Exposé des raisons de fait et de droit qui fondent le dispositif, « mobiles psychologiques » ayant conduit le juge à se forger sa conviction, telle est la motivation des décisions de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme. Parce qu'elle cherche à la fois à justifier et à expliquer les choix du juge, la motivation strasbourgeoise ne se conçoit pas comme une simple déduction purement logique. Elle est aussi un acte important de rhétorique. La Cour accorde une importance particulière au fait d'emporter l'adhésion de l'auditoire afin que celui-ci réceptionne de façon spontanée ses décisions et le droit qu'elle produit. C'est en faisant appel à la raison que la Cour entend affirmer son autorité et réaliser la mission qu'elle s'est fixée : former un droit commun européen des droits de l'homme. A la fois moyen de renforcement de la légitimité du juge et condition de la légitimité de ses décisions, la motivation contribue à nourrir la confiance des justiciables et des Etats parties dans la justice européenne. Dotée d'une fonction pédagogique, la motivation permet aussi à la Cour de persuader l'auditoire et d'inciter les Etats à la réception de sa jurisprudence. De ces différentes fonctions découlent alors une certaine manière de motiver. Certes, l'exposé des motifs n'est pas exempt de critiques. Il révèle régulièrement les erreurs, les manipulations et les excès d'un juge au pouvoir normatif certain. Mais le nombre considérable de décisions rendues invite à conclure au caractère satisfaisant de la motivation. Les efforts de la Cour pour construire un style judiciaire de qualité, mais aussi adapter de façon constante le contenu de sa motivation et « coller » de ce fait au plus près des réalités de la société démocratique européenne, doivent en effet être soulignés. / The motivation of the European Court of Human Rights' judgments is based both on the exposition of reasons containing elements of fact and law and on the “psychological motives” that allow the European judge to build up his convictions. The motivation included in the judgment tries both to justify and explain the Court's choice. So, it can't be considered only as a purely logical deduction. It is also an important act of rhetoric. The European Court wishes her audience to accept its case law in a spontaneous and voluntary way. The Court chooses therefore to appeal to good sense rather than constraint to assert its case law authority and so fulfill its long term mission which consists in building a European common law on Human Rights . The motivation contributes to build the legitimacy of the European Court's decisions. It also allows the public and the Contracting States to trust the European justice and to acknowledge the legitimacy of its decisions. It means that the motivation is also a teaching method helping to receive its case law and to accept the European supervision. To achieve this aim, the Court chose different strategies that sometimes show the mistakes, the manipulations or the excesses of the European Court's function. Nevertheless, the general opinion on the Court's motivation is positive and helps to adapt its contents to the realities of the democratic European society. The European Court's efforts to build a quality style of judgments must be also underlined.

- anglicky The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does not guarantee any right to the environment, in spite of that the European Court of Human Rights developed an extensive environmental case-law. This thesis examines the aforementioned case-law and on the ground of this examination assesses what are the limits of protection granted by the Court to the environment. The thesis focuses particularly on the limb of the case-law in which endangerment of the environment is perceived as violation of certain rights protected under the Convention. Subsequently, from the analysis of the selected cases the conclusion is inferred that the Convention is even in its present-day form an instrument which may contribute to the protection of the environment, nevertheless, its environmental effect in the states which are parties to the Convention will probably not be particularly significant.

Limits of freedom of expression in the light of case-law of the European Court of Human Rights This diploma thesis deals with the freedom of expression and its permissible limits as those declared in Article 10 od the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter referred as "Convention"). Freedom of expression is guaranteed to everyone. However freedom of expression is not absolute, restrictions on freedom of expression by the intervention of the national authorities to individual freedoms is permissable in case of existence any justifiable targets pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10. We named this procedure by test legality, legitimacy and proportionality. So, in other words, the measures used against a person must be established legal standards, must pursue achieving a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter "the Court") applies this test whenever it finds existing interference with freedom of expression. It focuses on case law precedents, set by the European Court's of Human Rights (hereinafter referred as "Court"), in cases of complaints for violation of the freedom of expression concerning the admissibility of the use of legitimate aim clauses by national authorities applying law. The structure of the contents of this thesis...

This diploma thesis deals with the issue of wiretapping and interception of telecommunications pursuant to Section 88 of the Czech Criminal Procedure Act. It deals also with the question of the so called metering which is governed by a separate Section within the Czech Criminal Procedure Act, Section 88a. The main purpose of this thesis is to provide thorough analysis of these two legal issues, taking into consideration domestic, international and partially also foreign legal provisions. This thesis is systematically divided into three main chapters which offer sequential elaboration on domestic, "European" and Slovak legislation. Each of these chapters is split into several separate parts. In Chapter One, I outline concept, major principles and procedure applying to wiretapping and interception of telecommunication on one hand, and concept, major principles and procedure applying to metering on the other hand. Issue of application of wiretap and interception of telecommunication obtained from foreign authority, as well as question of usage of acquired e-mail content are dealt with in two separate parts of this chapter. Moreover, I focus on utilization of the intercepted wiretap, in case it has been procured by a private individual. Second Chapter is dedicated to help the reader understand the...

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:31:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2013-04-03Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:20:04Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 gasparoto_al_dr_mar.pdf: 558358 bytes, checksum: ca0360fc9ba1705edfb9aebda579abeb (MD5) / Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo verificar a aplicabilidade do princípio da primazia da norma mais favorável ao indivíduo nas sentenças e opiniões consultivas proferidas pelas Cortes Européia e Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. Esta investigação foi feita por meio de uma análise da aplicação do princípio pro homine, nos tribunais europeu e interamericano dos direitos humanos, sob os pontos de vista da doutrina, jurisprudência e opiniões consultivas emitidas pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos e pelo Tribunal Europeu de Direitos Humanos. / This research aimed to investigate the employ of the principle of the primacy of the most favorable rule to the individual during the judgments and advisory opinions given for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights. The analysis was done evaluating the application of the pro homine principle in the referred courts about the doctrine jurisprudence and advisory opinions given for the Inter-American and European Courts of Human Rights.

This thesis aims to provide an evaluation of the property aspect of the Cyprus problem. The &#039 / property issue&#039 / is an important aspect of the problem because it concerns the individual human rights and interests of a large population on both sides of the island. Following an introduction and a description of the historical backgroundof the island, there will be a basic account of the Cyprus conflict in order to have a perspective on the disagreement. The bulk of the thesis is then formed by the problem of property in the overall disagreement and both sides&rsquo / arguments towards the issue. After detailing various peace negotiations in relation to the property issue, the involvement of the European Court of Human Rights in the issue will be discussed, including the most recent developments which have since emerged

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The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – supervised by the European Court of Human rights (ECtHR) – coexists with other normative (human rights) instruments that have been created at the national, regional, and international level, both by State and non-State actors. The ECHR represents one legal piece of this normative ‘jungle’, characterized by legal ‘fragmentation’. Whereas a lot is said about the negative aspects of this diverse world, this doctoral thesis aims to focus on its positive sides. To support its interpretation and application of the ECHR, the Strasbourg Court makes reference to a diverse range of instruments other than the ECHR, which we call external instruments. The Grand Chamber-case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey of 12 November 2008 provides a rare overview of the characteristics of this ‘referencing practice’. In this judgment, the Court included a separate heading to specifically explain its interpretative use of international law, discussing the legal basis as well as the type of instruments that it considers relevant. Two major conclusions follow from the Court’s explanations: firstly, it puts external referencing in the light of some rules on interpretation provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (particularly in Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT); secondly, it stresses that soft and non-ratified external instruments might equally offer support for (evolutively) interpreting the ECHR. These statements are controversial; the Court has been criticized for misinterpreting the rules of the VCLT, for not well justifying its references as well as for exceeding its powers by incoherently relying on (non-binding) external materials for interpretative purposes.The case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey left many questions open in respect of the importation of external instruments. There is some confusion about the functions and the weight of (non-binding) external instruments in legal reasoning. In addition, the justificatory arguments developed in this case lack precision and persuasiveness. Addressing these gaps, this study firstly offers an elaborate ‘mapping’ of the usage of external instruments by the ECtHR. For that purpose, all references in each Grand Chamber-case since Demir and Baykara v. Turkey of 12 November 2008 (until the end of 2015) have been analyzed and categorized. Secondly, this work develops arguments to better justify the Court’s practice of using external instruments. Both from a legality and a users’ perspective, this thesis demonstrates how external referencing may (under certain conditions) be a valid method to give meaning to the provisions in the ECHR. The ‘mapping’ of the referencing practice demonstrates that, to support the interpretation and application of the Convention in the ‘law’-section of the decision, external instruments have been invoked by the Grand Chamber in almost 70 percent of the examined cases. This interpretative technique covers a wide variety of instruments, diverging according to their origin as well as to their scope ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione loci. The legal status of the instruments constitutes an additional root of diversity; the ECtHR imports legal instruments that have been ratified by the Member States, instruments that have not been ratified by some of the Member States and/or by the respondent State, soft instruments created by politically (non-)representative bodies, and finally, case law developed by other (quasi-)judicial bodies. The Grand Chamber references these instruments for different purposes: to dismiss their content, to establish interpretative rules, to support the interpretation of notions and requirements of the Convention, to enable the creation of harmony between the Convention and external legal requirements, or to consider a State’s freedom of manoeuvre when applying the ECHR. An example of a contested – but rather rare – usage of external instruments consists of comparing a mixture of binding and non-binding instruments in order to progressively evolve (and change) the Court’s case law. Overall, however, the Grand Chamber adopts a rather traditional approach to its interpretative ‘sources’, not according to non-binding instruments an independent decisive weight.In the Grand Chamber cases issued after Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, the Court did not undertake efforts to further justify and explain its referencing practice. In our view, two provisions might nonetheless operate as valuable vehicles to enhance the legality of some references. It concerns, more particularly, Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT, inciting the Court to take into account external applicable norms, and Article 53 ECHR, offering a ‘safeguard’ for human rights. Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT is regularly used by the Court in connection to the method of ‘harmonious interpretation’, accommodating the obligations of the ECHR with external obligations (that risk to conflict with the Convention). We agree that Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT – covering a principle of ‘systemic integration’ – offers a legal basis for a coordinative integration of external applicable requirements. Some caution is nonetheless required; the creation of convergence between the ECHR and external legal domains should not supersede the aim of effective and progressive human rights protection. Therefore, when a conflict arises between the ECHR and an external provision, this should be clearly acknowledged instead of being artificially ignored under a pretext of ‘harmonisation’ and ‘anti-fragmentation’. Subsequently, the conflict should be solved by means of ‘hierarchical integration’ (giving precedence to human rights law) rather than by ‘coordinative integration’.Although the Court references Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT to support harmonious interpretation between the ECHR and external instruments outside the human rights domain, this case law study demonstrates that it does generally not cite this provision in respect of references to human rights catalogues other than the ECHR. For that reason, a criticism claiming that the Court misuses Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT to expand the ECHR on the basis of external higher human rights provisions, largely misses ground. This does not mean, however, that Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT has no relevance in respect of the importation of other human rights catalogues. Although this does not accord with the Court’s general practice, we are of the opinion that Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT mandates the Court to integrate (higher) protection standards applicable in all Member States of the Council of Europe. In other words, the ideal of ‘systemic integration’ is not only relevant in relation to the landscape of (general) international law, but should also permeate the domain of human rights law. As a harmonizing principle, it is supposed to encourage the Court to take account of ratified external human rights catalogues, including their authoritative interpretation by external monitoring bodies. Article 53 ECHR supports this argument too. This provision offers a human rights safeguard ensuring peaceful coexistence between the ECHR and higher protection standards. The message of Article 53 ECHR towards the Strasbourg judges is twofold. In its procedural dimension, the Court should use it directly, to sanction a State that, on the national level, did not give precedence to the highest applicable human rights standard. In its substantive dimension, this provision has effects similar to those of Article 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT. When higher and binding human rights standards are applicable in all Member States, Article 53 ECHR obliges the Court to substantively integrate them into its interpretation of the ECHR. In addition, we argue that Article 53 ECHR offers a symmetric human rights safeguard, preventing a downward evolution of the ECHR on the basis of external human rights instruments offering lower standards. The proposed interpretation of Article 53 ECHR is innovative, yet controversial; so far, the Court has not used it in this manner. In line with Articles 31 paragraph 3 (c) VCLT and 53 ECHR, we argue that external instruments, under certain conditions, exercise a binding authority. Apart from that, referencing could be exercised in an optional manner, for instance in order to support argumentative purposes such as ‘evolutive’, ‘practical and effective’, and ‘autonomous’ reasoning and/or the establishment of a ‘margin of appreciation’. Essentially, these interpretation principles are covered by a holistic reading of the rules of the VCLT. A concept that catches well a combined reading of the rules of the VCLT, without losing sight of the specificity of human rights law, is the search for ‘opinio juris under the treaty’. Under this interpretative framework, an emerging or an ambiguous State consensus may suffice to develop a dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, provided that the incomplete consensus is confirmed by an opinio juris. To establish an emerging or ambiguous State consensus, ‘hard’ and ratified legal instruments (of national or international origin) are of particular relevance. In addition, a wide variety of (non-binding) external instruments might be useful to demonstrate the opinio juris. Besides legal provisions, some other, less formal, users’ arguments may validate some aspects of the referencing practice. The usage of external human rights catalogues – possibly containing higher protection standards, rights of other ‘generations’, or more specialized and specific provisions – contributes to the creation of human rights that are effective, universal and indivisible. This serves the rights holders who have an interest in equal treatment by a law that operates as a ‘ius gentium’, and in an adjudication process that does justice to all specificities of their identity and lived experiences. In addition, referencing could contribute to progressively evolve the protection of human rights. The referencing practice also enhances the coherence of the system, which is beneficial for ‘legal certainty’ vis-à-vis all users of human rights. Moreover, external referencing may contribute to a more nuanced and ‘shared’ decision-making, inspired by the positions and insights of various actors. Indeed, by means of comparative law, judges can build a dialectic network of mutual influences and communicative enrichment on a global scale. When we acknowledge that it is the Court’s task to translate pluralism in balanced outcomes and to canalize the different interests underlying a case, the importation of external views from across the globe may help the Court is assuming that responsibility. The Strasbourg judges find particularly valuable tools in external instruments. Not only could their usage enhance the procedural economy and the deformalization of the decision-making process, external citations may also make a reasoning more convincing and authoritative towards the audience. However, these benefits only play to the extent that external referencing is transparent, consistent and systematically relies on a solid legal framework.To optimize the justification of the referencing practice, this doctoral thesis recommends the Court to better embed its external citations in both formal and informal arguments. We have done several suggestions as to how such arguments might be developed in practice. Their use could boost the valid usage of external instruments, which, under certain conditions, offers good opportunities for a persuasive interpretation and application of the ECHRWe started our research with a sketch of the present normative environment; it is disordered and can be metaphorically compared to a jungle. The Strasbourg judges walk through this area and use lianas to make connections between all elements that compose this forest. Through their referencing practice, they communicate, learn, and argue. In an ecosystem, all organisms are dependent on one another; they cannot survive in isolation. Following the rules of nature, the organisms mutually profit from each other’s existence and finally, provide each other with oxygen. In order to be good rangers in this jungle, the Strasbourg judges should recognize and acknowledge the existence and the value of all the other organisms. In addition, to ensure a high degree of balance in the ecosystem, they should keep an eye both on the system’s rules (legality) and on the views and interests of those that benefit from the system (the users of human rights). By handling the lianas in such manner, the Court contributes to more coherence of the system (combating ‘fragmentation’) and caters for the users’ needs. This does not mean that one day, the jungle will be turned into a nicely organized cornfield. Some diversity in global times is inevitable and necessary. After all, it is the chaotic context that offers us tools to advance the law, to persuade the public, etc. The art is not to replace pluralism by unity, but to find a balance between divergence and convergence by creating a form of justice that is shared by all. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Partout présentes au cœur de la jurisprudence européenne des droits de l'homme, les valeurs fondamentales des sociétés démocratiques constituent un sujet d'étude pertinent pour apprécier dans quelle mesure ces valeurs sont mobilisées et si elles participent d'une interprétation axiologique de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Simple rappel rhétorique ou véritable outil argumentatif, le recours aux valeurs dans la jurisprudence de la Cour EDH mérite ainsi d'être analysé au travers du prisme de l'interprétation de la Convention. A côté de l'interprétation téléologique, des interprétations évolutive et consensuelle, aucune étude n'a jusqu'alors recherché à systématiser la référence aux valeurs des sociétés démocratiques pour tenter d'en déduire une interprétation axiologique. Mais alors que le juge européen multiplie les références aux valeurs dans ses décisions, il y a néanmoins lieu de constater que l'utilisation de ces valeurs est concurrencée par d'autres politiques jurisprudentielles plus contemporaines et soucieuses des attentes actuelles des populations, de la revendication libertaire individualiste de plus en plus prégnante, et du nécessaire respect du principe de subsidiarité. Phénomènes qui s'accommodent difficilement d'une protection conservatrice de valeurs communes aux Etats parties à la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. / Everywhere in the legal precedents of the European court of human rights (ECHR), fundamental values of democratic societies are a relevant study subject to understand in which part the values are used and if they participate of a specific interpretation of the European convention based on axioms defense's. Simple rhetoric use or true argumentative tool, values resort's in the legal precedents of the ECHR need to be appreciated as an isolate interpretation method. Next to teleologic, evolutive, and consensual interpretative methods, none study try until then to systematize the resort of fundamental values of democratic societies by the judge and deduct of the European court case law the existence of a specific interpretation based on values defense's. If the European judge multiplies the resorts of values in case law, we have to notice that utilization of values competes with others interpretative methods, more contemporary, and respectful of actual societal expectations, individual claims and to enforce the subsidiarity principle. All social facts and jurisdictional necessities which are difficult to conciliate with requirement of a conservative protection of common values of the contracting States.