En 1969, dans une Communauté économique européenne (CEE) aux fondements déjà bien établis, et sous l’égide d’un néogaullisme assumé par la présidence de Georges Pompidou, l’Allemagne devient le modèle d’une France en quête de politique industrielle qui lui permettrait d’affirmer son rang sur l’échiquier international. Depuis le milieu des années 1960, le système monétaire international est fragilisé par l’endettement considérable des États-Unis. La France veut être à l’initiative d’une relance de l’Union économique et monétaire (UEM). Cette décision politique doit lui permettre d’adapter son économie et son industrie à l’instabilité grandissante du Système monétaire international. Comme le rappelait Jacques Rueff, « L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas ». L’action de l’économie française durant cette période qui court de la relance de l’Union économique et monétaire (décembre 1969) à la rédaction du Traité de Maastricht (février 1992), jalonnée par la mise en place du Système monétaire européen (SME : janvier 1979) et de l’Acte unique (janvier 1986), repose sur une volonté politique primordiale au service des relations avec la RFA, puis de l’Allemagne réunifiée. Les relations monétaires franco-allemandes ont pour but de promouvoir une Europe forte, maîtresse de son destin, et, d’une certaine façon, de revenir à une stabilité des changes. Le mythe de la stabilité de « l’étalon-or » a des acceptations différentes des deux côtés du Rhin. Si des études historiques récentes ont été consacrées partiellement aux conséquences de l’évolution des politiques monétaires européennes (et surtout françaises) sur l’intégration économique et monétaire dans la CEE, elles demeurent souvent centrées sur le septennat de VGE ou le début du premier mandat de François Mitterrand. La genèse de l’UEM est un processus dynamique long qui court de décembre 1969 à février 1992. En fait, les relations monétaires franco-allemandes englobent deux niveaux de décisions et d’applications. En premier lieu, sont à mentionner, les plus hautes instances politiques (présidence, chancellerie et ministères, mais aussi Commission européenne). En second lieu, interviennent les banques centrales dont le rôle quant à la mise en place et l’application des politiques monétaires est primordial. Cette dichotomie illustre l’avènement progressif du primat de l’économie sur la politique, perçu et analysé différemment en France et en Allemagne. Les attentes et les objectifs politiques et économiques divergent. Nous montrons dans cette étude que le processus d’UEM apparaît souvent comme un engrenage économique, où la politique cède le pas à l’économie. Les relations monétaires apparaissent asymétriques. Le pouvoir politique français a comme véritable interlocuteur le pouvoir économique allemand, représenté par la Bundesbank. Le « couple » franco-allemand est un mythe politique, français, que brise la libéralisation économique mondiale. L’UEM est, pour l’Allemagne, un moyen d’établir une Allemagne européenne au sein d’une Europe fédérale. En France, elle apparaît pour les gouvernements néo-gaullistes et libéraux comme un moyen de compenser une grandeur blessée, alors que les gouvernements socialistes donnent l’impression de l’utiliser pour compenser une idéologie en déroute. L’UEM parvient à la stabilité monétaire, mais en refusant l’Union politique européenne, proposée par l’Allemagne, la France laisse s’éloigner le rêve d’une Europe puissance et établit les bases une Europe allemande. / In 1969, in a well-established European Economic Community (EEC) under the neo-Gaullist presidency of Georges Pompidou, Germany stood as a model for France, looking for an effective industrial policy and a recovery of its rank on the international scene. Since the mid 1960s the international monetary system had been weakened by the growing US debt. France wanted to be the leader of the economic and monetary union (EMU). This political decision was a means to improve its economy confronted with the instability of the international monetary system. As pointed out by Jacques Rueff, « L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas. » During this period, from the relaunch of the EMU (December 1969) to the Maastricht Treaty (February 1992), French economic action was based on a strong political will defined to reinforce the relationships with the Federal German Republic, and then the reunified Germany. The Franco-German monetary relationships aimed to promote a strong and independent Europe and to restore an exchange rate stability. The “golden standard” stability myth was viewed and understood differently in France and Germany. If recent historical studies have been partially devoted to the consequences of European monetary policies (essentially in France) on economic and monetary integration in the EEC, they focused on the 1974-1981 or 1981-1986 periods. The creation of the EMU was a dynamic process running from December 1969 to February 1992. Franco-German monetary relationships included two levels of decision-making. First, on the political level, there was the presidency, the chancellery, the European Commission and the ministers. Second, its counterpart, economic power. The latter requires analysis of the role played by central banks in the definition and application of monetary policies. This dichotomy illustrates the progressive transition between the political level and the economic level during the 1980s. The decline of politics and the primacy of economics were analyzed differently in France and Germany. Political and economic objectives and expectations were contrasted and divergent. This study demonstrates that the EMU dynamic was an economic process where politics gave way to economics. Monetary relations were asymmetric. The real interlocutor of French political authorities was German economic power, represented by the Bundesbank. The Franco-German tandem was a political myth broken by world economy liberalization. For Germany, the EMU was a device to define a European Germany in a federal Europe. In France, it represented an illusory means to restore French primacy for conservative and liberal governments and a way of compensating a failing ideology for socialist governments. The EMU provided monetary stability, but the dream of a powerful and independent Europe vanished with the Maastricht treaty. Even as it rejected the idea of European political union defended by the German diplomacy, France paradoxically laid the foundations of a German Europe.

The study deals with the theory of optimal currency areas complemented with the EU's Maastricht criteria in order to investigate how today’s Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union can be divided into smaller unions with countries that are more homogeneous based on said criteria compared to the current larger currency union. To investigate this, we use cluster analysis as the method easily enables analysis of similarities and differences between countries. The results show that the optimal number of clusters for the nations in the EU in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2015 is ten and that the optimal number of clusters in 2019 is seven. We also observe a relatively distinct division between western and eastern countries, which splits the countries in two clusters. These two clusters are consistent over the studied years, however not considered the most optimal according to cluster analysis. Nonetheless, with respect to political, geographical, and cultural aspects, we conclude that having two different currencies within the European Union being the most realistic. / Studien behandlar teorin om optimala valutaområden, kompletterat med EU:s Maastrichtkriterier för att undersöka hur den nuvarande ekonomiska och monetära unionen i EU kan delas in i mindre unioner med länder som är mer homogena utifrån nämnda kriterier jämfört med dagens större valutaunion. För att undersöka detta använder vi oss av klusteranalys eftersom metoden på ett enkelt sätt möjliggör analys av likheter och skillnader mellan länder. Resultatet visar att optimalt antal kluster för länderna i EU under åren 2007, 2008, 2010 och 2015 är tio och att optimalt antal kluster under år 2019 är sju. Vi observerar också en relativt tydlig uppdelning mellan de västra och östra länderna, som delar länderna i EU i två större kluster. Dessa två kluster är enhetliga över de undersökta åren, men inte helt optimala enligt klusteranalysen. Trots detta, så bedömer vi att dela in den Europeiska unionen i två valutaunioner är den mest realistiska slutsatsen utifrån politiska, geografiska, och kulturella skillnader. / Die Studie behandelt die Theorie der optimalen Währungsräume, ergänzt durch die Maastricht-Kriterien der EU, um zu untersuchen, wie die heutige europäische Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion in kleinere Unionen aufgeteilt werden kann. Diese Unionen sollten auf der Grundlage dieser Kriterien homogener als die heutige größere Währungsunion sein. Um dies zu untersuchen, verwenden wir Clusteranalyse, da diese Methode die Analyse von Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschieden zwischen den Ländern leicht ermöglicht. Die Studie zeigt, dass die optimale Anzahl von Clustern für die EU-Länder in den Jahren 2007, 2008, 2010 und 2015 bei einer Größe von zehn liegt und dass die optimale Anzahl von Clustern im Jahr 2019 bei sieben liegt. Wir finden auch eine ziemlich deutliche Aufteilung zwischen westlichen und östlichen Ländern. Diese zwei Clustern sind über den studierten Jahren durchgängig, aber laut der Klusteranalyse nicht völlig optimal. Dennoch finden wir, die Europäische Union in zwei Währungsunionen verteilen, die am meisten realistische Schlussfolge laut politische, geographische, und kulturellen Aspekten ist.

The goal of my thesis on Supervision over the banking industry in the EU member states is to describe critically and to define newly engendering concept of the banking union. It is a very actual topic because the effective mechanism creation, which should solve problems of the European banking sector, is currently one of the primary goals of the European Union. The study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is the theoretical one. The definition and differentiation of the essential terms such as supervision and surveillance can be found there. Further the basic theoretical modules can be found there, from which it is possible to stem during the banking supervision implementation in practice. The second and the third chapters are the analytical parts. The introduction of the second chapter glances at the backgrounds of the legislative proposals acceptance in this area. Afterwards the chapter is already focused on four pillars of the proposed Banking union. The first pillar is formed with so called "single rule book", thus the uniform regulatory rules that are the implementation of the requirements expressed in so called Basel III. In this part of the study there is outlined why it is not quite happy at present to burden the credit institutions in the European Union even more through...

The aim of this work is to analyze the success of European monetary integration and it's contribution to countries, who's economics are, no matter if for the long lasting difficulties or recent transformation, likely to be called hazardous. In the first part, the work concerns itself with the very conception of the idea of European monetary integration and it's development, over the final form of the project, it's accomplishment up till current problem and challenges. The second part is an analysis of chosen countries who belong in the category named above. With this countries I will try to analyze the effect that joining the monetary union had on their economy. In the end I'll summarize the acquired knowledge to evaluate the effect of the common currency on the chosen group of countries.

disertační práce Petr Semecký Česká národní banka, právní postavení a náplň činnosti 5 Abstract A. Objectives The main goal of the dissertation "The Czech National Bank, legal status and content of activity" is to quantify, qualify and draw as exact as possible conclusions about some aspects of the development, status and activities of the Czech National Bank in the future. To solve this task, the author has used in the introduction of this work three following key questions: 1. What are the implications for the Czech National Bank of the new bodies supervising the financial markets at european level? 2. What are the benefits and negatives of adopting the euro for the Czech Republic and should the Czech Republic actually join the European Monetary Union? 3. What impact will have the amendment of the Capital Adequacy Directive (the "Basel II") on the activities of the Czech National Bank? B. Methods By creating this work was used a wide range of research methods to ensure that there will be drawn conclusions with the best possible informative value. It is possible to mention particularly the method of recherche, abstraction, comparison and synthesis. C. Sources As the most important sources used by creating the work can be mentioned ecpecially, scientific publications, monographs, articles published...

The main aim of this thesis is to discover a suitable instant of time for the Czech Republic to join European Monetary Union. I am analyzing dependence between monetary policies of the Czech National Bank (CNB) and the European Central Bank (ECB) themselves as well as in relation to essential Czech macroeconomic indicators. My observation is focused on interest rate policies represented by operative interest rates, on monetary policies represented by indices of nominal effective exchange rates and on convergence monitoring. The analytical instruments I used in the thesis are correlation analyses, linear trends, the Granger causality test and the Impulse-Reaction test. Besides, my thesis examines fulfillment of the Convergence (Maastricht) criteria in the Czech Republic and other central European countries. This thesis also examines impact of the European monetary policy on some Eurozone member countries.

Les rapports entre le Trésor français et les banques centrales africaines de la zone franc sont fondés sur la garantie de convertibilité externe que la France accorde aux francs CFA. De la sorte, le Trésor français convertit de manière illimitée les francs CFA en euro et en d’autres monnaies. Par ailleurs, la BCEAO et la BEAC sont protégées contre le risque d’épuisement des réserves de change car, elles peuvent puiser théoriquement de façon illimitée en cas de rupture de changes sur les réserves françaises. La mise en oeuvre de cette solidarité repose sur un mécanisme particulier appelé : comptes d’opérations. Hérité de la période coloniale, ce principe oblige les instituts d’émission africains en vertu des accords de coopération monétaire signés avec la France au lendemain des indépendances et rénovés en 1972 et 1973, à déposer 65 % de leurs réserves de change sur ces comptes. Cette quotité a été ramenée depuis la réforme de 2005 à 50%. Le Trésor français verse des intérêts à ces comptes lorsqu’ils sont créditeurs alors qu’il prélève des intérêts en cas de débit. Cette coopération vise deux objectifs principaux : la solidarité monétaire et le développement économique par le biais d’une solidarité monétaire sécurisée. Cette coopération a donné naissance à des institutions qui oeuvrent en vue d’atteindre ces objectifs. Lors de l’adoption de l’euro à l’échelle européenne en 1999, la France a pu obtenir de ses partenaires européens la reconnaissance de la nature budgétaire des accords qui la lient à ses anciennes possessions d’Afrique pour continuer à garantir les francs CFA. Cette coopération comporte cependant beaucoup d’inconvénients qui incitent au dépassement du cadre actuel. / The monetary agreements of France and the CFA franc zone are based on the permanent free convertibility of the CFA. In this case, the French Treasury supports the free convertibility of the CFA franc into Euros and other currencies with a fixed change rate. The BCEAO and the BEAC accordingly cannot suffer from the lack of changes risk for, they are both guaranteed by France. Such a parity and interdependence principles inherited from the colonial period was renewed in the 1960's up to 2005 reforms. The main goals of this cooperation are the economical development and monetary solidarity safety. Some institutions have been created in order to achieve those goals. In anticipation of the coming of the Euro in 1999, the competent French authorities convinced the European Union to maintain the monetary agreements France has with the African countries using the CFA currency. Nevertheless, such agreements compound some shortcomings which require new ideas.

This thesis examines the measurement, applications and properties of consumer inflation expectations in the context of eight European Union countries: France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. The data proceed mainly from the European Commission's Consumer Survey and are qualitative in nature, therefore requiring quantification prior to use. This study first seeks to determine the optimal quantification methodology among a set of approaches spanning three traditions, associated with Carlson-Parkin (1975), Pesaran (1984) and Seitz (1988). The success of a quantification methodology is assessed on the basis of its ability to match quantitative expectations data and on its behaviour in an important economic application, namely the modelling of wages for our sample countries. The wage equation developed here draws on the theoretical background of the staggered contracts and the wage bargaining literature, and controls carefully for inflation expectations and institutional variables. The Carlson-Parkin variation proposed in Curto Millet (2004) was found to be the most satisfactory. This being established, the wage equations are used to test the hypothesis that the advent of EMU generated an increase in labour market flexibility, which would be reflected in structural breaks. The hypothesis is essentially rejected. Finally, the properties of inflation expectations and perceptions themselves are examined, especially in the context of EMU. Both the rational expectations and rational perceptions hypotheses are rejected. Popular expectations mechanisms, such as the "rule-of-thumb" model or Akerlof et al.'s (2000) "near-rationality hypothesis" are similarly unsupported. On the other hand, evidence is found for the transmission of expert forecasts to consumer expectations in the case of the UK, as in Carroll's (2003) model. The distribution of consumer expectations and perceptions is also considered, showing a tendency for gradual (as in Mankiw and Reis, 2002) but non-rational adjustment. Expectations formation is further shown to have important qualitative features.