A pesquisa visa a fazer uma reflexão sobre a produção de hipermídias para a construção do conhecimento científico acadêmico. Para tanto, temos como base a filosofia de Gadamer (2008), que questiona a incontestabilidade da metodologia científica. Segundo ele, para chegarmos a uma inteligência compreensiva não necessitamos de uma imersão no método científico, uma vez que ela já é adquirida pela experiência mundana: na realidade histórica, na experiência, no tempo, na tradição, visão da qual compartilhamos e a qual acreditamos ser possibilitada por processos digitais de produção do conhecimento. Partimos do conceito de ruptura epistemológica (Bachelard, 1996) para desenvolver a noção da ciência no contexto da hipermídia e suas possibilidades de apropriação na difusão, divulgação e produção do conhecimento, dando origem a três categorias explicitadas no capítulo II. Ao nos concentramos na produção do conhecimento em hipermídia analisamos três trabalhos acadêmicos em linguagem hipermidiática: From (Gomes, 2008), LOttocento (Eco, 1999) e Ilha Cabu (Petry, 2010), análises realizadas sob a óptica de três metodologias distintas que visam avaliar níveis de navegabilidade (Landow, 2006), interatividade (Schulmeister, 2001), hibridismo de linguagens (Santaella, 2005) e níveis de conhecimento (Bairon, 2004) sob o viés da produção do conhecimento em hipermídia como possibilidade de abertura hermenêutica entre ciência e senso comum. / The research intends to ponder on the hypermedia production for the construction of scholarly science knowledge. To this end we rely on Gadamers (2008) philosophy , which questions the scientific methods indisputability. According to him, in order to achieve a comprehensive intelligence we do not need a scientific method immersion, once it has already been acquired viamundane experience -- in historical reality, in experience, in time, in tradition --, a view we share and believe may be allowed for digital processes of knowledge production. We depart from the epistemological rupture (Bachelard, 1996) to develop a notion of science in the hypermedia concept and its possibilities for appropriation of diffusion, dissemination and production of knowledge, giving rise to three categories explained in chapter II. We concentrate in knowledge production in hypermedia and we analyze three academicals works made in hypermedia: From (Gomes, 2008), LOttocento (Eco, 1999) and Ilha Cabu (Petry, 2010), conducted under three methodologies that evaluate levels of navegability (Landow, 2006), interaction (Schulmeister, 2001), hybridity (Santaella, 2005) and knowledge levels (Bairon, 2004) under the bias of the knowledge production in hypermedia as a possibility for a hermeneutical opening between science and common sense.

A pesquisa visa a fazer uma reflexão sobre a produção de hipermídias para a construção do conhecimento científico acadêmico. Para tanto, temos como base a filosofia de Gadamer (2008), que questiona a incontestabilidade da metodologia científica. Segundo ele, para chegarmos a uma inteligência compreensiva não necessitamos de uma imersão no método científico, uma vez que ela já é adquirida pela experiência mundana: na realidade histórica, na experiência, no tempo, na tradição, visão da qual compartilhamos e a qual acreditamos ser possibilitada por processos digitais de produção do conhecimento. Partimos do conceito de ruptura epistemológica (Bachelard, 1996) para desenvolver a noção da ciência no contexto da hipermídia e suas possibilidades de apropriação na difusão, divulgação e produção do conhecimento, dando origem a três categorias explicitadas no capítulo II. Ao nos concentramos na produção do conhecimento em hipermídia analisamos três trabalhos acadêmicos em linguagem hipermidiática: From (Gomes, 2008), LOttocento (Eco, 1999) e Ilha Cabu (Petry, 2010), análises realizadas sob a óptica de três metodologias distintas que visam avaliar níveis de navegabilidade (Landow, 2006), interatividade (Schulmeister, 2001), hibridismo de linguagens (Santaella, 2005) e níveis de conhecimento (Bairon, 2004) sob o viés da produção do conhecimento em hipermídia como possibilidade de abertura hermenêutica entre ciência e senso comum. / The research intends to ponder on the hypermedia production for the construction of scholarly science knowledge. To this end we rely on Gadamers (2008) philosophy , which questions the scientific methods indisputability. According to him, in order to achieve a comprehensive intelligence we do not need a scientific method immersion, once it has already been acquired viamundane experience -- in historical reality, in experience, in time, in tradition --, a view we share and believe may be allowed for digital processes of knowledge production. We depart from the epistemological rupture (Bachelard, 1996) to develop a notion of science in the hypermedia concept and its possibilities for appropriation of diffusion, dissemination and production of knowledge, giving rise to three categories explained in chapter II. We concentrate in knowledge production in hypermedia and we analyze three academicals works made in hypermedia: From (Gomes, 2008), LOttocento (Eco, 1999) and Ilha Cabu (Petry, 2010), conducted under three methodologies that evaluate levels of navegability (Landow, 2006), interaction (Schulmeister, 2001), hybridity (Santaella, 2005) and knowledge levels (Bairon, 2004) under the bias of the knowledge production in hypermedia as a possibility for a hermeneutical opening between science and common sense.

Cette thèse inscrit sa réflexion sur la pédagogie et la didactique du chinois langue étrangère (LE) dans une perspective historico-épistémologique. S’appuyant sur le processus de disciplinarisation comme fil directeur, elle comprend deux axes principaux : l’histoire de l’enseignement et l’épistémologie des savoirs à enseigner. Notre questionnement porte sur les conditions qui ont rendu possible la construction disciplinaire du chinois comme LE dans le système éducatif français. Il s’agit non seulement des conditions externes (économiques, politiques, sociales) qui ont permis l’émergence et l’institutionnalisation de l’enseignement du chinois dans le contexte précis de la France ; mais aussi et surtout des conditions de possibilité internes que sont la construction des savoirs enseignables, la transposition didactique, les continuités et les ruptures épistémologiques, ainsi que le fonctionnement intrinsèque du système éducatif. Notre enquête s’étend du début du XIXe siècle à nos jours. Elle porte sur quatre institutions dans lesquelles les cours de langue chinoise se sont introduits de façon graduelle : le Collège de France, l’Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales, l’université et enfin l’enseignement primaire et secondaire. L’objectif de cette recherche est de monter que le chinois enseigné comme LE n’est pas un objet « donné », préétabli, mais un objet construit et toujours à reconstruire en fonction de finalités pédagogiques et didactiques. Ainsi le chinois langue vivante étrangère (LVE) défini comme discipline scolaire se distingue fondamentalement d’une formation universitaire par une plus grande normalisation et homogénéisation de ses savoirs. C’est d’ailleurs du fait de sa tradition de centralisation et de planification éducative que la France a joué un rôle précurseur dans le processus de disciplinarisation du chinois LVE. / This thesis focuses on the pedagogy and didactics of the Chinese language from a historical and epistemological perspective. Using the concept of “disciplinarisation” as its main focus, it explores two main aspects: the history of the teaching of Chinese and the epistemology of the knowledge to be transmitted. It analyzes the conditions that have made it possible for the Chinese language to become a subject taught in the French educational system. It addresses both the external conditions - economical, political and social conditions - that have made the emergence and institutionalization of the teaching of Chinese in France possible, but also - and more importantly - the internal conditions: the construction of teachable content, didactic transposition, the epistemological continuum and epistemological ruptures as well as the inner workings of the French educational system. This investigation focuses on a period that ranges from the beginning of the nineteenth century to today. It focuses on four different institutions in which teaching Chinese gradually appeared: the Collège de France, the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations, French universities and finally French primary and secondary schools. The goal objective of this research is to show that Chinese, as a foreign language, is not a fixed object but rather an object that was constructed and is still being constructed according to various pedagogical and didactic goals. Thus, Chinese as a subject taught in primary and secondary school is fundamentally different from Chinese as a university discipline in that the former is more normalized and more homogenous. Indeed, the pioneering role played by France’s national education system in establishing “Chinese as a foreign language” as a school subject can be attributed in large part to its long-held traditions of centralization and academic planning.

In Sweden, Bachelard is mostly known for his works about poetry and literature, but he was also very productive in philosophy of science. Having studied engineering and taught physical sciences, his main writings in this field concern contemporary physics. He developed the idea of “epistemological rupture”, closely linked to the concept of “epistemological obstacle”. Those notions show science in its historicity and are linked to the idea of progress: a progress that strives not only towards a better approximation of reality, but that can also be seen as a progress of the scientific mind itself. Epistemological ruptures take place when epistemological obstacles are defeated. It is when an epistemological obstacle is met that the ways of thinking that prevents progress become visible; it needs to become an obstacle before we can get rid of it, which causes not only a more precise knowledge, but also a restructuration of the scientific mind. This way, epistemological rupture do not only refer to a historical process, but also to a psychological one. In The formation of the scientific mind, Bachelard shows, through examples taken from history of science, the path that each “scientific mind” has to travel. He analyses science with the aim of finding in its history a history of thought and of its progress: therefore, in The formation of the scientific mind, he gives the same status to the errors of the high school students, as to the ways of thinking that have impeded or slowed down sciences’ developments. By stressing the importance of history, Bachelard insists on the psychological aspects of the constitution of science: as much as it is absurd to try to understand an answer without knowing the question it replies to, it is not possible to cut knowledge from its context of emergence, or to understand an object of study without referring to the subject that constituted it. Thus, Bachelard emphasises the importance of the subject in science, but without making of science something subjective, or without falling into psychologism. The reference to the scientists’ subjectivity is not, for Bachelard, a way of questioning the validity of the scientific discourse; on the contrary, it is by describing science in terms of the scientist’s mind and psychology that Bachelard will find the grounds for science’s objectivity and its success. Bachelard shows science as a practice, as a training of the mind, as an effort involving a lot more than mere rationality, thereby destroying the myth of a universal reason as an underlying principle in the construction of science. / En Suède, Bachelard est surtout connu pour ses travaux sur la poésie et la littérature, mais il a été tout aussi productif en épistémologie. Ayant étudié et enseigné les sciences physiques, ses principaux écrits dans ce domaine concernent la physique contemporaine. Il a développé le concept de « rupture épistémologique », lié à celui d’ « obstacle épistémologique ». La notion d’obstacle épistémologique montre la science dans son historicité ; elle est liée à l’idée de progrès : un progrès qui recherche non seulement une meilleure approximation de la réalité, mais qui peut aussi être compris comme un progrès de l’esprit scientifique lui-même. Ce progrès est accompli lors de ruptures épistémologiques, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’un obstacle épistémologique est vaincu : c’est à ce moment que ce qui empêche la pensée d’avancer devient visible, ce qui cause non seulement une connaissance plus précise, mais aussi une restructuration de l’esprit scientifique.       De cette manière, le concept de rupture épistémologique ne réfère pas seulement à un processus historique, mais aussi à un processus psychologique. Dans La formation de l’esprit scientifique, Bachelard donne des exemples pris de l’histoire des sciences et montre, à travers elles, le cheminement que chaque « esprit scientifique » doit accomplir. Il analyse la science avec le but  de trouver dans son histoire, une histoire de la pensée et de ses progrès : c’est pour cela que Bachelard, dans son livre La formation de l’esprit scientifique, compare le développement des sciences au niveau historique avec l’apprentissage des sciences au niveau individuel, et fait souvent référence aux erreurs des lycéens autant qu’aux bévues historiques. Ainsi, Bachelard met en lumière l’aspect construit des sciences : pour autant qu’il soit absurde d’essayer de comprendre une réponse sans connaître la question à laquelle celle-ci répond, il est impossible de couper la connaissance de son contexte d’émergence, ou d’essayer de comprendre un objet d’étude sans référer au sujet qui l’a constitué. Il ne s’agit pas pour autant faire de la science quelque chose de subjectif ou de tomber dans le psychologisme. La référence à l’esprit du savant ou à l’intersubjectivité scientifique n’est pas, pour Bachelard, un moyen de questionner la validité du discours scientifique ; au contraire, c’est en décrivant la science grâce à la psychologie du savant que Bachelard montre la science comme une pratique, comme un entrainement de l’esprit, comme un effort impliquant bien plus que la simple rationalité, détruisant de ce fait le mythe d’une raison universelle comme principe sous-jacent de la construction des sciences.