Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät I--Universität--Zürich, 1993.

Thèse (Ph. D.) -- Université Laval, 1997. / Bibliogr.: f. 170-175. Publié aussi en version électronique.

Heraldry has been called the "shorthand of history" and with its own specific rules, symbols and shields in use for over eight hundred years, it is still of value today. Heraldry was first used as identification method in battle, but spread to other spheres of society. Heraldry was always part of the military and is still more visible in use by the military than other parts of society. It is these rules, terminology, and symbolism that influenced the choice of topic to understand the meaning of the emblems. Heraldry is a science that studies the rules and terminology of armorial bearings, as well as the colourful and artistic emblems of individuals, families, communities or nations. In ancient times man used symbols to distinguish and to identify with his world view. Ancient man's symbolic illustrative or carved signs evolved from totems being used as emblems of identification with clan members, to flags, badges and shields used in the army and logos used as trademarks. It grew into a science of heraldry with hereditary and regulating rules and systems. Symbols can mean different things to different people, the construction and reconstruction of meaning rely on the different cultural contexts in which it is used. It is these cultural contexts and the cohesion between them that will unveil the deeper meaning and worth of heraldic emblems. The study aims at compiling a catalogue of South African Army military units by presenting the emblems of the different units to understand the significance of the emblem for its users. To achieve this an exploratory and descriptive investigation on heraldry and South African military heraldry was done, defining esprit de corps, symbolism, identity, traditions, indigenous elements and totemism. The study focuses on the period 1994 to 2014 to give a snapshot of emblems in use during this period. It was mostly the emblems of higher headquarters that changed. The colours of the old flag of orange, white and blue changed to green, gold or yellow, red, blue, black and white. In spite of changes, the unit emblem still forged a strong bond of identity amongst members. / Mini Dissertation (MHCS)--University of Pretoria, 2017. / Historical and Heritage Studies / MHCS / Unrestricted

Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät--Düsseldorf--Heinrich-Heine-Universität, 1993.

Thesis (doctoral)--Uppsala University, 1983. / Distributor from label on verso of t.p. Includes indexes. Bibliography: p. 186-198.

Diss.--Sprachwissenschaft--Zürich. / Bibliogr. p. 136-139.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

En raison du progrès soutenu des sciences expérimentales et des technologies de l’information, plusieurs chercheurs en neurosciences affirment que nous sommes plus près que jamais de montrer la façon dont la physiologie et l’organisation du cerveau produisent les fonctions supérieures du système nerveux. Ainsi, des scientifiques de renom ont commencé à formuler des hypothèses, à construire des théories et à développer des modèles de simulation numérique en vue d’expliquer l’apparition de la conscience à partir des mécanismes de signalisation neuronale et de la modification adaptative des circuits nerveux cérébraux. Les philosophes aussi cherchent maintenant à formuler la solution au problème de l’explication de l’unité du corps et de l’esprit sur les bases de ces connaissances. Mais étant donné que cette approche implique la compréhension des phénomènes mentaux en termes de phénomènes physiques, leur réflexion conduit, en général, soit à une description réductionniste de l’esprit, soit à un dualisme de propriétés. C’est pourquoi certains d’entre eux ont proposé récemment de chercher dans la philosophie naturelle d’Aristote la direction que devrait emprunter cette recherche. Pourtant, plusieurs des arguments avancés par ces savants contemporains à l’appui de leurs thèses comportent des erreurs de principe, de compréhension ou de méthode qui mettent sérieusement en doute la solidité de leurs propositions. Cette recherche analyse en détail ces arguments dans le dessein de faire ressortir les principales difficultés et de les enlever pour juger d’une façon plus éclairée de la vraie contribution de ces connaissances à notre compréhension de l’unité naturelle que forment le corps et l’esprit. Sa démarche se divise en trois étapes principales. La première vise à prendre connaissance de l’état actuel de la recherche expérimentale en neurobiologie, la deuxième évalue deux modèles représentatifs de la recherche théorique des neurosciences et la troisième se propose de parvenir à comprendre le plus exactement possible la façon dont Aristote rend compte de l’unité du corps et de l’esprit. Trois observations générales résultent de cet examen. Premièrement, qu’en réalité la neurobiologie ne cherche pas à comprendre l’aspect phénoménal des fonctions supérieures du cerveau, mais uniquement leurs fondements neuraux, car elle est consciente de ses limites naturelles en tant que science expérimentale. Deuxièmement, que les arguments avancés par ces modèles théoriques de la conscience en faveur de la compréhension biologique des fonctions supérieures du système nerveux se servent principalement de l’altération du sens des mots du vocabulaire associé à la cognition pour accomplir le passage des phénomènes biologiques aux phénomènes mentaux, proposant essentiellement de comprendre ces derniers comme le résultat d’une inférence statistique accomplie par la signalisation neuronale grâce à la structuration adaptative des circuits nerveux. Troisièmement, que la philosophie naturelle d’Aristote accomplit réellement l’unité du corps et de l’esprit, mais qu’elle ne parvient pas à expliquer cette unité à partir des mécanismes de la perception et du mouvement de l’animal, mais plutôt à partir des principes qui fondent son étude de la nature, et que les objections formulées à ses arguments découlent d’une lecture fragmentaire ou biaisée de ses écrits et d’une compréhension superficielle ou erronée de ses concepts fondamentaux de sa philosophie. Ces observations permettent de conclure que la tâche de la philosophie de la nature n’est pas celle d’accommoder sa réflexion concernant l’unité que forment ensemble le corps, l’âme et l’esprit aux résultats des sciences expérimentales, mais celle de formuler des principes aptes à unifier les différents aspects de la réalité sur lesquels portent ces différentes sciences. / The steady progress of experimental science and information technologies has led several researchers in the neurosciences to affirm that we are now closer than ever to disclosing the way in which the physiological organisation of the brain produces the higher functions of the nervous system. Consequently, these renowned scientists have proposed hypotheses, elaborated theories and developed numerical simulation models in order to explain the emergence of consciousness from the mechanics of neural signaling and the adaptation of the brain’s neural circuits. Philosophers are currently also seeking the solution to the problem of explaining the unity of body and mind on the basis of this knowledge. But as this approach implies describing mental phenomena in terms of the underlying physical phenomena, their reflections generally lead either to a reductionist description of the mind or to a dualist theory. For this reason, certain of them have recently proposed that such research should look for inspiration in the natural philosophy of Aristotle. However, several of the arguments advanced by these contemporary researchers in the support of their theses are flawed by errors of principle, of comprehension or of method, which place serious doubt upon the solidity of their propositions. In the present dissertation these arguments are placed under detailed scrutiny in order to pinpoint the main difficulties and discard them, allowing a clearer evaluation of the true contribution of these propositions to our understanding of the natural unity formed by body and the mind. This project is divided into three major sections. The first is intended to present the current state of experimental research in neurobiology; the second evaluates two representative models from current theoretical research in neuroscience; and the third endeavours to come to as exact an understanding as possible of the way in which Aristotle treats the unity of the body and the soul, to which the intellect v i belongs in the particular case of man and whose concept does not exactly match the contemporary concept of mind. There are three general observations that can be drawn from this examination. Firstly, in reality neurobiology does not seek to explain the phenomenal aspects of the brain’s higher functions, only their neurological bases, because as an experimental science it is bound by natural limits. Secondly, the arguments put forth by theoretical models of consciousness in favour of a biological understanding of the higher neurological functions are mainly based on the alteration of the meaning of words associated with cognition in order to make the transition from biological to mental phenomena. These phenomena would then be understood essentially as the result of statistical inference accomplished by neuronal signaling, made possible by the adaptive restructuring of neural circuits. Thirdly, Aristotle’s natural philosophy truly succeeds in uniting body and soul, but his explanation of this unity is not founded on the mechanisms of perception and movement in the animal, but rather on the principles underlying his study of nature, and the objections that have been raised against his arguments have been based on fragmentary or biased readings of his writings, and on an erroneous or superficial understanding of the fundamental concepts of his philosophy. These observations allow us to draw the conclusion that the proper task of the philosophy of nature is not to accommodate its reflections concerning the unity of body, soul and spirit to the results of experimental science, but rather that of formulating the principles that unify the different aspects of reality upon which the different sciences are based.

Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2014

-i- Abstract The aim of this study was to conduct a cross-cultural validation of the Group Environment Questionnaire (GEQ) (Carron, Widmeyer, & Brawley, 1985), internationally recognized as useful and contemporary measurement approach to cohesion. The GEQ was originally validated for a sample of North American athletes. In total, the sample consisted of 1 410 adult athletes and trainers (1 019 male and 391 female). A modified direct translation method with protocol analysis was utilised to translate the GEQ from English into Czech. Content validity was analysed and confirmed by content validity ratio method for individual indicators of the questionnaire. The factor structure of the Czech version of the questionnaire, verified by structural equation modelling, did not differ from the original version. The predictive validity of the questionnaire was confirmed by its ability to differentiate between groups of athletes (with diverse levels of perceived successfulness) on the basis of their team cohesion scores. Reliability, measured by the Cronbach's coefficient α, was 0,59-0,69 (for version with positively/negatively worded items) and 0,63-0,79 (for version with positively worded items). The results are discussed in the context of possible cultural differences. For population of the Czech athletes from team...