The role of biraderi kinship networks has recently gained attention in U.K. elections. Biraderis are patriarchal and hierarchical kinship networks that are led by male elders and originate from Pakistan and Bangladesh. These networks have been accused of influencing selections and elections through bloc votes. Existing research into the actions and implications of biraderi in U.K. politics has examined these networks in isolation. To further understand and contextualise the actions and implications of biraderi networks in U.K. politics, I compare them to trade union networks. Trade unions are paid membership networks in which groups of employees take collective action to maintain and improve employment conditions. Using my two case studies, I focus on the Labour Party and ask two questions. Firstly, what are the implications of network influence for electoral choice? Secondly, are the actions of biraderi networks, and the implications of these actions, different to other networks? And if so, why? I use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data in the process of this inquiry. In chapter three, I use the analysis of 37 interviews with political and community activists to introduce biraderi networks and present their role in the selection and election of political representatives. In chapter four I use the same data to contextualise the role of biraderi and examine the relationship between biraderi networks and the Labour Party. In chapter five, I introduce trade union networks and use the analysis of 16 interviews with MPs, political activists and trade unionists to outline three aspects of the role that trade unions take in the selection and election processes: the legitimate aspect, the controversial aspect and the idealised aspect. In chapter six, the final empirical chapter, I ask which candidates receive support from trade unions. I build upon an existing dataset to analyse financial and in-kind trade union donations to the Labour Party. I find that biraderi and trade union networks both, to some extent, carry out five actions in the selection and election of political representatives: providing political education; providing financial and in-kind support; providing campaigners in selections and elections; selecting candidates; supporting the under-represented. I find that the implications of these five actions for voter choice are two-fold. On the one hand, networks can increase voter choice by providing political education and support to candidates who might not otherwise be able to stand for election. On the other hand, I find that networks can reduce electoral choice. Through a combination of legal and illegal actions, when elders control votes biraderi networks can at best restrict electoral choice and at worst remove it entirely. Although these networks carry out the same five actions, I do find that they differ in the way that they carry out some of these actions. I ague that there are three reasons for this: differing network structures; differing network motivations; and access to different resources to influence selections and elections. I argue that networks are motivated to influence selections and elections by instrumental desires to increase their political influence and power as well as ideological motivations to support the party. I find that political parties need networks to help to campaign and deliver political education. Networks can work alongside parties to do this but they can also takeover as political parties abdicate their responsibilities, effectively becoming the party on the ground in a constituency.

This research studies protests after fraudulent elections in a collective action framework, examining the impact of the potential cost, benefit and likelihood of success of protest on the occurrence and intensity of protests. Quantitative analysis of fraudulent elections in about 100 countries from 1990 to 2004 shows that the odds of protest after fraudulent elections are greater when the level of state repression is moderate with a possible backlash effect of high repression, when the opposition is united, and when international monitors denounce election results. The analysis only partially supports the benefit of protest argument. Also, the research uses case studies from Eurasia (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Russia) and mini-case studies from Africa and Latin America to study in more detail the effects of the factors identified in the quantitative analysis and to identify overlooked but important explanatory factors using a set of extensive interviews conducted in the United States and during fieldwork in Armenia, Georgia, and Russia with politicians, domestic and international election monitors, and country experts.

Il primo capitolo sviluppa un modello di gioco strategico di voto costoso per due candidati dove il processo elettorale può essere illecitamente influenzato da uno dei due. Si assume che vi sono due tipi di meccanismi di frodi elettorali: incidenza diretta sui costi di voto o probabilita’ di pivotality. Si dimostra che la frode può effettivamente aumentare l’affluenza. Per assicurare la vittoria al margine, l’affluenza degli elettori che sostengono entrambe le alternative sono aumentate rispetto ai casi senza frodi. Nel secondo capitolo si stima l'effetto delle frodi elettorali sull'affluenza analizzando un panel di elezioni a livello nazionale in più di 130 paesi dalla fine del 1970. Controllando per una serie di importanti variabili di sistema politico e socioeconomico otteniamo che le frodi a livello intermedio , ceteris paribus , deprimono l'affluenza di circa 3-4 punti percentuali , mentre interventi a livello elevato non hanno alcun effetto significativo. Il terzo capitolo riguarda dinamiche di protezione dei diritti di proprietà nelle economie in transizione che possono influenzati da parte del governo non benevolente. Possiamo osservare dinamiche positive dei diritti di proprietà se un governo e’ relativamente più efficiente ad estrarre rendite dalla redistribuzione del PIL piuttosto che dai pagamenti diretti degli agenti che se ne appropriano, anche con una moderata pressione politica. / In the first chapter a costly strategic voting game over two candidates is modeled and electoral process can be illicitly influenced by one of two candidates. Fraud mechanisms are assumed to be of two types: affecting directly voting costs or pivot probabilities. It is demonstrated that fraud may actually increase turnout. In particular, if it is of a magnitude to ensure a victory at the margin, then participation rates of voters sustaining both alternatives are increased compared to no fraud situation. In the second chapter we estimate the effect of electoral fraud on turnout by analyzing a panel of national level elections in more than 130 countries since the end of 1970s. Controlling for a set of important institutional, political system and socio-economic variables we obtain that medium fraud, ceteris paribus, depresses turnout by around 3-4% points, whereas high fraud has no significant effect. The third chapter deals with dynamics of property rights protection in transition economies, which can be influence by non-benevolent government. Whenever a government is relatively more efficient in extracting private rents from GDP redistribution rather than from direct payments of appropriating agents, positive dynamics in property rights protection can be observed, even with moderate political pressure.

I Sverige förekommer diskussioner om valfusk på sociala medier. Vid valet 2018 låg Valmyndighetens hemsida nere efter en överbelastningsattack, och fyra år senare sprids fortfarande teorier om att Valmyndigheten själva stängt ner sin hemsida för att påverka valresultatet (SvD, 2022). Twitter är en plattform där diskussioner om valfusk sker och där svensk politik diskuteras, det råder en oerhörd polarisering på plattformen kring detta ämne. I denna uppsats har vi med hjälp av en explorativ kartläggning undersökt hur förtroendet till demokratin möjligtvis kan urholkas genom att titta på förekomsten av narrativ om valfusk på Twitter, vår forskningsfråga lyder "hur och i vilken omfattning pratar man om valfusk innan, under och efter det svenska valet 2022". Vi har använt oss av en kvalitativ innehållsanalys för att analysera data från Twitter som handlar om valfusk under tidsperioden 1/8-22 fram till och med den 9/10-22. Vi har delat upp datasetet i tre delar, en period innan valet, en period som sträcker sig under valveckan samt en period som är tiden efter valet fram till den 9/10-22. Vi har kombinerat den kvalitativa innehållsanalysen med en kvantitativ innehållsanalys. Där vi genom deskriptiv statistik visar på förekomsten av de olika kategorierna vi tagit fram i materialet för att på så sätt identifiera i vilken utsträckning olika narrativ om valfusk förekommer i diskussioner om svenska valet 2022 på Twitter. Vårt resultat visar att tweetsen kring valfusk skiljer sig åt beroende på vilken period under valet som undersökts. I perioden innan valet var tweets som relaterar till att valfusk sker 66,5 procent av av det analyserade materialet. Dessa siffror skiftade i perioden under valet där motstånd mot narrativ om valfusk växte och utgjorde nästan lika stor andel som de som ansåg att valfusk sker (31 respektive 40,6 procent). Efter valet identifierade vi en ny kategori av tweets som var den näst största under den perioden (30,5 procent), efter de som anser att valfusk sker i svenska val. Det var de som ansåg att tweets om valfusk hade ökat om oppositionen ej vunnit riksdagsvalet, och att det istället blivit väldigt tyst från de individer som tidigare varit högljudda om att valfusk sker i svenska val. Diskussionen om valfusk är polariserad, där det är två ytterligheter som tampas mot varandra. 50 procent av det totala antalet inlägg som analyserats handlar om att valfusk pågår eller förväntas ske i svenska val, bland dessa inlägg riktas misstro till den svenska demokratin och det svenska valsystemet. Det uttrycks ett stort missnöje och hat mot de s.k "uråldriga" statliga medieinstitutionerna som anklagas för att vara en propagandamaskin för vänsterblockets räkning. Socialdemokraterna är det parti som överlägset mest anklagas för valfusk i debatten, 94,5 procent av alla inlägg som är riktade mot ett parti är riktade mot Socialdemokraterna. De anklagas för långvarig korruption, valfusk i tidigare val, där argumentet om att Socialdemokraterna är det enda partiet som blivit dömda för valfusk i domstol är vanligt förekommande. Huruvida narrativet om valfusk förändras för de olika tidsperioderna så visar resultatet att det är en större andel inlägg som påstår att valfusk sker i Sverige innan valet jämfört med under och efter valet. I datasetet efter valet handlar istället mycket kring diskussionen om valfusk om hur valresultatet hade gått åt andra hållet så hade det varit ett gigantiskt rop om valfusk från främst Sverigedemokrater / In Sweden, there are discussions about election fraud. At the 2018 election, the Swedish Election Authority's website was down after an overload attack, and four years later, theories and discussions are still spreading that the Swedish Election Authority itself shut down its website in order to influence the election results (SvD, 2022). Twitter is a platform where discussions about election fraud take place and where Swedish politics is discussed, there is an enormous polarization on the platform around this topic. In this essay, with the help of an exploratory survey, we have investigated how trust in democracy can possibly be eroded by looking at the prevalence of the spread of narratives about election fraud on Twitter, our research question is "how and to what extent do you talk about election fraud before, during and after the Swedish election in 2022". We have used a qualitative content analysis to analyze data from Twitter dealing with election fraud during the time period 1/8-22 up to and including 9/10-22. We have divided the data set into three parts, a period before the election, a period that extends during the election week and a period that is the time after the election until 9/10-22. We have combined the content of the qualitative analysis with a quantitative content analysis. Where we use descriptive statistics to show the existence of the different categories we developed in the material in order to identify the extent to which different narratives about electoral fraud appear in discussions about the Swedish 2022 election on Twitter. Our results show that the tweets about electoral fraud differ depending on which period during the election was examined. In the period before the election, tweets relating to election fraud were 66.5 percent of the analyzed material. These numbers shifted in the period during the election where opposition to the narrative of electoral fraud grew and constituted almost as large a proportion as those who believed that electoral fraud was taking place (31 and 40.6 percent, respectively). After the election, we identified a new category of tweets that was the second largest during that period (30.5 percent), after those who believe that electoral fraud occurs in Swedish elections. They were the ones who believed that tweets about electoral fraud would have increased if the opposition had not won the parliamentary election, instead the individuals who had previously been vocal about electoral fraud went silent. The discussion about electoral fraud is polarized, where two extremes are pitted against each other. 50 percent of the total number of posts analyzed are about electoral fraud taking place or expected to take place in Swedish elections, among these posts, a huge amount of mistrust of Swedish democracy and the Swedish electoral system is identified. There is great dissatisfaction and hatred expressed towards the so-called "ancient" state media institutions which are accused of being a propaganda machine on behalf of the left side. The Social Democrats are by far the party most accused of electoral fraud in the debate, 94.5 percent of all posts directed at any party are directed at the Social Democrats. They are accused of long-term corruption, electoral fraud in previous elections, where the argument that the Social Democrats are the only party that has been convicted of electoral fraud in court is common. Whether the narrative about election fraud changes for the different time periods, the results show that there is a greater proportion of posts that claim that election fraud takes place in Sweden before the election compared to during and after the election. In the data set after the election, instead, much of the discussion about election fraud is about how the election results had gone the other way, so there would have been a gigantic outcry about election fraud from mainly the Sweden Democrats.

La thèse consiste en un réexamen des traits saillants des systèmes politique et partisan du Japon d’avant-guerre (1890-1937). L’analyse de données quantitatives et qualitatives sur l’achat de voix et les pratiques d’ingérence des gouvernements dans le déroulement des campagnes électorales démontre que la première pratique était massive et généralisée et les secondes systématiques. L’achat de voix massif et généralisé et les pratiques d’ingérence étaient liés par une relation de complémentarité fonctionnelle, l’ingérence consistant le plus communément en la répression partiale des fraudes électorales. Le système partisan s’ordonnait autour de ce binôme d’expédients. Les acteurs collectifs de ce système furent des spécimens du type « parti-cartel, stratarchique, clientélistes et attrape-tout », des partis qui n’activaient pas de clivage sociologique ou idéologique. Le binôme d’expédients structurants eut de nombreuses conséquences systémiques et constitua la plus puissante des modalités de la politisation des rapports sociaux. En conclusion, les résultats de l’examen de la pratique de l’achat de voix dans le Japon d’avant-guerre sont confrontés à ceux que proposent des études de cette pratique en d’autres sociétés, les États-Unis d’Amérique et le Royaume-Uni au XIXe siècle ou, au XXe siècle, des pays d’Amérique Latine et Taiwan. / This thesis is a reappraisal of salient features of the political and party systems in prewar Japan (1890-1937). Analysis of qualitative and quantitative data on vote buying and governmental interference in electoral campaigns demonstrate that the first practice was massive and generalized; and that the second was systematic. These two practices were tied by a functional relationship since the most common form of governmental interference consisted in a partisan bias in the repression of electoral frauds. The core of electoral politics was a functional set of expedients. The collective actors of this system are characterized as specimens of the “cartel party stratarchic, clientelistic, catch-all” type, many political parties that did not activate any sociological or ideological cleavage. The two electoral expedients bore many systemic consequences and were the most powerful ways of the politicization of social relationships in this society. The concluding chapter is a comparative examination of the characteristics and properties of vote buying in prewar Japan to those of the same practice in other societies, the 19th century United States of America and Britain, or 20th century Latin America and Taiwan.

Pendant ces dernières années il y a eu aussi beaucoup des recherches axées à analyser pourquoi souvent les élections ne respectent pas ces standards, quel est leur rôle dans les régimes hybrides et autocratiques, et il y a aussi des recherches qui enquêtent notamment les fraudes électorales. Cette thèse propose une contribution dans le débat et elle souligne que les études sur les fraudes électorales on souvent sous-traitées : les dimensions internationales. Ces dimensions sont conceptualisées dans deux façonnes. La première concerne la pression démocratisant occidentale et comment elle peut influencer le changement et/ou l’évolution des fraudes électorales. La deuxième, concerne les dynamiques des socialisations en terme d’échange d’informations parmi les régimes hybrides par rapport diffèrent modalités de fraudes électorales. Selon mes analyses dans les cas où il y a une pression démocratisant occidentale plus forte les autorités locales changent les méthodes des fraudes électorales. Ce changement ne doit pas être considéré forcement comme un amélioration de l’intégrité électoral tout court. Plutôt, avec l’amélioration des cadres légales de la gestion électorale, les autorités modifient les fraudes pour essayer d’éluder le criticisme occidental. En autre, pour bien modifier les méthodes des fraudes électorales les autorités d’un pays recourent à des pratiques d’apprentissage tout en regardant les expériences des autres pays. Ces arguments théoriques ont été vérifiés sur trois cas d’études, notamment Armenia, Azerbaïdjan et Géorgie. Ces pays ont des caractéristiques en commune, qui permettent des analyses diachroniques et synchroniques concernant les fraudes électorales à partir de leurs indépendances de l’Union Soviétique. / During the last years many research have been conducted to analyse why elections fail, what is their role in hybrid as well as authoritarian regimes, and there is a growing stream of literature that is investigating electoral frauds and electoral malpractices. This thesis provides a contribution in this debate by pointing to one of the less analysed factors in the study of electoral frauds and electoral malpractices, which is the international dimension. The latter is conceptualized in two ways: the first one relates to Western democratizing pressure and how it can affect the change or the evolution of electoral frauds and malpractices. The second one concerns socialization dynamics in terms of methods of frauds and malpractices among authorities in different countries. It is argued that where there is a stronger Western democratizing pressure authorities change the way they conduct elections, even if this change does not forcefully means democratization. Rather, along with formal improvements in elections management, authorities alter and modify methods of frauds and malpractices as a way to elude Western criticism. In order to properly modify electoral frauds and malpractices, authorities resort to learning practices by looking at other experiences. These theoretical arguments have been verified on three cases study, which are Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These countries share some key characteristics, which allowed for cross-temporal and spatial analysis regarding electoral frauds and malpractices since their independence from the Soviet Union.

The diploma thesis examines why did the non-systemic opposition in Russia between 2011 and 2016 fail to reach any significant success. Even though during 2011 and 2012 Russia witnessed mass anti- government protests the non-systemic opposition was not able to enforce any relevant change in the regime, obtain representation in the state institutions or induce larger public dissatisfaction with the regime. The study analyses problematic internal features of the non-systemic opposition (lack of public support, coalition potential, election programs and campaigns, party financing) and external repressive means of the Vladimir Putin's regime against the opposition (legislation, direct confrontation, judicial trials, elections and means of rigging). The thesis offers a complex insight into the functioning of the non-systemic opposition in Russia in the observed period and accentuates the authoritarian character of the Russian regime. Based on the evaluation of the key variables the study concludes that the repressive policies of the regime cardinally affected the weakness and fragmentation of the non-systemic opposition which moreover was not able to overcome the internal conflicts and gain broader public support.

Le décret du 6 février 1911 applique dans les colonies de la Martinique, de la Guadeloupe et de La Réunion la loi de Séparation des Églises et de l'État du 9 décembre 1905. Cette séparation, franche, donne à l'institution religieuse sa liberté, puisqu'elle ne se trouve plus sous la dépendance financière et juridique de l'autorité publique. Si la question des retraites et des inventaires des biens se déroule assez rapidement et sans drame majeur, sauf à Saint-Gilles-les-Hauts, l'attribution des biens mobiliers et immobiliers ayant appartenu aux établissements ecclésiastiques ne sera résolue que sous le régime de Vichy et dans les premières années de la IVème République. Après le temps de la passion liée à l'application de la loi, vient le temps de l'Entente cordiale après la Grande Guerre sous l'épiscopat de Monseigneur de Beaumont. Celle qui devait être l'Absente redevient fortement présente dans la société coloniale puis postcoloniale, dans le cadre d'un respect mutuel. L'Église connaît, durant cette période, un acte audacieux (lutte contre la fraude lors des élections d'avril 1936), un soutien allant jusqu'à la compromission avec le régime de Vichy, et la lutte contre le communisme, surtout après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les années soixante et soixante-dix sont le temps de l'Affirmation (combat contre la fraude électorale, lutte pour la régulation naturelle des naissances, critique du projet et du modèle de développement économique et social mais aussi propositions alternatives) et de l'Émancipation qui passe par des déchirures internes, souvent parallèles à la société, et par la mise en échec de toutes les manipulations, qu'elles soient anciennes (la Droite) ou nouvelles (le Parti Communiste Réunionnais). Dans les années soixante-dix, Monseigneur Gilbert Aubry, l'actuel évêque, achève l'émancipation de l'institution commencée dans la décennie précédente. De 1911 à 1981, l'Église catholique à La Réunion passe de la Séparation d'avec l'État à l'Émancipation. / The decree of February 6th 1911 applies the law of December 9th 1905 to separate the Church and the State in the French colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe and Reunion. This complete separation gives to the religious institution its freedom since it is not under the financial and juridic dependence of public authority anymore. Even if the issues of retirement and inventory of goods take place quite quickly and without any major incident, except in Saint-Gilles-les-Hauts, the retribution of personal properties and real estates belonging to the ecclesiastical establishments will only be solved during the Vichy Administration and in the beginning of the 4th Republic.After the time of passion linked to the application of the law will come the time of cordial Agreement right after the World War 1 during the episcopate of his Lordship de Beaumont. The Church, which was supposed to be the Absente would then be present in the colonial on to the postcolonial society, on a mutual respect basis. During this period, the Church made a bold act (the fight against fraud for the elections of April 1936), a support going to the dishonest compromise with the Vichy Administration, and the struggle against Communism, especially after World War 2. The sixties and the seventies would be the time of Assertion (the fight against electoral fraud, the struggle for natural birth regulation, criticism of the economic and social project and model but also alternative propositions) and also a time of Emancipation not without any domestic tearing, often linked to Society, and finally a time for the check of all sorts of manipulations, whether old ones (the right wing) or new ones (the Communist Party of Reunion).In the 70s, his Lordship Gilbert Aubry, the actual bishop, finishes off the process of emancipation of the Church that had started ten years before. From 1911 to 1981 the Catholic Church in Reunion Island would go from the Separation with the State to Emancipation.