Thesis Abstract: Chapter I: Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies – A Canadian perspective. The distribution of the burden of cost arising from the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a contentious issue in policy discussions; more so among regional jurisdictions in the federalist countries with decentralized authorities over environmental regulations. In this setting, often the policy discussions are focused on the distribution of regional emission reduction targets that, in turn, entails negotiations over the distribution of the scarcity rents and the regional transfers of wealth. The allocation of regional emission entitlements is thus a key factor that could hinder the political feasibility of a national GHG mitigation policy. In this paper, we build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules governing the national GHG abatement policy with a cap-and-trade system of emission permits. In addition to assessing the impacts of traditional regional emissions allocation rules that involve intra-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emission allocation that avoids such transfers, which may be a more palatable option given the context of likely fierce negotiations over the issue. Our results indicate to differing outcomes depending on the allocation policy in use. The CGE framework is also able to shed light on the transmission mechanisms that drive the results underlying the policy options. Chapter II: Endogenous technological change and emission allowances. Given the imminent threat of global warming due to GHG emissions, a number of emission mitigation policies have been proposed in the literature. However, they generally suffer from the classical equity-efficiency trade-off. High costs from equity concerns often render environmental policies politically unattractive and thus hard to implement. Recent advancement in the climate policy modeling literature that incorporates endogenous technological change (ETC) into the framework can potentially bring new insights into this debate. Using an inter-temporal, multi-sector CGE approach with ETC incorporated into the framework, this paper builds a model that focuses on the equity-efficiency debate for the policymakers. Canada is chosen as the country of investigation for this purpose. The paper provides a new welfare ranking of four permit allocation policies that address the equity-efficiency trade-off. In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortions, output-based allocation (OBA) of emission permits is compared to three other policy options: (i) an emissions trading system with grandfathered allocation (GFA), (ii) an auction permit trading system where permit revenue is recycled to lower payroll taxes (RPT), and (iii) a hybrid of OBA and R&D subsidy (O-R&D). We find that adapting OBA, as well as O-R&D, is welfare improving over GFA. The implicit output subsidy, entailed in the OBA policy, mitigates against the rising cost effect in the GFA policy. This is reinforced through added investment incentive in R&D when ETC in incorporated into the framework. With O-R&D, since the R&D subsidy corrects for market imperfections in the knowledge accumulation process, the effect is further bolstered, culminating into mitigation of uneven distributional outcome for energy-intensive industries as a whole. Contrary to previous results, we also find that, in terms of the welfare metric, OBA unequivocally improves the distributional outcome across sectors as compared to the RPT policy. Inclusion of ETC also unequivocally generates a higher welfare ranking for all permit policy schemes. Chapter III: Emission permit banking and induced technological change. This paper attempts to undertake an exploratory research by integrating two themes in the emission mitigation policy literature, which include: the inter-temporal emission permit banking and borrowing and the role of induced technological change in emission mitigation. Using a simple optimal control approach, we construct a unified framework that evaluates the optimal path of emissions and the optimal trajectory of permit price when both inter-temporal banking and borrowing of permits and the effects of induced technological change (ITC) are present. We find that ITC leads to a declining emission trajectory over time. The effect of ITC on the optimal permit price path, however, is ambiguous and critically depends on the extent of marginal cost saving that emanates from emission-saving technological innovation.

L’objectif de cette étude est d’appréhender, à travers l’exemple du système européen d’échange des quotas d’émission de gaz à effet de serre, les conditions d’efficacité d’un instrument particulier de réalisation du développement durable : la technique de marché. Définie comme un instrument de police consistant en la poursuite d’un objectif de politique publique, préalablement défini par les pouvoirs publics, au moyen de la création volontaire d’un marché, c’est-à-dire l’organisation d’échanges d’« unités » entre opérateurs économiques, la technique de marché est utilisée de manière privilégiée en matière environnementale. La création ex nihilo d’un marché pour protéger l’environnement ne doit pas induire en erreur : la technique de marché ne conduit pas à une substitution de la liberté à la puissance publique. Au contraire, la technique de marché n’est efficace que si elle est sous-tendue par une action publique forte. Une intervention permanente – au stade de l’élaboration et de la mise en oeuvre de cet instrument – et multiforme – au niveau international, régional et national – de la puissance publique est nécessaire. La « main invisible » du marché ne produit ses effets que grâce à la « main visible » de la puissance publique. / By taking the example of the European Union emission trading system, the objective of the present study is to understand the conditions of effectiveness of a specific tool: the market-based instrument. Market-based instrument is defined as a tool of policing aiming at the achievement of a public policy objective (pre-established by public authorities) with the creation of a market, i.e. the organisation of exchanges of “units” between economic operators. This tool is widely used in environmental law. The ex nihilo creation of a market in order to protect the environment must not mislead: the market-based instrument does not lead to a shift from public action to freedom. To the contrary, the effectiveness of the market-based instrument depends on a strong public action. A permanent (i.e. both during the preparation and the implementation of this tool) and multifaceted (i.e. at international, regional and national levels) public intervention is therefore required. The “invisible hand” of the market could only be effective with the “visible hand” of public authorities.

Thesis Abstract: Chapter I: Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies – A Canadian perspective. The distribution of the burden of cost arising from the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a contentious issue in policy discussions; more so among regional jurisdictions in the federalist countries with decentralized authorities over environmental regulations. In this setting, often the policy discussions are focused on the distribution of regional emission reduction targets that, in turn, entails negotiations over the distribution of the scarcity rents and the regional transfers of wealth. The allocation of regional emission entitlements is thus a key factor that could hinder the political feasibility of a national GHG mitigation policy. In this paper, we build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules governing the national GHG abatement policy with a cap-and-trade system of emission permits. In addition to assessing the impacts of traditional regional emissions allocation rules that involve intra-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emission allocation that avoids such transfers, which may be a more palatable option given the context of likely fierce negotiations over the issue. Our results indicate to differing outcomes depending on the allocation policy in use. The CGE framework is also able to shed light on the transmission mechanisms that drive the results underlying the policy options. Chapter II: Endogenous technological change and emission allowances. Given the imminent threat of global warming due to GHG emissions, a number of emission mitigation policies have been proposed in the literature. However, they generally suffer from the classical equity-efficiency trade-off. High costs from equity concerns often render environmental policies politically unattractive and thus hard to implement. Recent advancement in the climate policy modeling literature that incorporates endogenous technological change (ETC) into the framework can potentially bring new insights into this debate. Using an inter-temporal, multi-sector CGE approach with ETC incorporated into the framework, this paper builds a model that focuses on the equity-efficiency debate for the policymakers. Canada is chosen as the country of investigation for this purpose. The paper provides a new welfare ranking of four permit allocation policies that address the equity-efficiency trade-off. In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortions, output-based allocation (OBA) of emission permits is compared to three other policy options: (i) an emissions trading system with grandfathered allocation (GFA), (ii) an auction permit trading system where permit revenue is recycled to lower payroll taxes (RPT), and (iii) a hybrid of OBA and R&D subsidy (O-R&D). We find that adapting OBA, as well as O-R&D, is welfare improving over GFA. The implicit output subsidy, entailed in the OBA policy, mitigates against the rising cost effect in the GFA policy. This is reinforced through added investment incentive in R&D when ETC in incorporated into the framework. With O-R&D, since the R&D subsidy corrects for market imperfections in the knowledge accumulation process, the effect is further bolstered, culminating into mitigation of uneven distributional outcome for energy-intensive industries as a whole. Contrary to previous results, we also find that, in terms of the welfare metric, OBA unequivocally improves the distributional outcome across sectors as compared to the RPT policy. Inclusion of ETC also unequivocally generates a higher welfare ranking for all permit policy schemes. Chapter III: Emission permit banking and induced technological change. This paper attempts to undertake an exploratory research by integrating two themes in the emission mitigation policy literature, which include: the inter-temporal emission permit banking and borrowing and the role of induced technological change in emission mitigation. Using a simple optimal control approach, we construct a unified framework that evaluates the optimal path of emissions and the optimal trajectory of permit price when both inter-temporal banking and borrowing of permits and the effects of induced technological change (ITC) are present. We find that ITC leads to a declining emission trajectory over time. The effect of ITC on the optimal permit price path, however, is ambiguous and critically depends on the extent of marginal cost saving that emanates from emission-saving technological innovation.

The master’s thesis deals with the environmental aspects of combined heat and power station Červený Mlýn (Red Mill). The introductory part of the thesis focuses on the current production technology and the electricity balance of the power station. The heat and power station (also called combined cycle heat and power plant) is scrutinized in terms of emissions sources, focusing on pollutant emissions to air in the following chapter. In this part of the thesis the quantities of the released emissions, namely solid particulate matter (TZL), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon dioxide (CO2) are also calculated. The calculation is worked out according to the valid Czech legislation. Further on, the current production technology of the power station is compared with the best available technologies according to the valid directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning integrated pollution prevention and control. The last chapter presents the innovative technologies which could possibly be installed to reduce pollution emissions (especially nitrogen oxides - NOx) to air at the heat and power station Červený Mlýn.

Im Jahr 2005 wurde als Reaktion auf die Unterzeichnung des Kyoto-Protokolls und der damit verbundenen Verpflichtung zur Reduktion von Treibhausgasemissionen der europäische Emissionshandel eingeführt. Versuche der Standardsetter für IFRS und US GAAP zu einer einheitlichen Bilanzierungsregel für Emissionsrechte scheiterten. Seitdem stehen den beteiligten Unternehmen speziell bei Ansatz und Bewertung von Emissionsrechten sowie der Verbindlichkeit für verursachte Emissionen Wahlrechte zur Verfügung. Da unterschiedliche Bilanzierungsansätze zu verschiedenen Resultaten beispielsweise in der Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung führen können, schränkt die Regelungslücke die Vergleichbarkeit zwischen Unternehmen mit unterschiedlichen Bilanzierungsansätzen ein. Dabei wird zudem deutlich, wie wichtig die Offenlegung des gewählten Bilanzierungsansatzes ist. Diese Arbeit beschreibt mit Hilfe einer ausführlichen Literaturrecherche den Diskurs in der Forschung und fasst die theoretisch möglichen Ansätze zusammen. Dem schließt sich eine Analyse aller im STOXX Europe 600 gelisteten Unternehmen an. Untersucht wird, inwieweit die Unternehmen am Emissionshandel beteiligt sind, welchen Ansatz zur Bilanzierung von Emissionsrechten sie wählen und in welcher Vollständigkeit sie den gewählten Ansatz im Geschäftsbericht offenlegen. Insgesamt 70 Unternehmen im STOXX Europe 600 geben eine Beteiligung am europäischen Emissionshandel an, 68 davon erhalten Emissionsrechte kostenfrei von einer staatlichen Stelle zugeteilt. Davon wiederum können 31 Unternehmen sicher einem Bilanzierungsansatz zugeordnet werden; bei den übrigen Unternehmen werden nicht alle relevanten Bilanzierungsentscheidungen offengelegt. Die große Mehrheit dieser 31 Unternehmen wendet den Netto-Ansatz an, bei welchem die zugeteilten Emissionsrechte zu Anschaffungskosten (üblicherweise Null) angesetzt werden. Nur zwei Unternehmen bilanzieren Emissionsrechte nach der 2005 zurückgenommenen, aber weiterhin gültigen Interpretation IFRIC 3. Insgesamt gibt es bezüglich der Bilanzierung von Emissionsrechten in europäischen Unternehmen in Theorie und Praxis Unterschiede, welche die Vergleichbarkeit einschränken. Dies wird durch die häufig unvollständige Offenlegung der Bilanzierungsentscheidung verstärkt. Diese Kritikpunkte sollten aus Sicht der Standardsetter IASB und FASB ausreichend Anlass geben, eine einheitliche Regelung zur Bilanzierung von Emissionsrechten zu entwickeln.

Le changement climatique est devenu aujourd’hui le fléau environnemental qui préoccupe etmobilise le plus la communauté internationale. L’aboutissement de cette mobilisation générale reste sansdoute la mise en place du régime international de lutte contre le changement climatique dont la Conventioncadredes Nations Unies sur le changement climatique et le Protocole de Kyoto constituent les basesjuridiques. Ce régime innove en ce qu’il fixe des engagements quantifiés de réduction des émissions de gaz àeffet de serre pour les États pollueurs, mais aussi en ce qu’il instaure des mécanismes dits de « flexibilité »dont la mise en oeuvre est assortie d’un contrôle original basé sur un Comité dit de « l’observance ». Mais, endépit de toute cette production normative, il est regrettable de constater aujourd’hui que le régimeinternational du climat est un véritable échec. En effet, si la mobilisation des États ne fait aucun doute, enrevanche, les mêmes États qui ont volontairement accepté de s’engager refusent délibérément d’honorer leursengagements pour des raisons essentiellement politiques, économiques et stratégiques. Ce travail ambitionnedonc de lever le voile sur les causes de cet échec en dressant un bilan mitigé de la première périoded’engagement de Kyoto qui a pris fin en 2012, et propose des perspectives pour un régime juridique duclimat post-Kyoto efficient et efficace, en mesure d’être à la hauteur des enjeux. / Climate change has become the scourge environmental concern and mobilizes more theinternational community. The outcome of this mobilization remains probably the implementation ofinternational climate change regime for which the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol are the legalbases. This system is innovative in that it sets quantified emission reduction commitments for greenhouse gasemissions (GHG) for polluters States, but also in that it establishes mechanisms known as of “flexibility”whose implementation is accompanied by a control based on a Committee known as of “compliance”. Butdespite all this normative production, it is regrettable that today the international climate regime is a realfailure. Indeed, if the mobilization of states is no doubt, however, the same states that have voluntarily agreedto engage deliberately refuse to honour their commitments for essentially political, economic and strategicreasons. This work therefore aims to shed light on the causes of this failure by developing a mixed record ofthe first Kyoto commitment ended period in 2012, and offers prospects for a legal regime of the post-Kyotoclimate and efficient, able to be up to the challenges.