For many, epistemology is a normative discipline in much the same sense as ethics. According to the analogy, just as ethics is about what we should do and how we should live our lives, epistemology is about what we should believe and how we should go about forming our beliefs. What complicates the analogy, however, is that believing things is also a part of living life. Our beliefs aren’t only evaluable with respect to whether they are credible, true, or amount to knowledge, but also with respect to whether they are useful, beneficial, or contribute to our happiness and wellbeing. The analogy implies that epistemic considerations (like evidence, truth, or knowledge) settle questions about what we should believe just as ethical considerations (like duty, goodness, or virtue) settle questions about what we should do and how we should live. The present work is an attempt to challenge this general picture of the subject matter of epistemology. Specifically, I argue that the normative assessment of belief cannot be understood in isolation from the broader social practices and human activities in virtue of which what we believe is ethically and practically significant. Chapter I introduces the central issues and raises a challenge to views that distinguish between epistemic and ethical assessment in terms of reasons for belief and reasons for action, respectively. The conclusion of this chapter is that there must be some conceptual link between the norms of belief and the norms of action. Chapter II builds upon this challenge by spelling out that conceptual link: reasons for belief entail reasons for action, and vice versa. The main conclusion of chapters I and II is that epistemology cannot settle questions about what we should believe without also settling questions about what we should do, and ethics cannot settle questions about what we should do without also settling questions about what we should believe. Chapters III and IV provide novel answers to two significant challenges to abandoning the analogy: providing plausible accounts of the relationship between reasons and rational motivation and the normative comparison of epistemic considerations and practical reasons for belief.

Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Nesta tese abordamos alguns aspectos das inter-relações entre conhecimento, ética e valores dentro da atividade científica segundo as ideias do matemático-filósofo vitoriano William Clifford. O nosso tema geral coloca em jogo o envolvimento da produção, da avaliação e da transmissão de conhecimento científico com os comportamentos, as responsabilidades e os traços de caráter do investigador. Nosso objetivo é oferecer uma introdução ao pensamento e a algumas produções intelectuais de Clifford, um autor pouco familiar ao público filosófico brasileiro, bem como uma descrição comentada de seu escrito mais famoso, intitulado A Ética da Crença. Mediante esse objetivo, extraímos suas concepções a respeito das características e consequências éticas do empreendimento científico. As questões que orientam a tese são as seguintes: de que maneira a produção de conhecimento estaria condicionada à personalidade e ao comportamento ético de quem se lança àquela prática? Em que medida essa prática promove o cultivo de características pessoais socialmente desejáveis e favoráveis? Quais as conseqüências para a sociedade dessa inter-relação entre o caráter do investigador e os valores epistêmicos que estes colocam em ação e, sem os quais parece não ser possível a obtenção de conhecimento confiável? / In this work, we address some aspects of the interrelation between knowledge, ethics and values inside scientific activity according to the ideas of Victorian mathematician-philosopher, William Kingdon Clifford. What is at stake in the overall theme of this thesis is the way the production, evaluation and transmission of scientific knowledge interact with the behaviors, responsibilities and character traits of the investigator. William Clifford is a little known author to the Brazilian philosophical public, thus our primary goal is to offer an introduction to some of his thoughts and intellectual productions, as well as a commented description of Cliffords most famous paper, The Ethics of Belief. By these means, we extract some of his ideas regarding the ethical characteristics and ethical consequences of scientific inquiry. So, these are our guiding question: in what way is knowledge production shaped by the personality and ethical behavior of the person engaged in such production? To what extent does it promote the development of socially desirable and favorable personal characteristics? What are the consequences for society of the interrelation between the investigator's character traits and the epistemic values which he/she puts into action, and without which it seems impossible to obtain reliable knowledge?

Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Nesta tese abordamos alguns aspectos das inter-relações entre conhecimento, ética e valores dentro da atividade científica segundo as ideias do matemático-filósofo vitoriano William Clifford. O nosso tema geral coloca em jogo o envolvimento da produção, da avaliação e da transmissão de conhecimento científico com os comportamentos, as responsabilidades e os traços de caráter do investigador. Nosso objetivo é oferecer uma introdução ao pensamento e a algumas produções intelectuais de Clifford, um autor pouco familiar ao público filosófico brasileiro, bem como uma descrição comentada de seu escrito mais famoso, intitulado A Ética da Crença. Mediante esse objetivo, extraímos suas concepções a respeito das características e consequências éticas do empreendimento científico. As questões que orientam a tese são as seguintes: de que maneira a produção de conhecimento estaria condicionada à personalidade e ao comportamento ético de quem se lança àquela prática? Em que medida essa prática promove o cultivo de características pessoais socialmente desejáveis e favoráveis? Quais as conseqüências para a sociedade dessa inter-relação entre o caráter do investigador e os valores epistêmicos que estes colocam em ação e, sem os quais parece não ser possível a obtenção de conhecimento confiável? / In this work, we address some aspects of the interrelation between knowledge, ethics and values inside scientific activity according to the ideas of Victorian mathematician-philosopher, William Kingdon Clifford. What is at stake in the overall theme of this thesis is the way the production, evaluation and transmission of scientific knowledge interact with the behaviors, responsibilities and character traits of the investigator. William Clifford is a little known author to the Brazilian philosophical public, thus our primary goal is to offer an introduction to some of his thoughts and intellectual productions, as well as a commented description of Cliffords most famous paper, The Ethics of Belief. By these means, we extract some of his ideas regarding the ethical characteristics and ethical consequences of scientific inquiry. So, these are our guiding question: in what way is knowledge production shaped by the personality and ethical behavior of the person engaged in such production? To what extent does it promote the development of socially desirable and favorable personal characteristics? What are the consequences for society of the interrelation between the investigator's character traits and the epistemic values which he/she puts into action, and without which it seems impossible to obtain reliable knowledge?

Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime. Toutefois, d’autres philosophes soutiennent que malgré son omniprésence dans la vie de tous les jours, le blâme doxastique n’est jamais approprié. En effet, selon l’argument à partir de l’involontarisme doxastique, nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances puisque (1) nous pouvons être blâmés pour une croyance seulement si elle est sous notre contrôle volontaire et (2) nos croyances ne sont jamais sous notre contrôle volontaire. Le but de ce mémoire est de déterminer si les déontologistes peuvent répondre de manière convaincante à cet argument. Autrement dit, pouvons-nous parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances malgré ce qu’en disent les anti-déontologistes, ou faut-il leur donner raison et rejeter la pratique du blâme doxastique ? Pour répondre à cette question, je commence par clarifier l’argument anti-déontologiste en précisant la teneur de sa thèse centrale : l’involontarisme doxastique. Par la suite, je passe en revue différentes stratégies qui ont été proposées par des représentants du déontologisme pour défendre le blâme doxastique contre cet argument. Devant l’échec de ces réponses, je suggère une défense alternative du déontologisme selon laquelle l’involontarisme doxastique n’est pas incompatible avec le blâme doxastique. Si cette réponse est concluante, alors nous n’avons pas à donner raison aux anti-déontologistes : nous pouvons parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances. / Can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs ? According to epistemic deontologism, the ordinary practice of blaming and criticizing people for their beliefs is a legitimate one. However, some philosophers argue that despite its pervasiveness in everyday life, doxastic blame is never appropriate. According to the argument from doxastic involuntarism, we can never be blamed for our beliefs since (1) we can be blamed for a belief only if it is under our voluntary control, and (2) our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. The goal of this thesis is to determine whether deontologists can reply convincingly to this argument. In other words, can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs despite what anti-deontologists claim, or do we have to accept the argument from doxastic involuntarism and reject the practice of doxastic blame ? In order to answer that question, I first clarify the anti-deontologist argument by making more precise the nature of its central thesis: doxastic involuntarism. I then review different strategies proposed by deontologists to defend doxastic blame against this argument. Given the failure of these replies, I propose an alternative defense of deontologism according to which doxastic involuntarism is not incompatible with doxastic blame. If this reply is sound, then we do not have to accept the anti-deontologist argument: we can sometimes be blamed for our beliefs.

Ce mémoire s'inscrit dans la constellation de questions regroupées sous l'étiquette de l'éthique de la croyance. Plus spécifiquement, il cherche à analyser la viabilité des jugements tout bien considéré portant sur les croyances lorsque des raisons de types distincts (raisons épistémiques et raisons pragmatiques) entrent en conflit. Cette analyse se fera à l'aune d'une recherche portant sur l'instrumentalisme de la croyance, la position avançant que les croyances sont instrumentales à nos intérêts et que, par conséquent, la normativité de la croyance se jauge en fonction de nos objectifs. L'instrumentalisme de la croyance est tombé sous le coup de plusieurs critiques dans les dernières années et se mémoire se donne comme mission d'en évaluer la portée. Si d'aventure l'instrumentalisme de la croyance devait être une position viable, il y a lieu de penser qu'il existe une commensurabilité possible entre raisons de différents types. / This thesis is part of a larger group of philosophical inquiries usually placed under the label of "Ethics of Belief". Specifically, my aim is to examine the possibility of all things considered judgments concerning beliefs for which there is a conflict between reasons of distinct kinds (epistemic reasons and pragmatic reasons). This inquiry will mostly concern epistemic instrumentalism, the position holding that one's beliefs are instrumental to one's own objectives and thus, that the rationality of beliefs must be an instrumental rationality. It appears that this position has been the aim of a few criticism in the recent years and my goal is to evaluate the strength of such criticism. If epistemic instrumentalism ends up being a viable thesis, we can expect that there may not be any incommensurability between reasons for belief of different kinds.

Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime. Toutefois, d’autres philosophes soutiennent que malgré son omniprésence dans la vie de tous les jours, le blâme doxastique n’est jamais approprié. En effet, selon l’argument à partir de l’involontarisme doxastique, nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances puisque (1) nous pouvons être blâmés pour une croyance seulement si elle est sous notre contrôle volontaire et (2) nos croyances ne sont jamais sous notre contrôle volontaire. Le but de ce mémoire est de déterminer si les déontologistes peuvent répondre de manière convaincante à cet argument. Autrement dit, pouvons-nous parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances malgré ce qu’en disent les anti-déontologistes, ou faut-il leur donner raison et rejeter la pratique du blâme doxastique ? Pour répondre à cette question, je commence par clarifier l’argument anti-déontologiste en précisant la teneur de sa thèse centrale : l’involontarisme doxastique. Par la suite, je passe en revue différentes stratégies qui ont été proposées par des représentants du déontologisme pour défendre le blâme doxastique contre cet argument. Devant l’échec de ces réponses, je suggère une défense alternative du déontologisme selon laquelle l’involontarisme doxastique n’est pas incompatible avec le blâme doxastique. Si cette réponse est concluante, alors nous n’avons pas à donner raison aux anti-déontologistes : nous pouvons parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances. / Can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs ? According to epistemic deontologism, the ordinary practice of blaming and criticizing people for their beliefs is a legitimate one. However, some philosophers argue that despite its pervasiveness in everyday life, doxastic blame is never appropriate. According to the argument from doxastic involuntarism, we can never be blamed for our beliefs since (1) we can be blamed for a belief only if it is under our voluntary control, and (2) our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. The goal of this thesis is to determine whether deontologists can reply convincingly to this argument. In other words, can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs despite what anti-deontologists claim, or do we have to accept the argument from doxastic involuntarism and reject the practice of doxastic blame ? In order to answer that question, I first clarify the anti-deontologist argument by making more precise the nature of its central thesis: doxastic involuntarism. I then review different strategies proposed by deontologists to defend doxastic blame against this argument. Given the failure of these replies, I propose an alternative defense of deontologism according to which doxastic involuntarism is not incompatible with doxastic blame. If this reply is sound, then we do not have to accept the anti-deontologist argument: we can sometimes be blamed for our beliefs.

Ce mémoire, qui appartient au domaine de l’éthique de la croyance, un champ d’enquête philosophique situé au confluent de la philosophie de l’esprit, de l’épistémologie et de l’éthique, cherche à évaluer la viabilité d’une certaine approche influente en faveur de l’anti-pragmatisme, qui est la thèse selon laquelle il n’existe aucune raison pratique normative de croire. Cette approche, que l’on peut qualifier de « constitutiviste », se fonde sur l’idée que certaines caractéristiques intrinsèques à la croyance feraient en sorte qu’il ne pourrait exister de raisons pratiques de croire. Les objectifs de ce mémoire sont : 1) sur le plan descriptif, de donner une topographie de l’approche constitutiviste 2) sur le plan normatif, d’évaluer si l’approche constitutiviste pour fonder l’anti-pragmatiste est une démarche viable ou si elle doit être rejetée. Je procède à cette évaluation par une analyse critique des arguments constitutivistes à la lumière de la littérature récente portant sur la cible de la croyance, les raisons de croire et les normes épistémiques. Je conclus que l’approche constitutiviste souffre de problèmes sérieux qui remettent en question sa viabilité. / This thesis, which pertains to the philosophical domain of inquiry called the ethics of belief, at the crossroads of philosophy of mind, epistemology and ethics, aims at assessing the viability of an influent argumentative strategy in favour of anti-pragmatism about reasons for belief. According to anti-pragmatism, there are no practical normative reasons for belief. The constitutivist strategy, as I call it, purports to show that anti-pragmatism is true by appealing to constitutive, intrinsic features of belief. The aim of this thesis is double: first, it is to give a portrait of the landscape of constitutivist arguments against practical reasons for belief. Second, it is to evaluate the merits of these arguments. In order to do so, I present a critical analysis of the two main constitutivist arguments that is grounded in recent works about the aim of belief, raisons for belief and epistemic norms. My conclusion is that the constitutivist strategy suffers from serious defects which threaten its viability.

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