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Les états mentaux réfèrent à la qualité de la capacité d’un individu à élaborer mentalement et à s’ouvrir à son expérience subjective dans l’ici et maintenant. Les divers états mentaux varient quant à la disponibilité des ressources représenta-tionnelles et affectives pouvant être activées afin d’organiser l’expérience vécue, ainsi que dans leur utilisation de stratégies défensives et d’autorégulation. La présente thèse avait pour objectifs 1) d’approfondir l’évaluation des états mentaux par le développement et la validation d’un instrument pratique, le Mental States Task (MST), développé afin d’évaluer différentes qualités d’états mentaux et 2) d’investiguer les propriétés psychiques et les répercussions des différents états mentaux. Le premier article avait pour but de valider le MST. La première partie de l’article est consacrée à la validation du MST dans sa version francophone, et la deuxième partie porte sur la traduction et la validation du MST dans sa version anglophone. Les résultats fournissent des indices convaincants de validité et de fidélité, ainsi qu’une valeur prédictive adéquate. Le MST semble représenter de façon conforme autant les états mentaux de bas niveau que de haut niveau selon le continuum de réflexivité. De fait, les états mentaux de bas niveau et de haut niveau ont été respectivement associés à un large spectre de construits négatifs/immatures et positifs/matures. De plus, chaque état mental évalué par le MST semble posséder des propriétés particulières relativement aux processus mentaux et émotionnels utilisés pour traiter l’expérience. Le second article avait pour objectif d’approfondir l’étude de la valeur prédictive du MST par le biais de l’évaluation des coûts psychiques engendrés par les différentes qualités d’états mentaux—coûts présumés dépendant des ressources représentationnelles disponibles et du type de stratégies de régulation utilisées. Les résultats suggèrent que les états mentaux de bas niveau génèrent des coûts énergétiques plus élevés, ayant pour répercussion d’entraîner subséquemment un effet de déplétion du moi. Inversement, les états mentaux de haut niveau engendrent de moindres coûts, protégeant contre un état subséquent de déplétion du moi. Le MST s’est avéré être un outil efficace d’évaluation des répercussions énergétiques occasionnées par les divers états mentaux. / Mental states refer to the quality of one’s capacity to mentally elaborate and open up to his/her subjective experience in the here-and-now moment. Mental states differ relatively to the availability of the representational and affective resources triggered in order to organize the experience, and in the type of defensive and self-regulatory strategies used. The aims of this thesis were 1) to deepen the evaluation of mental states through the creation and validation of a practical measure, the Mental States Task (MST), in order to evaluate differences in quality of mental states, and 2) to investigate the psychic properties and repercussions of the different mental states. The goal of the first article was to validate the MST. The first part of this article was dedicated to the validation of the French version of the MST, and the second part to the translation and validation of its English version. Results provide convincing evidence of validity and reliability, as well as an adequate predictive value with respect to a large range of related concepts, in both its French and English versions. The MST appears to well represent both low- and high-level mental states according to the reflective continuum, which were found to be linked to a large range of negative/immature and positive/mature constructs, respectively. In addition, each mental state measured by the MST appears to have particular characteristics relative to the mental and emotional processes used to deal with the experience. The purpose of the second article was to deepen the investigation of the predictive value of the MST, through the evaluation of the psychic costs generated by the different qualities of mental states—the costs presumably depending on the representational resources available and the regulatory strategies used. Results suggest that using low-level mental states generates higher energetic costs, resulting in a subsequent ego-depletion effect. Conversely, high-level mental states generate fewer costs, protecting from a subsequent ego-depletion effect. The MST appeared to be an efficient tool in the assessment of the energetic repercussions produced by the different mental sates.

Les états mentaux réfèrent à la qualité de la capacité d’un individu à élaborer mentalement et à s’ouvrir à son expérience subjective dans l’ici et maintenant. Les divers états mentaux varient quant à la disponibilité des ressources représenta-tionnelles et affectives pouvant être activées afin d’organiser l’expérience vécue, ainsi que dans leur utilisation de stratégies défensives et d’autorégulation. La présente thèse avait pour objectifs 1) d’approfondir l’évaluation des états mentaux par le développement et la validation d’un instrument pratique, le Mental States Task (MST), développé afin d’évaluer différentes qualités d’états mentaux et 2) d’investiguer les propriétés psychiques et les répercussions des différents états mentaux. Le premier article avait pour but de valider le MST. La première partie de l’article est consacrée à la validation du MST dans sa version francophone, et la deuxième partie porte sur la traduction et la validation du MST dans sa version anglophone. Les résultats fournissent des indices convaincants de validité et de fidélité, ainsi qu’une valeur prédictive adéquate. Le MST semble représenter de façon conforme autant les états mentaux de bas niveau que de haut niveau selon le continuum de réflexivité. De fait, les états mentaux de bas niveau et de haut niveau ont été respectivement associés à un large spectre de construits négatifs/immatures et positifs/matures. De plus, chaque état mental évalué par le MST semble posséder des propriétés particulières relativement aux processus mentaux et émotionnels utilisés pour traiter l’expérience. Le second article avait pour objectif d’approfondir l’étude de la valeur prédictive du MST par le biais de l’évaluation des coûts psychiques engendrés par les différentes qualités d’états mentaux—coûts présumés dépendant des ressources représentationnelles disponibles et du type de stratégies de régulation utilisées. Les résultats suggèrent que les états mentaux de bas niveau génèrent des coûts énergétiques plus élevés, ayant pour répercussion d’entraîner subséquemment un effet de déplétion du moi. Inversement, les états mentaux de haut niveau engendrent de moindres coûts, protégeant contre un état subséquent de déplétion du moi. Le MST s’est avéré être un outil efficace d’évaluation des répercussions énergétiques occasionnées par les divers états mentaux. / Mental states refer to the quality of one’s capacity to mentally elaborate and open up to his/her subjective experience in the here-and-now moment. Mental states differ relatively to the availability of the representational and affective resources triggered in order to organize the experience, and in the type of defensive and self-regulatory strategies used. The aims of this thesis were 1) to deepen the evaluation of mental states through the creation and validation of a practical measure, the Mental States Task (MST), in order to evaluate differences in quality of mental states, and 2) to investigate the psychic properties and repercussions of the different mental states. The goal of the first article was to validate the MST. The first part of this article was dedicated to the validation of the French version of the MST, and the second part to the translation and validation of its English version. Results provide convincing evidence of validity and reliability, as well as an adequate predictive value with respect to a large range of related concepts, in both its French and English versions. The MST appears to well represent both low- and high-level mental states according to the reflective continuum, which were found to be linked to a large range of negative/immature and positive/mature constructs, respectively. In addition, each mental state measured by the MST appears to have particular characteristics relative to the mental and emotional processes used to deal with the experience. The purpose of the second article was to deepen the investigation of the predictive value of the MST, through the evaluation of the psychic costs generated by the different qualities of mental states—the costs presumably depending on the representational resources available and the regulatory strategies used. Results suggest that using low-level mental states generates higher energetic costs, resulting in a subsequent ego-depletion effect. Conversely, high-level mental states generate fewer costs, protecting from a subsequent ego-depletion effect. The MST appeared to be an efficient tool in the assessment of the energetic repercussions produced by the different mental sates.

BACKGROUND: Today’s societal changes, including high rate of change and increasing information flows, are increasing the demand on the individual mental capacity. It becomes increasingly difficult to analytically process all the different dilemmas and everyday decisions as individuals have a limited mental capacity available to make these decisions. Thus, it has been suggested that ego-depleted relies more heavily on intuition, which is less burdensome, when making decision. However little is known about to what extent intuitive decisions differ from analytic. Are ego-depleted individuals more or less likely to maximize outcome in moral dilemmas involving conflicting values? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less willing to cooperate? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less altruistic? Is our intuition more or less in accordance with Homo Economicus?AIM: Starting from a Dual Process perspective on decision-making the aim of this study is to examine how ego depletion affects moral judgment and pro-social decisions.METHOD: A laboratory experiment involving 115 subjects, using real monetary incentives, was conducted among students at Linköping University. Subjects were randomized into one of two treatments. Everything was identical across treatments except for the initial ego-depletion manipulation. Using a standard paradigm for ego-depletion subjects in treatment 1 were put under high cognitive load while subjects in treatment two were put under low cognitive load. Subjects faced 16 questions divided into four different decision tasks: Moral dilemmas, Public Goods game, two types of Dictator Game where the type of sacrifice subjects could make in order to contribute money to charity was varied.RESULTS: Subjects in the high cognitive load treatment made fewer consequentialists moral judgments compared to other subjects (p = 0.075). The effect is especially strong when looking only at high-conflict dilemmas such as Crying Baby. No difference between treatments was found for the public goods games. In the dictator game involving monetary sacrifice subjects donated less money to charity when put under high cognitive load. However the finding was not significant (p = 0.292). No difference was found in the dictator game involving effort as personal sacrifice since almost everyone chooses to donate to charity.CONCLUSION: According to The Dual Process perspective this essay shows that intuitive thinking does not evidently lead to that they makes decision that more or less is in accordance with Homo Economicus. The connection between ego depletion and pro-social decisions is more complex. Further research needs to investigate which different mental shortcuts that individuals uses in various types of pro-social decisions and why intuitive and analytical decision-making differ between different decisions. Further research within the area can identify potential mechanisms and policies that can support individuals’ capacity to make decisions in accordance with their own and society’s preferences.

One of the factors significantly influencing our daily decisions is the so-called cognitive depletion.The theory of cognitive depletion postulates the existence of a limited mental resource that is necessary for self-regulation. If the resource is diminished by a task involving self-control, achievement in subsequent self-control task will be impaired. This project examines the effect of cognitive depletion on decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task designed to simulate real-life decision making involving gains and losses. Further, a possible effect of moderating factors that could be affected by cognitive depletion and consequently influence decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task -- risk preference and impulsivity -- is investigated. Dual-process theories postulate there are two systems involved in decision-making: faster, intuitive, emotional System 1 and slower, deliberative, rational System 2. It was found that cognitive depletion leads to enhancement of System 1. As advantageous decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task are closely related to emotional reactions -- domain of System 1 -- it was hypothesized that cognitive depletion will lead to not worse, or possibly even better results in depleted subjects. A controlled laboratory experiment was conducted involving 39 subjects in total. No difference was found in average desicions of depleted and non-depleted subjects in the Iowa Gambling Task, supporting the hypothesis. Further, short-term increase in impulsivity caused by cognitive depletion was very probably moderating choices in the IGT, leading to worse overall performance. Regarding risk preferences, we found that non-depleted subjects were generally more risk seeking in losses context, while depleted subjects exhibited rather loss aversion. This change in risk behaviors due to cognitive depletion very probably did not mediate choices in the Iowa Gambling Task.

This paper provides an analysis of Bradshaw and Colleagues' model of military healthcare professionals' moral distress experiences. Using novel interview data collected from Canadian Forces healthcare professionals, the steps of the model are validated or potential refinements are suggested. / Military healthcare professionals (HCPs) may experience moral distress during international deployment. Moral distress is experienced when a HCP faces a moral dilemma, e.g., knows the morally correct course of action but is blocked from taking it, or where all available courses of action require something of moral significance be given up. While the literature indicates that moral distress often negatively impacts the mental health of the individual and the effectiveness of the organization, limited research has examined moral distress amongst military HCP. Many similar stressors and psychological health problems are present for both civilian and military HCP; however, the unique context of deployment necessitates further examination. This thesis explores the military HCP experience with moral distress by using Bradshaw and colleague’s model of progression from the encounter with a moral dilemma to the impact on individuals and organizations. Through the analysis of novel interviews collected by the Ethics in Military Medicine Research Group (EMMRG), Bradshaw and colleague’s model of military moral distress is compared to participant’s experiences and qualitatively analysed, with the results outlining where the model is supported and where refinement is recommended. These challenges were then supported by a literature review from the disciplines of virtue and feminist ethics, moral psychology, bioethics, and civilian HCP moral distress research. Two novel and significant revisions to the model are suggested: representing and integrating the cumulative experience of moral distress, and re-conceptualizing the resolution process based on the consideration of contextual controllability on moral responsibility. / Thesis / Master of Science (MS) / This thesis examines the experience of moral distress in military healthcare professionals (HCPs) while working abroad, where a HCP faces a moral dilemma, e.g., knows the morally correct course of action but is blocked from taking it or it requires something of moral significance be given up. This thesis analyses the most recent model of military HCP moral distress (Bradshaw, et al., 2010) by comparing it to the experiences described by participants in the Ethics in Military Medicine Research Group (EMMRG) study. The results outline support for the model as well as novel suggestions for revision, which are supported by literature from a variety of disciplines. Two adjustments to Bradshaw and colleague’s model are suggested: clearer representation of the cumulative nature of moral distress as well as a reconceptualization of the resolution process to consider the influence of the immediate and extended environment on moral responsibility.

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