --- Effectiveness of Monetary Policy --- p.24 / Chapter 2.4 --- effectiveness of fiscal policy --- p.25 / Chapter 2.5 --- Conclusion for Part II --- p.26 / Chapter PART III --- TESTING RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE --- p.28 / Chapter 3.1 --- ricardian equivalence versus keynesian theory --- p.29 / Chapter 3:2 --- (unrealistic) assumptions behind ricardian proposition --- p.31 / Chapter 3.21 --- "INEFINTIE horizon, altruism, and intergeneration transfer" --- p.31 / Chapter 3.22 --- IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKET --- p.34 / Chapter 3 23 --- DISTORTIONARY TAX --- p.35 / Chapter 3.24 --- "BOUNDED rationality, PERFECT FORESIGHT, AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS" --- p.36 / Chapter 3.3 --- Empirical Evidence --- p.37 / Chapter 3.31 --- CONSUMPTION FUNCTION STUDIES --- p.38 / Chapter 3 32 --- INTEREST RATE STUDIES --- p.43 / Chapter 3.4 --- technical problems： (unrealistic) assumptions behind the econometric models --- p.45 / Chapter 3.41 --- Specification and Data Generation Process --- p.45 / Chapter 3 42 --- IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM --- p.48 / Chapter 3 43 --- staggerjng of (NOT-well-established) hypotheses --- p.49 / Chapter 3.44 --- PROXIES FOR unobservables --- p.50 / Chapter 3.5 --- Conclusion for Part III --- p.51 / Chapter PART IV --- CONCLUSION --- p.53 / Chapter 4.1 --- Duhem-Quine Thesis --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Austrians and Subjectivism --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3 --- hausman --- p.57 / Chapter 4.4 --- Friedman and Popper Revisited --- p.58 / Chapter 4.5 --- The Role of Prediction --- p.61 / EPILOGUE --- p.62 / Ricardian Equivalence Vs Approximate Equivalence： Some Reflections --- p.62 / Truth and Invariance --- p.63 / "Certitude, Simplicity, and Irrationality" --- p.65 / REFERENCES --- p.67

Esta dissertação examina a fecundidade da ?nova retórica?, formulada por Perelman&Olbrechts-Tyteca, para compreensão de elementos da obra de Joseph A. Schumpeter. Primeiro faz um apanhado da discussão teórica sobre retórica em economia e, a partir desta discussão, justifica a escolha da nova retórica frente à proposta alternativa de McCloskey. A fundamentação em arcabouços filosóficos diferenciados é o cerne da justificativa. Em seguida, com base nas noções de auditório universal e auditório particular, ela analisa e contrasta as estruturas argumentativas de Teoria do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Capitalismo, Socialismo e Democracia, tomando como linha de interpretação para os trabalhos de Schumpeter a proposta de Swedberg. Avalia como os conteúdos de cada uma das obras são arranjados tanto tendo em vista a persuasão de públicos concretos, quanto sua relação com concepções normativas de Schumpeter. A análise se mostra fecunda para compreensão de questões metodológicas referentes ao seu legado - inclusive pondo à prova elementos da interpretação de Swedberg. A principal constatação, porém, é a abertura da obra de Schumpeter à análise da nova retórica, sinalizada a partir da leitura da mesma e a partir das considerações metodológicas do próprio autor quanto ao estatuto científico da economia. O reconhecimento da economia como campo de premissas de caráter contingente é o ponto de partida e chegada da análise aqui proposta. / This dissertation analyses the fecundity of the new rhetoric for a understanding of some elements of Joseph A. Schumpeter`s work. First of all, it provides a summary of the theoretical discussion about rhetoric within economics, which justifies the choice of new rhetoric as an alternative to McCloskey´s proposal. The different philosophical foundations of both approaches is the main source of this justification. The next step is the analysis of the contrast between two important books wrote by Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. This analysis is based on the notions of universal and particular audiences proposed by Perelman&Olbrechts-Tyteca, using Swedberg`s proposal as a line of interpretation of Schumpeter´s work. The dissertation evaluates how the contents of each work are related according to their intent of persuading different concrete audiences as well as in what regards Schumpeter´s normative concepts. The analysis proves to be helpful to comprehend methodological questions with regard to his liability and includes testing some elements of Swedberg`s interpretation. The main finding, however, is how open Schumpeter´s work is to the new rhetoric, as revealed by the content of his writings and by his methodological statements on the scientific statute of economics. The recognition of economics as a field of assumptions of contingent nature is both the starting and the ending point of the proposed analysis.

This thesis examines the extent to which optimism has a bearing on objectivity in scientific inquiry. It is not, however, a psychological level examination into objectivity. Rather, the discussion focuses on collective attitudes, whether in the form of science or a more general public opinion. In essence, sources of optimism at the fundamental level of scientific inquiry are articulated with a careful attempt to differentiate between attitudes about the subject (methodology) and the object of study. The antithetical thread of optimism versus pessimism is teased out with the use of a joint case study of liberalism and Stalinism. The idea of antithesis, however, is contrasted by the fact that, although mirror image ideologies, these collective attitudes share a common faith in progress (albeit through different social mechanisms). This faith in progress provides the basis for the crux of the thesis as it moves to discuss scientific methodology. There is general agreement on what good science should look like and the possibility of progressive science can be articulated. However, it is also possible to highlight the conditions for degenerative science and to further link this to a degenerative social totality in which democracy and social progress are undermined. Economics is used as a case study and it is argued that dogmatic notions on progress have proved to be a major stumbling block to objectivity in the discipline. Furthermore, the implications on the real world are serious.

State and local governments in the U.S. spend an estimated $80 billion annually on economic development incentives and subsidies. The economic development discourse is dominated by a jobs-centered narrative, with the concept of "jobs created" at its core. This work examines the current jobs-centered narrative and how it came to be. It identifies the practices and processes by which the current narrative persists and proliferates, analyzing its implications, which include the narrative's role in the use of corporate subsidies and incentives. This work is a critical history, identifying the point of establishment of a new equilibrium in the economic development narrative (Gaddis, 2002), utilizing ethnographic description to examine behaviors within the economic development arena. Language game dynamics (Wittgenstein, 1953) working to establish "public" meaning (Geertz, 1973) within economic developmen t are explored. Baudrillard's Phases of the Image (1994) are employed to view alternative meanings of the term "jobs created". Policy emulation (Bennett, 1991) as a means for the replication of economic development practices is examined. The work differentiates between policy emulation and convergence, arguing that emulation can and does occur in the absence of convergence, but can also act as its agent. Convergence was established as a possible end result of emulation, and necessary elements such as disparate starting policy positions must first be present in order for convergence to occur. The analysis reveals that the current jobs-centered narrative in economic development is a result of a complex language game. The economic development language game is a multi-faceted game with well-established roots and mechanisms for self-preservation and perpetuation. Emanating from communities' sense and fear of loss, relying on an unchallenged library of professional jargon which the public only vaguely understands, and ever reinforcing itself through the use of state and international industry organizations, the game is deeply entrenched in the field of economic development. The study concludes with recommendations for mitigation of the effects of the game. These findings have implications for how economic development aims and successes are measured and communicated, how governments expend resources in economic development and how the industry regulates its own activities. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Orientador: Rogério Pereira de Andrade / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-25T08:23:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nascimento_PedroHenrique_M.pdf: 1343329 bytes, checksum: cacd0c4e0f520e75d5c910358ba0be42 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: Este trabalho examina os principais pontos de divergência entre os economistas Milton Friedman e Paul Davidson no que se refere ao papel da moeda, assim como a condução de suas políticas monetárias. O ponto de partida para essa análise é o fascinante debate de ideias entre os autores ocorrido no início da década de 1970 sobre o arcabouço teórico desenvolvido por Friedman, o qual prometia sepultar de uma vez por todas qualquer conflito entre economistas clássicos e "keynesianos". Embora o objetivo do monetarista tenha sido eliminar essas divergências, estas ficaram ainda mais evidentes a partir do debate direto entre os autores, deixando claro que o consenso entre eles nos moldes apresentados pelo debate não seria possível. Nesse sentido, o trabalho propõe um método alternativo para solucionar essa "disputa", ao apresentar o argumento de Sheila Dow, o qual sugere que as diferenças entre os economistas são resultado de suas também distintas posições metodológicas, as quais trazem implícitas as diferentes "visões de mundo" dos autores. Essas diferenças metodológicas são, portanto, a chave para compreender como Friedman e Davidson puderam atingir resultados tão contrastantes sobre dinheiro e política monetária / Abstract: This paper examines the main points of divergence between the economists Milton Friedman and Paul Davidson regarding the role of the money, as well as the conduct of their monetary policies. The starting point for this analysis is the fascinating debate of ideas among authors occurred at the beginning of the 1970s on the theoretical framework developed by Friedman, which promised bury once and for all any conflict between economists and classic "Keynesian". Although the objective of monetary policy has been to eliminate these differences, these were even more evident from the direct discussion between the authors, making it clear that the consensus between them in the manner presented by debate would not be possible. In this sense, the paper proposes an alternative method to resolve this "dispute", presenting the argument of Sheila Dow, which suggests that the differences between the economists are the result of their also distinct methodological positions, which brings the implied different "world views" of authors. These methodological differences are, therefore, the key to understanding how Friedman and Davidson could achieve results so contrasting on money and monetary policy / Mestrado / Teoria Economica / Mestre em Ciências Econômicas

This thesis has two main objectives. First, it accomplishes a detailed critical reading of Michel Foucault’s writings on the archaeology of knowledge, focusing on the emergence of political economy. Second, it explores some possibilities opened up by his work for a rethinking of the historiography and methodology of economics. The first results from the fact that there have been very few assessments of his archaeology of economics, not only in economics itself, but also in the fields of philosophy and history of thought in general. Although it may be possible to find some applications in economics of notions and concepts introduced by him, this has mostly been done without a detailed critical analysis of his writings. Thus, it is considered here that it is first necessary to go back to his writings and to develop a very careful reading of them in order to be able to explore them in a second stage. As for the second, the main argument is that his archaeology has important contributions that are still missing by economists. The study is developed in two parts. The first part is dedicated to a meticulous reading of the The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things, ending up with an assessment. Part II develops an analysis of his contributions in three areas of research in economics: methodology of economics, historiography of economic thought, and studies on Adam Smith’s context. This analysis is considered itself an important contribution of this thesis. Chapter 3 situates Foucault’s perspective and system among other current interests in economic methodology, comprising basically three parts. First, it identifies one common fundamental question underlying some of these interests, that is, whether there is an underlying configuration in knowledge that permits us to think what we think in economics in a certain moment in time and space. It is argued that Foucault’s archaeology makes important contributions to this strand. Second, it compares his approach to the current interest in rhetorical studies in economics. Third, it gives special attention to the historiography of economic thought through the investigation of the interplay between the notion of the ‘episteme’ and the Kuhnian concept of ‘paradigm’. Chapter 4 explores and assesses his archaeology of political economy in The Order of Things and briefly indicates some of the important ideas provided by him in his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978-79, which give some hints for the possibility of investigating the current epistemic context underlying economics. The last chapter concentrates on Smith’s writings on language and rhetoric, the methodological conception underlying his writings, and the notion of invisible hand, according to Foucault’s system. This latter essentially shows the potentiality for his system to improve the level of consciousness of our past and emphasizes that it opens up a series of possibilities of further and interesting inquiries. The thesis concludes with an appraisal of Foucault’s contribution and additional issues for further enquiry.

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In tins thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modern restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-fonnalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)

Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he introduced Popper into economics. This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. / Economics and Management Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (Economics)