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<p>The instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is the view according to which beliefs, or doxastic states generally, are epistemically rational insofar as they promote the achievement of an epistemic goal, and they are epistemically irrational to the extent that they fail to promote such a goal. The thesis that I defend here is that the instrumental conception is not satisfactory as a general account of epistemic rationality.</p> <p>I proceed by examining a number of reasons one might offer for accepting the instrumental account, and I find them wanting. I also consider various ways of formulating the epistemic goal, attempting to determine the best one, in order to show the instrumental conception in its best light. I consider and reject the attempt to ground the instrumental conception on the proper function of our cognitive systems. Finally, I consider three arguments against the instrumental conception of epistemic rationality, and some objections to them. I conclude that, even shown in its most favourable light, the instrumental conception cannot give us a satisfactory general account of epistemic rationality.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Notre travail s'attache à examiner la spécificité ainsi que la pertinence du mode d'explication cognitiviste des croyances, tel qu'il est défini par Raymond Boudon, à travers, tout d'abord, une analyse de la notion de "rationalité épistémique" et un examen de certaines des objections qui peuvent lui être faites. Nous interrogeons ensuite la compatibilité de ce type d'explication avec l'idée, propre à un certain nombre de travaux en sciences sociales, selon laquelle les intérêts sociaux et/ou les mécanismes fonctionnels sont aptes à expliquer la formation des croyances. Enfin, nous réfléchirons à la question de savoir si la présence éventuelle de facteurs explicatifs mixtes doit nous inciter à repenser la question de la rationalité des croyances, c'est-à-dire ici de la contribution explicative des raisons au sein de leurs modes de formation. Cette interrogation nous mènera alors à une tentative d'élucidation de la notion de "contexte épistémique" ainsi qu'à un examen de sa pertinence explicative. / My work aims at examining the specificity and the relevance of what Raymond Boudon calls 'the cognitivist model of belief explanation', through an analysis of the notion of 'epistemic rationality' and an examination of some objections against it. Then I ask the compatibility between this kind of explanation with the common idea in social science that social interests and functional mechanisms are relevant to explain the belief formation process. Finally, I will study the question of the influence of the plurality of explanative factors on the rationality of social agent's beliefs. This interrogation will lead us to an elucidation of the notion of 'epistemic context' and its explanative relevance.

Cette thèse tente de démontrer que la rationalité épistémique est normative, ou plus précisément, que les agents doivent être épistémiquement rationnels. On peut dire provisoirement que la rationalité est un code – ou un ensemble de règles – en ce sens qu’elle correspond à une collection systématique d’exigences. En particulier, la rationalité est souvent identifiée à un ensemble systématique de lignes de conduite ayant pour but de faire en sorte qu’un agent réponde correctement à ses raisons, qu’il évite de se contredire, d’être incohérent ou akratique. La thèse poursuit aussi certains objectifs secondaires, en particulier: (i) montrer que les raisons épistémiques apparentes de croire que P (comprises comme des propositions apparemment vraies qui, si elles étaient vraies, militeraient en faveur de la conclusion que P) sont normatives; (ii) montrer qu’il n’y a pas de dilemme insoluble de la rationalité épistémique; (iii) montrer que, relativement à un ensemble de données probantes ou de raisons épistémiques, un agent idéalement rationnel n’a jamais la permission épistémique de croire que P et de croire que ~P simultanément. Si ces objectifs secondaires sont intéressants en eux-mêmes, ils contribuent aussi à confirmer l’idée selon laquelle la rationalité épistémique est normative. / This thesis argues that epistemic rationality is normative, or that agents ought to be epistemically rational. The property of rationality is here understood as a code. Specifically, the code of epistemic rationality requires various things, such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons one has, remaining coherent and avoiding akratic combinations of beliefs. Additionally, this thesis has secondary aims, such as: (i) arguing that apparent epistemic reasons to believe P (understood as apparently true propositions which, if they were true, would count in favour of the conclusion that P) are deontically significant; (ii) arguing against unsolvable normative dilemmas of epistemic rationality; (iii) arguing against a specific type of permissiveness which roughly states that, relative to a body of epistemic reasons, it can be epistemically rational for an ideal agent to believe P and to disbelieve P. While these secondary aims are interesting in their own right, they confirm the main claim of this thesis, namely, that epistemic rationality is normative.

This thesis is on Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) and its relevance for the rationality of religious beliefs. An epistemical model for rationality is developed according to which: a person (or group of persons) is rational to hold a certain belief a) if this belief can be assumed to have been generated by one or more reliable cognitive mechanisms, b) applies whether or not she is aware of what these mechanisms are, but c) only as long as it does not exist or arise some reasons (defeaters) to question the belief; if they occur, she must d) reflect on it and find other reasons or grounds to hold the belief in question.      Two different positions are examined, namely: 1) negative relevance: the findings and theories in CSR undermines the rationality of religious beliefs; 2) positive relevance: religious beliefs need not be irrational in the light of CSR, in fact CSR may actually support the rationality of religious beliefs.      Two lines of argument can be distinguished among those who argue for a negative relevance: a) the natural explanations that are provided by CSR are preferable; and b) religious beliefs are irrational because they are caused by unreliable cognitive mechanisms.      Among those who argue for positive relevance two arguments can be distinguised: a) religious beliefs seem to come naturally to humans and therefore are probably true; and b) CSR confirms empirically that we are equipped with a "divine mechanism" that there are reasons to believe is reliable.      The conclusions are: CSR has negative relevance to beliefs in "finite supernatural agency", but not for the faith of "infinite supernatural agency". First, the first type of beliefs is easier to explain by being generated by unreliable cognitive mechanisms; secondly they are difficult to integrate with what we otherwise know about the world. A category that falls outside the scope of CSR and thus not even potentially can be affected, is beliefs in "supernatural non-agency". / The Impact of Religion – Challenges for Society, Law and Democracy

In this thesis, the theory of rational irrationality is used to explore the incentives behind seemingly irrational beliefs held by a large part of the contemporary American society towards anthropogenic climate change. Applying causal analysis, three questions are answered: "is it rationally irrational for people to be indifferent towards climate change?" "Are Americans inherently more likely than others to hold irrational beliefs about global issues such as climate change?" If so, "is this phenomenon rooted in certain values that constitute the American identity?" The author focuses on specific "American values" and uses statistics and recent empirical studies to find correlations and causality between those values and the exhibited behavior of individuals, while discussing its possible causes and implications. The study concludes that the root cause of irresponsibility of the American citizen towards climate change is a lack of social mechanisms rewarding individuals for holding epistemologically accurate beliefs. The author then proposes a set of general measures to be prioritized in order to improve social reward mechanisms in the American society. If implemented, those measures should be able to effectively enforce epistemic rationality in the U.S. political debate, which is desirable...