Recent literature in religious epistemology has overlooked a significant debate in mainstream epistemology. In short, theories in religious epistemology have failed to consider the value problem. This essay, then, hopes to rectify this omission by arguing that one of the most influential accounts of religious epistemology - reformed epistemology - fails to adequately account for the value of knowledge. I argue, however, that a reasonable way out for the reformed epistemologist comes by way of endorsing the achievement thesis. The achievement thesis, put simply, states that knowledge is valuable because it is a cognitive achievement - unlike, for example, mere true belief. The central question of this essay, then, is this: Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? In order to better answer this question I highlight two different ways in which one can understand the nature of cognitive achievements. First, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is always primarily creditable to the agent. Or, second, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is jointly creditable to the agent. Both, I argue, are compatible with knowledge and the achievement thesis. Whether knowledge of God is primarily or jointly creditable, however, will depend on the way in which one understands the role the agent plays in the belief forming process. Given the nature of reformed epistemology, I argue that knowledge of God is the kind of achievement that is jointly creditable. Further, and central to the argument, I argue that the reformed epistemologist is in a good position to meet the requirements for the strong achievement thesis. The strong achievement thesis argues that an achievement should be understood in terms of overcoming some obstacle whereby the agent's belief is the result of some ability that can be credited to the agent. The account I propose not only meets the requirements of the strong achievement thesis, but also retains a distinctive feature of reformed epistemology - namely, that the belief in God can be said to overcome the obstacle of cognitive malfunction that, as the reformed epistemologist argues, is brought about by sin. It's an achievement becasue it overcomes an excessively hostile environment (what I call the maxi-environment) that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. In the end, it is possible to provide an account of reformed epistemology where the value of knowledge (over and above mere true belief) is adequately demonstrated.

My main aim is to contribute to the exploration of the nature of the epistemic state of understanding. It seems that the most productive way in which this might be done is by (i) investigating what sort of conditions must be fulfilled in order for one to understand, and (ii) comparing understanding’s place in certain contemporary debates to the place that knowledge has in those debates. Regarding conditions for understanding, I will argue that there are two types of understanding that are most relevant to epistemology—objectual understanding and atomistic understanding. I will contend that atomistic understanding is entirely factive while objectual understanding is moderately factive, that objectual understanding admits of degrees, that both types involve some sort of grasp of explanatory relations, that both possess a measure of luck immunity, and that both are cognitive achievements with instrumental, teleological, contributory and (crucially) final value. It must be stressed that the general accounts of both types of understanding that I attempt to provide are not supposed to be exhaustive sets of necessary and sufficient conditions—I remain particularly open to the possibility that there are further necessary conditions that are as yet undiscovered, especially for objectual understanding. Regarding understanding’s place in contemporary debates, it is perplexing that existing work does not capitalise on the thought that treating understanding in conjunction with many of the most prominent issues in recent epistemology is a worthwhile project that could yield interesting and important results. I will summarise understanding's potential significance for a number of these topics, looking at all of the following (in varying degrees of detail): factivity, coherentism, norms of assertion, the transmission of epistemic properties, epistemic luck, the nature of cognitive achievement, and epistemic value. This last topic is one that I think is particularly important to an investigation into understanding, because it is quite plausible that there is a particularly strong revisionist theory of epistemic value focused on understanding. Such a view would be one on which knowledge is not finally valuable, but one by way of which we could nonetheless explain why we might pre-theoretically think that knowledge is finally valuable. Since revisionist views often involve a claim that we should think of a different, closely related epistemic state as distinctively valuable, it is natural to consider understanding as a prime candidate for the focus of such a theory.

Every time we act in an effort to attain our epistemic goals, we express our epistemic agency. The present study argues that a proper understanding of the actions and goals relevant to expressions of such agency can be used to make ameliorative recommendations about how the ways in which we actually express our agency can be brought in line with how we should express our agency. More specifically, it is argued that the actions relevant to such expressions should be identified with the variety of actions characteristic of inquiry; that contrary to what has been maintained by recent pluralists about epistemic value, the only goal relevant to inquiry is that of forming true belief; and that our dual tendency for bias and overconfidence gives us reason to implement epistemically paternalistic practices that constrain our freedom to exercise agency in substantial ways. For example, we are often better off by gathering only a very limited amount of information, having our selection of methods be greatly restricted, and spending our time less on reflecting than on simply reading off the output of a simple algorithm. In other words, when it comes to our freedom to express epistemic agency, more is not always better. In fact, less is often so much more.

No description available.

<p>The instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is the view according to which beliefs, or doxastic states generally, are epistemically rational insofar as they promote the achievement of an epistemic goal, and they are epistemically irrational to the extent that they fail to promote such a goal. The thesis that I defend here is that the instrumental conception is not satisfactory as a general account of epistemic rationality.</p> <p>I proceed by examining a number of reasons one might offer for accepting the instrumental account, and I find them wanting. I also consider various ways of formulating the epistemic goal, attempting to determine the best one, in order to show the instrumental conception in its best light. I consider and reject the attempt to ground the instrumental conception on the proper function of our cognitive systems. Finally, I consider three arguments against the instrumental conception of epistemic rationality, and some objections to them. I conclude that, even shown in its most favourable light, the instrumental conception cannot give us a satisfactory general account of epistemic rationality.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value”. Some philosopherswho defend pragmatic encroachment” and sensitive invariantism” argue thatchanges in the importance of being right and signiicant increases of the costsof error in given contexts can alter the standards of knowledge. If this view werecorrect, it could explain to some extent the practical value of knowledge. Thispaper argues that the pragmatic encroachment thesis is wrong. It discusses threepossible sources of encroachment on epistemic notions: on belief, on justiication,and on knowledge, and rejects the idea that the epistemic standards change withpractical stakes. Pragmatic factors can be relevant to the formation of belief andto the context of inquiry, although they are not relevant to epistemic evaluation.Epistemic value cannot depend upon such factors. / Algunos filósofos que defienden la intrusión pragmática y el invariantismo sensible sostienen que, en ciertos contextos, los cambios en la importancia de estar en lo cierto y los aumentos significativos de los costos del error pueden alterar los estándares del conocimiento. Si esta postura fuese correcta, podría explicar, hasta cierto punto, el valor práctico del conocimiento. El presente artículo sostiene que la tesis de la intrusión pragmática es incorrecta. Discute tres fuentes posibles de intrusión en nociones epistémicas: en la creencia, en la justificación y en el conocimiento, y rechaza la idea de que los estándares epistémicos cambian según lo que se ponga en juego a nivel práctico. Los factores pragmáticos pueden ser relevantes para la formación de creencias y para el contexto de indagación, pese a que no son relevantes para la evaluación epistémica. El valor epistémico no puede depender de tales factores.

Recently in analytic philosophy, interest in the issue of the epistemic value of art has been revived. Philosophers have sought to establish whether and in what ways art is a source of knowledge, understanding or a means of inquiry. In philosophy this is a longstanding question, addressed both in the Greek and German traditions, but it seems pertinent to ask the question again today in light of significant changes that have taken place in contemporary art practice. In my thesis, I investigate this question from two perspectives: in terms of analytic philosophy of art, and in terms of developments in contemporary art since the 1960s. In Part I, I offer a defence of a philosophical theory of artistic value, critically overview the extant philosophical literature on the question of epistemic value of art, and explain why the inherently experimental character of contemporary art makes it difficult simply to apply the available theories. I argue that a philosophical engagement with contemporary art requires a different, more inductive method. In Part II, I closely consider three recent developments in which the relationship between art and knowledge has been rendered more complex. The Conceptual Art movement of the 1960s and 1970s privileged concerns with concepts, thought processes and truth over expression, materiality and fidelity to genre. The social turn of the 1990s cast the artist in a position that is almost indistinguishable from that of a teacher, social activist or even of a technology developer. And the artists working within the bio art movement of the 1990s and 2000s have assimilated the activity of the artist to that of the scientist, sometimes blurring the two roles. The goal of the thesis is twofold. On the one hand, I show how cases from recent art history put pressure on some key commitments in recent analytic philosophy. Revisions and challenges are suggested in particular for extant theories of artistic value, conceptions of artistic autonomy and heteronomy, and some popular accounts of the epistemic value of art. On the other hand, concepts from analytic philosophy are used to shed light on some of the more radical developments in recent art practice, and to rethink the ways in which art participates in the broader culture.

Democracy has been encountering an increasing number of critics. Whether it comes from a sympathy for autocrats, free-markets, or the more knowledgeable, this increasing democratic scepticism often takes an epistemic form. Democracy's critics argue that democratic procedures and institutions are unlikely to make good decisions or produce good outcomes in terms of justice or the common good, and should, therefore, be restricted if not completely rejected in favour of its more able alternatives. In the face of such scepticism, this thesis develops an epistemic theory of deliberative democracy. This theory has two principal aims. The first is to analyse and define the epistemic properties of deliberative democracy, and the second is to clarify the possible role epistemic values can play in a wider justification of democratic rule. In accordance with the first, the thesis analyses the ability of deliberative democratic institutions to make good or correct decisions in comparison to a broad range of prominent alternatives. These include traditional rivals such as autocracy and aristocracy, but also more modern and less considered alternatives such as free-markets, limited epistocracy and forms of technical calculation. Through these comparisons, it is argued that we have no good or clear epistemic reason to reject democracy. Deliberative democracy is found to be epistemically superior to many of its alternatives and epistemically equivalent to even its best competitors. The thesis, therefore, mounts a strong reply to democracy's epistemic sceptics. The analysis, however, also helps clarify which form of deliberative democracy is epistemically most valuable, pointing to the value systems approaches which give a prominent role to direct citizen deliberation. The epistemic theory of deliberative democracy also aims to clarify what role epistemic values can play in a wider justification of democratic rule. The thesis argues that deliberative democracy is epistemically superior to many of its rivals and no worse epistemically than even its best alternatives. This suggests that although epistemic values cannot mount a stand-alone defence of democracy, democrats would only be required to defend very weak non-epistemic values to produce a mixed justification. Far from being 'rule by the incompetent many' and therefore highly reliant on procedural values, the thesis will demonstrate that epistemic values can carry significant weight in an argument for democratic rule.