In this dissertation I propose an ethical framework for "meeting mosses." At first glance, mosses are a tiny type of plants that have been uncritically understood as "primitive plants," to the extent that they are defined by negation as "non-vascular plants." Hence, mosses have been considered as "primitive" relatives of "true" vascular plants. This distortion is linked to the fact that mosses have been overlooked and represented as a radical otherness in Western civilization. To critically examine this distortion of, and injustice toward mosses, I use the methodology of field environmental philosophy within the conceptual framework of biocultural ethics developed by Ricardo Rozzi. I complement these concepts with foundational philosophical work by continental philosophers Martin Buber and Immanuel Levinas, and ethnobotanist and indigenous writer Robin Wall Kimmerer, with emphasis on their discourses of meeting, "face-to-face," otherness, heterogeneity, and alterity. Collectively thinking with these philosophers, I address the possibility of genuinely "meeting mosses," valuing them as such and not merely as a primitive "relative" or "ancestor" of vascular plants. Drawing on several botanists' accounts of plant language and plant wisdom has sharpened my reading of human-moss interactions and enriched my engagement with the heterogeneity and alterity of the Western philosophical tradition. In his book Gardens: An Essay on the Human Condition, Humanist scholar Robert Pogue Harrison argues that care (for plants and life) is the human vocation. Harrison's discussion of the diversity of "gardens" helped me to clarify multi-dimensional human-moss interactions. In terms of content and structure, I organize my analysis based on two central dimensions of human-plant interactions stated in Rozzi's biocultural ethics: biophysical and cultural, particularly, symbolic-linguistic dimensions. I explore the biophysical dimension of biocultural conservation focusing on mosses in a region where they represent the most diverse and abundant type of plants, southwestern South America. In this region, I conducted fieldwork at three reserves in Chile, Senda Darwin Biological Reserve on Chiloe Island, Magallanes National Reserve, and Omora Ethnobotanical Park in the Cape Horn Biosphere Reserve, south of Tierra del Fuego. I investigate the linguistic-cultural dimension, through the scientific binomial nomenclature as well as through the traditional naming by indigenous cultures, particularly in China. Additionally, I examine the arts as an important cultural expression of interacting with mosses that inspires biocultural conservation. I examine the role that the arts play in the education and conservation programs at the Omora Ethnobotanical Park in Chile and Shenzhen Fairy Lake Botanical Garden in China, as a way to invite students and others to have direct encounters with mosses which lead to hands-on (tactile and place-based) moss conservation. I begin this study with a deliberation of the multiple injustices embedded in contemporary social-ecological-cultural dimensions of global change, and I suggest pathways towards caring for plants and the diversity of life. Caring for mosses is not a one-way human-plant-directed process. By nourishing our physical and cultural lives, we can metaphorically say that mosses "take care" of humans. Once we integrate both "caring for mosses" and being sensitive to the "mosses caring for us," then biocultural conservation moves towards a more reciprocal conviviality. In addition to collectively thinking with other humans, metaphorically I aim to think and feel with the mosses, and therefore I am transformed by them. This is the ultimate meaning of "meeting mosses."

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A significant and growing number of authors and commentators have proposed that ecologically enlightened (‘greened’) religion is the solution or at least a major part of the solution to the global ecological crisis. These include Birch, 1965 p90; Brindle, 2000; Callicott, 1994; Gardner, 2002, 2003, 2006; Gore Jr., 1992; Gottlieb, 2006, 2007; Hallman, 2000; Hamilton, 2006b, a, 2007b; Hessel & Ruether, 2000b; Hitchcock, 1999; King, 2002; Lerner, 2006a; McDonagh, 1987; McFague, 2001; McKenzie, 2005; Nasr, 1996; Oelschlaeger, 1994; Palmer, 1992; Randers, 1972; Tucker & Grim, 2000; and White Jr., 1967. Proponents offer a variety of reasons for this view, including that the majority of the world’s and many nations’ people identify themselves as religious, and that there is a large amount of land and infrastructure controlled by religious organisations worldwide. However, the most important reason is that ‘religion’ is said to have one or more exceptional qualities that can drive and sustain dramatic personal and societal change. The underlying or sometimes overt suggestion is that as the ecological crisis is ultimately a moral crisis, religion is best placed to address the problem at its root. ¶ Proponents of the above views are often religious, though there are many who are not. Many proponents are from the USA and write in the context of the powerful role of religion in that country. Others write in a global context. Very few write from or about the Australian context where the role of religion in society is variously argued to be virtually non-existent, soon to be non-existent, or conversely, profound but covert. ¶ This thesis tests the proposition that religion is the solution to the ecological crisis. It does this using a case study of mainstream religion in Australia, represented by the Catholic, Anglican, and Uniting Churches. The Churches’ ecological policies and practices are analysed to determine the extent to which these denominations are fulfilling, or might be able to fulfil, the proposition. The primary research method is an Internet-based search for policy and praxis material. The methodology is Critical Human Ecology. ¶ The research finds that: the ‘greening’ of these denominations is evident; it is a recent phenomenon in the older Churches; there is a growing wealth of environmentalist sentiment and ecological policy being produced; but little institutional praxis has occurred. Despite the often-strong rhetoric, there is no evidence to suggest that ecological concerns, even linked to broader social concerns (termed ‘ecojustice’) are ‘core business’ for the Churches as institutions. Conventional institutional and anthropocentric welfare concerns remain dominant. ¶ Overall, the three Churches struggle with organisational, demographic, and cultural problems that impede their ability to convert their official ecological concerns into institutional praxis. Despite these problems, there are some outstanding examples of ecological policy and praxis in institutional and non-institutional forms that at least match those seen in mainstream secular society. ¶ I conclude that in Australia, mainstream religion is a limited part of the solution to the ecological crisis. It is not the solution to the crisis, at least not in its present institutional form. Institutional Christianity is in decline in Australia and is being replaced by non-institutional Christianity, other religions and non-religious spiritualities (Tacey, 2000, 2003; Bouma, 2006; Tacey, 2007). The ecological crisis is a moral crisis, but in Australia, morality is increasingly outside the domain of institutional religion. The growth of the non-institutional religious and the ‘spiritual but not religious’ demographic may, if ecologically informed, offer more of a contribution to addressing the ecological crisis in future. This may occur in combination with some of the more progressive movements seen at the periphery of institutional Christianity such as the ‘eco-ministry’ of Rev. Dr. Jason John in Adelaide, and the ‘Creation Spirituality’ taught, advocated and practiced by the Mercy Sisters’ Earth Link project in Queensland.

The research focuses on the epistemic tension between Western positivist epistemology and African indigenous knowledge systems particularly Shona proverbs. The research argues that Western epistemological hegemony is both unjustified and unacceptable in the context of the pluriversal understanding of knowledge where systems of knowledge are both multiple and diverse. After a critique of Eurocentric thinking, the research defends an African epistemological paradigm that emerges as an alternative framework for the authentic and legitimate study of African knowledge systems and ways of knowing. The approach opens intellectual space for the philosophical study of Shona proverbs. Under Shona environmental philosophy, it shall be argued that ubuntu respects all aspects of the environment, recognizes the dependence of human beings on the environment, sees the land as sacred and affords responsibility for future generations by encouraging the preservation and conservation of resources. Three Shona proverbs have been used to show how the Shona think about preservation of natural resources, conservation of natural resources and the interdependence between humanity and the natural world. In the context of Shona philosophy of law, it is argued that ubuntu provides the basis of a coherent philosophy of law among the Shona. Shona philosophy of law is a reflection of legal elements and the study draws these elements from selected proverbs. These proverbs have been used to show the metaphysical basis of Shona legal philosophy, the role of the law in protecting the dignity of individuals and the importance of the law in peace building within the community. Concerning political philosophy, the study has argued that ubuntu is the political foundation of solidarity, oneness and mutual support in politics. Shona political philosophy stresses coexistence and relatedness (ukama) within the community. Shona political philosophy maintains that authority should be guided by respect, good governance, solidarity and peace. Under Shona philosophy of economics, themes of human dignity, respect for hard work and the need for moderation in the desire for money are discussed in the context of the Shona philosophical worldview. The proverbs under study contribute to alternative ways of philosophical reflection in the context of the pluriversality of knowledge / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D.Litt et Phil. (Philosophy)

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<p>I argue in my dissertation that the Marxist ethical claim against capitalism could be bolstered through: 1) a recognition of the inaccurate human ontology that capitalist theories of entitlement presuppose, 2) a reconceptualization and replacement of that old paradigm of human ontology with a concept that I call “organicism” and 3) a normative argument for why this new paradigm of human ontology necessitates a new political economy and a new way of structuring society. I use the debate between Robert Nozick and G.A. Cohen as a launching point for my case.</p> <p><br></p> <p>In his book, <i>Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality</i>, G.A. Cohen argues that Robert Nozick’s “entitlement theory” is unable to produce the robust sense of freedom that libertarians and capitalist proponents aggrandize. According to Cohen, the reason for this is due to the limitations and consistency errors produced by the libertarian adherence to the “self-ownership principle.” (the moral/natural right that a person is the sole proprietor of their own body and life). Namely, that the pale freedom that the proletariat enjoys within capitalism is inconsistent with the Libertarian’s own standard for freedom. So, Cohen argues for the elimination of the self-ownership principle. My project picks up where Cohen’s leaves off, claiming that the consistency errors don’t lie in entitlement theory’s use of the self-ownership principle (it is important that we don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater). Rather, the errors lie in the principle’s metaphysics - specifically in the ontology of the human being. The self-ownership principle is only faulty because it presupposes an impossible self. I show that entitlement theory heedlessly presupposes the self (or a human ontology) as a “rational, autonomous, individual.” I then deconstruct each of these three features (rationality, autonomy, and individuality) to show that this picture of the human being is not necessarily incorrect, but it is incomplete.</p> <p><br></p> <p>Although we are indeed rational, autonomous, individual creatures, these are only emergent characteristics that merely arise after the organic and socially interconnected aspects of our selves are nurtured. I encompass these latter features of our selves under the heading: “organicism”. So, my contribution is to provide a different ontological foundation of the human being – “organicism” – to replace the Enlightenment grown: “rational, autonomous, individual”. I draw heavily from Karl Marx’s philosophical anthropology, and G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of the unfolding of Geist/Spirit, with a little inspiration from Aristotle and ecological theory to construct “organicism” – a pancorporealist, naturalistic materialism. It is the theory that the human being is, in essence, an organic creature, inseparable from nature, but <i>through </i>the nurturing of these material, organic, symbiotic relationships (with other humans and with the ecosystem) that these “super”-natural capacities of rationality and autonomy arise along with and because of a <i>full</i> self-consciousness.</p> <p><br></p> <p>Finally, I infer the normative implications of this ontology of subjectivity. This organicist conception of the self has transformational effects on our notions of property and the way we structure society. So, I contend that organicist ontology then serves as the foundation for a normative theory of political economy that sees the flourishing or health (broadly speaking) of the organicist human as the primary ethical goal. I speculate on an alternative political economy that can provide the robust sense of freedom that Nozick’s entitlement theory (capitalism) was lacking because it actually produces the <i>conditions</i> necessary for rationality, autonomy and individual freedom.</p>

Erika Cudworth's Developing Ecofeminist Theory provides a helpful foundation for a non-essentialist, properly intersectional ecofeminist account of oppression, marginalization, and domination, but her rejection of what she refers to as "postmodernism" appears to be based on a misreading of Judith Butler. I attempt to provide a synthesis of Cudworth's framework with Butler, particularly through the use of Karen Barad's agential realism, in order to provide possibility for new alliances between ecofeminism and other anti-oppressive frameworks. I then examine what it might look like to do ecofeminist praxis, given the complex view of agency, ontology, and intersectionality rendered by such a synthesis. I draw from bicycling as an example from which to extrapolate what it means to resist oppression, and then draw from the Philosophy for Children movement to consider what such resistance might look like within the classroom. This dissertation thus attempts to move from theory to practice, recognizing that "the real world" is both always at hand and also subject to performative deconstruction.

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