O presente trabalho visa a estudar a regulamentação existente a respeito da relação de substituição de ações em operações de incorporação de sociedades e incorporação de ações. Para tanto, serão abordados os dispositivos legais, as posições doutrinárias e as interpretações da jurisprudência sobre o assunto no Brasil e em Direito Comparado. No primeiro capítulo, são estudados os institutos da incorporação e da incorporação de ações, analisando-se a natureza jurídica dessas operações e os procedimentos para realização de cada uma delas. No segundo capítulo, examina-se propriamente a relação de substituição de ações e sua natureza jurídica para, na sequência, analisarmos o arcabouço legal em que se insere a determinação da relação de troca de ações. Nesse contexto, são abordados os critérios, parâmetros e requisitos que norteiam a sua definição, bem como os mecanismos legais previstos pela legislação societária para compor os diferentes interesses envolvidos, notadamente aqueles dos acionistas minoritários e do controlador. O terceiro capítulo analisa algumas especificidades relativas às operações de incorporação que envolvem companhias abertas, operações de incorporação englobando sociedades sob controle comum, diferentes relações de substituição de ações entre ações de diferentes espécies e classes e, por fim, entre ações da mesma espécie e classe. Finalmente, a conclusão arremata as principais ideias discutidas ao longo deste trabalho. / This paper aims at analyzing the existing regulation regarding the share exchange ratio in mergers and merger of shares (incorporação de ações). For this purpose, this work will examine the legal provisions, the different doctrinal positions and case law understandings relating to this matter under Brazilian Law and Comparative Law. The first chapter of this paper presents the concepts of the merger and merger of shares and analyzes the nature of such transactions and the procedures necessary for their performance. The second chapter examines the share exchange ratio and its nature, followed by an analysis of the legal environment in which such share exchange ratio is determined. In this sense, this paper analyzes the criteria, parameters and requirements that drive the determination of the share exchange ratio, as well as the legal provisions established by Corporate Law to assure that all interests involved in such transactions are addressed, mainly those of minority shareholders as opposed to those of the controlling shareholders. The third chapter analyzes certain special situations concerning mergers and mergers of shares that involve publicly held corporations or corporations under common control. This chapter also analyzes special cases regarding the establishment of different share exchange ratios between different types and classes of shares and between shares of the same type and class. Finally, the conclusion of this work summarizes the main ideas discussed herein.

Offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på den svenska aktiemarknaden sker främst med kontantvederlag, ofta förenat med aktievederlag. Som alternativ till sådant vederlag kan budgivaren erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare ”stub equity” med vilket avses det fall budgivaren erbjuder målbolagets aktieägare en begränsad mängd aktier i ett särskilt onoterat holding- eller budbolag, vilket i sin tur efter det offentliga uppköpserbjudandet innehar samtliga aktier i målbolaget. Syftet med denna uppsats är att utreda hur ett sådant erbjudande måste utformas för att vara förenligt med Takeover-reglerna, då i synnerhet den aktiemarknadsrättsliga likabehandlingsprincipen. Det föreligger inga direkt aktiemarknadsrättsliga hinder för stub equity vid offentliga uppköpserbjudanden, förfarandets förenlighet med regleringen är helt beroende av hur erbjudandet utformas och vilka syften erbjudandet avser uppnå. Möjligheterna att särbehandla målbolagets aktieägare är till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen i regel mycket små. Ett erbjudande med stub equity torde kunna utformas så att mindre aktieägare erbjuds ett kontantvederlag alternativt ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget medan de större aktieägarna enbart erhåller ett aktievederlag i holding- eller budbolaget, då mot bakgrund av de praktiska skäl som finns till stöd för en sådan utformning. Budgivaren har därutöver vid ett erbjudande med stub equity möjligheten att erbjuda målbolagets aktieägare A-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot A-aktier i målbolaget, B-aktier i budbolaget i utbyte mot B-aktier i målbolaget samt en premie för aktier med olika ekonomiska rättigheter. Ett stub equity-erbjudande ställer därutöver krav på erbjudandehandlingens utformning, innefattande att ett värderingsutlåtande avseende värderingen av aktievederlaget bör inhämtas och bifogas samt att målbolagets aktieägare bör informeras om upplägget i erbjudandehandlingen på ett tydligt och lättbegripligt sätt. Vidare torde villkor om viss anslutandegrad för stub equity-delen av vederlaget, villkor om att aktievederlaget med stub equity begränsas samt villkor om att vissa aktieägare ska acceptera erbjudandet vara förenligt med likabehandlingsprincipen. Gällande reglering torde slutligen innebära ett erforderligt skydd för okvalificerade investerare vid erbjudanden om stub equity, detta då möjligheterna att särbehandla aktieägare till följd av likabehandlingsprincipen är mycket begränsade och skyldigheterna att informera okvalificerade investerare om innebörden av ett erbjudande med stub equity betydande. / Public takeover bids on the Swedish stock market are mainly made with cash considerations, frequently combined with share considerations. As an alternative to such public offerings, the bidder may offer the company's shareholders “stub equity”, in which case the bidder offers the target company's shareholders a limited number of shares in a special unlisted holding or bidding company, which in turn after the public takeover bid holds all shares in the target company. This thesis seeks to discuss how such an offer needs to be designed in order to be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation, in particular the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. There are no direct restrictions to stub equity in public takeover bids in the Swedish takeover regulation, the procedure's compatibility with the regulation is entirely dependent on how the offer is designed and what purposes the offer is intended to achieve. The opportunity to treat the target company's shareholders differently are generally very limited due to the principle of equal treatment. An offer with stub equity ought to be able to be designed so that smaller shareholders are offered a cash consideration or a share consideration in the holding or bidding company, whilst the larger shareholders only receive a share consideration in the holding or bidding company. This in accordance with the exception for practical reasons the Swedish takeover regulation permits in these cases. In addition to this, in an offer with stub equity, the bidder has the opportunity to offer the target company's shareholders A-shares in in the holding- or bid company in exchange for A-shares in the target company, B-shares in the holding- or bid company in exchange for B-shares in the target company as well as a premium for shares with different financial rights. Furthermore, an offer with stub equity places high demands on the design and content of the offer document, including obtaining a valuation statement regarding the valuation of the share consideration and informing the target company's shareholders about the structure of the offer document in a clear and easy to understand manner. Conditions regarding certain degree of accession to the stub equity part of the offer, conditions that the share consideration with stub equity is limited and conditions that certain shareholders must accept the offer ought to also be compatible with the Swedish takeover regulation. Lastly, the existing regulation ought to entail the necessary protection for unqualified investors when offering stub equity, as the opportunity to treat shareholders differently due to the principle of equal treatment is very limited and the obligations to inform unqualified investors about the meaning of an offer with stub equity are significant.